Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2031528
Bryn Rosenfeld
ABSTRACT This commentary on Belarus’ 2020 uprising discusses the symposium’s contributions to understanding public opinion, protest, and regime crisis in countries like Belarus, and the case of Belarus itself.
{"title":"Belarusian public opinion and the 2020 uprising","authors":"Bryn Rosenfeld","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2031528","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2031528","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT This commentary on Belarus’ 2020 uprising discusses the symposium’s contributions to understanding public opinion, protest, and regime crisis in countries like Belarus, and the case of Belarus itself.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46164372","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2032956
H. Aliyev
ABSTRACT How do social sanctions affect individual participation in civil war violence? Which mechanisms facilitate implementation of social sanctions in times of crises? This study draws on unique in-depth interview data with former ethnic Crimean Tatar combatants in Ukraine to flesh out specific mechanisms that enable social sanctions to function as an effective instrument of violent mobilization, facilitating individual participation in high-risk collective action. Empirical findings demonstrate that in the Crimean Tatar case (non)participation in high-risk collective action had an effect on individuals’ family honor within the community, and on their access to community-distributed public goods, such as jobs and social benefits. The effect of social sanctions on violent mobilization remains particularly strong among traditionalist societies with higher levels of adherence to social norms, local customs, and traditions. The findings reveal that while social sanctions remained effective among rural community residents, their effect was limited on non-community urban settlers.
{"title":"Social sanctions and violent mobilization: lessons from the Crimean Tatar case","authors":"H. Aliyev","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2032956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2032956","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How do social sanctions affect individual participation in civil war violence? Which mechanisms facilitate implementation of social sanctions in times of crises? This study draws on unique in-depth interview data with former ethnic Crimean Tatar combatants in Ukraine to flesh out specific mechanisms that enable social sanctions to function as an effective instrument of violent mobilization, facilitating individual participation in high-risk collective action. Empirical findings demonstrate that in the Crimean Tatar case (non)participation in high-risk collective action had an effect on individuals’ family honor within the community, and on their access to community-distributed public goods, such as jobs and social benefits. The effect of social sanctions on violent mobilization remains particularly strong among traditionalist societies with higher levels of adherence to social norms, local customs, and traditions. The findings reveal that while social sanctions remained effective among rural community residents, their effect was limited on non-community urban settlers.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44944487","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-27DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2031843
Samuel A. Greene
ABSTRACT The movement that mobilized to oppose Alyaksandr Lukashenka in August 2020 was notable for its ability to bridge divisions of social class, geography, age, and identity. Almost uniquely among post-Soviet revolutionary movements, the Belarusians who rose up were not divided from those who did not along clearly discernible socio-demographic, ethnic, linguistic, or regional lines. They were, however, separated by one very stark barrier: the one separating the country’s two distinct media systems, one controlled by the state, and one independent. Drawing on an original survey conducted in September 2020, just as the protest movement was reaching its peak, this article finds that respondents’ choice of news media was the strongest and most consistent predictor of their political opinions. Media, then, appear to have served not merely as aggregators of and conduits for social processes generated elsewhere, but as the producers of social and political force in their own right.
