Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2199580
Kris Shrishak
ABSTRACT AI systems are harming people. Harms such as discrimination and manipulation are reported in the media, which is the primary source of information on AI incidents. Reporting AI near-misses and learning from how a serious incident was prevented would help avoid future incidents. The problem is that ongoing efforts to catalog AI incidents rely on media reports—which does not prevent incidents. Developers, designers, and deployers of AI systems should be incentivized to report and share information on near misses. Such an AI near-miss reporting system does not have to be designed from scratch; the aviation industry’s voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive approach to such reporting can be used as a guide. AI incidents are accumulating, and the sooner such a near-miss reporting system is established, the better.
{"title":"How to deal with an AI near-miss: Look to the skies","authors":"Kris Shrishak","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2199580","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2199580","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT AI systems are harming people. Harms such as discrimination and manipulation are reported in the media, which is the primary source of information on AI incidents. Reporting AI near-misses and learning from how a serious incident was prevented would help avoid future incidents. The problem is that ongoing efforts to catalog AI incidents rely on media reports—which does not prevent incidents. Developers, designers, and deployers of AI systems should be incentivized to report and share information on near misses. Such an AI near-miss reporting system does not have to be designed from scratch; the aviation industry’s voluntary, confidential, and non-punitive approach to such reporting can be used as a guide. AI incidents are accumulating, and the sooner such a near-miss reporting system is established, the better.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"166 - 169"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48916198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2199567
D. Drollette
ABSTRACT The 1989 Montreal Protocol that banned chlorofluorocarbons is probably the best example of international cooperation to resolve a common problem.
摘要1989年《蒙特利尔议定书》禁止使用氟氯化碳，这可能是国际合作解决共同问题的最佳范例。
{"title":"Interview with Susan Solomon: The healing of the ozone hole, and what else we can learn from atmospheric near-misses","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2199567","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2199567","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The 1989 Montreal Protocol that banned chlorofluorocarbons is probably the best example of international cooperation to resolve a common problem.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"142 - 147"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49125837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2199565
C. Tinsley
ABSTRACT Many, if not most, man-made disasters are preceded by near-misses, where something goes awry but lucky circumstances prevent things from going truly and irreparably wrong. Organizations can learn from these near-misses and make changes necessary to prevent future disasters, but often they do not. This can sometimes be the fault of dysfunctional leadership, but there are also more basic psychological factors at work.
{"title":"Lessons learned in blood: Why we fail to use near-misses to prevent man-made disasters","authors":"C. Tinsley","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2199565","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2199565","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Many, if not most, man-made disasters are preceded by near-misses, where something goes awry but lucky circumstances prevent things from going truly and irreparably wrong. Organizations can learn from these near-misses and make changes necessary to prevent future disasters, but often they do not. This can sometimes be the fault of dysfunctional leadership, but there are also more basic psychological factors at work.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"137 - 141"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45167914","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2202535
D. Drollette
{"title":"Interview with Eric Schlosser: Why we can’t trust the government’s figures about nuclear close calls","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2202535","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2202535","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"148 - 154"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43800278","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2199577
Thomas Fraise, Kjølv Egeland
ABSTRACT Able Archer 83, a NATO nuclear exercise conducted in the fall of 1983, has been the subject of considerable debate in recent decades. While some analysts have argued that the superpowers came close to blows due to Soviet fears that the exercise was a ruse meant to disguise a NATO attack, revisionists have maintained that the danger associated with Able Archer 83 has been seriously overstated. In this article, the authors review the scholarship, take stock of the evidence, and discuss some of the challenges of studying nuclear history and close calls. They argue that further research is needed to determine how close of a nuclear call Able Archer 83 actually was and conclude that the case highlights the uncertainty inherent to nuclear policy making.
