Abstract Armed conflicts have increasingly been characterized by a phenomenon of massive violence against civilians. Beyond a certain point, the question becomes whether such violence is properly characterized as incidental to the pursuit of hostilities or should be seen as conceptually detached from it. This article looks at the competing cases for dealing with this phenomenon of massive violence against civilians from the perspective of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The focus of war crimes particularly when committed as part of a policy at the International Criminal Court has further diminished the difference with crimes against humanity. This article finds that, given the dense overlap of both categories when it comes to massive violence against civilians in times of war, the expressivist finalities of international criminal justice are better served by emphasizing the fundamental nature of such violence as a crime against humanity. This better makes sense of the genealogy of international criminal law as emerging from a tradition of human rights and recuses any notion that systematic attacks against civilians have, in fact and in principle, anything to do with the pursuit of war.
{"title":"Massive Violence Against Civilians in War","authors":"Frédéric Mégret","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad030","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad030","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Armed conflicts have increasingly been characterized by a phenomenon of massive violence against civilians. Beyond a certain point, the question becomes whether such violence is properly characterized as incidental to the pursuit of hostilities or should be seen as conceptually detached from it. This article looks at the competing cases for dealing with this phenomenon of massive violence against civilians from the perspective of war crimes or crimes against humanity. The focus of war crimes particularly when committed as part of a policy at the International Criminal Court has further diminished the difference with crimes against humanity. This article finds that, given the dense overlap of both categories when it comes to massive violence against civilians in times of war, the expressivist finalities of international criminal justice are better served by emphasizing the fundamental nature of such violence as a crime against humanity. This better makes sense of the genealogy of international criminal law as emerging from a tradition of human rights and recuses any notion that systematic attacks against civilians have, in fact and in principle, anything to do with the pursuit of war.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136362180","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Current discussions on the military use of artificial intelligence (AI), in particular concerning autonomous weapons systems, have largely focused on the challenges for the attribution of individual criminal responsibility for war crimes whenever such systems do not perform as initially intended by human operators. Yet, recent observations evidence the pressing need to shift the discussion on the responsibility gap further to include challenges raised by the intentional use of AI systems for the commission of war crimes and other international crimes. Additionally, the increasing development and use of AI systems, based on data-driven learning (DDL) methods, demands particular attention due to the difficulty these systems’ lack of predictability and explainability poses in terms of anticipation of their effects. Against this background, this article complements the present discussion on the responsibility gap by discussing some concerns that the intentional use of DDL systems for the commission of international crimes raises regarding the required mental element and thus, the ascription of individual criminal responsibility. Ultimately, this article proposes preliminary avenues to address these concerns.
{"title":"Data-driven Learning Systems and the Commission of International Crimes","authors":"Anna Rosalie Greipl","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad031","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad031","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Current discussions on the military use of artificial intelligence (AI), in particular concerning autonomous weapons systems, have largely focused on the challenges for the attribution of individual criminal responsibility for war crimes whenever such systems do not perform as initially intended by human operators. Yet, recent observations evidence the pressing need to shift the discussion on the responsibility gap further to include challenges raised by the intentional use of AI systems for the commission of war crimes and other international crimes. Additionally, the increasing development and use of AI systems, based on data-driven learning (DDL) methods, demands particular attention due to the difficulty these systems’ lack of predictability and explainability poses in terms of anticipation of their effects. Against this background, this article complements the present discussion on the responsibility gap by discussing some concerns that the intentional use of DDL systems for the commission of international crimes raises regarding the required mental element and thus, the ascription of individual criminal responsibility. Ultimately, this article proposes preliminary avenues to address these concerns.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":"73 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-09-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135403226","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article identifies and evaluates key international legal aspects concerning three notions that have figured in debates on war crimes involving an autonomous weapon system (AWS): responsibility, liability and accountability. It focuses on the general contours of the existing international law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law (IHL), and related fields, concepts and institutions. Regarding responsibility, this article examines, on one hand, the international responsibility of a state for an internationally wrongful act related to a breach of a rule of IHL involving an AWS that may form the basis of a war crime and, on the other hand, individual criminal responsibility for a war crime involving an AWS. As for liability, this article outlines three international legal concepts of state liability potentially related to a war crime involving an AWS. Finally, this article sets out an, at least, legally adjacent concept of accountability that involves an explanation of the conduct related to a war crime involving an AWS and imposing political, legal, social or other consequences where such an explanation is absent or insufficient.
