Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2099713
G. Bosse
ABSTRACT Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has taken dozens of decisions, on which agreement had hitherto been unthinkable due to differences between member states. A norms-based approach is used to better understand the EU’s unexpected agreement on two key measures: the sanctions packages against Russia and the decision to allow Ukrainian nationals the right to live and work in the EU. Congruence among member states over the responsibility to protect Ukrainian civilians from atrocity crimes and war crimes played an important role, including the obligations to react (sanctions) and to prevent (refugee protection). EU actions arising from moral obligations based on rights-based norms have been linked closely to values-based norms pertaining to EU solidarity, identity, and ethical obligations vis-à-vis fellow Europeans. These preliminary findings matter as they suggest an inextricable linkage between rights-based norms and values-based norms to trigger effects on EU foreign policy.
{"title":"Values, rights, and changing interests: The EU’s response to the war against Ukraine and the responsibility to protect Europeans","authors":"G. Bosse","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2099713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2099713","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has taken dozens of decisions, on which agreement had hitherto been unthinkable due to differences between member states. A norms-based approach is used to better understand the EU’s unexpected agreement on two key measures: the sanctions packages against Russia and the decision to allow Ukrainian nationals the right to live and work in the EU. Congruence among member states over the responsibility to protect Ukrainian civilians from atrocity crimes and war crimes played an important role, including the obligations to react (sanctions) and to prevent (refugee protection). EU actions arising from moral obligations based on rights-based norms have been linked closely to values-based norms pertaining to EU solidarity, identity, and ethical obligations vis-à-vis fellow Europeans. These preliminary findings matter as they suggest an inextricable linkage between rights-based norms and values-based norms to trigger effects on EU foreign policy.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41871496","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-03DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2093587
N. Kostyuk, Aaron F. Brantly
ABSTRACT Prior to the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, experts predicted an extensive cyber conflict. However, to date the scale of known cyberattacks has been quite modest. Pundits suggest that Ukraine’s improved cyber defenses, which it developed through its close cooperation with Western partners, is one of the possible explanations for Russia’s limited cyber front. This article interrogates this claim, outlining two plausible reasons for the limited effectiveness of Ukraine’s cyber defenses in the Kremlin’s limited cyber front. First, despite an extensive outpouring of cyber knowledge and expertise from the West, Ukraine’s cyber capabilities are still organizationally and operationally underdeveloped. Second, limited fungibility of cyber capabilities complicates interoperability between any joint operations and diminishes the West’s willingness to share their time-limited cyber tools with Ukraine. By explaining the challenges of interstate cooperation in the cyber domain, this article contributes to the literature on the role of alliances in modern warfare.
{"title":"War in the borderland through cyberspace: Limits of defending Ukraine through interstate cooperation","authors":"N. Kostyuk, Aaron F. Brantly","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2093587","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2093587","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Prior to the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, experts predicted an extensive cyber conflict. However, to date the scale of known cyberattacks has been quite modest. Pundits suggest that Ukraine’s improved cyber defenses, which it developed through its close cooperation with Western partners, is one of the possible explanations for Russia’s limited cyber front. This article interrogates this claim, outlining two plausible reasons for the limited effectiveness of Ukraine’s cyber defenses in the Kremlin’s limited cyber front. First, despite an extensive outpouring of cyber knowledge and expertise from the West, Ukraine’s cyber capabilities are still organizationally and operationally underdeveloped. Second, limited fungibility of cyber capabilities complicates interoperability between any joint operations and diminishes the West’s willingness to share their time-limited cyber tools with Ukraine. By explaining the challenges of interstate cooperation in the cyber domain, this article contributes to the literature on the role of alliances in modern warfare.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43135733","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-30DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2092679
C. Panico
ABSTRACT This article interrogates the disarmament principle under Article VI of the NPT, drawing attention to how the disarmament discourse shapes and reproduces the nuclear status quo. Building on the work of Kimberly Hutchings and Maja Zehfuss, I argue that the disarmament discourse renders nuclear possession more acceptable. It enables nuclear states to present themselves as less violent and more responsible actors glossing over the nature of possessing nuclear weapons. Using a feminist poststructuralist lens and examining empirical illustrations, the article explains how declarations of strict observance of the disarmament principle reaffirm traits and values that underpin social expectations of what is considered ethical and appropriate in nuclear politics. Moreover, it shows how the rhetorical commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons reinstitutes and preserves existing understandings around nuclear responsibility that define the bounds of acceptable nuclear possession, perpetuating the dominant status quo.
