Pub Date : 2023-10-29DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906
André Barrinha, Rebecca Turner
{"title":"Strategic narratives and the multilateral governance of cyberspace: The cases of European Union, Russia, and India","authors":"André Barrinha, Rebecca Turner","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136133618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-22DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809
Mark Raymond, Justin Sherman
Multilateralism is regarded as a constitutive feature of the contemporary liberal international order and is associated with liberal values. However, for twenty-five years, authoritarian states have advocated the expansion of multilateral governance modalities for cybersecurity issues while major consolidated democracies have often opposed them. We explain this puzzle by distinguishing an overlooked variant of authoritarian multilateralism from the better-understood liberal variant. A Russo-Chinese coalition has employed various strategies within and beyond the United Nations to facilitate the adoption of this authoritarian variant for key cyber-governance processes, to achieve both specific cybersecurity goals and broader aims in contesting the liberal international order. Liberal democracies oppose instantiating authoritarian multilateralism, but they have also altered their understanding of multilateralism to encompass more space for private and multistakeholder governance alongside it, leading to a double transformation of the practice of multilateralism. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for multilateralism.
{"title":"Authoritarian multilateralism in the global cyber regime complex: The double transformation of an international diplomatic practice","authors":"Mark Raymond, Justin Sherman","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809","url":null,"abstract":"Multilateralism is regarded as a constitutive feature of the contemporary liberal international order and is associated with liberal values. However, for twenty-five years, authoritarian states have advocated the expansion of multilateral governance modalities for cybersecurity issues while major consolidated democracies have often opposed them. We explain this puzzle by distinguishing an overlooked variant of authoritarian multilateralism from the better-understood liberal variant. A Russo-Chinese coalition has employed various strategies within and beyond the United Nations to facilitate the adoption of this authoritarian variant for key cyber-governance processes, to achieve both specific cybersecurity goals and broader aims in contesting the liberal international order. Liberal democracies oppose instantiating authoritarian multilateralism, but they have also altered their understanding of multilateralism to encompass more space for private and multistakeholder governance alongside it, leading to a double transformation of the practice of multilateralism. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for multilateralism.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"77 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135461653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2259661
Kseniya Oksamytna
Few predicted the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and especially its brutality. Similarly, Ukraine’s capable and determined resistance came as a surprise to many. Ukraine, viewed through the Russian lenses, was erroneously characterized as “weak” and “fragmented.” In turn, Russia was seen as a modern power seeking a “sphere of influence” through attraction and occasional meddling in neighbors’ affairs. The Ukraine–Russia relations were misconstrued as “brotherly.” I argue that Russia should be understood as a colonial power whose aggression aims to re-establish supremacy over the Ukrainian nation. This desire arose from Ukrainians' increased acceptance in Europe, which Russians perceived as a transgression of hierarchies. The brutality of the invasion was aggravated by the Russian forces’ realization that Ukrainians not only rejected their “rescue mission” but did not need one in the first place. Misconceptions about the Russian invasion can be addressed through interdisciplinarity, engagement with postcolonial scholarship, and attention to facts.
{"title":"Imperialism, supremacy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Kseniya Oksamytna","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2259661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2259661","url":null,"abstract":"Few predicted the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and especially its brutality. Similarly, Ukraine’s capable and determined resistance came as a surprise to many. Ukraine, viewed through the Russian lenses, was erroneously characterized as “weak” and “fragmented.” In turn, Russia was seen as a modern power seeking a “sphere of influence” through attraction and occasional meddling in neighbors’ affairs. The Ukraine–Russia relations were misconstrued as “brotherly.” I argue that Russia should be understood as a colonial power whose aggression aims to re-establish supremacy over the Ukrainian nation. This desire arose from Ukrainians' increased acceptance in Europe, which Russians perceived as a transgression of hierarchies. The brutality of the invasion was aggravated by the Russian forces’ realization that Ukrainians not only rejected their “rescue mission” but did not need one in the first place. Misconceptions about the Russian invasion can be addressed through interdisciplinarity, engagement with postcolonial scholarship, and attention to facts.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"86 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135790682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792
Dominika Kunertova
Before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, security studies scholars were myopic about small drones’ enabling functions and tactical benefits. They were preoccupied with drone impacts on international security and the ethical dimensions of counterterrorism drone strikes. Similarly, literature on the revolution in military affairs has examined emerging drone technologies based on their strategic advantages. “Low-tech” drone innovations have received less attention. The war has highlighted the collective magnitude of these omissions. At first, scholars followed extant predictions by concluding that large drones did not revolutionize warfare, proliferated slowly, and were too costly and complex to operate. Yet, one year into the war, thousands of drones—scouts, loitering grenades, drone bomblets, and suicide drones—are defying the field’s assumptions of their uselessness sans air superiority. Contrary to most theoretical expectations, small drones in Ukraine are changing battlefield dynamics from lower airspace. Scholars must begin to study drone diversity in modern wars.
