Pub Date : 2023-06-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2214757
E. Moussa
ABSTRACT Some Arab countries have since 2011 experienced intense security market diversification with considerable outsourcing of domestic security and guarding services. To date, scholars and security experts predominantly conceive this development within security reform processes or as an inevitable outcome of a chaotic post-uprisings period. Instead, this article situates some Arab states’ increasing reliance on private security actors within the evolving power dynamics and diverse challenges facing ruling elites and populations alike. Addressing how privatizing security contributes to perpetuating authoritarian practices post-2010, the article argues that contemporary security privatization and outsourcing provide alternative agents and strategies for control, while offering new venues to enrich and strengthen ruling elites. Guided by critical security studies and drawing on interviews, fieldwork and official documents, the article advances three ways through which outsourcing security supports practices of authoritarian adaptation: cultivating networks of patronage, diversifying ruling elites’ bases of security, and curbing constant sources of unrest.
{"title":"Privatizing security and authoritarian adaptation in the Arab region since the 2010–2011 uprisings","authors":"E. Moussa","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2214757","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2214757","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Some Arab countries have since 2011 experienced intense security market diversification with considerable outsourcing of domestic security and guarding services. To date, scholars and security experts predominantly conceive this development within security reform processes or as an inevitable outcome of a chaotic post-uprisings period. Instead, this article situates some Arab states’ increasing reliance on private security actors within the evolving power dynamics and diverse challenges facing ruling elites and populations alike. Addressing how privatizing security contributes to perpetuating authoritarian practices post-2010, the article argues that contemporary security privatization and outsourcing provide alternative agents and strategies for control, while offering new venues to enrich and strengthen ruling elites. Guided by critical security studies and drawing on interviews, fieldwork and official documents, the article advances three ways through which outsourcing security supports practices of authoritarian adaptation: cultivating networks of patronage, diversifying ruling elites’ bases of security, and curbing constant sources of unrest.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41621114","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-31DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2212464
Costantino Pischedda, Andrew Cheon
ABSTRACT States conduct unclaimed coercive acts, imposing costs on adversaries to signal resolve but denying (or not claiming) responsibility. Some scholars posit that unclaimed acts have considerable potential to coerce targets, while containing escalation risks. Others suggest that unclaimed coercive efforts tend to fail and trigger escalation. We assess these competing perspectives about the effects of unclaimed attacks with a vignette experiment exposing US-based respondents to a scenario where, after Russia warns of unpredictable consequences if NATO continues providing weapons to Ukraine, an explosion occurs at a NATO base in Poland used to funnel weapons to Ukraine. Intelligence agencies and independent analysts identify Russia as the likely culprit, while not ruling out the possibility of an accident. We randomize whether Russia claimed or denied responsibility for the explosion and find that unclaimed acts have lower coercive leverage than claimed ones, but the two do not significantly differ in escalation risk.
{"title":"Does plausible deniability work? Assessing the effectiveness of unclaimed coercive acts in the Ukraine war","authors":"Costantino Pischedda, Andrew Cheon","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2212464","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2212464","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT States conduct unclaimed coercive acts, imposing costs on adversaries to signal resolve but denying (or not claiming) responsibility. Some scholars posit that unclaimed acts have considerable potential to coerce targets, while containing escalation risks. Others suggest that unclaimed coercive efforts tend to fail and trigger escalation. We assess these competing perspectives about the effects of unclaimed attacks with a vignette experiment exposing US-based respondents to a scenario where, after Russia warns of unpredictable consequences if NATO continues providing weapons to Ukraine, an explosion occurs at a NATO base in Poland used to funnel weapons to Ukraine. Intelligence agencies and independent analysts identify Russia as the likely culprit, while not ruling out the possibility of an accident. We randomize whether Russia claimed or denied responsibility for the explosion and find that unclaimed acts have lower coercive leverage than claimed ones, but the two do not significantly differ in escalation risk.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47515747","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-25DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2216112
Marcelo M. Leal, P. Musgrave
ABSTRACT Zero-day vulnerabilities are software and hardware flaws that are unknown to computer vendors. As powerful means of carrying out cyber intrusions, such vulnerabilities present a dilemma for governments. Actors that develop or procure such vulnerabilities may retain them for future use; alternatively, agencies possessing such vulnerabilities may disclose the flaws to affected vendors so they can be patched, thereby denying vulnerabilities not only to adversaries but also themselves. Previous research has explored the ethics and implications of this dilemma, but no study has investigated public opinion regarding zero-day exploits. We present results from a survey experiment testing whether conditions identified as important in the literature influence respondents’ support for disclosing or stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities. Our results show that respondents overwhelmingly support disclosure, a conclusion only weakly affected by the likelihood that an adversary will independently discover the vulnerability. Our findings suggest a gap between public preferences and current U.S. policy.