{"title":"Able Archer: How close of a call was it?","authors":"Thomas Fraise, Kjølv Egeland","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2199577","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2199577","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Able Archer 83, a NATO nuclear exercise conducted in the fall of 1983, has been the subject of considerable debate in recent decades. While some analysts have argued that the superpowers came close to blows due to Soviet fears that the exercise was a ruse meant to disguise a NATO attack, revisionists have maintained that the danger associated with Able Archer 83 has been seriously overstated. In this article, the authors review the scholarship, take stock of the evidence, and discuss some of the challenges of studying nuclear history and close calls. They argue that further research is needed to determine how close of a nuclear call Able Archer 83 actually was and conclude that the case highlights the uncertainty inherent to nuclear policy making.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"155 - 160"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48240255","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2199595
Maya Wang, Frederike Kaltheuner, Amanda M. Klasing
ABSTRACT As the competition between the US and China heats up in the realm of technology, the US media has been increasingly portraying it as a simplistic battle between democracy and authoritarianism. This article, however, argues that the reality is that people everywhere—including in China and the United States—are all living in an increasingly digital world where surveillance has become ubiquitous, and accountability for human rights abuses more challenging. It presents five solutions which the United States needs to take to address these challenges, and make for a more fair and equitable future.
{"title":"The future of technology: Lessons from China","authors":"Maya Wang, Frederike Kaltheuner, Amanda M. Klasing","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2199595","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2199595","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT As the competition between the US and China heats up in the realm of technology, the US media has been increasingly portraying it as a simplistic battle between democracy and authoritarianism. This article, however, argues that the reality is that people everywhere—including in China and the United States—are all living in an increasingly digital world where surveillance has become ubiquitous, and accountability for human rights abuses more challenging. It presents five solutions which the United States needs to take to address these challenges, and make for a more fair and equitable future.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"170 - 173"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42926345","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-05-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2202526
D. Drollette
Unexploded nuclear bombs still lie off American coasts, embedded in swamps, or down on the seabed. These are just a few examples of America’s 32, officially recognized “Broken Arrows”—the Pentagon’s terminology for the unintentional launches, detonations, thefts, or losses of US nuclear weapons. (Technically speaking, the Pentagon defines Broken Arrows as only the worst types of accidents and puts some similar accidents into categories such as “Bent Spear” and “Empty Quiver,” but in common parlance they are generally all lumped together as Broken Arrows.) In a vein closely related to these near-misses with disaster, there was the 1983 NATO “Able Archer” war game—a nuclear exercise that was too realistic, causing the leaders of the Soviet Union to go to high alert and possibly bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. The reasons why one should be concerned about such incidents is obvious. But the world’s close calls are not limited to the world of nuclear weapons. What happened at Fukushima, Japan, in 2011—one of the world’s best-known nuclear accidents—could correctly be called a “near-miss;” but for luck, spent fuel in the plant’s storage pool could have boiled dry and caught fire, spewing even more radiation than the power plant’s three melted reactor cores emitted, with truly dire results. Because there have been similar almost-catastrophes across our coverage areas, we’ve devoted this special issue to near-misses, close calls, and early warnings, focusing it on the lessons humanity can learn from these narrow escapes. In this issue, Eric Schlosser—the author of Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety— explains why the actual number of Broken Arrows is probably in the hundreds, rather than the official figure of 32. He also shares some declassified documents acquired under the Freedom of Information Act that contain information about accidents and incidents that shocked nuclear weapons development and safety engineers at Sandia National Laboratories. Schlosser says these and other declassified reports show that no system for safeguarding nuclear weapons will ever be 100-percent effective, and that the United States (and other nuclear weapons nations, which have their own Broken Arrows) can never completely eliminate the potential for a catastrophic nuclear error. In the article “Able Archer: How close of a call was it?” Thomas Fraise and Kjølv Egeland—experts with the Nuclear Knowledges program at the Center for International Studies in Paris—delve into just how close the superpowers came to blows, because some Soviet leaders feared that a NATO military exercise was a ruse meant to disguise a NATO attack. Lest readers think that such close calls are limited to the Cold War era, technology policy expert Kris Shrishak describes how poorly designed navigation apps employing artificial intelligence led users into greater danger during the 2017 wildfires in California. Technically, the app was
