Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives.
{"title":"The unity argument: Phenomenology's departure from Kant","authors":"Lilian Alweiss","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12963","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12963","url":null,"abstract":"Phenomenology questions the centrality that Kant attributes to the “I think.” It claims that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless as unity is given. I call this the “unity argument.” The paper explores the significance of this claim by focusing on the work of Edmund Husserl. What interests me is that although the unity argument claims that we can account for the unity of experience without appealing to the an “I think,” Husserl agrees with Kant that experience must be owned. Moreover, he endorses Kant's dictum that ‘the “I think” must be capable of accompanying all my presentations’. The aim of the paper is to explore how Husserl can consistently appeal to Kant's account of the “I think” and at the same time contend that on the pre‐reflective level experience is selfless. The thesis I wish to advance is that although the unity argument acknowledges that experience is necessarily mine, it reveals that it is a necessary feature of self‐reference that I have never taken absolute ownership over my experience. This may explain why our sense of self can often be out of tune with the way we live our lives.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863124","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Das Wissen der Person: Eine Topographie des menschlichen Geistes By Pirmin, Stekeler-Weithofer Edited by Leander Berger, Jakob Kümmerer, and Max Stange Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2022. ISBN 978–3–7873-4129-0","authors":"Simon Schüz","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12988","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12988","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863231","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Heidegger's notion of philosophical concepts as “formal indications” is rightly viewed as a crucial development. The idea of formal indication is partly intended to answer concerns that phenomenology objectivizes conscious life. Formal indication responds—in what would become a signature feature of much of Heidegger's early work—by setting up a unique dependency of the meaning of phenomenological concepts on their “enactment” in the first‐personal life of the investigator or reader. Commentators have appropriately wondered whether this move succeeds. Yet relatively little emphasis has been placed on the potential problem of underdetermination: whether this model of deferring meaning to “enactment” leaves the reader with a sufficient understanding of the term that they know what to enact and (hopefully) gain some positive self‐understanding through it. This problem becomes more or less acute depending on how we model the “deferred meaning” of formal indication. Here I study candidate models of “deferred meaning,” including those prominent in the literature, to determine whether any are suitable to model the meaning‐structure of formal indication and stave off the underdetermination problem.
{"title":"The Puzzle of Empty Formal Indications: On the ‘Deferred’ Meaning of Heidegger's Language","authors":"David Zoller","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12990","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12990","url":null,"abstract":"Heidegger's notion of philosophical concepts as “formal indications” is rightly viewed as a crucial development. The idea of formal indication is partly intended to answer concerns that phenomenology objectivizes conscious life. Formal indication responds—in what would become a signature feature of much of Heidegger's early work—by setting up a unique dependency of the meaning of phenomenological concepts on their “enactment” in the first‐personal life of the investigator or reader. Commentators have appropriately wondered whether this move succeeds. Yet relatively little emphasis has been placed on the potential problem of underdetermination: whether this model of deferring meaning to “enactment” leaves the reader with a sufficient understanding of the term that they know what to enact and (hopefully) gain some positive self‐understanding through it. This problem becomes more or less acute depending on how we model the “deferred meaning” of formal indication. Here I study candidate models of “deferred meaning,” including those prominent in the literature, to determine whether any are suitable to model the meaning‐structure of formal indication and stave off the underdetermination problem.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141863233","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper makes a case for treating the boundary between what counts as practical reasoning and what does not as essentially indeterminate. The idea that there is an “essential indeterminacy in what can be counted as a rational deliberative process” was put forward by Bernard Williams in his well‐known discussion of statements about an agent's reasons for action. But in contrast to the more familiar argument of that paper, the idea has received almost no attention. To understand and defend the idea, I first offer a somewhat novel reconstruction of the more familiar argument against making statements about a person's reasons intended on an “external” interpretation. On my reading, the argument shows how making such statements runs afoul of ideals of honesty in our interpersonal dealings. I then argue for countenancing an essential indeterminacy in what counts as practical reasoning, in a manner that involves a re‐application of these same ideals of honesty, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. One advantage of understanding the entire discussion of reasons statements and reasoning along these lines is that it highlights the deeply anti‐rationalistic flavor of Williams' own interest in these topics. Unsurprisingly, Williams' treatment displays a deep affinity with the anti‐rationalistic ethics advanced by Hume. It also turns out to be at cross purposes with the far more rationalistic ethical vision that animates more recent attempts to advance a “Humean Theory of Reasons,” which is sometimes mistakenly seen as following in Williams' and Hume's footsteps.