{"title":"Making nuclear possession possible: The NPT disarmament principle and the production of less violent and more responsible nuclear states","authors":"C. Panico","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2092679","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2092679","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article interrogates the disarmament principle under Article VI of the NPT, drawing attention to how the disarmament discourse shapes and reproduces the nuclear status quo. Building on the work of Kimberly Hutchings and Maja Zehfuss, I argue that the disarmament discourse renders nuclear possession more acceptable. It enables nuclear states to present themselves as less violent and more responsible actors glossing over the nature of possessing nuclear weapons. Using a feminist poststructuralist lens and examining empirical illustrations, the article explains how declarations of strict observance of the disarmament principle reaffirm traits and values that underpin social expectations of what is considered ethical and appropriate in nuclear politics. Moreover, it shows how the rhetorical commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons reinstitutes and preserves existing understandings around nuclear responsibility that define the bounds of acceptable nuclear possession, perpetuating the dominant status quo.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43072066","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-26DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2092820
Tobias Bunde
ABSTRACT In Germany, the Russian war on Ukraine is widely perceived as a “Zeitenwende,” a watershed moment undermining key foreign policy beliefs. Despite mounting evidence contradicting them, German elites previously failed to adapt core beliefs regarding Russia and the use of force because these beliefs were not only deeply embedded in largely uncontested identity constructions but also shaped the definition of economic interests, which in turn made ideational adaptation more costly. Moreover, Germany’s extraordinarily beneficial geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era meant that the country could afford not to learn. Although the “Zeitenwende” will trigger significant change, it is unclear which lessons exactly Germans will now be learning and how far that adaptation will go. Given Germany’s key position in Europe and its previous role in shaping the European and transatlantic policy toward Russia, the results of these learning processes will significantly shape the emerging European security order.
{"title":"Lessons (to be) learned? Germany’s Zeitenwende and European security after the Russian invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Tobias Bunde","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2092820","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2092820","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In Germany, the Russian war on Ukraine is widely perceived as a “Zeitenwende,” a watershed moment undermining key foreign policy beliefs. Despite mounting evidence contradicting them, German elites previously failed to adapt core beliefs regarding Russia and the use of force because these beliefs were not only deeply embedded in largely uncontested identity constructions but also shaped the definition of economic interests, which in turn made ideational adaptation more costly. Moreover, Germany’s extraordinarily beneficial geopolitical situation in the post-Cold War era meant that the country could afford not to learn. Although the “Zeitenwende” will trigger significant change, it is unclear which lessons exactly Germans will now be learning and how far that adaptation will go. Given Germany’s key position in Europe and its previous role in shaping the European and transatlantic policy toward Russia, the results of these learning processes will significantly shape the emerging European security order.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44052430","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-24DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580
Harry Verhoeven, Michael Woldemariam
ABSTRACT In November 2020, Ethiopia descended into full-scale civil war which, owing to mass atrocities and regional intervention, metastasized into among the most acute humanitarian emergencies in the world. The violent fragmentation of state authority tarnished Ethiopia’s internationally sanctioned role as regional peacekeeper and developmental leader—an “anchor state” of the Pax Americana in the Horn of Africa. While acknowledging the complex, multi-dimensional origins of the conflict, this article examines how efforts by the U.S. government to reinvent the strategic relationship during the 2018–2020 political transition in Addis Ababa helped pave the road to war. We argue that U.S. policymakers provided largely unconditional support to Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, creating problems of moral hazard that encouraged confrontation between rival political forces. The story of U.S. engagement in Ethiopia in this period illustrates the perils of Washington’s efforts to rebalance fraught relations with its most important regional anchors.