{"title":"You are what you read: media, identity, and community in the 2020 Belarusian uprising","authors":"Samuel A. Greene","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2031843","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2031843","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The movement that mobilized to oppose Alyaksandr Lukashenka in August 2020 was notable for its ability to bridge divisions of social class, geography, age, and identity. Almost uniquely among post-Soviet revolutionary movements, the Belarusians who rose up were not divided from those who did not along clearly discernible socio-demographic, ethnic, linguistic, or regional lines. They were, however, separated by one very stark barrier: the one separating the country’s two distinct media systems, one controlled by the state, and one independent. Drawing on an original survey conducted in September 2020, just as the protest movement was reaching its peak, this article finds that respondents’ choice of news media was the strongest and most consistent predictor of their political opinions. Media, then, appear to have served not merely as aggregators of and conduits for social processes generated elsewhere, but as the producers of social and political force in their own right.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47344042","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-01-16DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2026127
Emma Mateo
ABSTRACT During moments of nationwide mass mobilization, what distinguishes the towns and cities that rise in the first week from those that do not see protest? Taking the case of nationwide protests in Belarus in August 2020, this study employs an original protest event catalogue to investigate what drives mobilization in early-rising localities. I test hypotheses in the protest literature relating to whether pre-existing social networks, or pre-election campaign rallies, influence subsequent protest mobilization. The innovative use of Telegram data demonstrates the platform’s value for social scientists studying protest. My results suggest that pre-existing social networks help drive mobilization in localities by facilitating communication, coordination, and engagement prior to protest onset, priming people to be ready when the moment of protest arrives. This article also highlights the impressive scale of nationwide mobilization in Belarus in 2020, and demonstrates that local networks were engaging in widespread opposition activity even before mass mobilization.
{"title":"“All of Belarus has come out onto the streets”: exploring nationwide protest and the role of pre-existing social networks","authors":"Emma Mateo","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2022.2026127","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2022.2026127","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT During moments of nationwide mass mobilization, what distinguishes the towns and cities that rise in the first week from those that do not see protest? Taking the case of nationwide protests in Belarus in August 2020, this study employs an original protest event catalogue to investigate what drives mobilization in early-rising localities. I test hypotheses in the protest literature relating to whether pre-existing social networks, or pre-election campaign rallies, influence subsequent protest mobilization. The innovative use of Telegram data demonstrates the platform’s value for social scientists studying protest. My results suggest that pre-existing social networks help drive mobilization in localities by facilitating communication, coordination, and engagement prior to protest onset, priming people to be ready when the moment of protest arrives. This article also highlights the impressive scale of nationwide mobilization in Belarus in 2020, and demonstrates that local networks were engaging in widespread opposition activity even before mass mobilization.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2022-01-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48209646","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-28DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.2020575
Matthew Blackburn, B. Petersson
ABSTRACT Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement.
{"title":"Parade, plebiscite, pandemic: legitimation efforts in Putin’s fourth term","authors":"Matthew Blackburn, B. Petersson","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.2020575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.2020575","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Putin’s fourth term as president (2018–2024) has involved new challenges for Russia’s hybrid regime. COVID-19 hit the Kremlin at a sensitive time, when the old institutional forces had been demounted and new arrangements, including extensive constitutional changes, had yet to become cemented. There is an emerging gulf between state rhetoric, PR events, and patriotic performances, on the one hand, and economic chaos, social disorder and dysfunctional state capacity, on the other, which is likely to reduce system legitimacy and cause increased reliance on repressive methods. This article examines Kremlin legitimation efforts across Beetham’s three dimensions: rules, beliefs, and actions. We argue that the regime’s legitimation efforts in 2020–21 have failed to reverse emerging cleavages in public opinion since 2018. Increased reliance on repression and manipulation in this period, combined with the contrast between regime promises and observable realities on the ground, speak not of strength, but of the Kremlin’s increased weakness and embattlement.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47406894","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-20DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.2013047
S. Joo
ABSTRACT Russian regional governments have shown remarkable variation in prohibiting immigrants from working in specific economic sectors. Why do regions enact immigration bans in some sectors but not in others? Few studies have explored the politics of immigration in authoritarian regimes, and recent sectoral bans in Russia have received scant attention. Based on an analysis of a novel data set on sectoral bans in 83 Russian regions and a case study of Novosibirsk Oblast, this article shows that regional governments tend to enact immigration bans in sectors that do not rely on a foreign workforce. I argue that autocrats impose immigration restrictions as mere grandstanding to appeal to public anti-immigrant sentiment. My findings challenge the existing literature’s emphasis on the roles of economic factors, such as economic growth and natural resources, in immigration restrictions, as well as the argument that Russia imposes excessive immigration restrictions.