{"title":"An Indeterminate Conception of Practical Reasoning","authors":"Jorah Dannenberg","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12992","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12992","url":null,"abstract":"This paper makes a case for treating the boundary between what counts as <jats:italic>practical reasoning</jats:italic> and what does not as essentially indeterminate. The idea that there is an “essential indeterminacy in what can be counted as a rational deliberative process” was put forward by Bernard Williams in his well‐known discussion of statements about an agent's reasons for action. But in contrast to the more familiar argument of that paper, the idea has received almost no attention. To understand and defend the idea, I first offer a somewhat novel reconstruction of the more familiar argument against making statements about a person's reasons intended on an “external” interpretation. On my reading, the argument shows how making such statements runs afoul of ideals of <jats:italic>honesty</jats:italic> in our interpersonal dealings. I then argue for countenancing an essential indeterminacy in what counts as practical reasoning, in a manner that involves a re‐application of these same ideals of honesty, albeit at a higher level of abstraction. One advantage of understanding the entire discussion of reasons statements and reasoning along these lines is that it highlights the deeply anti‐rationalistic flavor of Williams' own interest in these topics. Unsurprisingly, Williams' treatment displays a deep affinity with the anti‐rationalistic ethics advanced by Hume. It also turns out to be at cross purposes with the far more rationalistic ethical vision that animates more recent attempts to advance a “Humean Theory of Reasons,” which is sometimes mistakenly seen as following in Williams' and Hume's footsteps.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper is divided into two parts. In the first I outline and defend Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that consequentialism is a shallow philosophy by considering how two contemporary consequentialists reach opposing but equally outlandish moral conclusions on a matter as fundamental as whether it is good or bad that the human race continues. In the second I argue that in order to show what is wrong with the consequentialist arguments presented in part one, we need to deploy a wider range of critical resources than what typically appears in contemporary analytic moral philosophy. One example of a relevant and under‐appreciated resource I then consider is satire as a mode of moral thought.
{"title":"Anscombe on the shallowness of consequentialism","authors":"Craig Taylor","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12995","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12995","url":null,"abstract":"This paper is divided into two parts. In the first I outline and defend Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that consequentialism is a shallow philosophy by considering how two contemporary consequentialists reach opposing but equally outlandish moral conclusions on a matter as fundamental as whether it is good or bad that the human race continues. In the second I argue that in order to show what is wrong with the consequentialist arguments presented in part one, we need to deploy a wider range of critical resources than what typically appears in contemporary analytic moral philosophy. One example of a relevant and under‐appreciated resource I then consider is satire as a mode of moral thought.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141783338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars as a result of knowing universals, and not the other way around. My argument draws from the work of Malebranche, who notoriously contended that we see ordinary objects through the immutable ‘ideas’. I conclude with the suggestion that the resulting account of the relationship between our knowledge of universals and our perception of particulars may be thought of as a kind of Platonic indirect realism.