{"title":"Who lost Ethiopia? The unmaking of an African anchor state and U.S. foreign policy","authors":"Harry Verhoeven, Michael Woldemariam","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091580","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In November 2020, Ethiopia descended into full-scale civil war which, owing to mass atrocities and regional intervention, metastasized into among the most acute humanitarian emergencies in the world. The violent fragmentation of state authority tarnished Ethiopia’s internationally sanctioned role as regional peacekeeper and developmental leader—an “anchor state” of the Pax Americana in the Horn of Africa. While acknowledging the complex, multi-dimensional origins of the conflict, this article examines how efforts by the U.S. government to reinvent the strategic relationship during the 2018–2020 political transition in Addis Ababa helped pave the road to war. We argue that U.S. policymakers provided largely unconditional support to Ethiopia’s new Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, creating problems of moral hazard that encouraged confrontation between rival political forces. The story of U.S. engagement in Ethiopia in this period illustrates the perils of Washington’s efforts to rebalance fraught relations with its most important regional anchors.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44820833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-24DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2091591
Trine Flockhart, E. Korosteleva
ABSTRACT The global rules-based order has been in transformation for more than a decade, whilst the liberal international order has been in crisis and new international orders are emerging. Within this context, the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks what the Germans have called a Zeitenwende because the multi-order world is now a reality. The article outlines the main characteristics and implications of a multi-order world and outlines four categories of orders that will populate the multi-order world. The article details Putin’s vision for a Eurasian order and how his plans are received within the Eurasian order. The article offers a perspective on how the global dynamics of the new multi-order world might play out, showing that it is likely to be conflictual rather than a cooperative, and that members of the Eurasian order show little enthusiasm for Putin’s vision, resulting in an order held together by force rather than consent.
{"title":"War in Ukraine: Putin and the multi-order world","authors":"Trine Flockhart, E. Korosteleva","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2091591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2091591","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 The global rules-based order has been in transformation for more than a decade, whilst the liberal international order has been in crisis and new international orders are emerging. Within this context, the Russian invasion of Ukraine marks what the Germans have called a Zeitenwende because the multi-order world is now a reality. The article outlines the main characteristics and implications of a multi-order world and outlines four categories of orders that will populate the multi-order world. The article details Putin’s vision for a Eurasian order and how his plans are received within the Eurasian order. The article offers a perspective on how the global dynamics of the new multi-order world might play out, showing that it is likely to be conflictual rather than a cooperative, and that members of the Eurasian order show little enthusiasm for Putin’s vision, resulting in an order held together by force rather than consent.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46845639","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-22DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2090070
Jaganath Sankaran
Abstract Russia has recently tested several anti-satellite weapons. The Russian military literature reveals hedging and offsetting strategies behind these actions. First, Russians cast their weapons as a mirror response to American experiments. Russians fear a technological surprise and suggest that their experimentation hedges against significant advantages that may accrue to the United States from dominating space. Second, Russians perceive satellites providing vital targeting and navigation information as crucial enablers of U.S. and NATO aerospace precision strike weapons. Therefore, dependence on space-based assets is a vulnerability that Russia cannot fail to take advantage of in a crisis to offset U.S. and NATO military superiority. Some unilateral measures such as deploying cheaper and distributed small satellite constellations can reduce U.S. and allied vulnerabilities. Bilateral behavioral norms can offer reassurances to both the United States and Russia. However, deeper regulation and limits on emerging strategic aerospace weaponry may also be required.
{"title":"Russia's anti-satellite weapons: A hedging and offsetting strategy to deter Western aerospace forces","authors":"Jaganath Sankaran","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2090070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2090070","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Russia has recently tested several anti-satellite weapons. The Russian military literature reveals hedging and offsetting strategies behind these actions. First, Russians cast their weapons as a mirror response to American experiments. Russians fear a technological surprise and suggest that their experimentation hedges against significant advantages that may accrue to the United States from dominating space. Second, Russians perceive satellites providing vital targeting and navigation information as crucial enablers of U.S. and NATO aerospace precision strike weapons. Therefore, dependence on space-based assets is a vulnerability that Russia cannot fail to take advantage of in a crisis to offset U.S. and NATO military superiority. Some unilateral measures such as deploying cheaper and distributed small satellite constellations can reduce U.S. and allied vulnerabilities. Bilateral behavioral norms can offer reassurances to both the United States and Russia. However, deeper regulation and limits on emerging strategic aerospace weaponry may also be required.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59721061","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-01DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633
Elias Götz, J. Staun
ABSTRACT This article explores Russia’s attack on Ukraine using the lens of strategic culture. Specifically, two strands in Russian strategic culture are identified. The first is a deep-seated sense of vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis “the West.” To counter this perceived threat, Russia’s national security establishment has long emphasized the importance of possessing strategic depth and buffer zones. The second strand revolves around a feeling of entitlement to great power status. A central component in Russia’s great power vision is the right to have a sphere of influence in its Eurasian neighborhood. The article shows that Kremlin officials perceived Ukraine’s drift toward the West as a major threat to both Russia’s security interests and its status aspirations. As a result, Russia’s rhetorical milieu regarding Ukraine became increasingly radicalized. The article concludes that this provided the discursive and intellectual habitat that enabled Putin to launch a large-scale attack.