{"title":"Drones have boots: Learning from Russia’s war in Ukraine","authors":"Dominika Kunertova","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792","url":null,"abstract":"Before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, security studies scholars were myopic about small drones’ enabling functions and tactical benefits. They were preoccupied with drone impacts on international security and the ethical dimensions of counterterrorism drone strikes. Similarly, literature on the revolution in military affairs has examined emerging drone technologies based on their strategic advantages. “Low-tech” drone innovations have received less attention. The war has highlighted the collective magnitude of these omissions. At first, scholars followed extant predictions by concluding that large drones did not revolutionize warfare, proliferated slowly, and were too costly and complex to operate. Yet, one year into the war, thousands of drones—scouts, loitering grenades, drone bomblets, and suicide drones—are defying the field’s assumptions of their uselessness sans air superiority. Contrary to most theoretical expectations, small drones in Ukraine are changing battlefield dynamics from lower airspace. Scholars must begin to study drone diversity in modern wars.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135790542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298
Hylke Dijkstra, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Nicole Jenne, Yf Reykers
{"title":"What we got wrong: The war against Ukraine and security studies","authors":"Hylke Dijkstra, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Nicole Jenne, Yf Reykers","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135902434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-28DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2256572
Amir Lupovici
During the course of the war in Ukraine, various actors have employed a unique type of deterrence by denial: namely, the threat to deliver arms. NATO leaders have committed—through rhetoric and deeds—to continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine if Russia escalated the war in order to deny Russian success. Not only is this type of strategy undertheorized, but it also challenges the distinction between direct and extended deterrence that has been central to deterrence scholarship. In deterrence by delivery of arms, the patron deters not by threatening to fight or deploy forces, but by committing to send weapons. However, the strategy also requires the protégé’s ability to fight. Studying deterrence by delivery of arms opens up understudied areas of deterrence (by denial), and provides a useful opportunity to consider how prominent concepts contribute to the research but also at times limit it.
{"title":"Deterrence by delivery of arms: NATO and the war in Ukraine","authors":"Amir Lupovici","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2256572","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2256572","url":null,"abstract":"During the course of the war in Ukraine, various actors have employed a unique type of deterrence by denial: namely, the threat to deliver arms. NATO leaders have committed—through rhetoric and deeds—to continue to deliver weapons to Ukraine if Russia escalated the war in order to deny Russian success. Not only is this type of strategy undertheorized, but it also challenges the distinction between direct and extended deterrence that has been central to deterrence scholarship. In deterrence by delivery of arms, the patron deters not by threatening to fight or deploy forces, but by committing to send weapons. However, the strategy also requires the protégé’s ability to fight. Studying deterrence by delivery of arms opens up understudied areas of deterrence (by denial), and provides a useful opportunity to consider how prominent concepts contribute to the research but also at times limit it.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135386437","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-26DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2259153
Jonas J. Driedger, Mikhail Polianskii
When Russia amassed troops in the winter of 2021–2022, many analysts deemed a large-scale invasion of Ukraine unlikely. Surveying the expert literature, we establish that these arguments largely relied on utility-based reasoning: Analysts thought an invasion was improbable, as it would foreseeably entail massive costs for Russia, its people, and its regime. We show that this regnant expert opinion had not sufficiently accounted for the Russian regime’s tendencies to increasingly accept risks, coupled with an inadequate processing of information on Ukrainian and Western views and policies. We argue that analysts miscalculated partially because the most prominent facts, long-term trends, and causal mechanisms available to them jointly suggested Russian cost-sensitivity, but provided only weak signs of countervailing factors. We thereby showcase that good forecasting requires explicit theory with a view on multiple interacting causal factors, area expertise and Socratic humility on the extent, context and certainty of our findings.
