Pub Date : 2022-11-22DOI: 10.1177/00483931221128513
Lydia Amir
This paper presents Agassi’s views of morality and ethics. Agassi proposes a non-reductive psychological theory of moral judgments, complemented by duties, and a psychological hypothesis regarding the psychological and social conditions that invite openness to criticism. His opposition to moralism, his objection to justification, his emphasis on red lines and grey areas, and his rejection of abstract moral debates in favor of public moralism result in a distinct approach to moral philosophy that is in conflict with most of the mainstream work in this field. Following Socrates, he takes education for autonomy as the critical rationalist life-style.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-20DOI: 10.1177/00483931221128508
N. Laor
Joseph Agassi, together with Yehuda Fried, presented the paradoxes of paranoia and proposed to explain and solve them by introducing innovative diagnostic criteria for psychosis as reflecting a specific kind of rationality. Their ethical-clinical framework however, discouraged discussion of placing impositions on the mentally ill, even when in danger. According to these very criteria, Agassi’s institutional individualism framework renders paranoiacs defective in autonomy. Introducing the idea of degrees of autonomy as a guiding principle for research and practice will promote responsible commitment to the mentally ill and to all other persons in society.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-19DOI: 10.1177/00483931221128516
S. Gattei
In Towards an Historiography of Science (1963) and in other related works spanning over his entire career, Agassi presents his wide-ranging and original understanding of the history of science. It emerges from the criticism of two distinctive approaches, each informed by the uncritical acceptance, on the part of historians, of two philosophies of science: inductivism (scientific theories emerge from facts), and conventionalism (scientific theories are mathematical frameworks for classifying facts). Both produce unsatisfactory historical reconstructions, in which errors are either concealed or condemned. Popper’s philosophy, by contrast, allows for a picture in which science grows from the recognition and criticism of our best and wisest errors.
{"title":"Joseph Agassi’s Critical Historiography of Science","authors":"S. Gattei","doi":"10.1177/00483931221128516","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221128516","url":null,"abstract":"In Towards an Historiography of Science (1963) and in other related works spanning over his entire career, Agassi presents his wide-ranging and original understanding of the history of science. It emerges from the criticism of two distinctive approaches, each informed by the uncritical acceptance, on the part of historians, of two philosophies of science: inductivism (scientific theories emerge from facts), and conventionalism (scientific theories are mathematical frameworks for classifying facts). Both produce unsatisfactory historical reconstructions, in which errors are either concealed or condemned. Popper’s philosophy, by contrast, allows for a picture in which science grows from the recognition and criticism of our best and wisest errors.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46555416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1177/00483931221128509
Chen Yehezkely
Agassi’s chief contribution to the application of critical rationalism to political science is his claim that civic nationhood is a minimum requirement of democracy. This usually comes with the qualification that it is so, not as a matter of principle, but as a matter of contingency: it is an operative minimum requirement.
{"title":"All we Are Saying: Joseph Agassi’s Application of Critical Rationalism to Political Science","authors":"Chen Yehezkely","doi":"10.1177/00483931221128509","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221128509","url":null,"abstract":"Agassi’s chief contribution to the application of critical rationalism to political science is his claim that civic nationhood is a minimum requirement of democracy. This usually comes with the qualification that it is so, not as a matter of principle, but as a matter of contingency: it is an operative minimum requirement.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42891613","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1177/00483931221128514
J. Shearmur
This paper discusses Agassi’s critique of Popper’s theory of the “empirical basis”. It argues that Popper’s theory should be interpreted with emphasis on its realism and anti-subjectivism, and as stressing a tentative inter-subjective consensus as to what is observed when tests are made. It agrees with Agassi’s critique of “sensationalism”, disagrees that there are residues of “sensationalism” in Popper’s approach, and argues that Popper’s view should be supplemented by a tentative realist metaphysics.
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Pub Date : 2022-10-17DOI: 10.1177/00483931221100423
J. Wettersten
Critical rationalists cannot reconcile their falibilism with the demand of logic for universality. Popper tried, but failed, to achieve universality in logic without proof. Attempts to find a limited approach to logic as ‘logics of’ have failed to find a coherent critical rationalist alternative. Critical rationalists take Tarski’s logic to be the best of logic today. But Tarski renders logic as close to justification, and thereby universality, as possible. A fallibilist version of Tarskian logic can yield a critical rationalist alternative: It provides rules for solving problems in linguistic contexts, but also discovers mistakes by discovering errors in logical inference.