{"title":"Why Russia attacked Ukraine: Strategic culture and radicalized narratives","authors":"Elias Götz, J. Staun","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2082633","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article explores Russia’s attack on Ukraine using the lens of strategic culture. Specifically, two strands in Russian strategic culture are identified. The first is a deep-seated sense of vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis “the West.” To counter this perceived threat, Russia’s national security establishment has long emphasized the importance of possessing strategic depth and buffer zones. The second strand revolves around a feeling of entitlement to great power status. A central component in Russia’s great power vision is the right to have a sphere of influence in its Eurasian neighborhood. The article shows that Kremlin officials perceived Ukraine’s drift toward the West as a major threat to both Russia’s security interests and its status aspirations. As a result, Russia’s rhetorical milieu regarding Ukraine became increasingly radicalized. The article concludes that this provided the discursive and intellectual habitat that enabled Putin to launch a large-scale attack.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44149232","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-19DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2075665
A. Nadibaidze
ABSTRACT This article proposes an identity-based analysis of the Russian position in the global debate on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Based on an interpretation of Russian written and verbal statements submitted to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) meetings from 2014 to 2022, I find that two key integral elements of Russian great power identity—the promotion of multipolarity and the recognition of Russia’s equal participation in global affairs—guide its evolving position on the potential regulation of AWS. The analysis makes an empirical contribution by examining one of the most active participants in the CCW discussion, an opponent to any new regulations of so-called “killer robots,” and a developer of autonomy in weapons systems. It highlights the value of a more thorough understanding of the ideas guiding the Russian position, assisting actors who seek a ban on AWS in crafting their responses and strategies in the debate.
{"title":"Great power identity in Russia’s position on autonomous weapons systems","authors":"A. Nadibaidze","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2075665","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2075665","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 This article proposes an identity-based analysis of the Russian position in the global debate on autonomous weapons systems (AWS). Based on an interpretation of Russian written and verbal statements submitted to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) meetings from 2014 to 2022, I find that two key integral elements of Russian great power identity—the promotion of multipolarity and the recognition of Russia’s equal participation in global affairs—guide its evolving position on the potential regulation of AWS. The analysis makes an empirical contribution by examining one of the most active participants in the CCW discussion, an opponent to any new regulations of so-called “killer robots,” and a developer of autonomy in weapons systems. It highlights the value of a more thorough understanding of the ideas guiding the Russian position, assisting actors who seek a ban on AWS in crafting their responses and strategies in the debate.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42018764","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-18DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2074116
G. Heimann, Deganit Paikowsky
ABSTRACT Established powers enjoy privileges in world politics coveted by emerging powers. These privileges vary in their level of institutionalization: full formal privileges, partial formal privileges, and informal privileges. We identify two alternative strategic routes through which emerging powers target these three types of privileges: a top-down and a bottom-up route. We analyze two factors that impact the choice between these two routes: restrictiveness of eligibility criteria for winning privileges, and the expected levels of opposition by both established powers and outsiders. We examine the impact of these factors on two cases in which India negotiated privileges: India’s top-down campaign to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and India’s bottom-up campaign to enter the nuclear club as a de facto nuclear weapon state. Highly restrictive eligibility criteria along with high levels of opposition drove India to gradually seek nuclear privileges through a bottom-up route.
{"title":"Winning a seat at the table: Strategic routes by emerging powers to gain privileges in exclusive formal clubs","authors":"G. Heimann, Deganit Paikowsky","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2074116","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2074116","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Established powers enjoy privileges in world politics coveted by emerging powers. These privileges vary in their level of institutionalization: full formal privileges, partial formal privileges, and informal privileges. We identify two alternative strategic routes through which emerging powers target these three types of privileges: a top-down and a bottom-up route. We analyze two factors that impact the choice between these two routes: restrictiveness of eligibility criteria for winning privileges, and the expected levels of opposition by both established powers and outsiders. We examine the impact of these factors on two cases in which India negotiated privileges: India’s top-down campaign to win a permanent seat on the UN Security Council; and India’s bottom-up campaign to enter the nuclear club as a de facto nuclear weapon state. Highly restrictive eligibility criteria along with high levels of opposition drove India to gradually seek nuclear privileges through a bottom-up route.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45244899","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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