Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2132737
D. Drollette
{"title":"What do ordinary Russians think? Interview with a Russian independent reporter","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2132737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2132737","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"315 - 317"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45853813","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2133287
Jessica Rogers, Matt Korda, Hans M. Kristensen
ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. This edition features unique contributions from FAS Impact Fellow and international lawyer Jessica Rogers. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the topic of strategic arms control after the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026. We explore potential avenues for constructive engagement between the United States and Russia and consider how to optimally balance arms control options that are legally possible and politically feasible. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/.
{"title":"The long view: Strategic arms control after the New START Treaty","authors":"Jessica Rogers, Matt Korda, Hans M. Kristensen","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2133287","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2133287","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. This edition features unique contributions from FAS Impact Fellow and international lawyer Jessica Rogers. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the topic of strategic arms control after the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026. We explore potential avenues for constructive engagement between the United States and Russia and consider how to optimally balance arms control options that are legally possible and politically feasible. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook/.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"347 - 368"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43425588","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2132738
D. Drollette
{"title":"“It’s a different kind of world we’re living in now”: Interview with Francis Fukuyama","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2132738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2132738","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"318 - 323"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41363231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2132740
B. Harrington
ABSTRACT When most people hear the word “sanctions,” they think of formal economic and political punishments leveled at rogue regimes, like the US trade embargo against Iran, or the threatened expulsion of Hungary from the European Union. Both kinds of sanctions have been leveled against Russia since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But the past eight months have also brought a different sanctions strategy to the fore: one aimed at stigmatizing the individuals close to Putin’s regime, in hopes of shattering elite support and encouraging revolt. These sanctions, which have led to the freezing and seizure of Russian oligarchs’ assets in the West, have prompted the first murmurs of public dissent by Russian oligarchs in nearly two decades. The sanctions have consequently been effective in destabilizing Putin’s authority, cracking the façade of control that has previously deterred attempts to topple him. This article explains the sociological dynamics of this strategy, and how stigma can be effective even where legal and economic punishments fail.
{"title":"Sanctioning Russia’s oligarchs – with shame","authors":"B. Harrington","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2132740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2132740","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT When most people hear the word “sanctions,” they think of formal economic and political punishments leveled at rogue regimes, like the US trade embargo against Iran, or the threatened expulsion of Hungary from the European Union. Both kinds of sanctions have been leveled against Russia since its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. But the past eight months have also brought a different sanctions strategy to the fore: one aimed at stigmatizing the individuals close to Putin’s regime, in hopes of shattering elite support and encouraging revolt. These sanctions, which have led to the freezing and seizure of Russian oligarchs’ assets in the West, have prompted the first murmurs of public dissent by Russian oligarchs in nearly two decades. The sanctions have consequently been effective in destabilizing Putin’s authority, cracking the façade of control that has previously deterred attempts to topple him. This article explains the sociological dynamics of this strategy, and how stigma can be effective even where legal and economic punishments fail.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"329 - 333"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49182290","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-11-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2132742
Mariana Budjeryn
ABSTRACT While prosecuting its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has relied heavily on nuclear threats, turning the war in Ukraine into a dangerous nuclear crisis with profound implications for the global nuclear order and its two constitutive systems of nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. These two interconnected systems, each aiming to manage nuclear possession and reduce the risk of nuclear use, are at once complimentary and contradictory. While tensions between these systems are not new, the war in Ukraine exacerbates them in unprecedented ways. The system of nuclear deterrence seems to be proving its worth by inducing restraint on Russia and NATO, while the system of restraint is undermined by demonstrating what happens to a country not protected by nuclear deterrence. The latter lesson is particularly vivid given Ukraine’s decision to forgo a nuclear option in 1994 in exchange for security assurances from nuclear powers. Russia’s use of nuclear threats as an enabler for escalation and the specter of Russian tactical nuclear use against Ukraine goes well beyond its declared nuclear doctrine. The outcome of the war in Ukraine thus has critical importance for deciding the value of nuclear weapons in global security architecture and for resolving the conundrum between the systems of deterrence and restraint.