{"title":"Building fences? sectoral immigration bans in Russian regions","authors":"S. Joo","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.2013047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.2013047","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Russian regional governments have shown remarkable variation in prohibiting immigrants from working in specific economic sectors. Why do regions enact immigration bans in some sectors but not in others? Few studies have explored the politics of immigration in authoritarian regimes, and recent sectoral bans in Russia have received scant attention. Based on an analysis of a novel data set on sectoral bans in 83 Russian regions and a case study of Novosibirsk Oblast, this article shows that regional governments tend to enact immigration bans in sectors that do not rely on a foreign workforce. I argue that autocrats impose immigration restrictions as mere grandstanding to appeal to public anti-immigrant sentiment. My findings challenge the existing literature’s emphasis on the roles of economic factors, such as economic growth and natural resources, in immigration restrictions, as well as the argument that Russia imposes excessive immigration restrictions.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45464191","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-12-07DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.2010397
Paul Chaisty, C. Gerry, S. Whitefield
ABSTRACT How did the Russian government deal with popular dissatisfaction from the effects of COVID-19 and the policies it adopted in its wake? And how successful was President Vladimir Putin in evading blame given that Russia is de facto highly politically centralized under the president? We analyze data from a national probability sample of Russians conducted following the first wave of the pandemic in July/August 2020. Our results indicate that Putin’s blame-deflecting strategy appears to have been broadly but not entirely successful.
{"title":"The buck stops elsewhere: authoritarian resilience and the politics of responsibility for COVID-19 in Russia","authors":"Paul Chaisty, C. Gerry, S. Whitefield","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.2010397","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.2010397","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT How did the Russian government deal with popular dissatisfaction from the effects of COVID-19 and the policies it adopted in its wake? And how successful was President Vladimir Putin in evading blame given that Russia is de facto highly politically centralized under the president? We analyze data from a national probability sample of Russians conducted following the first wave of the pandemic in July/August 2020. Our results indicate that Putin’s blame-deflecting strategy appears to have been broadly but not entirely successful.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46389328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-12DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.2002629
L. Henry, Elizabeth Plantan
ABSTRACT After the 2011–2012 protests, Russian activists faced increased pressure that pushed many to flee Russia to secure the safety of themselves or their families. But emigrating from Russia does not mean that activists must give up their role as advocates for causes back home. These new “activists-in-exile” can use their positions abroad to mobilize international pressure and support outside of Russia. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s ideas of exit, voice, and loyalty, we argue that “exit” in the form of emigration from a politically hostile environment can in fact enable “voice.” However, through case studies of Russian environmental activists, we map the tradeoffs of emigration along two different dimensions of voice: vertical and horizontal. While activists-in-exile lose horizontal voice through remote engagement, they gain vertical connections through empowered exile. Conversely, activists who stay in Russia maintain horizontal ties through constrained legitimacy, but have limited vertical power as targets of repression.