{"title":"Backwards from zero: How the U.S. public evaluates the use of zero-day vulnerabilities in cybersecurity","authors":"Marcelo M. Leal, P. Musgrave","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2216112","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2216112","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Zero-day vulnerabilities are software and hardware flaws that are unknown to computer vendors. As powerful means of carrying out cyber intrusions, such vulnerabilities present a dilemma for governments. Actors that develop or procure such vulnerabilities may retain them for future use; alternatively, agencies possessing such vulnerabilities may disclose the flaws to affected vendors so they can be patched, thereby denying vulnerabilities not only to adversaries but also themselves. Previous research has explored the ethics and implications of this dilemma, but no study has investigated public opinion regarding zero-day exploits. We present results from a survey experiment testing whether conditions identified as important in the literature influence respondents’ support for disclosing or stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities. Our results show that respondents overwhelmingly support disclosure, a conclusion only weakly affected by the likelihood that an adversary will independently discover the vulnerability. Our findings suggest a gap between public preferences and current U.S. policy.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47896119","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-16DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2211899
Jan Karlas
ABSTRACT Much of what we know about state participation in universal weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties is based on research about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This article instead analyzes the ratification of all ten current WMD treaties. Using a survival analysis of ratification events (1960–2022), it challenges conventional wisdom. It shows that security threats—a factor stressed by neorealists and research on the NPT—provide only a weak and incomplete explanation. Instead, three types of costs and benefits influence ratification decisions: policy change costs, benefits from the secondary functions of treaties, and benefits from the conformity with the ratification behavior of regional peers. More specifically, the article finds that the possession and pursuit of WMD delays ratification. The country’s support for the liberal hegemonic order, the level of its economic development, and a high regional ratification rate of the respective treaty increase the probability of ratification.
{"title":"Explaining state participation in ten universal WMD treaties: A survival analysis of ratification decisions","authors":"Jan Karlas","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2211899","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2211899","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Much of what we know about state participation in universal weapons of mass destruction (WMD) treaties is based on research about the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This article instead analyzes the ratification of all ten current WMD treaties. Using a survival analysis of ratification events (1960–2022), it challenges conventional wisdom. It shows that security threats—a factor stressed by neorealists and research on the NPT—provide only a weak and incomplete explanation. Instead, three types of costs and benefits influence ratification decisions: policy change costs, benefits from the secondary functions of treaties, and benefits from the conformity with the ratification behavior of regional peers. More specifically, the article finds that the possession and pursuit of WMD delays ratification. The country’s support for the liberal hegemonic order, the level of its economic development, and a high regional ratification rate of the respective treaty increase the probability of ratification.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43128963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-04-27DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2204266
Rebecca Strating
ABSTRACT In response to challenges to Asia’s security order, regional powers such Australia, India, and Japan have adopted new “Indo-Pacific” strategic narratives to promote and defend the “rules-based order.” These narratives use China’s maritime disputes with smaller neighbors in the South China Sea as a key example of Beijing’s revisionist intentions. Yet such narratives expose “rules-based order” advocates to risks of “rhetorical entrapment” as other actors compel them to abide by the standards they have set. To what extent have Indo-Pacific powers been forced to follow the rules in their own asymmetrical maritime disputes? This article examines three Indo-Pacific cases: Timor Sea Compulsory Conciliation between Australia and Timor-Leste, the Chagos Island Marine Protected Area Arbitration between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, and the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between India and Bangladesh. To varying degrees, this article finds that strategic narratives constrained the policy options of all three Indo-Pacific powers.