{"title":"Seeing through the forms ‐ towards a Platonic indirect realism","authors":"Christophe de Ray","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12989","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12989","url":null,"abstract":"Universals in the Platonic tradition were intended to play both metaphysical and epistemological roles. The contemporary debate around universals has focused overwhelmingly on the former, with even ‘platonists’ typically holding that our knowledge of universals is derived from our knowledge of particulars. In contrast, I wish to argue for the epistemological primacy of the universal: specifically, I defend the thesis that we perceive particulars as a result of knowing universals, and not the other way around. My argument draws from the work of Malebranche, who notoriously contended that we see ordinary objects <jats:italic>through</jats:italic> the immutable ‘ideas’. I conclude with the suggestion that the resulting account of the relationship between our knowledge of universals and our perception of particulars may be thought of as a kind of Platonic indirect realism.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141786245","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morality (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the “will's memory” (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor commitments, while bad conscience is that “other gloomy thing” (GM II, 4), gloomy because it is a self‐punishing faculty that produces feelings of guilt. In addition to having different functions, conscience and bad conscience have distinct causal origins. Conscience originated as a memory of “I will nots” inculcated by punishment (GM II, 3), whereas bad conscience is produced by the process of “internalization” (GM II, 16)—not punishment (GM II, 14–15). It would seem to be possible, then, that an agent could have a conscience without having a bad conscience. The sovereign individual is sometimes interpreted in such terms. I argue that this separation is impossible, however. An agent would be incapable of generating and sustaining the motivation to honor commitments, thus having a conscience, without having undergone the process of internalization, necessitating the presence of bad conscience as well.
{"title":"Conscience and Bad Conscience","authors":"A. Snelson","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12991","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12991","url":null,"abstract":"This paper attempts to clarify the relationship between conscience and bad conscience in the Second Essay of the Genealogy of Morality (GM II). Conscience, which Nietzsche calls the “will's memory” (GM II, 1), is a faculty that enables agents to generate and sustain the motivation necessary to honor commitments, while bad conscience is that “other gloomy thing” (GM II, 4), gloomy because it is a self‐punishing faculty that produces feelings of guilt. In addition to having different functions, conscience and bad conscience have distinct causal origins. Conscience originated as a memory of “I will nots” inculcated by punishment (GM II, 3), whereas bad conscience is produced by the process of “internalization” (GM II, 16)—not punishment (GM II, 14–15). It would seem to be possible, then, that an agent could have a conscience without having a bad conscience. The sovereign individual is sometimes interpreted in such terms. I argue that this separation is impossible, however. An agent would be incapable of generating and sustaining the motivation to honor commitments, thus having a conscience, without having undergone the process of internalization, necessitating the presence of bad conscience as well.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141642856","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike other characterizations of “naturalism,” this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non‐naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this.
{"title":"Experience and naturalism","authors":"Adam Zweber","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12974","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12974","url":null,"abstract":"Much of contemporary metaethics revolves around the issue of “naturalism.” However, there is little agreement on what “naturalism” is or why it should be of significance. In this paper, I aim to rectify this situation by providing a set of necessary conditions on what positions ought to count as “naturalistic.” A metaethical view should count as an instance of naturalism only if it claims that there can be evidence for normative claims that is both public and spatiotemporal. I argue that, unlike other characterizations of “naturalism,” this view shows a clear difference between many metaethical positions and the sciences. The view thereby renders debates about naturalism philosophically significant: the division between naturalists and non‐naturalists is that between philosophers who hold that ethics is relevantly similar to the sciences and those who deny this.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-07-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141649463","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In the Port‐Royal Logic, Arnauld and Nicole argue that eloquence plays a crucial role in the cultivation of the art of thinking. In this essay, we demonstrate that Arnauld and Nicole's reflections on eloquence exemplify the need to reconceive the larger framework in which Cartesian theories of ideas operate. Instead of understanding epistemic agents as solitary thinkers who pursue their intellectual goals without the influence of others, our analysis shows that for Arnauld and Nicole thinking well was an intersubjective discursive activity that unfolds between complexly organized persons. Central to this activity is the ability to gauge the affective and associative tendencies of interlocutors and to communicate accordingly. This ability is required to enable speakers to deal constructively with problems arising from the context sensitivity of language, the influences of the passions, and the audience's capacity to decipher meaning in the communication of ideas that facilitate understanding and knowledge. By drawing attention to communication, affect, and association in the Port‐Royal Logic, we show that there is a significant connection between thinking and expressing oneself well in the early modern period.
