Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics最新文献

This study examines the effect of institutional investors’ site visits on corporate employment decision-making. Using a unique dataset of corporate site visits (CSVs) to the listed firms in China, we find that CSVs are associated with less labor investment inefficiency. The effect is more pronounced in firms with lower information quality, worse corporate governance, and severe financial constraints. Our results are robust to endogeneity concerns. Further analysis suggests that labor investment inefficiency leads to lower future performance. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that CSVs improve information quality, corporate governance, and access to finance, which in turn, mitigates inefficient labor investment.

We examine the effectiveness of institutional investors in constraining aggressive earnings management induced by strong contractual incentives. To this end we focus on the consequences of earnings-related promises (covenants) negotiated between corporate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders during China’s split-share structure reform, wherein failure to achieve profit benchmarks had the potential to transfer significant wealth from controlling to minority shareholders. Our initial analysis provides evidence that profit-promised firm-years are, on average, associated with income-increasing earnings management, and that this association is stronger for: (i) firm-years in which the profit-promise was satisfied, and (ii) firm-years in which proxies for the level of unmanaged earnings suggest that earnings management was needed to satisfy the promise. However, such benchmark-beating behavior is weaker for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership. Further analysis documents that the exit threat of institutional shareholders can discipline earnings management associated with profit promises. We also show that the effect of institutional shareholders in reducing earnings management associated with profit promises is greater for domestic mutual funds and for privately controlled firms. Interestingly, our evidence suggests that institutional investors only play an effective monitoring role over earnings management when their incentives are strongly aligned with those of other minority owners. In other cases, our evidence suggests that these investors may exacerbate the level of earnings management.

The U.S. banking industry has seen waves of mergers since the 1980s. Despite a significant body of research on the determinants of these waves, there are few studies of how CEOs influence banks’ mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This paper studies the effect of CEO aggressiveness on bank M&As. We construct a new measure of bank CEO aggressiveness based on CEOs’ ancestral countries of origin and data on inter-country wars. We find that aggressive CEOs are more likely to acquire other banks. Moreover, the impact of CEO aggressiveness on bank M&A decisions is more pronounced when the CEOs are from larger and more profitable banks, when CEOs have a longer tenure, and when CEOs’ ancestral country of origin has a more masculine culture. Moreover, we show that aggressive CEOs are more likely to make acquisitions when CEOs possess more cultural maintenance, which captures the extent to which CEOs retain their original cultural values and beliefs. Finally, we document positive short-term stock market reactions to bank M&As initiated by aggressive CEOs.

We examine how regulatory nudges mandating only disclosure of ownership information and no structural change impact a firm’s access to capital based on its organizational form. As a first of its kind, Clause 35 in India (characterized by weak enforcement and concentrated ownership) only required classifying shareholders into insiders and outsiders. Pre-regulation, group-affiliated firms exhibited lesser financial constraints than standalone firms. This reverses post-regulation, especially for group firms with higher insider ownership. More so for those with weaker compensating mechanisms or poorer future performance. In essence, regulation exclusively requiring information disclosure has been effective in reallocating capital more efficiently to firms with fewer agency problems.

We find that the accrual anomaly is concentrated in healthy firms and is absent in financially distressed firms. The differential persistence between accruals and cash flows is the main driver of the relationship. Prior studies propose two explanations for the accrual anomaly: (1) accounting distortions of accruals and (2) investment mispricing. Our empirical evidence supports the former and challenges the latter. Our findings also disagree with the idea that the accrual anomaly is distress risk premium in disguise.

This study investigates the effect of the elimination of Form 20-F reconciliation items on the risk relevance of accounting information. Using a sample of U.S. companies and American depositary receipts adopting domestic standards that are generally in accordance or fully compliant with IFRS, this paper finds that IFRS better reflect macroeconomic fluctuations after Form 20-F reconciliation elimination. This paper also finds that Form 20-F reconciliation elimination has no negative effect on the usefulness of accounting data under IFRS in the formulation of superior risk forecasts. Further, this paper finds that the elimination of Form 20-F reconciliation items is associated with lower idiosyncratic risk. Overall, the findings indicate some benefits from Form 20-F reconciliation elimination.

An auditor common to a supplier and customer may serve an information role, reduce information asymmetry, or mitigate a potential hold-up problem in the supply chain. The information role of shared auditors could be more important in a lax institutional environment where a lack of trust exists between the supplier and customer. Using a sample of listed firms in China from 2009 to 2015, we find that (1) a shared auditor enhances the supplier’s relationship-specific investment (RSI), and (2) this positive association is stronger when the customer is located in a region with lower trust. We also document an incremental effect of a shared audit partner on enhancing the supplier’s RSI in addition to the effect of a shared auditor at the audit firm level. Additional analyses suggest that a shared auditor alleviates information asymmetry between the supplier and customer and hence improves the supplier’s RSI. A shared auditor particularly improves the supplier’s RSI when the customer is limited in its legal protection, which validates the usefulness of this unique research setting (China) for studying the information role of shared auditors. By extending the research on shared auditors and social trust, this paper provides a reference for companies that wish to explore the role of auditors in enhancing RSI in the supply chain.

This paper examines whether the presence of risk management committees is associated with the readability of risk management disclosure. Specifically, we consider the presence and the effectiveness of risk management committees. We measure the readability of risk management disclosure using six different readability indices, namely: Bog index; Flesch Reading Ease score; Coleman–Liau index; Flesch–Kincaid Grade level; Simple Measure of Gobbledygook; and Automated Reading index. We find that the presence and the effectiveness of risk management committees are associated with the higher readability of risk management disclosure. We adopt various methods, including an instrumental variable approach, the entropy balancing method and the dynamic generalised method of moments, to address endogeneity concerns. Taken together, our results highlight the important role of the risk management committee in communicating risk management information.