Pub Date : 2022-07-18DOI: 10.1177/00483931221096401
I. Jarvie
Three main conflicts between Popper and Agassi are discussed. Over the ethics of hard work which in reality turns out to be over perfectionism and optimism. Over the role of metaphysics in science. Over methodological individualism where is it argued that Popper's views are contradictory and that Agassi' Institutionalism prevails.
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Pub Date : 2022-07-18DOI: 10.1177/00483931221115345
N. Bulle
In contrast to dominant approaches to human reason involving essentially a logical and instrumental conception of rationality easily modeled by artificial intelligence mechanisms, I argue that the specific capacities of the human mind are meta-analytic in nature, understood as irreducible to the analytic or the logical, or else the computational. Firstly, the assumption of a meta-analytical level of rationality is derived from key insights developed in various branches of the social sciences. This meta-analytical level is then inferred from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. On these bases, and with the help of psychological approaches to consciousness, I argue that human rationality may be characterized as the capacity to make meaningful use of signs.
{"title":"Rationality As A Meta-Analytical Capacity of the Human Mind: From the Social Sciences to Gödel","authors":"N. Bulle","doi":"10.1177/00483931221115345","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221115345","url":null,"abstract":"In contrast to dominant approaches to human reason involving essentially a logical and instrumental conception of rationality easily modeled by artificial intelligence mechanisms, I argue that the specific capacities of the human mind are meta-analytic in nature, understood as irreducible to the analytic or the logical, or else the computational. Firstly, the assumption of a meta-analytical level of rationality is derived from key insights developed in various branches of the social sciences. This meta-analytical level is then inferred from Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. On these bases, and with the help of psychological approaches to consciousness, I argue that human rationality may be characterized as the capacity to make meaningful use of signs.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45857750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-09DOI: 10.1177/00483931221096468
M. Segre
Agassi has undertaken the challenge of performing a microanalysis of the works of several scientists, pointing out areas of complexity, raising questions, and criticizing current histories of science. Among the topics he has tackled are Bacon’s philosophy of science, Boyle’s ideology, the rationale of Galileo’s work, Newton’s declared methodology—influential, but misleading—, Faraday’s emancipatory enterprise; and the roots of the quantum revolution. He attempts to reconstruct what scientists did in the immediate context, rather than what they said they did, and highlights difficulties and points of scepticism. Agassi considers many neglected factors that influenced science, taking in the metaphysical, social, anthropological, and even psychological spheres.
{"title":"Agassi’s Contribution to the History of Science","authors":"M. Segre","doi":"10.1177/00483931221096468","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221096468","url":null,"abstract":"Agassi has undertaken the challenge of performing a microanalysis of the works of several scientists, pointing out areas of complexity, raising questions, and criticizing current histories of science. Among the topics he has tackled are Bacon’s philosophy of science, Boyle’s ideology, the rationale of Galileo’s work, Newton’s declared methodology—influential, but misleading—, Faraday’s emancipatory enterprise; and the roots of the quantum revolution. He attempts to reconstruct what scientists did in the immediate context, rather than what they said they did, and highlights difficulties and points of scepticism. Agassi considers many neglected factors that influenced science, taking in the metaphysical, social, anthropological, and even psychological spheres.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43693120","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-05DOI: 10.1177/00483931221096408
W. Berkson
Joseph Agassi's distinction and characterization of science, applied science, and technology—with invention connecting applied science and technology—has been a signal contribution. His theory of science, though, is flawed by his rejection of any role for corroboration, when corroboration in fact has guided researchers in various ways. His later, more extensive discussions of these issues, unfortunately have not advanced on his important early work.
{"title":"Agassi on Technology","authors":"W. Berkson","doi":"10.1177/00483931221096408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221096408","url":null,"abstract":"Joseph Agassi's distinction and characterization of science, applied science, and technology—with invention connecting applied science and technology—has been a signal contribution. His theory of science, though, is flawed by his rejection of any role for corroboration, when corroboration in fact has guided researchers in various ways. His later, more extensive discussions of these issues, unfortunately have not advanced on his important early work.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42416648","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-01DOI: 10.1177/00483931221096402
R. Sassower
The philosophical principles guiding the pedagogy of Critical Rationalism emphasize the autonomy of individual students, the democratic organization of learning institutions, and a workshop setting where mutual respect is observed by so-called masters and apprentices. This article critically outlines what undergirds this approach to pedagogy and casts some doubt on the potential of operationalizing these ideas on a grand scale and the potential psychological toll that might be exacted from both teachers and students.