{"title":"The art of thinking as an intersubjective practice: Eloquence, affect, and association in the Port‐Royal Logic","authors":"Laura Kotevska, Anik Waldow","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12976","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12976","url":null,"abstract":"In the <jats:italic>Port‐Royal Logic</jats:italic>, Arnauld and Nicole argue that eloquence plays a crucial role in the cultivation of the art of thinking. In this essay, we demonstrate that Arnauld and Nicole's reflections on eloquence exemplify the need to reconceive the larger framework in which Cartesian theories of ideas operate. Instead of understanding epistemic agents as solitary thinkers who pursue their intellectual goals without the influence of others, our analysis shows that for Arnauld and Nicole thinking well was an intersubjective discursive activity that unfolds between complexly organized persons. Central to this activity is the ability to gauge the affective and associative tendencies of interlocutors and to communicate accordingly. This ability is required to enable speakers to deal constructively with problems arising from the context sensitivity of language, the influences of the passions, and the audience's capacity to decipher meaning in the communication of ideas that facilitate understanding and knowledge. By drawing attention to communication, affect, and association in the <jats:italic>Port‐Royal Logic</jats:italic>, we show that there is a significant connection between thinking and expressing oneself well in the early modern period.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141613675","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
<p>In her 2013 book <i>Kritik von Lebensformen</i>, Rahel Jaeggi, one of the most prominent exponents of the new German social philosophy, set out to offer a revision of critical theory centered on the notion of “forms of life.” This reconsideration, however, did not take the typical form of a new <i>diagnosis of the times</i>, comparable, for example, to the diagnoses of the reification of social relations (Suhrkamp Lukács, <span>2013</span>), the one-dimensionality of consciousness (Marcuse, <span>2012</span>), or the systemic colonization of the <i>lebenswelt</i>, or lifeworld (Habermas, <span>2014</span>). Rather, Jaeggi was interested in developing a theoretical conception of how forms of life fail or succeed. We find a similar strategy, albeit oriented to a different theoretical object, in her earlier book, <i>Entfremdung. Zur Aktualität eines sozialphilosophischen Problems</i>. Here, again, the author did not articulate a diagnosis of the social causes of alienation, but rather a highly abstract theory of human subjectivity from which to offer a functional account of the concept of alienation (Jaeggi, <span>2005</span>; Neuhouser, <span>2016</span>). We again find this strategy in the formidable 2013 article “Was (wenn überhaupt etwas) ist falsch am Kapitalismus? Drei Wege der Kapitalismuskritik,” in which Jaeggi is not interested in advancing a concrete critique of capitalist societies, but rather in discussing the three most common forms of doing so (functional, moral, and ethical) in order to develop an integrative and complex approach (Jaeggi, <span>2013b</span>).