Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178179
Jay A. Tilden, D. Boyd
ABSTRACT Recently declassified material and other information that has never before appeared in the public domain allow the authors to explain some of the workings of the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST)—often one of the first units to respond whenever there is a nuclear incident, whether it involves a nuclear reactor or a nuclear weapon. Long the subject of mystique, NEST is often depicted on screen as a secretive government unit with highly specialized capabilities and harrowing missions. The reality is at once more mundane and more remarkable. Formed in the 1970s in response to a spate of nuclear blackmail attempts, NEST has been at the center of every major nuclear event from the accident at Three Mile Island to the disaster at Fukushima. Other operations, unknown to the public, are described here for perhaps the first time. Historical accounts provide a glimpse into the breadth of the organization’s missions, from neutralizing terrorist nuclear devices to responding to nuclear reactor accidents. The diversity of NEST’s missions and the uniqueness of its scientific capabilities set the unit apart as a national asset.
{"title":"Nerds, ninjas, and neutrons: The story of the Nuclear Emergency Support Team","authors":"Jay A. Tilden, D. Boyd","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178179","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178179","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Recently declassified material and other information that has never before appeared in the public domain allow the authors to explain some of the workings of the Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST)—often one of the first units to respond whenever there is a nuclear incident, whether it involves a nuclear reactor or a nuclear weapon. Long the subject of mystique, NEST is often depicted on screen as a secretive government unit with highly specialized capabilities and harrowing missions. The reality is at once more mundane and more remarkable. Formed in the 1970s in response to a spate of nuclear blackmail attempts, NEST has been at the center of every major nuclear event from the accident at Three Mile Island to the disaster at Fukushima. Other operations, unknown to the public, are described here for perhaps the first time. Historical accounts provide a glimpse into the breadth of the organization’s missions, from neutralizing terrorist nuclear devices to responding to nuclear reactor accidents. The diversity of NEST’s missions and the uniqueness of its scientific capabilities set the unit apart as a national asset.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"87 - 94"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45461970","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178166
L. Diamond, James O. Ellis
ABSTRACT There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms “reunification.” Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a “porcupine strategy” of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security.
{"title":"Deterring a Chinese military attack on Taiwan","authors":"L. Diamond, James O. Ellis","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178166","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT There is a growing risk of a military attack on Taiwan by mainland China (otherwise known as the People’s Republic of China, or PRC) to achieve what the latter terms “reunification.” Taiwan, the US, and Japan must urgently and interactively prepare for this contingency—which is also the best way of deterring it. Taiwan must increase military spending (as it has begun to do), with an emphasis on a “porcupine strategy” of lots of distributed, mobile, survivable, affordable, and lethal weapons. The US must increase its military deployments and joint exercises in the region, again emphasizing the types of weapons that can survive a preemptive PRC attack and counter a Chinese blockade or amphibious invading force. Japan will double defense spending over the next five years in a welcome and transformative move, but effective deterrence requires that it also signal that the collective defense of Taiwan against a military attack is existential for its own security.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"65 - 71"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42356457","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178161
R. Garwin, F. V. von Hippel
ABSTRACT The United States is in a developing military confrontation with China over Taiwan. China has built long-distance precision strike missiles to prevent US Navy task forces from participating effectively. The early Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and United States over West Berlin provides a relevant precedent. There is a significant probability a war between China and the United States could escalate to nuclear threats or even use. Recently, China has launched a major buildup of its nuclear forces. It is urgent that the two countries launch talks on nuclear arms control, both to prevent a nuclear arms race and to reassure each other that both want to avoid a nuclear conflict. Citizens should reengage with their governments to urge alternatives to a new nuclear arms race, and US scientists should brainstorm with their Chinese counterparts about nuclear risks and risk reduction.
{"title":"How to avoid nuclear war with China","authors":"R. Garwin, F. V. von Hippel","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178161","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178161","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The United States is in a developing military confrontation with China over Taiwan. China has built long-distance precision strike missiles to prevent US Navy task forces from participating effectively. The early Cold War confrontation between the Soviet Union and United States over West Berlin provides a relevant precedent. There is a significant probability a war between China and the United States could escalate to nuclear threats or even use. Recently, China has launched a major buildup of its nuclear forces. It is urgent that the two countries launch talks on nuclear arms control, both to prevent a nuclear arms race and to reassure each other that both want to avoid a nuclear conflict. Citizens should reengage with their governments to urge alternatives to a new nuclear arms race, and US scientists should brainstorm with their Chinese counterparts about nuclear risks and risk reduction.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"57 - 64"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46980009","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178707
L. Goldstein
ABSTRACT What is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world teeters on the brink of catastrophe as the Taiwan issue threatens to precipitate a war between the two nuclear-armed superpowers of China and the United States. Beijing demonstrated its determination to pursue unification with Taiwan during August 2022 by shooting ballistic missiles over the island. Meanwhile, the Ukraine War has increased Washington’s resolve to confront perceived Chinese aggression. There are many dimensions to the unfolding crisis over Taiwan’s future status—and the wisest US policy is one of realism and restraint in order to avert a disaster of global proportions.
{"title":"The trouble with Taiwan","authors":"L. Goldstein","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178707","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178707","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT What is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world teeters on the brink of catastrophe as the Taiwan issue threatens to precipitate a war between the two nuclear-armed superpowers of China and the United States. Beijing demonstrated its determination to pursue unification with Taiwan during August 2022 by shooting ballistic missiles over the island. Meanwhile, the Ukraine War has increased Washington’s resolve to confront perceived Chinese aggression. There are many dimensions to the unfolding crisis over Taiwan’s future status—and the wisest US policy is one of realism and restraint in order to avert a disaster of global proportions.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"103 - 107"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41550055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713
Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Reynolds
ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research associate Matt Korda, and research associate Eliana Reynolds. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines China’s nuclear arsenal. We estimate that China’s stockpile now includes roughly 410 nuclear warheads with more in production. The stockpile is expected to increase significantly in the next decade but remains significantly smaller than that of Russia or the United States. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.