{"title":"Distressing a system in distress: global nuclear order and Russia’s war against Ukraine","authors":"Mariana Budjeryn","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2132742","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2132742","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT While prosecuting its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has relied heavily on nuclear threats, turning the war in Ukraine into a dangerous nuclear crisis with profound implications for the global nuclear order and its two constitutive systems of nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. These two interconnected systems, each aiming to manage nuclear possession and reduce the risk of nuclear use, are at once complimentary and contradictory. While tensions between these systems are not new, the war in Ukraine exacerbates them in unprecedented ways. The system of nuclear deterrence seems to be proving its worth by inducing restraint on Russia and NATO, while the system of restraint is undermined by demonstrating what happens to a country not protected by nuclear deterrence. The latter lesson is particularly vivid given Ukraine’s decision to forgo a nuclear option in 1994 in exchange for security assurances from nuclear powers. Russia’s use of nuclear threats as an enabler for escalation and the specter of Russian tactical nuclear use against Ukraine goes well beyond its declared nuclear doctrine. The outcome of the war in Ukraine thus has critical importance for deciding the value of nuclear weapons in global security architecture and for resolving the conundrum between the systems of deterrence and restraint.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"339 - 346"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41976949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2109338
(Clark) Aoqi Wu
ABSTRACT The crisis today in Ukraine between Russia and the West has uncanny parallels to an often-overlooked Cold War conflict between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States known as “The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958” or “The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis” – which some analysts have referred to as the first serious nuclear crisis. In addition to worries about nuclear escalation, there are other similarities: Russia and China viewed themselves, then and now, as exceptional nations, superior to a decadent, materialist America thought to be in decline – but still carrying dangerous military clout. Faced with a strong West, the leaders of China and Russia in the 1950s tried to present a united, Sino-Russian public front, even if their two countries were fundamentally split over the issues that led to the Taiwan Straits Crisis. If the past is any guide, then despite economic pressure from the United States and the loss of international reputation, China is unlikely to ever join the US-led sanctions against Russia. As the conflict deepens, both dictators’ assessments of the strength and intentions of the United States might begin to diverge, opening a way for their rivals to drive a wedge between them.
{"title":"What a Cold War crisis over Taiwan could tell us about China-Russia relations today","authors":"(Clark) Aoqi Wu","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2109338","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2109338","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The crisis today in Ukraine between Russia and the West has uncanny parallels to an often-overlooked Cold War conflict between China, the Soviet Union, and the United States known as “The Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1958” or “The Second Taiwan Straits Crisis” – which some analysts have referred to as the first serious nuclear crisis. In addition to worries about nuclear escalation, there are other similarities: Russia and China viewed themselves, then and now, as exceptional nations, superior to a decadent, materialist America thought to be in decline – but still carrying dangerous military clout. Faced with a strong West, the leaders of China and Russia in the 1950s tried to present a united, Sino-Russian public front, even if their two countries were fundamentally split over the issues that led to the Taiwan Straits Crisis. If the past is any guide, then despite economic pressure from the United States and the loss of international reputation, China is unlikely to ever join the US-led sanctions against Russia. As the conflict deepens, both dictators’ assessments of the strength and intentions of the United States might begin to diverge, opening a way for their rivals to drive a wedge between them.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"261 - 267"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45575630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2109322
D. Drollette
Michel Paradis teaches courses at Columbia University Law School on national security law, international law, the constitution, and the law of war, and is a fellow at the Center on National Security and the National Institute for Military Justice. He is also a senior attorney with the US Defense Department’s Military Commissions Defense Organization, where he has been helping to wrap up the situation with the very last of the detainees of Guantanamo Bay, who are still in legal limbo. (People seem to forget that there are 37 people still detained there.) He was part of a Bar Association presentation last December called “Guantanamo Bay, Torture and Drones: Are We Countering Violent Extremism . . . or Fueling It?” In this interview, Paradis talks with the Bulletin’s executive editor, Dan Drollette Jr., about the the law and the use – and mis-use – of high-tech surveillance in a democracy. Paradis wrote a book in 2020 titled “Last Mission to Tokyo,” about the war crimes trials in the Pacific after World War II. He received his PhD from Oxford University and his law degree from Fordham Law School in New York. (Editor’s note: This interview has been condensed and edited for brevity and clarity.)