{"title":"Utility-based predictions of military escalation: Why experts forecasted Russia would not invade Ukraine","authors":"Jonas J. Driedger, Mikhail Polianskii","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2259153","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2259153","url":null,"abstract":"When Russia amassed troops in the winter of 2021–2022, many analysts deemed a large-scale invasion of Ukraine unlikely. Surveying the expert literature, we establish that these arguments largely relied on utility-based reasoning: Analysts thought an invasion was improbable, as it would foreseeably entail massive costs for Russia, its people, and its regime. We show that this regnant expert opinion had not sufficiently accounted for the Russian regime’s tendencies to increasingly accept risks, coupled with an inadequate processing of information on Ukrainian and Western views and policies. We argue that analysts miscalculated partially because the most prominent facts, long-term trends, and causal mechanisms available to them jointly suggested Russian cost-sensitivity, but provided only weak signs of countervailing factors. We thereby showcase that good forecasting requires explicit theory with a view on multiple interacting causal factors, area expertise and Socratic humility on the extent, context and certainty of our findings.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134904366","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-24DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2256065
Vinícius G. Rodrigues Vieira
ABSTRACTThe idea of weaponised interdependence has led many to believe that Russia would not invade Ukraine due to the high costs of sanctions, including through the Western-backed SWIFT system of financial payments. Although Russia’s economy has been facing shortcomings, the Russian leadership thrived in part due to connections beyond the West. This article argues that scholars have missed the fact that, more than being interdependent with the West, rising states have been decoupling from the United States and the European Union. Emerging powers, particularly China and Russia, have expanded their trade network and built their own financial infrastructure. Those transformations call for a less Western-centric International Relations (IR) scholarship. Scholars should furthermore not only focus on theories of Neoliberal Institutionalism, but also consider contributions from Realism and Marxism to International Political Economy (IPE).KEYWORDS: Sanctionsdecouplingde-dollarizationSWIFTCIPSBRICS AcknowledgementsI would like to thank the CSP editorial team for their guidance in preparing the final version of this manuscript. I am also grateful for the comments two anonymous reviewers provided. Any remaining mistakes are my own responsibility.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In revising the second edition of this work, published in 1990, Pape (Citation1997, Citation1998, p. 66) claimed that only five cases out of 114 can actually be considered successful.
【摘要】武器化的相互依存理念让许多人相信，由于制裁的高昂成本，包括通过西方支持的金融支付系统SWIFT，俄罗斯不会入侵乌克兰。尽管俄罗斯经济一直面临缺陷，但俄罗斯领导层的繁荣在一定程度上要归功于与西方以外的关系。本文认为，学者们忽略了一个事实，即新兴国家不仅与西方相互依存，而且一直在与美国和欧盟脱钩。新兴大国，尤其是中国和俄罗斯，已经扩大了贸易网络，建立了自己的金融基础设施。这些转变需要较少以西方为中心的国际关系(IR)研究。学者们不仅应该关注新自由主义制度主义的理论，还应该考虑现实主义和马克思主义对国际政治经济学的贡献。关键词:制裁脱钩去美元化swiftcipsbrics致谢感谢CSP编辑团队在编写本文最终版本时提供的指导。我也很感谢两位匿名评论者提供的评论。任何剩下的错误都是我自己的责任。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1:在修改1990年出版的第二版时，Pape (Citation1997, Citation1998, p. 66)声称114例中只有5例可以被认为是成功的。
{"title":"The limits of weaponised interdependence after the Russian war against Ukraine","authors":"Vinícius G. Rodrigues Vieira","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2256065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2256065","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe idea of weaponised interdependence has led many to believe that Russia would not invade Ukraine due to the high costs of sanctions, including through the Western-backed SWIFT system of financial payments. Although Russia’s economy has been facing shortcomings, the Russian leadership thrived in part due to connections beyond the West. This article argues that scholars have missed the fact that, more than being interdependent with the West, rising states have been decoupling from the United States and the European Union. Emerging powers, particularly China and Russia, have expanded their trade network and built their own financial infrastructure. Those transformations call for a less Western-centric International Relations (IR) scholarship. Scholars should furthermore not only focus on theories of Neoliberal Institutionalism, but also consider contributions from Realism and Marxism to International Political Economy (IPE).KEYWORDS: Sanctionsdecouplingde-dollarizationSWIFTCIPSBRICS AcknowledgementsI would like to thank the CSP editorial team for their guidance in preparing the final version of this manuscript. I am also grateful for the comments two anonymous reviewers provided. Any remaining mistakes are my own responsibility.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In revising the second edition of this work, published in 1990, Pape (Citation1997, Citation1998, p. 66) claimed that only five cases out of 114 can actually be considered successful.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135924996","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-24DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2257965
Jonathan D. Caverley
