Pub Date : 2023-12-06DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2286771
Timo Graf, Markus Steinbrecher, Heiko Biehl
{"title":"From reluctance to reassurance: Explaining the shift in the Germans’ NATO alliance solidarity following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Timo Graf, Markus Steinbrecher, Heiko Biehl","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2286771","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2286771","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138594335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-12-04DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2288468
Tereza Hendl, Olga Burlyuk, Mila O’Sullivan, Aizada Arystanbek
{"title":"(En)Countering epistemic imperialism: A critique of “Westsplaining” and coloniality in dominant debates on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Tereza Hendl, Olga Burlyuk, Mila O’Sullivan, Aizada Arystanbek","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2288468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2288468","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138604985","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-16DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2279033
Josephine Wolff
{"title":"The role of insurers in shaping international cyber-security norms about cyber-war","authors":"Josephine Wolff","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2279033","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2279033","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":5.9,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"139270184","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2271794
Yehonatan Abramson, Gil Baram
How do states “save face” following a cyber intrusion directed at them? Recent scholarship demonstrates that the covert nature of cyber intrusions allows states to respond with restraint, avoiding escalation. But what happens when cyber intrusions become public and are highly visible? This article examines the rhetorical strategies employed by authoritarian Gulf states to mitigate the image-related costs associated with a public cyber intrusion. Drawing on the conceptual language of image-repair and crisis communication theories and employing discourse analysis of original data in Arabic, we identify three types of face-saving strategies: diminishing, self-complimenting, and accusing. Our findings indicate that intrusions involving leaking or faking information bring about unique “face-saving” strategies that do not only deal with the intrusion itself but also with the subsequent information crisis. Overall, the article identifies how states employ diverse rhetorical strategies—beyond attribution—to narrate cyber intrusions and keep cyber conflict contained.
{"title":"Saving face in the cyberspace: responses to public cyber intrusions in the Gulf","authors":"Yehonatan Abramson, Gil Baram","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2271794","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2271794","url":null,"abstract":"How do states “save face” following a cyber intrusion directed at them? Recent scholarship demonstrates that the covert nature of cyber intrusions allows states to respond with restraint, avoiding escalation. But what happens when cyber intrusions become public and are highly visible? This article examines the rhetorical strategies employed by authoritarian Gulf states to mitigate the image-related costs associated with a public cyber intrusion. Drawing on the conceptual language of image-repair and crisis communication theories and employing discourse analysis of original data in Arabic, we identify three types of face-saving strategies: diminishing, self-complimenting, and accusing. Our findings indicate that intrusions involving leaking or faking information bring about unique “face-saving” strategies that do not only deal with the intrusion itself but also with the subsequent information crisis. Overall, the article identifies how states employ diverse rhetorical strategies—beyond attribution—to narrate cyber intrusions and keep cyber conflict contained.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135372070","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2274775
James Shires
ABSTRACTThe Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on cybercrime (2001) remains a key landmark in multilateral governance on cybersecurity. Negotiated over two decades ago, this regional agreement gains renewed significance today through its enduring impact, its rarity as a binding multilateral agreement on cyber-issues, and its role in shaping the debate on free speech and the criminalization of online content. This article asks how the almost-total exclusion of content crimes from the Convention can be explained. Drawing on new documents published for the twentieth anniversary of the Convention, including detailed testimonials from its chair and principal drafters, the article highlights the importance of long-term career connections among technically-savvy and diplomatically experienced negotiators, creating a transnational policy network that overcame differences and power imbalances. Understanding how the Budapest Convention resolved disagreements helps contextualize current crises in multilateral cybersecurity and cybercrime governance and provides a path away from growing digital authoritarianism.KEYWORDS: CybersecuritycybercrimemultilateralismgovernanceBudapest Conventionexpertise AcknowledgmentsI thank the editors of the special issue at The Hague Program on International Cyber Security for the opportunity to contribute to this issue, and the editors and reviewers at Contemporary Security Policy for their guidance and feedback. I also thank the team of the International Security Programme at Chatham House for their support in writing this article, and for enabling my participation in various cybercrime forums as a non-state multistakeholder organization.