{"title":"Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023","authors":"Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Reynolds","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, senior research associate Matt Korda, and research associate Eliana Reynolds. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue’s column examines China’s nuclear arsenal. We estimate that China’s stockpile now includes roughly 410 nuclear warheads with more in production. The stockpile is expected to increase significantly in the next decade but remains significantly smaller than that of Russia or the United States. To see all previous Nuclear Notebook columns, go to https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-risk/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-notebook/.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"108 - 133"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47388806","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-03-04DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2023.2179787
D. Drollette
{"title":"Introduction: how to negotiate the China-Taiwan impasse","authors":"D. Drollette","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2023.2179787","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2023.2179787","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"55 - 56"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45470246","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2155004
J. Hecht
ABSTRACT A science writer who has been covering advanced technology for over 40 years gives a different, rarely seen view of tech startups: how they work, the common problems they seem to encounter – and why there are so many “Valley of Death” pitfalls waiting for them.
{"title":"Why will some promising renewables technologies enter a “Valley of Death,” from which they never emerge?","authors":"J. Hecht","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2155004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2155004","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT A science writer who has been covering advanced technology for over 40 years gives a different, rarely seen view of tech startups: how they work, the common problems they seem to encounter – and why there are so many “Valley of Death” pitfalls waiting for them.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"3 - 8"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"59015391","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2155007
Z. Braden, A. Macfarlane
ABSTRACT Selecting a site to build a deep geologic repository for high-level nuclear waste is a process fraught with social tension and few countries have managed to do so successfully. Canada is poised to be next, with a site selection decision due in 2024. Two potential sites are under consideration, one in northern Ontario and one in southern Ontario, each with different geologic settings and different social and economic landscapes. We review the consent-based process that has led to this point, the complexities involved in expressing consent in Canada, and some of the hurdles that remain.
{"title":"The final countdown to site selection for Canada’s nuclear waste geologic repository","authors":"Z. Braden, A. Macfarlane","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2155007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2155007","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Selecting a site to build a deep geologic repository for high-level nuclear waste is a process fraught with social tension and few countries have managed to do so successfully. Canada is poised to be next, with a site selection decision due in 2024. Two potential sites are under consideration, one in northern Ontario and one in southern Ontario, each with different geologic settings and different social and economic landscapes. We review the consent-based process that has led to this point, the complexities involved in expressing consent in Canada, and some of the hurdles that remain.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"22 - 27"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44350081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2155005
D. Macfarlane
ABSTRACT Ammonia can be used to fuel relatively traditional internal combustion engines, with minor modifications similar to those involved in converting a gasoline engine to use liquified petroleum gas. And like hydrogen, ammonia has great potential as a no-carbon-emissions alternative to fossil fuels. In principle, the main product of burning ammonia in an engine is nitrogen, a gas that constitutes some 78 percent of the atmosphere and is, in itself, not a greenhouse gas. But ammonia is easier to handle and transport in bulk than hydrogen. Promising technologies for increased ammonia production using renewable energy are being researched, and if production expands, ammonia could make its place – and perhaps a leading place – as an easily transported fuel for use in the effort to decarbonize transportation around the world.
{"title":"Renewable ammonia: The future of fuels?","authors":"D. Macfarlane","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2155005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2155005","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Ammonia can be used to fuel relatively traditional internal combustion engines, with minor modifications similar to those involved in converting a gasoline engine to use liquified petroleum gas. And like hydrogen, ammonia has great potential as a no-carbon-emissions alternative to fossil fuels. In principle, the main product of burning ammonia in an engine is nitrogen, a gas that constitutes some 78 percent of the atmosphere and is, in itself, not a greenhouse gas. But ammonia is easier to handle and transport in bulk than hydrogen. Promising technologies for increased ammonia production using renewable energy are being researched, and if production expands, ammonia could make its place – and perhaps a leading place – as an easily transported fuel for use in the effort to decarbonize transportation around the world.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"14 - 16"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48310678","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-02DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686
Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda
ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the status of the US nuclear arsenal. The US nuclear arsenal remained roughly unchanged in the last year, with the Department of Defense maintaining an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,708 warheads. Of these, only about 1,770 warheads are deployed, while approximately 1,938 are held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 1,536 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 5,244 nuclear warheads. Of the approximately 1,770 warheads that are deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 970 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and 100 tactical bombs are at European bases.
{"title":"United States nuclear weapons, 2023","authors":"Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda","doi":"10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2022.2156686","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project with the Federation of American Scientists, and Matt Korda, a senior research associate with the project. The Nuclear Notebook column has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists since 1987. This issue examines the status of the US nuclear arsenal. The US nuclear arsenal remained roughly unchanged in the last year, with the Department of Defense maintaining an estimated stockpile of approximately 3,708 warheads. Of these, only about 1,770 warheads are deployed, while approximately 1,938 are held in reserve. Additionally, approximately 1,536 retired warheads are awaiting dismantlement, giving a total inventory of approximately 5,244 nuclear warheads. Of the approximately 1,770 warheads that are deployed, 400 are on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, roughly 970 are on submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 300 are at bomber bases in the United States, and 100 tactical bombs are at European bases.","PeriodicalId":46802,"journal":{"name":"Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists","volume":"79 1","pages":"28 - 52"},"PeriodicalIF":1.3,"publicationDate":"2023-01-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48504103","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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