Pub Date : 2023-02-12DOI: 10.1177/00471178231153554
M. Sampson, T. Theuns
This article compares the EU and China’s approaches to negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs). We show how China’s approach is more gradualist with regards to coverage of issues, and argue that this gives China advantages, which it leverages in later deals. While there are important differences in the scope and approach of EU trade negotiations, we argue that the EU could gain similar advantages by incorporating more Chinese-style gradualism to how it negotiates FTAs. Paradoxically, we argue that mirroring Chinese strategy in this regard could be used by the EU to secure very different ends from China’s such as normative reforms in the areas of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic government. More gradualism would allow the EU to scale up trade cooperation and regulatory convergence in an incremental manner while autocratic partner countries make democratic reforms, and would also enlarge the scope of more coherent positive conditionality.
{"title":"Comparing Chinese and EU trade agreement strategies: lessons for normative power Europe?","authors":"M. Sampson, T. Theuns","doi":"10.1177/00471178231153554","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178231153554","url":null,"abstract":"This article compares the EU and China’s approaches to negotiating free trade agreements (FTAs). We show how China’s approach is more gradualist with regards to coverage of issues, and argue that this gives China advantages, which it leverages in later deals. While there are important differences in the scope and approach of EU trade negotiations, we argue that the EU could gain similar advantages by incorporating more Chinese-style gradualism to how it negotiates FTAs. Paradoxically, we argue that mirroring Chinese strategy in this regard could be used by the EU to secure very different ends from China’s such as normative reforms in the areas of human rights, the rule of law, and democratic government. More gradualism would allow the EU to scale up trade cooperation and regulatory convergence in an incremental manner while autocratic partner countries make democratic reforms, and would also enlarge the scope of more coherent positive conditionality.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-02-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73326994","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-31DOI: 10.1177/00471178231151904
Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie
The parliamentarization of military deployments is a burgeoning area of study but has tended to neglect the peculiar cases of legislatures deprived of any war powers. This article contributes to this literature by examining the curious case of Canada. Since Canadian governments are not required to secure parliamentary support to deploy the military, it analyzes why they occasionally have and increasingly do. We propose and test four hypotheses to explain why and when governments willingly choose to involve parliament in war decisions absent constitutional or legal obligation to do so: executive ideology, mission risk, minority parliament, and blame shifting. Our findings suggest that ideology and mission risk have the strongest explanatory and predictive power for when the executive will invite the legislature to vote on a military deployment in Canada. While the desire to avoid blame may contribute to the decision to hold a vote, this is not as influential or statistically relevant. The association between holding a vote and being in a minority parliament, for its part, is negligible and statistically insignificant.
{"title":"Parliamentarizing war: explaining legislative votes on Canadian military deployments","authors":"Philippe Lagassé, Justin Massie","doi":"10.1177/00471178231151904","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178231151904","url":null,"abstract":"The parliamentarization of military deployments is a burgeoning area of study but has tended to neglect the peculiar cases of legislatures deprived of any war powers. This article contributes to this literature by examining the curious case of Canada. Since Canadian governments are not required to secure parliamentary support to deploy the military, it analyzes why they occasionally have and increasingly do. We propose and test four hypotheses to explain why and when governments willingly choose to involve parliament in war decisions absent constitutional or legal obligation to do so: executive ideology, mission risk, minority parliament, and blame shifting. Our findings suggest that ideology and mission risk have the strongest explanatory and predictive power for when the executive will invite the legislature to vote on a military deployment in Canada. While the desire to avoid blame may contribute to the decision to hold a vote, this is not as influential or statistically relevant. The association between holding a vote and being in a minority parliament, for its part, is negligible and statistically insignificant.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"75513393","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-31DOI: 10.1177/00471178231151908
Shabnam J Holliday
Contributing to neo-Gramscian IR and debates regarding world order, this article puts forward Gramsci’s domination as a framework for better understanding the dynamics of a so-called ‘western liberal order’. It shows how Gramsci can be used to explore the power relations of world order that moves beyond Eurocentrism by highlighting the agency of the ‘non-West’ or ‘Global South’. In so doing, it illustrates the contradictions of a liberal world order. To make its case, it examines the relationship between Iran’s Green Movement, and the EU, US and UN sanctions regimes imposed on Iran in response to its nuclear programme. It is argued that domination, rather than hegemony, allows for a better understanding of the power relations in this case.
