Pub Date : 2023-03-16DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970
Samuel Žilinčík, T. Sweijs
ABSTRACT Contrary to detailed work on deterrence by punishment, Western strategic thought about denial and its effects is conceptually muddled at the expense of effective strategy-making. This article seeks to reconceptualize denial and rethink its emotional effects. It defines denial as a strategy aimed at frustrating the adversary’s military power and proposes four different denial logics: capability elimination, operational paralysis, tactical degradation, and strategic effect reduction. It then turns to the effects through which these denial logics generate favorable consequences, and singles out the emotions of despondency, resignation, fear, and disappointment as the key factors that mediate their impact. The article offers a framework that can help guide further theoretical reflection and empirical research, as well as inform the development of policies and strategies in today’s world.
{"title":"Beyond deterrence: Reconceptualizing denial strategies and rethinking their emotional effects","authors":"Samuel Žilinčík, T. Sweijs","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Contrary to detailed work on deterrence by punishment, Western strategic thought about denial and its effects is conceptually muddled at the expense of effective strategy-making. This article seeks to reconceptualize denial and rethink its emotional effects. It defines denial as a strategy aimed at frustrating the adversary’s military power and proposes four different denial logics: capability elimination, operational paralysis, tactical degradation, and strategic effect reduction. It then turns to the effects through which these denial logics generate favorable consequences, and singles out the emotions of despondency, resignation, fear, and disappointment as the key factors that mediate their impact. The article offers a framework that can help guide further theoretical reflection and empirical research, as well as inform the development of policies and strategies in today’s world.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"248 - 275"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45379434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-10DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2180882
Christopher Whyte
ABSTRACT The use of AI to automate defense and intelligence tasks is increasing. And yet, little is known about how algorithmic analyses, data capture, and decisions will be perceived by elite decision-makers. This article presents the results of two experiments that explore manifestations of AI systems in the cyber conflict decision-making loop. Though findings suggest that technical expertise positively impacts respondents’ ability to gauge the potential utility and credibility of an input (indicating that training can, in fact, overcome bias), the perception of human agency in the loop even in the presence of AI inputs mitigates this effect and makes decision-makers more willing to operate on less information. This finding is worrying given the extensive challenges involved in effectively building human oversight and opportunity for intervention into any effective employment of AI for national security purposes. The article considers these obstacles and potential solutions in the context of data gathered.
{"title":"Learning to trust Skynet: Interfacing with artificial intelligence in cyberspace","authors":"Christopher Whyte","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2180882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2180882","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The use of AI to automate defense and intelligence tasks is increasing. And yet, little is known about how algorithmic analyses, data capture, and decisions will be perceived by elite decision-makers. This article presents the results of two experiments that explore manifestations of AI systems in the cyber conflict decision-making loop. Though findings suggest that technical expertise positively impacts respondents’ ability to gauge the potential utility and credibility of an input (indicating that training can, in fact, overcome bias), the perception of human agency in the loop even in the presence of AI inputs mitigates this effect and makes decision-makers more willing to operate on less information. This finding is worrying given the extensive challenges involved in effectively building human oversight and opportunity for intervention into any effective employment of AI for national security purposes. The article considers these obstacles and potential solutions in the context of data gathered.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"308 - 344"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43101262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-10DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702
Nien-chung Chang-Liao
ABSTRACT Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bring China and Russia closer together or drive them farther apart, or will it be business as usual? This article addresses this question by conceptualizing the main characteristics of the China–Russia strategic partnership. It argues that a strategic partnership, characterized as it is by informality, equality, and inclusivity, is essentially different from an alliance or alignment. These characteristics allow Beijing to distance itself from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This makes it unlikely that China will attempt any simultaneous aggression in East Asia or that it will be able to mediate in the conflict. This effectively rules out the rise of a China–Russia axis. As China strives to balance its close ties with Russia and its economic engagement with the West, Beijing is more likely to maintain, rather than strengthen or weaken, its strategic partnership with Moscow.
