Japan and the World Economy最新文献

We examined the accuracy of prediction of Canada, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States from the viewpoint of forecast errors. Compared with the forecast error of each country at the around same time, the forecast error of Japan is about 2 times larger. In case of Japan, even immediately before release of quarterly GDP, the forecast error is over 1 %, which is the same level of forecast error as 94 days before in the United States and 135 days before in Canada.

Evaluating the characteristics of forecast errors, it can be pointed out that Japan's forecasts are as efficient as those of other countries, and the addition of major economic statistics is unlikely to improve forecast errors. The reason for Japan's large forecast errors is the fluctuations in the GDP growth rate. These results provide evidence that volatile GDP may make the outlook worse.

Large fluctuations in Japan's quarterly GDP have already been pointed out. It is necessary to examine the factors behind the large fluctuations in the rate of change in Japan's quarterly GDP.

Commodity prices provide useful information about current and future global economic activity. First, we show that overall commodity prices indeed tend to comove with economic activity. Second, we try to extract the global demand factor(s) using many commodity prices. While commodity prices reflect both demand and supply factors, by relying on a wide variety of commodity prices, supply shocks can be filtered out as they tend to be commodity-specific idiosyncratic shocks except for widespread supply disruptions confined to a few historical periods. In this paper, we then show that factors extracted from commodity prices movement contain useful information to nowcast and forecast global GDP and industrial production.

We examine management innovation of family and non-family firms after CEO successions by using data of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan. Consistent with predictions based on the resource-based view and agency theory, we find that family firms managed by non-family professional CEO successors are less innovative than those managed by family CEO successors or non-family firms. Further analyses indicate that limited access to family-based resources is a key determinant of the conservativeness of professional CEO successors. Our findings suggest the importance of the congruence of ownership and management in family firms due to CEOs’ access to family-based resources.

We review long-term changes in “zombie firms” in Japan over this half-century using listed firm data with a framework in which the concept of “zombie firms” includes possible efficient bailouts. The first wave of zombie firms occurred during the period of main banks (hereinafter MBs). MBs were able to actively choose which firms would receive bailouts at the time. However, commonly held beliefs about MBs’ monitoring power and the special role of corporate groups and long-term credit banks for bailouts are not supported. In the largest wave of the lost decade, we find the zombie firm problem in the manufacturing sector was just as serious as the non-manufacturing in terms of firm count. Moreover, the pathological phenomena such as unwilling concentration of loans to MBs were also rather typical in the manufacturing. Soft budget constraints have continued in the manufacturing even after the resolution of banks’ non-performing loans since the bubble burst came to an end, leading to the manufacturing-centered third wave of zombie firms following the Global Financial Crisis.

Digital technology such as virtual meetings is key to communication and collaboration. However, a firm-level survey in Japan during the COVID-19 pandemic shows that foreign firms regarded digital communication as a key business obstacle. This paper estimates the determinants of the likelihood that foreign firms regard digital communication as an obstacle. The results show that digital communication is hindered by language differences, employees’ nationality differences, employment size, and time differences from foreign headquarters. Contrary to common assertions, digital communication is regarded as an obstacle in remote-work feasible sectors, but not so in in-person service sectors. Thus, digital communication does not completely eliminate barriers to face-to-face communication.

We survey the economics literature on dual-role platforms and self-preferencing by them. Existing studies mainly consist of theoretical studies, but there are also some empirical studies. Regardless of whether it is theoretical or empirical, many studies on self-preferencing are concerned with the manipulation of search results and recommendation algorithms. Some recent studies have examined first-party selling by platforms that use proprietary transaction data collected from third-party sellers. However, little has been explored about other types of self-preferencing. Findings reported in the existing literature indicate that the impact of self-preferencing on consumers depends largely on the forms of self-preferencing and market environments, implying that policymakers need to gather relevant information on a case-by-case basis for better decision-making. Finally, we discuss the types of data used in existing empirical studies, which suggest what kind of data and information can (not) be accessible by researchers. Several directions for future research are also proposed.

Since the end of the 1990 s, the sluggish growth of Japan’s gross domestic product (GDP) and the mired fiscal state of its public sector have provoked consternation about its public sector’s fiscal sustainability. Therefore, I estimated the fiscal reaction functions (stemming from Bohn, 1998a, 2008) with time-varying parameters for all Japan’s government sectors (for 1976Q2–2020Q1), i.e., the general government (GG), the central government (CG), the whole of the local governments (WLG), and the whole of the social security funds (WSSF), to chronologically assess their fiscal sustainability using four different models, including a least-squares with breakpoints model and a state-space model with the Kalman filter. My results demonstrate that (1) the least-squares with breakpoints model outperformed the others, and (2) although CG, WLG, and WSSF often sustainably managed their finances during the analysis term, GG has failed to implement a sustainable fiscal policy from the mid-1990 s (3) CG and WSSF adjusted their fiscal postures according to Japan’s economic state. Fiscal severity caused WLG to change its fiscal posture.

This study empirically examines the determinants of individuals’ attitudes about inward foreign direct investment (FDI) using responses from questionnaire surveys that were originally designed. Individuals’ preferences for inward FDI differ between greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and people are more likely to have a negative attitude toward M&A than greenfield investments. People with a negative image of the so-called “vulture fund” for foreign capital tend to oppose inward FDI, and this is more pronounced for M&A than greenfield investments. Moreover, loss aversion and high time preference rates are strongly related to opposition to inward FDI, and people with such behavioral biases tend to refuse indigenous firms to be acquired by foreign capital, even if they agree to accept greenfield investment. These results indicate that people’s preferences for inward FDI depend more on non-economic attributes than economic attributes. Our results also suggest that a lack of economic literacy is associated with unconscious biases against accepting inward FDI.

Average fuel efficiency of vehicles improved substantially over the last three decades in Japan. Yet, the carbon emissions from on-road passenger vehicles continued to increase until 2000, and then turned to a steadily declining trend. We empirically investigate this disparity. To that end, we apply an analogue of the Copeland-Taylor decomposition, combined with an empirically estimated behavioral model of car ownership and utilization choice, to economically decompose vehicle carbon emissions into the scale, composition, and technique effects over our study period, 1990–2015. We find that exogenous demographic changes such as population size, driver’s license holdings, or labor migration across regions can only explain this disparity partially. After accounting for endogenous changes in household’s geographically-explicit transport demand by the estimated behavioral model, the predicted emissions match the time path of the observed emissions surprisingly well. Of all the factors in the behavioral model, the fuel cost per unit of driving accounts for the largest share of the total variation in the observed emissions. Our result indicates that 60% of the technique effect is offset by the perverse effect of induced transport demand due to the lower fuel cost. Importantly, the induced demand comes from both the intensive margin (driving) and the extensive margin (car ownership).

Using an overlapping generations model, we present analyses of public long-term care provision effects on fertility and time allocation decisions of sandwich caregivers, those caring for young children and old parents simultaneously. If the public long-term care level runs short of the necessary level, then working children must compensate for the difference by spending their time. Reportedly, about a third of university students’ parents are sandwich caregivers in Japan, although Japan has a Long-Term Care Insurance system, which is a mandatory system with universal coverage. With a rapidly aging population, demand for long-term care is predicted to increase, thereby affecting family time allocation, e.g., fertility decisions, in Japan. Results show that if public long-term care production is costly relative to family care provision, then increases in public care provision lower the fertility rate. If labor productivity in the public long-term care sector improves, then it increases the fertility rate by freeing caregivers’ time from family care provision. It will also increase social welfare. The effects on labor employment in the goods production sector are generally ambiguous because the increased public care provision requires more labor.