ABSTRACTMajor arms producing states and defense firms have struggled to supply the Ukraine war's massive demand for munitions. Key elements of the war—such as artificial intelligence-enabled analysis of data obtained from commercial surveillance satellites transmitted by the privately-owned Starlink network—have emerged from new providers as well as developed organically on the battlefield. Research failed to anticipate this due largely to the discipline’s focus on the “defense industry” rather than three distinct “defense industries” highlighted in the war: platforms such as tanks, commodities such as artillery shells and loitering munitions, and militarized “tech” such as commercial satellites and artificial intelligence. Understanding each requires a distinct political economic approach. Using these three lenses, the article concludes that the United States retains advantages in all three industries, Europe risks regressing into a commodities producer, and China seeks to disrupt, rather than duplicate, American defense industrial advantages in technology.KEYWORDS: Ukrainemilitary technologydefense industryspacedefense economics AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Jordan Becker, Ethan Kapstein, Mike Poznansky, and Sam Tangredi.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
{"title":"Horses, nails, and messages: Three defense industries of the Ukraine war","authors":"Jonathan D. Caverley","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2257965","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2257965","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTMajor arms producing states and defense firms have struggled to supply the Ukraine war's massive demand for munitions. Key elements of the war—such as artificial intelligence-enabled analysis of data obtained from commercial surveillance satellites transmitted by the privately-owned Starlink network—have emerged from new providers as well as developed organically on the battlefield. Research failed to anticipate this due largely to the discipline’s focus on the “defense industry” rather than three distinct “defense industries” highlighted in the war: platforms such as tanks, commodities such as artillery shells and loitering munitions, and militarized “tech” such as commercial satellites and artificial intelligence. Understanding each requires a distinct political economic approach. Using these three lenses, the article concludes that the United States retains advantages in all three industries, Europe risks regressing into a commodities producer, and China seeks to disrupt, rather than duplicate, American defense industrial advantages in technology.KEYWORDS: Ukrainemilitary technologydefense industryspacedefense economics AcknowledgementsThe author would like to thank Jordan Becker, Ethan Kapstein, Mike Poznansky, and Sam Tangredi.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"30 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135926514","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-09-24DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2260175
Giles David Arceneaux
ABSTRACTRussia’s war in Ukraine directly speaks to a core theory in nuclear politics: the theory of the nuclear revolution. Whereas this theory argues that nuclear weapons inhibit conflict and competition in international politics, skeptics of the nuclear revolution argue that competition endures in a nuclear world, and that nuclear weapons can even enable such competition. This article argues that the Russia-Ukraine war challenges expectations of the theory of the nuclear revolution, while largely supporting arguments made by the nuclear revolution skeptics. Specifically, the article argues that the theory of the nuclear revolution cannot explain Russia’s use of nuclear threats to enable its conventional aggression, nor can it explain the ways in which Russia has developed its nuclear posture to provide a bargaining advantage in competitive risk-taking scenarios. These findings challenge the leading theory in the field of nuclear politics and yield policy implications for maintaining nuclear stability during crises.KEYWORDS: War in Ukrainenuclear revolutiondeterrenceemboldenmentnuclear weapons AcknowledgementsThe author thanks the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
{"title":"Whether to worry: Nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war","authors":"Giles David Arceneaux","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2260175","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2260175","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRussia’s war in Ukraine directly speaks to a core theory in nuclear politics: the theory of the nuclear revolution. Whereas this theory argues that nuclear weapons inhibit conflict and competition in international politics, skeptics of the nuclear revolution argue that competition endures in a nuclear world, and that nuclear weapons can even enable such competition. This article argues that the Russia-Ukraine war challenges expectations of the theory of the nuclear revolution, while largely supporting arguments made by the nuclear revolution skeptics. Specifically, the article argues that the theory of the nuclear revolution cannot explain Russia’s use of nuclear threats to enable its conventional aggression, nor can it explain the ways in which Russia has developed its nuclear posture to provide a bargaining advantage in competitive risk-taking scenarios. These findings challenge the leading theory in the field of nuclear politics and yield policy implications for maintaining nuclear stability during crises.KEYWORDS: War in Ukrainenuclear revolutiondeterrenceemboldenmentnuclear weapons AcknowledgementsThe author thanks the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135926487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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