{"title":"The rules-based order as rhetorical entrapment: Comparing maritime dispute resolution in the Indo-Pacific","authors":"Rebecca Strating","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2204266","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2204266","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT In response to challenges to Asia’s security order, regional powers such Australia, India, and Japan have adopted new “Indo-Pacific” strategic narratives to promote and defend the “rules-based order.” These narratives use China’s maritime disputes with smaller neighbors in the South China Sea as a key example of Beijing’s revisionist intentions. Yet such narratives expose “rules-based order” advocates to risks of “rhetorical entrapment” as other actors compel them to abide by the standards they have set. To what extent have Indo-Pacific powers been forced to follow the rules in their own asymmetrical maritime disputes? This article examines three Indo-Pacific cases: Timor Sea Compulsory Conciliation between Australia and Timor-Leste, the Chagos Island Marine Protected Area Arbitration between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, and the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between India and Bangladesh. To varying degrees, this article finds that strategic narratives constrained the policy options of all three Indo-Pacific powers.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-04-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45017288","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-16DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970
Samuel Žilinčík, T. Sweijs
ABSTRACT Contrary to detailed work on deterrence by punishment, Western strategic thought about denial and its effects is conceptually muddled at the expense of effective strategy-making. This article seeks to reconceptualize denial and rethink its emotional effects. It defines denial as a strategy aimed at frustrating the adversary’s military power and proposes four different denial logics: capability elimination, operational paralysis, tactical degradation, and strategic effect reduction. It then turns to the effects through which these denial logics generate favorable consequences, and singles out the emotions of despondency, resignation, fear, and disappointment as the key factors that mediate their impact. The article offers a framework that can help guide further theoretical reflection and empirical research, as well as inform the development of policies and strategies in today’s world.
{"title":"Beyond deterrence: Reconceptualizing denial strategies and rethinking their emotional effects","authors":"Samuel Žilinčík, T. Sweijs","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2185970","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Contrary to detailed work on deterrence by punishment, Western strategic thought about denial and its effects is conceptually muddled at the expense of effective strategy-making. This article seeks to reconceptualize denial and rethink its emotional effects. It defines denial as a strategy aimed at frustrating the adversary’s military power and proposes four different denial logics: capability elimination, operational paralysis, tactical degradation, and strategic effect reduction. It then turns to the effects through which these denial logics generate favorable consequences, and singles out the emotions of despondency, resignation, fear, and disappointment as the key factors that mediate their impact. The article offers a framework that can help guide further theoretical reflection and empirical research, as well as inform the development of policies and strategies in today’s world.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45379434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-10DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2180882
Christopher Whyte
ABSTRACT The use of AI to automate defense and intelligence tasks is increasing. And yet, little is known about how algorithmic analyses, data capture, and decisions will be perceived by elite decision-makers. This article presents the results of two experiments that explore manifestations of AI systems in the cyber conflict decision-making loop. Though findings suggest that technical expertise positively impacts respondents’ ability to gauge the potential utility and credibility of an input (indicating that training can, in fact, overcome bias), the perception of human agency in the loop even in the presence of AI inputs mitigates this effect and makes decision-makers more willing to operate on less information. This finding is worrying given the extensive challenges involved in effectively building human oversight and opportunity for intervention into any effective employment of AI for national security purposes. The article considers these obstacles and potential solutions in the context of data gathered.
{"title":"Learning to trust Skynet: Interfacing with artificial intelligence in cyberspace","authors":"Christopher Whyte","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2180882","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2180882","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The use of AI to automate defense and intelligence tasks is increasing. And yet, little is known about how algorithmic analyses, data capture, and decisions will be perceived by elite decision-makers. This article presents the results of two experiments that explore manifestations of AI systems in the cyber conflict decision-making loop. Though findings suggest that technical expertise positively impacts respondents’ ability to gauge the potential utility and credibility of an input (indicating that training can, in fact, overcome bias), the perception of human agency in the loop even in the presence of AI inputs mitigates this effect and makes decision-makers more willing to operate on less information. This finding is worrying given the extensive challenges involved in effectively building human oversight and opportunity for intervention into any effective employment of AI for national security purposes. The article considers these obstacles and potential solutions in the context of data gathered.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-03-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43101262","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-02-10DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702
Nien-chung Chang-Liao
ABSTRACT Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bring China and Russia closer together or drive them farther apart, or will it be business as usual? This article addresses this question by conceptualizing the main characteristics of the China–Russia strategic partnership. It argues that a strategic partnership, characterized as it is by informality, equality, and inclusivity, is essentially different from an alliance or alignment. These characteristics allow Beijing to distance itself from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This makes it unlikely that China will attempt any simultaneous aggression in East Asia or that it will be able to mediate in the conflict. This effectively rules out the rise of a China–Russia axis. As China strives to balance its close ties with Russia and its economic engagement with the West, Beijing is more likely to maintain, rather than strengthen or weaken, its strategic partnership with Moscow.