{"title":"Activism in exile: how Russian environmentalists maintain voice after exit","authors":"L. Henry, Elizabeth Plantan","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.2002629","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.2002629","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT After the 2011–2012 protests, Russian activists faced increased pressure that pushed many to flee Russia to secure the safety of themselves or their families. But emigrating from Russia does not mean that activists must give up their role as advocates for causes back home. These new “activists-in-exile” can use their positions abroad to mobilize international pressure and support outside of Russia. Drawing on Albert Hirschman’s ideas of exit, voice, and loyalty, we argue that “exit” in the form of emigration from a politically hostile environment can in fact enable “voice.” However, through case studies of Russian environmental activists, we map the tradeoffs of emigration along two different dimensions of voice: vertical and horizontal. While activists-in-exile lose horizontal voice through remote engagement, they gain vertical connections through empowered exile. Conversely, activists who stay in Russia maintain horizontal ties through constrained legitimacy, but have limited vertical power as targets of repression.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48421395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-02DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1970956
G. Krol
ABSTRACT The Russian Duma and the Kazakh Mazhilis are typical examples of formally democratic legislatures in authoritarian regimes. This article investigates their role and asks why different authoritarian legislatures have different levels of law-making activity. Neo-institutionalist scholarship argues that legislatures stabilize authoritarian regimes by institutionalizing access to decision-making, but this literature requires further evidence showing which factors stimulate a parliament’s law-making function. The analysis uses an original dataset on 7,564 bills in Russia and Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2016 to explore how different power-sharing arrangements affect the legislative output of both parliaments. The results show that the Duma is much more active in terms of initiating laws and amending executive bills because of its highly differentiated committee system. Nevertheless, both legislatures have become more active after electoral contestedness decreased when United Russia and Nur Otan emerged. This suggests that internal parliamentary organization stimulates law-making activity, whereas electoral contestedness obstructs collective decision-making.
{"title":"The legislative role of the Russian Duma and the Kazakh Mazhilis: authoritarianism and power sharing in post-Soviet Eurasia","authors":"G. Krol","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1970956","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1970956","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT The Russian Duma and the Kazakh Mazhilis are typical examples of formally democratic legislatures in authoritarian regimes. This article investigates their role and asks why different authoritarian legislatures have different levels of law-making activity. Neo-institutionalist scholarship argues that legislatures stabilize authoritarian regimes by institutionalizing access to decision-making, but this literature requires further evidence showing which factors stimulate a parliament’s law-making function. The analysis uses an original dataset on 7,564 bills in Russia and Kazakhstan between 2000 and 2016 to explore how different power-sharing arrangements affect the legislative output of both parliaments. The results show that the Duma is much more active in terms of initiating laws and amending executive bills because of its highly differentiated committee system. Nevertheless, both legislatures have become more active after electoral contestedness decreased when United Russia and Nur Otan emerged. This suggests that internal parliamentary organization stimulates law-making activity, whereas electoral contestedness obstructs collective decision-making.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45714225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-11-02DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1976575
V. Bederson, A. Semenov
ABSTRACT We argue that limited authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia have to work out a delicate balance between suppressing civil society and buying its loyalty by allocating funds to the organizations willing to cooperate with the regime. Using the data on the distribution of presidential grants among civil society organizations working on human rights projects in 2017–2018, we show that organizations whose leaders take part in consultative bodies and pro-governmental organizations such as the All-Russian People’s Front receive larger amounts of money on average. Organizations with links to the parliamentary parties also have some premium in grant disbursement, while affiliation with the ruling party does not increase the amount of funding. These findings imply some degree of political bias in state funding for the third sector in Russia. We also found that professionalism matters, and seasoned civil society organizations have considerably more funding than less experienced organizations in the field.
{"title":"Political foundations of state support for civil society: analysis of the distribution of presidential grants in Russia","authors":"V. Bederson, A. Semenov","doi":"10.1080/1060586X.2021.1976575","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2021.1976575","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT We argue that limited authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia have to work out a delicate balance between suppressing civil society and buying its loyalty by allocating funds to the organizations willing to cooperate with the regime. Using the data on the distribution of presidential grants among civil society organizations working on human rights projects in 2017–2018, we show that organizations whose leaders take part in consultative bodies and pro-governmental organizations such as the All-Russian People’s Front receive larger amounts of money on average. Organizations with links to the parliamentary parties also have some premium in grant disbursement, while affiliation with the ruling party does not increase the amount of funding. These findings imply some degree of political bias in state funding for the third sector in Russia. We also found that professionalism matters, and seasoned civil society organizations have considerably more funding than less experienced organizations in the field.","PeriodicalId":46960,"journal":{"name":"Post-Soviet Affairs","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.2,"publicationDate":"2021-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43037963","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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