{"title":"The Pedagogical Perils and Promises of Critical Rationalism","authors":"R. Sassower","doi":"10.1177/00483931221096402","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221096402","url":null,"abstract":"The philosophical principles guiding the pedagogy of Critical Rationalism emphasize the autonomy of individual students, the democratic organization of learning institutions, and a workshop setting where mutual respect is observed by so-called masters and apprentices. This article critically outlines what undergirds this approach to pedagogy and casts some doubt on the potential of operationalizing these ideas on a grand scale and the potential psychological toll that might be exacted from both teachers and students.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48138640","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-30DOI: 10.1177/00483931221100424
Joseph Agassi
{"title":"Comment on Wettersten","authors":"Joseph Agassi","doi":"10.1177/00483931221100424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221100424","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48304801","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-06-17DOI: 10.1177/00483931221109000
M. Hammersley
I welcome Mike Lynch’s response to my article and thank him for it. It is, perhaps, necessary to reiterate that the article was not primarily about ethnomethodology, or even about ethnomethodological work in Science and Technology Studies (STS), but about a particular line of argument – what can crudely be called radical constructionism – which has long been part of STS and continues to be influential in some quarters there, as Lynch acknowledges. My discussion of ethnomethodology in the article pointed to a parallel between this line of argument and some ethnomethodological sources; this probably stemming from the influence of the latter on the former. I have written about ethnomethodology itself at length elsewhere, in publications referenced in the article (for example Hammersley 2019). Lynch claims that I ‘lump [...] ethnomethodology together with latter-day constructionism in the anti-representationalist camp.’ I tried to make clear that I was referring to the work of some ethnomethodologists, rather than to ethnomethodology as a whole. He questions my interpretation of a quotation from Coopmans et al. (2014, 2) but what he presents as an alternative is his
{"title":"Reply to Michael Lynch’s Comment on “Is Representation a ‘Folk’ Term?”","authors":"M. Hammersley","doi":"10.1177/00483931221109000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221109000","url":null,"abstract":"I welcome Mike Lynch’s response to my article and thank him for it. It is, perhaps, necessary to reiterate that the article was not primarily about ethnomethodology, or even about ethnomethodological work in Science and Technology Studies (STS), but about a particular line of argument – what can crudely be called radical constructionism – which has long been part of STS and continues to be influential in some quarters there, as Lynch acknowledges. My discussion of ethnomethodology in the article pointed to a parallel between this line of argument and some ethnomethodological sources; this probably stemming from the influence of the latter on the former. I have written about ethnomethodology itself at length elsewhere, in publications referenced in the article (for example Hammersley 2019). Lynch claims that I ‘lump [...] ethnomethodology together with latter-day constructionism in the anti-representationalist camp.’ I tried to make clear that I was referring to the work of some ethnomethodologists, rather than to ethnomethodology as a whole. He questions my interpretation of a quotation from Coopmans et al. (2014, 2) but what he presents as an alternative is his","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-06-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49411449","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-24DOI: 10.1177/00483931221091555
M. Lynch
Hammersley asserts that “radical” strands of ethnomethodology and constructionism in science and technology studies (STS) take an anti-representationalist approach which denies that “science produces representations referring to objects or processes that exist independently of it.” In this ‘Comment,’ I argue that ethnomethodology is distinct from both constructionist and post-constructionist research programs in STS, and that Hammersley presents a binary choice between being for or against the general proposition that scientific representations correspond to independent realities. He suggests that STS studies should “suspend” the philosophical question of whether scientific representations correspond to their worldly referents. Perhaps this is good advice for proponents of STS who promote a “turn to ontology” or propose to do “empirical philosophy,” but ethnomethodologists take a deflationary approach to the topics of philosophical inquiry.
{"title":"Comment on Martin Hammersley, “Is ‘Representation’ a Folk Term?”","authors":"M. Lynch","doi":"10.1177/00483931221091555","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221091555","url":null,"abstract":"Hammersley asserts that “radical” strands of ethnomethodology and constructionism in science and technology studies (STS) take an anti-representationalist approach which denies that “science produces representations referring to objects or processes that exist independently of it.” In this ‘Comment,’ I argue that ethnomethodology is distinct from both constructionist and post-constructionist research programs in STS, and that Hammersley presents a binary choice between being for or against the general proposition that scientific representations correspond to independent realities. He suggests that STS studies should “suspend” the philosophical question of whether scientific representations correspond to their worldly referents. Perhaps this is good advice for proponents of STS who promote a “turn to ontology” or propose to do “empirical philosophy,” but ethnomethodologists take a deflationary approach to the topics of philosophical inquiry.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46588467","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-24DOI: 10.1177/00483931221091536
Terry Goode
{"title":"Book Review","authors":"Terry Goode","doi":"10.1177/00483931221091536","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221091536","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44456024","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-05-23DOI: 10.1177/00483931221080999
B. Green
In terms of the distinction between relationalist and substantialist philosophies of science opened up by American pragmatist thinkers like Dewey and Bentley, Bentham’s social ontology is relationalist and anti-substantialist. When the ontology is combined with his emphasis on ordinary language as the basis of social reality, it is seen to have thematic connections to later developments in social science such as social constructionism, social phenomenology, ethnomethodology and, due to its intent to critically question-received fictions, to neo-Marxian and other concerns about objectivation and reification. Also, by re-reading Bentham’s theory of fictions as a theory of vernacular language habits, it can be shown to have empirical relevance for the sociology of language.
{"title":"Jeremy Bentham’s Social Ontology: Fictionality, Factuality and Language Critique","authors":"B. Green","doi":"10.1177/00483931221080999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221080999","url":null,"abstract":"In terms of the distinction between relationalist and substantialist philosophies of science opened up by American pragmatist thinkers like Dewey and Bentley, Bentham’s social ontology is relationalist and anti-substantialist. When the ontology is combined with his emphasis on ordinary language as the basis of social reality, it is seen to have thematic connections to later developments in social science such as social constructionism, social phenomenology, ethnomethodology and, due to its intent to critically question-received fictions, to neo-Marxian and other concerns about objectivation and reification. Also, by re-reading Bentham’s theory of fictions as a theory of vernacular language habits, it can be shown to have empirical relevance for the sociology of language.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-05-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49161579","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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