{"title":"Introduction: Near-misses, close calls, and early warnings","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2202526","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2202526","url":null,"abstract":"Unexploded nuclear bombs still lie off American coasts, embedded in swamps, or down on the seabed. These are just a few examples of America’s 32, officially recognized “Broken Arrows”—the Pentagon’s terminology for the unintentional launches, detonations, thefts, or losses of US nuclear weapons. (Technically speaking, the Pentagon defines Broken Arrows as only the worst types of accidents and puts some similar accidents into categories such as “Bent Spear” and “Empty Quiver,” but in common parlance they are generally all lumped together as Broken Arrows.) In a vein closely related to these near-misses with disaster, there was the 1983 NATO “Able Archer” war game—a nuclear exercise that was too realistic, causing the leaders of the Soviet Union to go to high alert and possibly bringing the world to the brink of nuclear war. The reasons why one should be concerned about such incidents is obvious. But the world’s close calls are not limited to the world of nuclear weapons. What happened at Fukushima, Japan, in 2011—one of the world’s best-known nuclear accidents—could correctly be called a “near-miss;” but for luck, spent fuel in the plant’s storage pool could have boiled dry and caught fire, spewing even more radiation than the power plant’s three melted reactor cores emitted, with truly dire results. Because there have been similar almost-catastrophes across our coverage areas, we’ve devoted this special issue to near-misses, close calls, and early warnings, focusing it on the lessons humanity can learn from these narrow escapes. In this issue, Eric Schlosser—the author of Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety— explains why the actual number of Broken Arrows is probably in the hundreds, rather than the official figure of 32. He also shares some declassified documents acquired under the Freedom of Information Act that contain information about accidents and incidents that shocked nuclear weapons development and safety engineers at Sandia National Laboratories. Schlosser says these and other declassified reports show that no system for safeguarding nuclear weapons will ever be 100-percent effective, and that the United States (and other nuclear weapons nations, which have their own Broken Arrows) can never completely eliminate the potential for a catastrophic nuclear error. In the article “Able Archer: How close of a call was it?” Thomas Fraise and Kjølv Egeland—experts with the Nuclear Knowledges program at the Center for International Studies in Paris—delve into just how close the superpowers came to blows, because some Soviet leaders feared that a NATO military exercise was a ruse meant to disguise a NATO attack. Lest readers think that such close calls are limited to the Cold War era, technology policy expert Kris Shrishak describes how poorly designed navigation apps employing artificial intelligence led users into greater danger during the 2017 wildfires in California. Technically, the app was ","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"135 - 136"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45518509","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180
Dominika Kunertova
ABSTRACT The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to the first large-scale, high intensity war where both sides have extensively deployed military and commercial drones. What the conflict has so far highlighted is that the frequently mentioned “game-changing effect” of drones on warfare depends on the game. Based on their category, drones produce distinctive military effects either as an extension of air power or as ammunition. Military thinking is therefore changing, making armed drones more politically acceptable. There is also reduced focus on the large armed and surveillance drones known from counterterrorism operations, as better integrated small drone scouts now serve land forces in combat. Far from being a mere security nuisance, small drones have yet to be effectively countered with air defenses. Military and dual-use export controls require adaptation to keep pace with these evolving battlefield realities. The drone lessons of the war in Ukraine thus point to many future challenges lying in wait for the international community.