{"title":"War Crimes Involving Autonomous Weapons","authors":"D. Lewis","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad027","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article identifies and evaluates key international legal aspects concerning three notions that have figured in debates on war crimes involving an autonomous weapon system (AWS): responsibility, liability and accountability. It focuses on the general contours of the existing international law of armed conflict, also known as international humanitarian law (IHL), and related fields, concepts and institutions. Regarding responsibility, this article examines, on one hand, the international responsibility of a state for an internationally wrongful act related to a breach of a rule of IHL involving an AWS that may form the basis of a war crime and, on the other hand, individual criminal responsibility for a war crime involving an AWS. As for liability, this article outlines three international legal concepts of state liability potentially related to a war crime involving an AWS. Finally, this article sets out an, at least, legally adjacent concept of accountability that involves an explanation of the conduct related to a war crime involving an AWS and imposing political, legal, social or other consequences where such an explanation is absent or insufficient.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41557799","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Since its hailing as the ‘supreme international crime’ during the Nuremberg Trials, aggression has largely been neglected relative to other core international crimes. However, the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War starting in early 2022 is being held as an opportunity to breathe new life into this de facto dormant norm. This article seeks to address novel concerns as to the scope of liability permitted by the crime of aggression, which arise from Russia’s enthusiastic use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in this conflict. It first overviews the relevant terminology applicable to the use of private armed personnel. It then asserts the value of pursuing accountability for both aggression and PMSCs. The article continues by evaluating the requirements of aggression’s ‘leadership element’, which seeks to restrict liability to high-level leaders. As an illustrative case study, it applies this to the Wagner Group’s military operations in Ukraine. This article confirms that senior corporate officers of PMSCs may, in principle, satisfy the leadership requirement of aggression, opening up the door for their liability and urging closer scrutiny of such matters.
{"title":"Profiteers of Misery","authors":"Jeremy Pizzi","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad022","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad022","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Since its hailing as the ‘supreme international crime’ during the Nuremberg Trials, aggression has largely been neglected relative to other core international crimes. However, the escalation of the Russo-Ukrainian War starting in early 2022 is being held as an opportunity to breathe new life into this de facto dormant norm. This article seeks to address novel concerns as to the scope of liability permitted by the crime of aggression, which arise from Russia’s enthusiastic use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in this conflict. It first overviews the relevant terminology applicable to the use of private armed personnel. It then asserts the value of pursuing accountability for both aggression and PMSCs. The article continues by evaluating the requirements of aggression’s ‘leadership element’, which seeks to restrict liability to high-level leaders. As an illustrative case study, it applies this to the Wagner Group’s military operations in Ukraine. This article confirms that senior corporate officers of PMSCs may, in principle, satisfy the leadership requirement of aggression, opening up the door for their liability and urging closer scrutiny of such matters.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47510568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The doctrine of superior responsibility is occasionally presented as a potential solution to the ‘responsibility gap’ allegedly created when the employment of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) results in violations of international humanitarian law, which would amount to war crimes. This article analyses several challenges to the applicability of the doctrine of superior responsibility in these circumstances. In fact, superior responsibility is premised on the existence of a superior–subordinate relationship between individuals. The type of control required for this relationship to exist is different from the kind of control exercised over weapons, including AWS. Additionally, the doctrine requires the commission of an underlying crime in all its elements by a punishable subordinate. Nonetheless, superior responsibility remains a useful framework to demarcate the scope of the supervisory duties of the superior in relation to the prevention of war crimes. Understanding the limitations of this doctrine will be important in guiding the discussions concerning the level of human control that should be retained over AWS.
{"title":"A Weapon is No Subordinate","authors":"Alessandra Spadaro","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad025","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad025","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The doctrine of superior responsibility is occasionally presented as a potential solution to the ‘responsibility gap’ allegedly created when the employment of autonomous weapon systems (AWS) results in violations of international humanitarian law, which would amount to war crimes. This article analyses several challenges to the applicability of the doctrine of superior responsibility in these circumstances. In fact, superior responsibility is premised on the existence of a superior–subordinate relationship between individuals. The type of control required for this relationship to exist is different from the kind of control exercised over weapons, including AWS. Additionally, the doctrine requires the commission of an underlying crime in all its elements by a punishable subordinate. Nonetheless, superior responsibility remains a useful framework to demarcate the scope of the supervisory duties of the superior in relation to the prevention of war crimes. Understanding the limitations of this doctrine will be important in guiding the discussions concerning the level of human control that should be retained over AWS.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":"23 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136327941","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and, more generally, the role of artificial intelligence in warfare, may come to pose unprecedented challenges to criminal law, including by making it harder to link harm to individuals who can be held responsible, due to the pivotal role of the concepts of actus reus, mens rea and causation in that domain. In this context, the notion of meaningful human control has been proposed to address some of the challenges of ensuring accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law. One possibility might be to link — conceptually, or even legally — meaningful human control with the ‘control theory’ propounded at the International Criminal Court to assign criminal responsibility. Under this theory, the ascription of criminal responsibility to an individual as a direct perpetrator requires an assessment of whether they enjoy an effective ability to decide on the commission of a crime. This article elaborates on some of the issues posed by this approach, proceeding then to consider the most ‘extreme’ instance of AWS, i.e. the deployment of swarms of drones operating autonomously and coordinating their behaviour in a decentralized manner.
