Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible attendabilia. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a sensitivity to affordances. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot as grippable and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things as attendable. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems.
{"title":"Attention and Attendabilia: The Perception of Attentional Affordances","authors":"Tom McClelland","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13010","url":null,"abstract":"Agents are continually faced with two related selection problems: i) the problem of selecting what to do from a space of possible behaviours; ii) the problem of selecting what to attend to from a space of possible <jats:italic>attendabilia</jats:italic>. We have psychological mechanisms that enable us to solve both types of problem. But do these mechanisms follow different principles or work along the same lines? I argue for the latter. I start from the theory that bodily action is supported by a sensitivity to <jats:italic>affordances</jats:italic>. Strong evidence suggests that affordances feature in our perception of the world and that affordance perception can trigger the neural preparation of the afforded act. An agent can thus see a teapot <jats:italic>as grippable</jats:italic> and their doing so can automatically ready a gripping response. Something affords attending for an agent just in case it is a possible target of their focal attention. I argue that we are sensitive to these attentional affordances in much the same way. First I argue that we perceive things <jats:italic>as attendable</jats:italic>. Second I argue that our doing so can trigger the preparation of shifts in focal attention. My case for this is based on a variety of phenomenological, neurological and behavioural parallels between our sensitivity to bodily affordances and our sensitivity to attentional affordances. This yields a unified account with specific implications for our understanding of attention and affordance perception and general implications for our understanding of how the mind solves selection problems.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215334","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Misinterpreting Negativism: on Peter E. Gordon's A Precarious Happiness: Adorno and the Sources of Normativity","authors":"Fabian Freyenhagen","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-09-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215336","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Introspection: First‐person access in science and agency: By MajaSpener Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024. ISBN: 9780198867449","authors":"Christopher Mole","doi":"10.1111/ejop.13004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.13004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215337","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Two theories dominate the current debate over the nature of verbal irony: the pretence theory and the echoic theory. It is common ground in this debate that irony is sometimes both echoic and enacted through pretence; my concern here is with such cases. I ask how these features interact with each other within a form of irony that has not so far been the focus of theoretical attention: hidden or deceptive irony. This enables us to see that interesting cases of verbal irony often target an outlook or point of view rather than some real or imagined prior utterance. This, in turn, suggests a move from the idea of echoic irony to irony which invokes a defective outlook. Using the tools constructed thus far, I focus on an exchange in Euripides' Medea, indicating how deceptive verbal irony gives rise to situations of dramatic irony, and provides a showcase for exhibitions of mastery by characters otherwise lacking control of their situations. I ask whether such instances of deceptive irony encourage audience members to see themselves as side‐participants in the dramas they witness. The question has an empirical aspect we are in no good position to answer; I offer a version of the idea which has at least the merit of not falling victim to obvious philosophical objections.
{"title":"Irony, Tragedy, Deception","authors":"Gregory Currie","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12997","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12997","url":null,"abstract":"Two theories dominate the current debate over the nature of verbal irony: the pretence theory and the echoic theory. It is common ground in this debate that irony is sometimes both echoic and enacted through pretence; my concern here is with such cases. I ask how these features interact with each other within a form of irony that has not so far been the focus of theoretical attention: hidden or deceptive irony. This enables us to see that interesting cases of verbal irony often target an outlook or point of view rather than some real or imagined prior utterance. This, in turn, suggests a move from the idea of echoic irony to <jats:italic>irony which invokes a defective outlook</jats:italic>. Using the tools constructed thus far, I focus on an exchange in Euripides' <jats:italic>Medea</jats:italic>, indicating how deceptive verbal irony gives rise to situations of dramatic irony, and provides a showcase for exhibitions of mastery by characters otherwise lacking control of their situations. I ask whether such instances of deceptive irony encourage audience members to see themselves as side‐participants in the dramas they witness. The question has an empirical aspect we are in no good position to answer; I offer a version of the idea which has at least the merit of not falling victim to obvious philosophical objections.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Anscombe seems to think that, even though “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions” is not “knowledge by observation”, it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form “I am doing something to that G": knowledge in which the subject, at once, knows himself “as self" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object “as other” (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity.