{"title":"Smart devices, cell phone cameras, social shaming and the loss of the right to a private self: Interview with Michel Paradis about the modern panopticon","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2109322","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2109322","url":null,"abstract":"Michel Paradis teaches courses at Columbia University Law School on national security law, international law, the constitution, and the law of war, and is a fellow at the Center on National Security and the National Institute for Military Justice. He is also a senior attorney with the US Defense Department’s Military Commissions Defense Organization, where he has been helping to wrap up the situation with the very last of the detainees of Guantanamo Bay, who are still in legal limbo. (People seem to forget that there are 37 people still detained there.) He was part of a Bar Association presentation last December called “Guantanamo Bay, Torture and Drones: Are We Countering Violent Extremism . . . or Fueling It?” In this interview, Paradis talks with the Bulletin’s executive editor, Dan Drollette Jr., about the the law and the use – and mis-use – of high-tech surveillance in a democracy. Paradis wrote a book in 2020 titled “Last Mission to Tokyo,” about the war crimes trials in the Pacific after World War II. He received his PhD from Oxford University and his law degree from Fordham Law School in New York. (Editor’s note: This interview has been condensed and edited for brevity and clarity.)","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"243 - 248"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43838660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2109339
D. Drollette
{"title":"“When it comes to Russia, it’s like living in a volcano”: An interview with Farida Rustamova, an independent reporter working in Putin’s Russia","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2109339","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2109339","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"268 - 272"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49324731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2109318
D. Drollette
{"title":"Introduction: The brave new world of the high-tech surveillance state","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2109318","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2109318","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"237 - 238"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46138402","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-09-03DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2109319
D. Drollette
As readers may know from media exposés, the Chinese government has already implemented an authoritarian surveillance state in its province of Xinjiang, where the Uyghur Muslim minority is constantly subject to cameras, facial recognition algorithms, biometrics, abundant checkpoints, big data, and constant screening – making them live inside what some have called a “virtual cage.” Some of this technology has spread to other parts of the country, in one form or another. But what may have gotten lost in the shuffle is that there is no reason for the misuse of these technologies to be confined to communist China. One of the first researchers to become aware of the size and extent of this surveillance apparatus was Maya Wang, whose ground-breaking research on China’s use of technology for mass surveillance has helped to galvanize international attention on these developments. In this interview with the Bulletin’s Dan Drollette Jr., Wang explains how she learned of what was going on, what technologies are being used, and the thinking behind its implementation on the part of the Chinese government – and how this techno-authoritarianism could be a taste of what is to come.
{"title":"The high-tech surveillance state is not restricted to China: Interview with Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2109319","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2109319","url":null,"abstract":"As readers may know from media exposés, the Chinese government has already implemented an authoritarian surveillance state in its province of Xinjiang, where the Uyghur Muslim minority is constantly subject to cameras, facial recognition algorithms, biometrics, abundant checkpoints, big data, and constant screening – making them live inside what some have called a “virtual cage.” Some of this technology has spread to other parts of the country, in one form or another. But what may have gotten lost in the shuffle is that there is no reason for the misuse of these technologies to be confined to communist China. One of the first researchers to become aware of the size and extent of this surveillance apparatus was Maya Wang, whose ground-breaking research on China’s use of technology for mass surveillance has helped to galvanize international attention on these developments. In this interview with the Bulletin’s Dan Drollette Jr., Wang explains how she learned of what was going on, what technologies are being used, and the thinking behind its implementation on the part of the Chinese government – and how this techno-authoritarianism could be a taste of what is to come.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"78 1","pages":"239 - 242"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2022-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48884147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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