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 It should be noted that issues of unreliability and unduly positive memory are common across qualitative methods, including interviews. In this way, while commemorative materials pose specific challenges for interpretation, these challenges are equivalent to those faced by other methodological routes; in each case, the guiding principle must be to incorporate critical analysis of such factors into the interpretation.2 Workshop held under the Chatham House Rule on 8 February 2023.3 The standard term used in this area is now child sexual abuse material (CSAM), avoiding problematic associations and conflations with adult pornography, legal in many jurisdictions.4 While many Arab states subsequently adopted national cybercrime laws, their first iterations did not refer to the Arab Convention, and it was ratified (phrased more loosely as “certification or acceptance or ratification” in the Arabic original) by only 11 of the 22 members of the League of Arab states (most recently Bahrain in 2017).Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames ShiresJames Shires is a senior research fellow in cyber policy at Chatham House. He is a co-founder and trustee of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative
{"title":"Career connections: transnational expert networks and multilateral cybercrime negotiations","authors":"James Shires","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2274775","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2274775","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe Council of Europe’s Budapest Convention on cybercrime (2001) remains a key landmark in multilateral governance on cybersecurity. Negotiated over two decades ago, this regional agreement gains renewed significance today through its enduring impact, its rarity as a binding multilateral agreement on cyber-issues, and its role in shaping the debate on free speech and the criminalization of online content. This article asks how the almost-total exclusion of content crimes from the Convention can be explained. Drawing on new documents published for the twentieth anniversary of the Convention, including detailed testimonials from its chair and principal drafters, the article highlights the importance of long-term career connections among technically-savvy and diplomatically experienced negotiators, creating a transnational policy network that overcame differences and power imbalances. Understanding how the Budapest Convention resolved disagreements helps contextualize current crises in multilateral cybersecurity and cybercrime governance and provides a path away from growing digital authoritarianism.KEYWORDS: CybersecuritycybercrimemultilateralismgovernanceBudapest Conventionexpertise AcknowledgmentsI thank the editors of the special issue at The Hague Program on International Cyber Security for the opportunity to contribute to this issue, and the editors and reviewers at Contemporary Security Policy for their guidance and feedback. I also thank the team of the International Security Programme at Chatham House for their support in writing this article, and for enabling my participation in various cybercrime forums as a non-state multistakeholder organization.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 It should be noted that issues of unreliability and unduly positive memory are common across qualitative methods, including interviews. In this way, while commemorative materials pose specific challenges for interpretation, these challenges are equivalent to those faced by other methodological routes; in each case, the guiding principle must be to incorporate critical analysis of such factors into the interpretation.2 Workshop held under the Chatham House Rule on 8 February 2023.3 The standard term used in this area is now child sexual abuse material (CSAM), avoiding problematic associations and conflations with adult pornography, legal in many jurisdictions.4 While many Arab states subsequently adopted national cybercrime laws, their first iterations did not refer to the Arab Convention, and it was ratified (phrased more loosely as “certification or acceptance or ratification” in the Arabic original) by only 11 of the 22 members of the League of Arab states (most recently Bahrain in 2017).Additional informationNotes on contributorsJames ShiresJames Shires is a senior research fellow in cyber policy at Chatham House. He is a co-founder and trustee of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative ","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135371551","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-29DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906
André Barrinha, Rebecca Turner
{"title":"Strategic narratives and the multilateral governance of cyberspace: The cases of European Union, Russia, and India","authors":"André Barrinha, Rebecca Turner","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2266906","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136133618","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-22DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809
Mark Raymond, Justin Sherman
Multilateralism is regarded as a constitutive feature of the contemporary liberal international order and is associated with liberal values. However, for twenty-five years, authoritarian states have advocated the expansion of multilateral governance modalities for cybersecurity issues while major consolidated democracies have often opposed them. We explain this puzzle by distinguishing an overlooked variant of authoritarian multilateralism from the better-understood liberal variant. A Russo-Chinese coalition has employed various strategies within and beyond the United Nations to facilitate the adoption of this authoritarian variant for key cyber-governance processes, to achieve both specific cybersecurity goals and broader aims in contesting the liberal international order. Liberal democracies oppose instantiating authoritarian multilateralism, but they have also altered their understanding of multilateralism to encompass more space for private and multistakeholder governance alongside it, leading to a double transformation of the practice of multilateralism. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for multilateralism.