{"title":"The limits of strategic partnerships: Implications for China’s role in the Russia-Ukraine war","authors":"Nien-chung Chang-Liao","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2174702","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT\u0000 Will Russia’s invasion of Ukraine bring China and Russia closer together or drive them farther apart, or will it be business as usual? This article addresses this question by conceptualizing the main characteristics of the China–Russia strategic partnership. It argues that a strategic partnership, characterized as it is by informality, equality, and inclusivity, is essentially different from an alliance or alignment. These characteristics allow Beijing to distance itself from Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. This makes it unlikely that China will attempt any simultaneous aggression in East Asia or that it will be able to mediate in the conflict. This effectively rules out the rise of a China–Russia axis. As China strives to balance its close ties with Russia and its economic engagement with the West, Beijing is more likely to maintain, rather than strengthen or weaken, its strategic partnership with Moscow.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48058130","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-11DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2164974
Jonas J. Driedger
ABSTRACT Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 was seemingly driven by an unprecedented willingness to accept risks for the Russian regime, state, and society. Developing a generalizable framework, this article analyzes the development of Russian risk acceptance in offensive war initiation. Drawing on policy documents, speeches, expert literature, and various interviews with Russian, Ukrainian, and Western policymakers, the article finds that risk acceptance has continuously risen since the mid-2000s, although the 2022 invasion still evinces some risk aversion. These results are robust when accounting for miscalculation and caution against attributing the 2022 invasion solely to short-term and leader-centric factors. They also provide cues for understanding the crisis behavior of Russia and other major powers, corroborate prospect theory models on cognitive biases in elite decision-making, and indicate the need to revise the theoretical assumption that risk acceptance is an empirically rare and drastic aberration from a risk-neutral or risk-averse normality.
{"title":"Risk acceptance and offensive war: The case of Russia under the Putin regime","authors":"Jonas J. Driedger","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2164974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2164974","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine in early 2022 was seemingly driven by an unprecedented willingness to accept risks for the Russian regime, state, and society. Developing a generalizable framework, this article analyzes the development of Russian risk acceptance in offensive war initiation. Drawing on policy documents, speeches, expert literature, and various interviews with Russian, Ukrainian, and Western policymakers, the article finds that risk acceptance has continuously risen since the mid-2000s, although the 2022 invasion still evinces some risk aversion. These results are robust when accounting for miscalculation and caution against attributing the 2022 invasion solely to short-term and leader-centric factors. They also provide cues for understanding the crisis behavior of Russia and other major powers, corroborate prospect theory models on cognitive biases in elite decision-making, and indicate the need to revise the theoretical assumption that risk acceptance is an empirically rare and drastic aberration from a risk-neutral or risk-averse normality.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46643557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-09DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2022.2164122
Ofek Riemer, Daniel Sobelman
ABSTRACT Can intelligence serve as a coercive instrument in international relations? While coercion literature mostly addresses military and economic means, this article argues that coercion can also include the deliberate public disclosure of intelligence. Intelligence can be employed to threaten adversaries, reduce their latitude, and force them to adjust their plans and operations. Additionally, intelligence disclosure can be used to mobilize domestic and international audiences and make others align with a certain narrative and alter their policies accordingly. Still, coercive disclosure can fail or succeed only partially against a determined opponent or a target that is resilient to public and international pressure. To demonstrate the workings of coercive disclosure, we analyze Israel's campaign, beginning in 2017, against the Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile manufacturing program and Turkey's coercive campaign vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the United States following Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in 2018.
{"title":"Coercive disclosure: The weaponization of public intelligence revelation in international relations","authors":"Ofek Riemer, Daniel Sobelman","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2022.2164122","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2022.2164122","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Can intelligence serve as a coercive instrument in international relations? While coercion literature mostly addresses military and economic means, this article argues that coercion can also include the deliberate public disclosure of intelligence. Intelligence can be employed to threaten adversaries, reduce their latitude, and force them to adjust their plans and operations. Additionally, intelligence disclosure can be used to mobilize domestic and international audiences and make others align with a certain narrative and alter their policies accordingly. Still, coercive disclosure can fail or succeed only partially against a determined opponent or a target that is resilient to public and international pressure. To demonstrate the workings of coercive disclosure, we analyze Israel's campaign, beginning in 2017, against the Lebanese Hezbollah’s missile manufacturing program and Turkey's coercive campaign vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia and the United States following Jamal Khashoggi's assassination in 2018.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45356527","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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