{"title":"The limits of strategic partnerships: Implications for China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war","authors":"Nien-chung Chang-Liao","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bring China and Russia closer together or drive them farther apart, or will it be business as usual? This article addresses this question by conceptualizing the main characteristics of the China–Russia strategic partnership. It argues that a strategic partnership, characterized as it is by informality, equality, and inclusivity, is essentially different from an alliance or alignment. These characteristics allow Beijing to distance itself from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This makes it unlikely that China will attempt any simultaneous aggression in East Asia or that it will be able to mediate in the conflict. This effectively rules out the rise of a China–Russia axis. As China strives to balance its close ties with Russia and its economic engagement with the West, Beijing is more likely to maintain, rather than strengthen or weaken, its strategic partnership with Moscow.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"226 - 247"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48058130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-11DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2164974
Jonas J. Driedger
ABSTRACT Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 was seemingly driven by an unprecedented willingness to accept risks for the Russian regime, state, and society. Developing a generalizable framework, this article analyzes the development of Russian risk acceptance in offensive war initiation. Drawing on policy documents, speeches, expert literature, and various interviews with Russian, Ukrainian, and Western policymakers, the article finds that risk acceptance has continuously risen since the mid-2000s, although the 2022 invasion still evinces some risk aversion. These results are robust when accounting for miscalculation and caution against attributing the 2022 invasion solely to short-term and leader-centric factors. They also provide cues for understanding the crisis behavior of Russia and other major powers, corroborate prospect theory models on cognitive biases in elite decision-making, and indicate the need to revise the theoretical assumption that risk acceptance is an empirically rare and drastic aberration from a risk-neutral or risk-averse normality.
{"title":"Risk acceptance and offensive war: The case of Russia under the Putin regime","authors":"Jonas J. Driedger","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2164974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2164974","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 was seemingly driven by an unprecedented willingness to accept risks for the Russian regime, state, and society. Developing a generalizable framework, this article analyzes the development of Russian risk acceptance in offensive war initiation. Drawing on policy documents, speeches, expert literature, and various interviews with Russian, Ukrainian, and Western policymakers, the article finds that risk acceptance has continuously risen since the mid-2000s, although the 2022 invasion still evinces some risk aversion. These results are robust when accounting for miscalculation and caution against attributing the 2022 invasion solely to short-term and leader-centric factors. They also provide cues for understanding the crisis behavior of Russia and other major powers, corroborate prospect theory models on cognitive biases in elite decision-making, and indicate the need to revise the theoretical assumption that risk acceptance is an empirically rare and drastic aberration from a risk-neutral or risk-averse normality.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"199 - 225"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46643557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-09DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2164122
Ofek Riemer, Daniel Sobelman
ABSTRACT Can intelligence serve as a coercive instrument in international relations? While coercion literature mostly addresses military and economic means, this article argues that coercion can also include the deliberate public disclosure of intelligence. Intelligence can be employed to threaten adversaries, reduce their latitude, and force them to adjust their plans and operations. Additionally, intelligence disclosure can be used to mobilize domestic and international audiences and make others align with a certain narrative and alter their policies accordingly. Still, coercive disclosure can fail or succeed only partially against a determined opponent or a target that is resilient to public and international pressure. To demonstrate the workings of coercive disclosure, we analyze Israel's campaign, beginning in 2017, against the Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile manufacturing program and Turkey's coercive campaign vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the United States following Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in 2018.
{"title":"Coercive disclosure: The weaponization of public intelligence revelation in international relations","authors":"Ofek Riemer, Daniel Sobelman","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2164122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2164122","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Can intelligence serve as a coercive instrument in international relations? While coercion literature mostly addresses military and economic means, this article argues that coercion can also include the deliberate public disclosure of intelligence. Intelligence can be employed to threaten adversaries, reduce their latitude, and force them to adjust their plans and operations. Additionally, intelligence disclosure can be used to mobilize domestic and international audiences and make others align with a certain narrative and alter their policies accordingly. Still, coercive disclosure can fail or succeed only partially against a determined opponent or a target that is resilient to public and international pressure. To demonstrate the workings of coercive disclosure, we analyze Israel's campaign, beginning in 2017, against the Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile manufacturing program and Turkey's coercive campaign vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the United States following Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in 2018.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"276 - 307"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45356527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2143890
Benjamin Leruth
ABSTRACT This article focuses on the use of experimental differentiation, a form of small-scale pilot program that aims at testing whether further institutional integration can be bolstered in an area where cooperation has not been tested or proven. Experimental differentiation consists of three features. Firstly, participation should not be constrained by membership in the European Union. Secondly, experimental differentiation should consist of short-term projects. Thirdly, the functional scope of such experiments should be clearly limited to reduce the expected political costs of participation. Empirically, this article focuses on the EU Battlegroups and analyzes how the above-mentioned features drove political actors to support participation. While EU Battlegroups have been criticized for their lack of effective action and the political and financial costs they entail, this article offers a more positive feature, arguing that Battlegroups should be seen as experiments that lead reluctant political actors to consider their cooperation under the EU framework.