{"title":"The war in Ukraine shows the game-changing effect of drones depends on the game","authors":"Dominika Kunertova","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178180","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Russian invasion of Ukraine has led to the first large-scale, high intensity war where both sides have extensively deployed military and commercial drones. What the conflict has so far highlighted is that the frequently mentioned “game-changing effect” of drones on warfare depends on the game. Based on their category, drones produce distinctive military effects either as an extension of air power or as ammunition. Military thinking is therefore changing, making armed drones more politically acceptable. There is also reduced focus on the large armed and surveillance drones known from counterterrorism operations, as better integrated small drone scouts now serve land forces in combat. Far from being a mere security nuisance, small drones have yet to be effectively countered with air defenses. Military and dual-use export controls require adaptation to keep pace with these evolving battlefield realities. The drone lessons of the war in Ukraine thus point to many future challenges lying in wait for the international community.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"95 - 102"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42130636","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178174
(Clark) Aoqi Wu
ABSTRACT For the past several decades, US policy toward China has fundamentally limited the policy options toward Taiwan. For several historical and practical reasons, mistrust of the United States remains relatively strong among the Taiwanese public. Skepticism about US intentions oscillates between fears of being abandoned and being entrapped. As Washington policymakers continue to debate Taiwan policy through the lens of US-China relations, most of the discussion focuses on how to deter China from attacking Taiwan; few are articulating the importance of reassuring Taiwan. This article sheds light on the Taiwanese sentiment toward the United States, specifically the source of mistrust of the United States, which would significantly affect the efficacy of any US policy. The intricate history of the United States and Taiwan suggests that a new and effective US policy toward Taiwan should include both credible military deterrence of China and a clear reassurance for Taiwan.
{"title":"To reassure Taiwan and deter China, the United States should learn from history","authors":"(Clark) Aoqi Wu","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178174","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178174","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT For the past several decades, US policy toward China has fundamentally limited the policy options toward Taiwan. For several historical and practical reasons, mistrust of the United States remains relatively strong among the Taiwanese public. Skepticism about US intentions oscillates between fears of being abandoned and being entrapped. As Washington policymakers continue to debate Taiwan policy through the lens of US-China relations, most of the discussion focuses on how to deter China from attacking Taiwan; few are articulating the importance of reassuring Taiwan. This article sheds light on the Taiwanese sentiment toward the United States, specifically the source of mistrust of the United States, which would significantly affect the efficacy of any US policy. The intricate history of the United States and Taiwan suggests that a new and effective US policy toward Taiwan should include both credible military deterrence of China and a clear reassurance for Taiwan.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"72 - 79"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47243247","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178176
Jingdong Yuan
ABSTRACT The changing dynamics of the Taiwan Strait necessitate a review of the United States’ “One China” policy. For more than four decades, this policy—anchored in the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and the three Joint Communiqués—has allowed Washington to maintain unofficial ties with Taipei. But China’s growing economic power, increasing military capabilities, and mounting pressure on Taiwan pose major challenges to US security commitments regarding Taiwan. In recent years, Washington has countered by attempting to pursue a multi-pronged approach while remaining under the umbrella of the One China policy framework—introducing such changes as new legislation conveying US support and commitment, engagement in high-level official exchanges, support for Taiwan’s pursuit of greater international space, and more arms sales. How these major policy changes are interpreted and implemented under the new environment imposed by China could affect Taiwan’s security, and whether a war with China can be avoided.
{"title":"The United States and stability in the Taiwan Strait","authors":"Jingdong Yuan","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178176","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178176","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The changing dynamics of the Taiwan Strait necessitate a review of the United States’ “One China” policy. For more than four decades, this policy—anchored in the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and the three Joint Communiqués—has allowed Washington to maintain unofficial ties with Taipei. But China’s growing economic power, increasing military capabilities, and mounting pressure on Taiwan pose major challenges to US security commitments regarding Taiwan. In recent years, Washington has countered by attempting to pursue a multi-pronged approach while remaining under the umbrella of the One China policy framework—introducing such changes as new legislation conveying US support and commitment, engagement in high-level official exchanges, support for Taiwan’s pursuit of greater international space, and more arms sales. How these major policy changes are interpreted and implemented under the new environment imposed by China could affect Taiwan’s security, and whether a war with China can be avoided.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"80 - 86"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45065800","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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