</p><p>If I understand it correctly, Jaeggi's latest book, published by Suhrkamp under the title <i>Fortschritt und Regression</i> (Jaeggi, <span>2023</span>), follows the same strategy. Jaeggi does not aim to answer the question (of an empirical nature, of course) of the existence, or nonexistence, of progress in modern societies. Rather, her interest is, again, of a conceptual nature. <i>Fortschritt und Regression</i> offers an impressive analysis of the concepts of progress and regression as consistent criteria for criticisms of social development, and thus, as useful instruments for critical theory. Of course, this approach is not only legitimate, but also extremely useful in shedding light on some of the central concepts critical social theory is based on—sometimes in an insufficiently reflexive way. However, such a strategy, which is well suited to the category of a “critical theory of criticism” (Boltanski & Honneth, <span>2009</span>; Celikates, <span>2006</span>; Jaeggi & Wesche, <span>2009</span>), should not, in my opinion, exhaust the tasks of social philosophy, lest we run the risk of critical theory of criticism ending up cornering social criticism itself. In order to do justice to both elements, in what follows I will proceed in two steps. First, I will offer a systematic reconstruction of Jaeggi's central theses concerning the concepts of progress and r
德国新社会哲学最杰出的代表人物之一拉赫尔-雅伊吉（Rahel Jaeggi）在其2013年出版的《生活形式批判》（Kritik von Lebensformen）一书中，以 "生活形式 "这一概念为中心，对批判理论进行了修正。然而，这种重新思考并没有采取对时代进行新诊断的典型形式，例如，与对社会关系再化（苏尔坎普-卢卡奇，2013）、意识的一维性（马尔库塞，2012）或生活世界（lebenswelt）的系统殖民化（哈贝马斯，2014）的诊断相提并论。相反，耶吉感兴趣的是发展一种关于生命形式如何失败或成功的理论概念。在她早期的著作《Entfremdung.Zur Aktualität eines sozialphilosophischen Problems.在这本书中，作者同样没有对异化的社会原因进行诊断，而是阐述了一种高度抽象的人类主观性理论，并据此对异化概念进行了功能性解释（Jaeggi, 2005; Neuhouser, 2016）。我们在 2013 年发表的题为 "Was (wenn überhaupt etwas) ist falsch am Kapitalismus?Drei Wege der Kapitalismuskritik "一文中，耶吉对提出对资本主义社会的具体批判并不感兴趣，而是讨论了批判的三种最常见形式（功能性、道德性和伦理性），以形成一种综合而复杂的方法（耶吉，2013b）。Jaeggi 的目的并不是要回答现代社会存在或不存在进步的问题（当然是经验性的）。相反，她的兴趣同样是概念性的。Fortschritt und Regression》对进步和倒退这两个概念进行了令人印象深刻的分析，将其作为批判社会发展的一致标准，从而成为批判理论的有用工具。当然，这种方法不仅是合理的，而且对于揭示批判性社会理论所依据的一些核心概念也非常有用--有时是以一种不够自省的方式。然而，在我看来，这种非常适合 "批判的批判理论 "范畴的策略（Boltanski & Honneth, 2009; Celikates, 2006; Jaeggi & Wesche, 2009）不应穷尽社会哲学的任务，以免我们冒着批判的批判理论最终将社会批判本身逼入绝境的风险。为了公正地对待这两个要素，下面我将分两步进行。首先，我将系统地重构耶吉关于进步与倒退概念的核心论点。其次，我将对她关于进步的过程性概念提出一些批判性的评论，并试图勾勒出一些可能有助于回答现代化进程的进步性或倒退性这一问题（我坚持认为是经验性问题）的观点：在该书中，作者向自己提出了以下问题："生命形式可以被批判吗？也就是说，是否可以将它们诊断为良好、成功或合理的生命形式？(Jaeggi, 2013a）。在约翰-罗尔斯和于尔根-哈贝马斯的政治哲学中，"自由主义者 "对生活形式的伦理内容的讨论是弃权的，而耶吉有意识地偏离了这一弃权，他提供了一个标准来确定我们何时可以谈论成功或合理的生活形式：如果生活形式是学习和实验过程的结果，并且最终允许进一步学习，那么它们就是成功的。10 年后，耶吉用 "进步 "的概念重新表述了这一论点：理性的生命形式是进步的生命形式，而非理性的生命形式则是倒退的生命形式。那么，什么是进步呢？正如我们将要看到的，耶吉选择的是过程性概念（Prozessbegriff），而不是实质性概念。这种概念存在于欧洲启蒙思想中，由四个基本特征组成：从技术创新到道德、政治和经济的改善，进步的各个层面之间大概是不可侵犯的相互关系；所谓的不可抗拒性，即进步是必要的；进化逻辑或发展逻辑的论述，即进步是一种具有规范约束力的世界历史进程，遵循一种独特的模式；以及对一种无损失积累的信心。
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