{"title":"Experimental differentiation as an innovative form of cooperation in the European Union: Evidence from the Nordic Battlegroup","authors":"Benjamin Leruth","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2143890","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2143890","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This article focuses on the use of experimental differentiation, a form of small-scale pilot program that aims at testing whether further institutional integration can be bolstered in an area where cooperation has not been tested or proven. Experimental differentiation consists of three features. Firstly, participation should not be constrained by membership in the European Union. Secondly, experimental differentiation should consist of short-term projects. Thirdly, the functional scope of such experiments should be clearly limited to reduce the expected political costs of participation. Empirically, this article focuses on the EU Battlegroups and analyzes how the above-mentioned features drove political actors to support participation. While EU Battlegroups have been criticized for their lack of effective action and the political and financial costs they entail, this article offers a more positive feature, arguing that Battlegroups should be seen as experiments that lead reluctant political actors to consider their cooperation under the EU framework.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"125 - 149"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42855782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2164914
H. Dijkstra
Contemporary Security Policy awards the Bernard Brodie Prize annually to the author(s) of an outstanding article published in the journal the previous year. The award is named after Dr. Bernard Brodie (1918–1978), author of The Absolute Weapon (1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (1958), and War and Strategy (1973). Brodie’s ideas remain at the center of security debates to this day. One of the first analysts to cross between official and academic environments, he pioneered the very model of civilian influence that Contemporary Security Policy represents. Contemporary Security Policy is honored to acknowledge the permission of Brodie’s son, Dr. Bruce R. Brodie, to use his father’s name. The winner of the 2023 Bernard Brodie Prize is:
{"title":"The 2023 Bernard Brodie Prize","authors":"H. Dijkstra","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2164914","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2164914","url":null,"abstract":"Contemporary Security Policy awards the Bernard Brodie Prize annually to the author(s) of an outstanding article published in the journal the previous year. The award is named after Dr. Bernard Brodie (1918–1978), author of The Absolute Weapon (1946), Strategy in the Missile Age (1958), and War and Strategy (1973). Brodie’s ideas remain at the center of security debates to this day. One of the first analysts to cross between official and academic environments, he pioneered the very model of civilian influence that Contemporary Security Policy represents. Contemporary Security Policy is honored to acknowledge the permission of Brodie’s son, Dr. Bruce R. Brodie, to use his father’s name. The winner of the 2023 Bernard Brodie Prize is:","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"2 - 3"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43658351","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2168854
Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, M. Sus
ABSTRACT While the standard conceptualization of differentiation in the European Union (EU) focuses on differentiated integration, scholars devote less attention to differentiated cooperation. This article argues, on the contrary, that member states’ engagement in differentiated efforts in EU foreign policy manifest themselves both in the form of differentiated integration and cooperation. It elaborates an original conceptual framework for exploring differentiated cooperation as a mode of governance. Drawing on the articles in this special issue, this introduction maps empirical manifestations of differentiated cooperation in various areas and dimensions of EU foreign policy. The results of the special issue show that differentiated cooperation has mostly manifested itself in informal patterns of cooperation, with the treaty-based mechanisms being limited. As such, the special issue reflects the differentiation and informalization processes occurring not only in the EU, but also in global governance more broadly.
