This study exploits the phased implementation of China’s registration-based IPO reform as a natural experiment to investigate the impact of regulatory enforcement on the conflicts of interest faced by underwriter-affiliated analysts. We find that the transition from an approval-based system to a registration-based system significantly mitigates the incentives for affiliated analysts to issue optimistically biased recommendations. This result remains robust across a battery of sensitivity analyses. Mechanism tests indicate that the reform operates by enhancing the objectivity and relevance of issuer disclosures, thereby increasing the detectability of biased recommendation. Cross-sectional tests show that this disciplining effect is more pronounced when analysts face greater pressure from buy-side clients and high investor sentiment. Furthermore, we document stronger market reactions to affiliated analysts’ recommendations post-reform, suggesting a restoration of investor trust. These findings offer novel insights into the role of public enforcement and disclosure quality in disciplining financial intermediaries within emerging capital markets.
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