{"title":"Crimes without Humanity?","authors":"G. Acquaviva","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad024","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) and, more generally, the role of artificial intelligence in warfare, may come to pose unprecedented challenges to criminal law, including by making it harder to link harm to individuals who can be held responsible, due to the pivotal role of the concepts of actus reus, mens rea and causation in that domain. In this context, the notion of meaningful human control has been proposed to address some of the challenges of ensuring accountability for serious violations of international humanitarian law. One possibility might be to link — conceptually, or even legally — meaningful human control with the ‘control theory’ propounded at the International Criminal Court to assign criminal responsibility. Under this theory, the ascription of criminal responsibility to an individual as a direct perpetrator requires an assessment of whether they enjoy an effective ability to decide on the commission of a crime. This article elaborates on some of the issues posed by this approach, proceeding then to consider the most ‘extreme’ instance of AWS, i.e. the deployment of swarms of drones operating autonomously and coordinating their behaviour in a decentralized manner.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"60868204","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article explains variation in state cooperation with International Criminal Court (ICC)’s investigations and prosecutions across cases and over time. The idea motivating this study stems from the observation of the mixed record of state cooperation with ICC operations. For legal professionals and scholars this observation is puzzling, since states falling within the ICC’s territorial jurisdiction are legally bound to provide full judicial assistance to the Court. Thus, why do some countries entertain collaborative relations with the ICC while others display hostility towards it? I argue that state leaders’ perceptions of potential ICC indictment best explain variation in state behaviour. This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of how state attitudes form and of the extent to which external actors, spearheaded by the ICC Prosecutor’s Office (OTP), can change them. The research findings suggest that: 1) neither formal state consent (ratification) nor regime type are reliable predictors of state cooperation; 2) state leaders’ perception of potential ICC indictment appears better suited to correctly predict state behaviour in all the situations investigated by the OTP; 3) the OTP’s signalling strategy — including the timing of its intervention — affects state leaders’ perception of future ICC indictment and, in turn, the prospects of state cooperation; 4) when state authorities deny cooperation, regime change provides a one-time opportunity to start ICC–state relations anew.
{"title":"Of Crimes and Crowns","authors":"Marco Bocchese","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article explains variation in state cooperation with International Criminal Court (ICC)’s investigations and prosecutions across cases and over time. The idea motivating this study stems from the observation of the mixed record of state cooperation with ICC operations. For legal professionals and scholars this observation is puzzling, since states falling within the ICC’s territorial jurisdiction are legally bound to provide full judicial assistance to the Court. Thus, why do some countries entertain collaborative relations with the ICC while others display hostility towards it? I argue that state leaders’ perceptions of potential ICC indictment best explain variation in state behaviour. This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of how state attitudes form and of the extent to which external actors, spearheaded by the ICC Prosecutor’s Office (OTP), can change them. The research findings suggest that: 1) neither formal state consent (ratification) nor regime type are reliable predictors of state cooperation; 2) state leaders’ perception of potential ICC indictment appears better suited to correctly predict state behaviour in all the situations investigated by the OTP; 3) the OTP’s signalling strategy — including the timing of its intervention — affects state leaders’ perception of future ICC indictment and, in turn, the prospects of state cooperation; 4) when state authorities deny cooperation, regime change provides a one-time opportunity to start ICC–state relations anew.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42671700","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Christoph Sperfeldt, Practices of Reparations in International Criminal Justice","authors":"L. Moffett","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad020","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46535683","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Denys Azarov, D. Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, Volodymyr Venher
The new wave of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, and the intensification of the armed conflict accompanied by grave breaches of international humanitarian law, has received significant scholarly attention. Many academic interventions have examined the developments in Ukraine through the frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Some, however, have applied a genocide lens to make sense of reported numerous and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. This article contributes to the latter stream of scholarship by contextualizing the arguments for the existence of genocidal intent behind the seemingly unrelated crimes committed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation all over Ukraine. The authors pay particular attention to the language and pseudo-historical references used by Russia’s leaders as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine and argue that these statements and expressions indicate the existence of genocidal intent. This article also reflects on the issue of the systematic destruction of cultural heritage of Ukraine as further evidence of the intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation understood as a protected national group under the Genocide Convention, at least in part. Finally, the authors analyse the genocidal acts that have apparently been committed, including killings; the causing of serious bodily or mental harm; the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the deliberate infliction of conditions of life aimed at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation. It is stressed that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the destruction of the Ukrainian nation by Russia has been pursued through commission of these prohibited acts. Their nature and large-scale character serve as further evidence of genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation.