{"title":"Differentiated cooperation as the mode of governance in EU foreign policy","authors":"Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré, M. Sus","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2168854","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2168854","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While the standard conceptualization of differentiation in the European Union (EU) focuses on differentiated integration, scholars devote less attention to differentiated cooperation. This article argues, on the contrary, that member states’ engagement in differentiated efforts in EU foreign policy manifest themselves both in the form of differentiated integration and cooperation. It elaborates an original conceptual framework for exploring differentiated cooperation as a mode of governance. Drawing on the articles in this special issue, this introduction maps empirical manifestations of differentiated cooperation in various areas and dimensions of EU foreign policy. The results of the special issue show that differentiated cooperation has mostly manifested itself in informal patterns of cooperation, with the treaty-based mechanisms being limited. As such, the special issue reflects the differentiation and informalization processes occurring not only in the EU, but also in global governance more broadly.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"4 - 34"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49494133","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-18DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2155360
Benjamin Martill, C. Gebhard
ABSTRACT Sustaining meaningful defense cooperation in Europe is made difficult by defense-industrial fragmentation, a multiplicity of institutional frameworks, divergent strategic cultures and domestic opposition to integration. The European Union’s recent foray into defense integration incorporates multiple forms of differentiation to overcome these barriers, with Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) characterized by selective membership, external participation, and project-based clustering. Such “combined differentiation” offers an instructive example of how EU practices and principles can contribute to meaningful defense collaboration, even though Brussels is often thought a weak actor externally. It also illustrates how distinct forms of differentiation can be embodied within a single structure to accommodate complexity in strategic preferences. Using the example of PESCO, this article shows how “combined differentiation” has emerged as a response to the nature of the European defense landscape and how debates between member states about how to respond to specific challenges have brought about further differentiation over time.
{"title":"Combined differentiation in European defense: tailoring Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to strategic and political complexity","authors":"Benjamin Martill, C. Gebhard","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2155360","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2155360","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Sustaining meaningful defense cooperation in Europe is made difficult by defense-industrial fragmentation, a multiplicity of institutional frameworks, divergent strategic cultures and domestic opposition to integration. The European Union’s recent foray into defense integration incorporates multiple forms of differentiation to overcome these barriers, with Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) characterized by selective membership, external participation, and project-based clustering. Such “combined differentiation” offers an instructive example of how EU practices and principles can contribute to meaningful defense collaboration, even though Brussels is often thought a weak actor externally. It also illustrates how distinct forms of differentiation can be embodied within a single structure to accommodate complexity in strategic preferences. Using the example of PESCO, this article shows how “combined differentiation” has emerged as a response to the nature of the European defense landscape and how debates between member states about how to respond to specific challenges have brought about further differentiation over time.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"105 3","pages":"97 - 124"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41288693","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-07DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2148942
M. Sus
ABSTRACT Informal groupings have proliferated in EU foreign policy over the past decade, despite the enhanced role of the High Representative tasked with ensuring the coherence of this policy domain under the Lisbon Treaty. This article analyzes how the decision of select EU member states to act on certain policy issues through informal groupings, bypassing the EU framework, affects the High Representative’s room for maneuver. Drawing on the principal-agent model, the emergence of informal groupings is conceptualized as a manifestation of pathological delegation, which undermines High Representative’s role. The findings reveal two factors that may nevertheless increase the agent’s discretion in cases of delegation anomalies: the low heterogeneity of member state preferences toward the informal grouping and the interaction between agents in the same domain, facilitating agent’s performance. By examining agent's discretion when delegation anomalies arise, the article may be useful for scholars investigating delegation and agency in international organizations.
{"title":"How does delegation structure shape agent discretion in EU foreign policy? Evidence from the Normandy Format and the Contact Group on Libya","authors":"M. Sus","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2148942","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2148942","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Informal groupings have proliferated in EU foreign policy over the past decade, despite the enhanced role of the High Representative tasked with ensuring the coherence of this policy domain under the Lisbon Treaty. This article analyzes how the decision of select EU member states to act on certain policy issues through informal groupings, bypassing the EU framework, affects the High Representative’s room for maneuver. Drawing on the principal-agent model, the emergence of informal groupings is conceptualized as a manifestation of pathological delegation, which undermines High Representative’s role. The findings reveal two factors that may nevertheless increase the agent’s discretion in cases of delegation anomalies: the low heterogeneity of member state preferences toward the informal grouping and the interaction between agents in the same domain, facilitating agent’s performance. By examining agent's discretion when delegation anomalies arise, the article may be useful for scholars investigating delegation and agency in international organizations.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"44 1","pages":"67 - 96"},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45774860","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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