{"title":"Authoritarian multilateralism in the global cyber regime complex: The double transformation of an international diplomatic practice","authors":"Mark Raymond, Justin Sherman","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2269809","url":null,"abstract":"Multilateralism is regarded as a constitutive feature of the contemporary liberal international order and is associated with liberal values. However, for twenty-five years, authoritarian states have advocated the expansion of multilateral governance modalities for cybersecurity issues while major consolidated democracies have often opposed them. We explain this puzzle by distinguishing an overlooked variant of authoritarian multilateralism from the better-understood liberal variant. A Russo-Chinese coalition has employed various strategies within and beyond the United Nations to facilitate the adoption of this authoritarian variant for key cyber-governance processes, to achieve both specific cybersecurity goals and broader aims in contesting the liberal international order. Liberal democracies oppose instantiating authoritarian multilateralism, but they have also altered their understanding of multilateralism to encompass more space for private and multistakeholder governance alongside it, leading to a double transformation of the practice of multilateralism. The article concludes by discussing the implications of our analysis for multilateralism.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135461653","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2259661
Kseniya Oksamytna
Few predicted the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and especially its brutality. Similarly, Ukraine’s capable and determined resistance came as a surprise to many. Ukraine, viewed through the Russian lenses, was erroneously characterized as “weak” and “fragmented.” In turn, Russia was seen as a modern power seeking a “sphere of influence” through attraction and occasional meddling in neighbors’ affairs. The Ukraine–Russia relations were misconstrued as “brotherly.” I argue that Russia should be understood as a colonial power whose aggression aims to re-establish supremacy over the Ukrainian nation. This desire arose from Ukrainians' increased acceptance in Europe, which Russians perceived as a transgression of hierarchies. The brutality of the invasion was aggravated by the Russian forces’ realization that Ukrainians not only rejected their “rescue mission” but did not need one in the first place. Misconceptions about the Russian invasion can be addressed through interdisciplinarity, engagement with postcolonial scholarship, and attention to facts.
{"title":"Imperialism, supremacy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine","authors":"Kseniya Oksamytna","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2259661","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2259661","url":null,"abstract":"Few predicted the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine and especially its brutality. Similarly, Ukraine’s capable and determined resistance came as a surprise to many. Ukraine, viewed through the Russian lenses, was erroneously characterized as “weak” and “fragmented.” In turn, Russia was seen as a modern power seeking a “sphere of influence” through attraction and occasional meddling in neighbors’ affairs. The Ukraine–Russia relations were misconstrued as “brotherly.” I argue that Russia should be understood as a colonial power whose aggression aims to re-establish supremacy over the Ukrainian nation. This desire arose from Ukrainians' increased acceptance in Europe, which Russians perceived as a transgression of hierarchies. The brutality of the invasion was aggravated by the Russian forces’ realization that Ukrainians not only rejected their “rescue mission” but did not need one in the first place. Misconceptions about the Russian invasion can be addressed through interdisciplinarity, engagement with postcolonial scholarship, and attention to facts.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135790682","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792
Dominika Kunertova
Before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, security studies scholars were myopic about small drones’ enabling functions and tactical benefits. They were preoccupied with drone impacts on international security and the ethical dimensions of counterterrorism drone strikes. Similarly, literature on the revolution in military affairs has examined emerging drone technologies based on their strategic advantages. “Low-tech” drone innovations have received less attention. The war has highlighted the collective magnitude of these omissions. At first, scholars followed extant predictions by concluding that large drones did not revolutionize warfare, proliferated slowly, and were too costly and complex to operate. Yet, one year into the war, thousands of drones—scouts, loitering grenades, drone bomblets, and suicide drones—are defying the field’s assumptions of their uselessness sans air superiority. Contrary to most theoretical expectations, small drones in Ukraine are changing battlefield dynamics from lower airspace. Scholars must begin to study drone diversity in modern wars.
{"title":"Drones have boots: Learning from Russia’s war in Ukraine","authors":"Dominika Kunertova","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2262792","url":null,"abstract":"Before Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, security studies scholars were myopic about small drones’ enabling functions and tactical benefits. They were preoccupied with drone impacts on international security and the ethical dimensions of counterterrorism drone strikes. Similarly, literature on the revolution in military affairs has examined emerging drone technologies based on their strategic advantages. “Low-tech” drone innovations have received less attention. The war has highlighted the collective magnitude of these omissions. At first, scholars followed extant predictions by concluding that large drones did not revolutionize warfare, proliferated slowly, and were too costly and complex to operate. Yet, one year into the war, thousands of drones—scouts, loitering grenades, drone bomblets, and suicide drones—are defying the field’s assumptions of their uselessness sans air superiority. Contrary to most theoretical expectations, small drones in Ukraine are changing battlefield dynamics from lower airspace. Scholars must begin to study drone diversity in modern wars.","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135790542","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-02DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298
Hylke Dijkstra, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Nicole Jenne, Yf Reykers
{"title":"What we got wrong: The war against Ukraine and security studies","authors":"Hylke Dijkstra, Myriam Dunn Cavelty, Nicole Jenne, Yf Reykers","doi":"10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2261298","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46729,"journal":{"name":"Contemporary Security Policy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135902434","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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