{"title":"Understanding Russia’s Actions in Ukraine as the Crime of Genocide","authors":"Denys Azarov, D. Koval, Gaiane Nuridzhanian, Volodymyr Venher","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The new wave of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine that began on 24 February 2022, and the intensification of the armed conflict accompanied by grave breaches of international humanitarian law, has received significant scholarly attention. Many academic interventions have examined the developments in Ukraine through the frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Some, however, have applied a genocide lens to make sense of reported numerous and widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law. This article contributes to the latter stream of scholarship by contextualizing the arguments for the existence of genocidal intent behind the seemingly unrelated crimes committed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation all over Ukraine. The authors pay particular attention to the language and pseudo-historical references used by Russia’s leaders as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine and argue that these statements and expressions indicate the existence of genocidal intent. This article also reflects on the issue of the systematic destruction of cultural heritage of Ukraine as further evidence of the intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation understood as a protected national group under the Genocide Convention, at least in part. Finally, the authors analyse the genocidal acts that have apparently been committed, including killings; the causing of serious bodily or mental harm; the forcible transfer of Ukrainian children to Russia, and the deliberate infliction of conditions of life aimed at the physical destruction of the Ukrainian nation. It is stressed that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the destruction of the Ukrainian nation by Russia has been pursued through commission of these prohibited acts. Their nature and large-scale character serve as further evidence of genocidal intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-06-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49086884","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The US Army war crimes trials held in Manila from 1945 to 1947 prosecuted around 200 Japanese military personnel for war crimes committed against US prisoners of war and Filipino non-combatants. Japanese defendants attempted to argue, with little success, that the defence of superior orders justified their actions. General Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allies in the Pacific or SCAP) was adamant that superior orders would not serve to excuse alleged Japanese war criminals from war crimes. What is clear from the trial documents and other archival material from Manila is that not all sections of the prosecution agreed with MacArthur’s interpretation of the law. However, it seems as though MacArthur’s pronouncement in relation to the application of superior orders may have had a profound impact on not only the Manila trials, but also with subsequent trials in World War II and beyond. This article explores the various arguments in relation to superior orders emanating from the US Army trials in Manila. The trials in Manila show that the rejection of superior orders as a defence in war crimes offered a reasonable foundation and precedent for how subsequent courts and tribunals evaluated the defence of superior orders within the context of war crimes jurisprudence.
{"title":"‘He Offered a Prayer for the Flier He Had Just Killed’","authors":"J. Fellows, Mark Chong","doi":"10.1093/jicj/mqad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqad017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The US Army war crimes trials held in Manila from 1945 to 1947 prosecuted around 200 Japanese military personnel for war crimes committed against US prisoners of war and Filipino non-combatants. Japanese defendants attempted to argue, with little success, that the defence of superior orders justified their actions. General Douglas MacArthur (Supreme Commander for the Allies in the Pacific or SCAP) was adamant that superior orders would not serve to excuse alleged Japanese war criminals from war crimes. What is clear from the trial documents and other archival material from Manila is that not all sections of the prosecution agreed with MacArthur’s interpretation of the law. However, it seems as though MacArthur’s pronouncement in relation to the application of superior orders may have had a profound impact on not only the Manila trials, but also with subsequent trials in World War II and beyond. This article explores the various arguments in relation to superior orders emanating from the US Army trials in Manila. The trials in Manila show that the rejection of superior orders as a defence in war crimes offered a reasonable foundation and precedent for how subsequent courts and tribunals evaluated the defence of superior orders within the context of war crimes jurisprudence.","PeriodicalId":46732,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Criminal Justice","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47417568","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}