{"title":"Knowledge Aided by Observation†","authors":"Adrian Haddock","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12993","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12993","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Anscombe seems to think that, even though “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions” is not “knowledge by observation”, it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form “I am doing something to that <i>G</i>\": knowledge in which the subject, at once, knows himself “as self\" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object “as other” (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity.</p>","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142215339","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this article I take a closer look at Adorno's methodology, and specifically the question of how – in Adorno's view – philosophy ought to be done. In this, my aim is to see whether there might be ‘quietist’ elements in his methodological account, i.e. the meta‐philosophical position of quietism as it stands against (scientific) naturalism in recent discussions. Recent work on Adorno and classical critical theory has discussed numerous similarities and overlaps with the post‐analytical work of, e.g., John McDowell and Michael Thompson. Building on this recent work, my article suggests further points of contact, by focusing on the interplay of question and answer present in both McDowell and Adorno. To do this, I first outline McDowell's version of quietism. From there, an interpretation of Adorno can proceed along the lines developed with McDowell, centering the idea of unanswerable philosophical questions that need to be treated instead of answered straightforwardly. I demonstrate the relation he draws from disappearance of questions to ‘praxis’ and suggest how this differs from McDowell yet might still be viewed as an account related to quietism. I conclude by suggesting taking up Adorno's term ‘immanent criticism’ as a methodological concept.
{"title":"Quietist Elements in Adorno","authors":"Christian Lamp","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12999","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12999","url":null,"abstract":"In this article I take a closer look at Adorno's methodology, and specifically the question of how – in Adorno's view – philosophy ought to be done. In this, my aim is to see whether there might be ‘quietist’ elements in his methodological account, i.e. the meta‐philosophical position of quietism as it stands against (scientific) naturalism in recent discussions. Recent work on Adorno and classical critical theory has discussed numerous similarities and overlaps with the post‐analytical work of, e.g., John McDowell and Michael Thompson. Building on this recent work, my article suggests further points of contact, by focusing on the interplay of question and answer present in both McDowell and Adorno. To do this, I first outline McDowell's version of quietism. From there, an interpretation of Adorno can proceed along the lines developed with McDowell, centering the idea of unanswerable philosophical questions that need to be treated instead of answered straightforwardly. I demonstrate the relation he draws from disappearance of questions to ‘praxis’ and suggest how this differs from McDowell yet might still be viewed as an account related to quietism. I conclude by suggesting taking up Adorno's term ‘immanent criticism’ as a methodological concept.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141921397","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is the function of morality—what is it all about? What is the basis of morality—what explains our moral agency and patiency? This essay defends a unique Kantian answer to these questions. Morality is about securing our independence from each other by giving each other equal discretion over whether and how we interact. The basis of our moral agency and patiency is practical reason. The first half addresses objections that this account cannot explain the moral patiency of beings who are not also moral agents such as infantile, elderly, and infirm human beings and the other animals. The second half argues that this account is preferable, on grounds of consistency with the basic Kantian account of the function and content of morality, to the familiar account of our moral patiency, popular especially though not exclusively with contemporary Kantians, in terms of the value of humanity.
{"title":"The Unity of the Moral Domain","authors":"Jeremy David Fix","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12998","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12998","url":null,"abstract":"What is the function of morality—what is it all about? What is the basis of morality—what explains our moral agency and patiency? This essay defends a unique Kantian answer to these questions. Morality is about securing our independence from each other by giving each other equal discretion over whether and how we interact. The basis of our moral agency and patiency is practical reason. The first half addresses objections that this account cannot explain the moral patiency of beings who are not also moral agents such as infantile, elderly, and infirm human beings and the other animals. The second half argues that this account is preferable, on grounds of consistency with the basic Kantian account of the function and content of morality, to the familiar account of our moral patiency, popular especially though not exclusively with contemporary Kantians, in terms of the value of humanity.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141928068","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Moral Articulation: On the Development of New Moral Concepts, by Matthew Congdon Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024, ISBN: 9780197691571","authors":"Nora Hämäläinen","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12987","DOIUrl":"10.1111/ejop.12987","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141938549","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of “desire,” and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and how effective Sidgwick's criticism of Green is. Despite the appearance of a mere clash of intuitions, an interesting rationale for the thesis can be found in Green's theory of free will and moral responsibility, of which I defend a broadly compatibilist interpretation. Sidgwick's criticisms either miss this rationale altogether, or do not take adequately into account Green's complex theory of free will.
{"title":"T. H. Green and Henry Sidgwick on free agency and the guise of the good","authors":"E. E. Sheng","doi":"10.1111/ejop.12980","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12980","url":null,"abstract":"The history of the thesis of the guise of the good between Kant and Anscombe is not well understood. This article examines a notable disagreement over the thesis during this period, between Green and Sidgwick. It shows that Green accepts versions of the thesis concerning action and desire in one sense of “desire,” and that Sidgwick rejects the thesis concerning both action and desire. It then considers why Green accepts the thesis, and how effective Sidgwick's criticism of Green is. Despite the appearance of a mere clash of intuitions, an interesting rationale for the thesis can be found in Green's theory of free will and moral responsibility, of which I defend a broadly compatibilist interpretation. Sidgwick's criticisms either miss this rationale altogether, or do not take adequately into account Green's complex theory of free will.","PeriodicalId":46958,"journal":{"name":"EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141885198","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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