{"title":"One Step Forward From Agassi’s Inquiries on Logic: A Fallibilist Logic for Critical Rationalism","authors":"J. Wettersten","doi":"10.1177/00483931221100423","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221100423","url":null,"abstract":"Critical rationalists cannot reconcile their falibilism with the demand of logic for universality. Popper tried, but failed, to achieve universality in logic without proof. Attempts to find a limited approach to logic as ‘logics of’ have failed to find a coherent critical rationalist alternative. Critical rationalists take Tarski’s logic to be the best of logic today. But Tarski renders logic as close to justification, and thereby universality, as possible. A fallibilist version of Tarskian logic can yield a critical rationalist alternative: It provides rules for solving problems in linguistic contexts, but also discovers mistakes by discovering errors in logical inference.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41779706","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-12DOI: 10.1177/00483931221128550
J. Agassi
Reply to Nathaniel Laor Nathaniel Laor discusses the work of the late Yehuda Fried and myself on mental illness. I cannot speak for the late Fried. Let me report, however, about the way we cooperated. He suffered from a severe writing block. We met in my place and talked. I took notes while we spoke and he repeatedly interrupted me, asking me to delete or at least alter what I was writing. In response, I asked him to explain his requests and wrote down his explanations. This led to further protests, and so on repeatedly. This is how our output took shape. Our initial contribution was our refusal to offer a definition of our subject matter (as tradition requires). Instead, we declared the physician’s task to help given patients. The fashion of the day was anti-psychiatry, the contention that mental patients use language idiosyncratically. This is not a diagnosis, at least not yet: why is this idiosyncrasy problematic? We do not consider patients strangers who speak languages different from ours; we do not consider all verbal variants sick. Fried and I attempted to comprehend the suffering of mental patients. Obviously, the suffering here involves an idiosyncratic use of a shared dictionary. We took it for granted that mental patients use of language is an attempt to express the pain of facing impossible (intellectual) tasks that they take seriously. Consequently, we took the paradoxes of paranoia seriously, wording them as best we could, and trying to offer hypotheses that might resolve them. We surmised that the taking seriously of impossible intellectual tasks makes all incipient cases of mental illness pure paranoia (paranoia vera). This is a hypothesis: the initial stage of every case of mental illness is paranoia. Now the standard diagnosis of mental illness does not accord with this hypothesis. This is so, we have surmised, because usually
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Pub Date : 2022-10-10DOI: 10.1177/00483931221121126
Nimrod Bar‐Am
In this paper I offer a brief summary of Popper’s views on metaphysics. I then explain Agassi’s criticism of those views, and why I regard them as fruitful improvements.
{"title":"Metaphysical Perspectives and Their Role in Science","authors":"Nimrod Bar‐Am","doi":"10.1177/00483931221121126","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221121126","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper I offer a brief summary of Popper’s views on metaphysics. I then explain Agassi’s criticism of those views, and why I regard them as fruitful improvements.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49514950","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-08DOI: 10.1177/00483931221126912
J. Söderberg, Olle Bjurö
The surge of post-truth calls for a reassessment of psychoanalytic and ideology critique-approaches in the social sciences. Both traditions are dismissed by the principal antagonists in the post-truth debate, the “positivist” defenders of science and the “post-modern” critics of science. The antagonists share a predisposition towards anti-humanism, refusal to distinguish between the latent and the manifest, and adherence to descriptive methods. In order to substantiate these claims, the article investigates commonalities between B.F. Skinner and Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. The article concludes that the allegedly “pseudo-scientific” or “metaphysical” concepts of Subject and Truth, pivotal to both psychoanalysis and ideology critique-approaches, need to be rehabilitated in response to the challenge of post-truth.
{"title":"The Return of the Repressed: Subject, Truth and Critique in Times of Post-Truth","authors":"J. Söderberg, Olle Bjurö","doi":"10.1177/00483931221126912","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00483931221126912","url":null,"abstract":"The surge of post-truth calls for a reassessment of psychoanalytic and ideology critique-approaches in the social sciences. Both traditions are dismissed by the principal antagonists in the post-truth debate, the “positivist” defenders of science and the “post-modern” critics of science. The antagonists share a predisposition towards anti-humanism, refusal to distinguish between the latent and the manifest, and adherence to descriptive methods. In order to substantiate these claims, the article investigates commonalities between B.F. Skinner and Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. The article concludes that the allegedly “pseudo-scientific” or “metaphysical” concepts of Subject and Truth, pivotal to both psychoanalysis and ideology critique-approaches, need to be rehabilitated in response to the challenge of post-truth.","PeriodicalId":46776,"journal":{"name":"Philosophy of the Social Sciences","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45199624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-10-06DOI: 10.1177/00483931221121673
J. Agassi
“The differences between Popper and Agassi come down to emphasis, to priorities rather than to views that are true or false. Take the issue of hard work. Both Popper and Agassi worked very hard.... Agassi... insists that he does not accept the ethics of hard work, does not accept, that is, that we have a duty to work as hard as we can. He sees “hard work” as a phrase meaning “slog”, meaning work you do not enjoy but which you force yourself to do. This seems to be a willful misunderstanding. Popper was not recommending ditch-digging or toilet cleaning when he counselled hard work. The work Popper was referring to was scholarship and scholarship can of course be immensely enjoyable to the scholar. Popper was a perfectionist and a pessimist. ... His pessimism shows in his view that no matter how careful one is there will always be misprints.”
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