{"title":"Beyond hegemony, world order as domination: Iran’s Green Movement and the nuclear sanctions regimes","authors":"Shabnam J Holliday","doi":"10.1177/00471178231151908","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178231151908","url":null,"abstract":"Contributing to neo-Gramscian IR and debates regarding world order, this article puts forward Gramsci’s domination as a framework for better understanding the dynamics of a so-called ‘western liberal order’. It shows how Gramsci can be used to explore the power relations of world order that moves beyond Eurocentrism by highlighting the agency of the ‘non-West’ or ‘Global South’. In so doing, it illustrates the contradictions of a liberal world order. To make its case, it examines the relationship between Iran’s Green Movement, and the EU, US and UN sanctions regimes imposed on Iran in response to its nuclear programme. It is argued that domination, rather than hegemony, allows for a better understanding of the power relations in this case.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"90653421","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-31DOI: 10.1177/00471178231151907
Payam Ghalehdar
The scholarly debate about the Obama doctrine has focused on the extent of military force in Obama’s foreign policy. Offering both a novel definition of presidential doctrines and a reinterpretation of the Obama doctrine, this article shifts the focus from the extent to the purpose of force. More specifically, it claims that the Obama doctrine is better described as a general unwillingness to fight for a reputation for resolve. Unlike most of his predecessors, Obama did not consider the US military as a tool for projecting firmness. Instead, his decisions concerning the use of force were dominated by material considerations, be it in limited or expansive military operations. To illustrate Obama’s refusal to fight for face, the article examines three prominent decision points during the Obama presidency – the 2009 surge in Afghanistan, the 2011 intervention in Libya, and Obama’s reaction to the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons in 2013.
{"title":"The purpose of military force and the Obama doctrine: no fighting for face","authors":"Payam Ghalehdar","doi":"10.1177/00471178231151907","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178231151907","url":null,"abstract":"The scholarly debate about the Obama doctrine has focused on the extent of military force in Obama’s foreign policy. Offering both a novel definition of presidential doctrines and a reinterpretation of the Obama doctrine, this article shifts the focus from the extent to the purpose of force. More specifically, it claims that the Obama doctrine is better described as a general unwillingness to fight for a reputation for resolve. Unlike most of his predecessors, Obama did not consider the US military as a tool for projecting firmness. Instead, his decisions concerning the use of force were dominated by material considerations, be it in limited or expansive military operations. To illustrate Obama’s refusal to fight for face, the article examines three prominent decision points during the Obama presidency – the 2009 surge in Afghanistan, the 2011 intervention in Libya, and Obama’s reaction to the Syrian regime’s use of chemical weapons in 2013.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82983727","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-31DOI: 10.1177/00471178231151561
Christopher S. Browning, J. Brassett
Humour is usually overlooked in analyses of international politics, this despite its growing prevalence and circulation in an increasingly mediatised world, with this neglect also evident in the growing literature on ontological security and anxiety in IR. Humour, though, needs to be taken seriously, crossing as it does the high-low politics divide and performing a variety of functions. In the context of the Covid pandemic we argue that the link between humour and anxiety has been evident in three notable respects: (i) functioning as a (sometimes problematic) form of stress relief at the level of everyday practices of anxiety management, (ii) working to reaffirm biographical narratives of (national) community and status and (iii) most significantly for IR, as a form of anxiety geopolitics.
{"title":"Anxiety, humour and (geo)politics: warfare by other memes","authors":"Christopher S. Browning, J. Brassett","doi":"10.1177/00471178231151561","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178231151561","url":null,"abstract":"Humour is usually overlooked in analyses of international politics, this despite its growing prevalence and circulation in an increasingly mediatised world, with this neglect also evident in the growing literature on ontological security and anxiety in IR. Humour, though, needs to be taken seriously, crossing as it does the high-low politics divide and performing a variety of functions. In the context of the Covid pandemic we argue that the link between humour and anxiety has been evident in three notable respects: (i) functioning as a (sometimes problematic) form of stress relief at the level of everyday practices of anxiety management, (ii) working to reaffirm biographical narratives of (national) community and status and (iii) most significantly for IR, as a form of anxiety geopolitics.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2023-01-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87254328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-01-17DOI: 10.1177/00471178221149636
Bahar Rumelili
This contribution to the Forum, Anxiety and possibility: the many future(s) of COVID-19, develops a conception of uncertainty as constituted by cognitive (awareness of possibilities) and affective (mood in which possibility is encountered) dimensions. Based on this conception, it is suggested that the COVID-19 crisis has led to a qualitative leap in our already growing sense of uncertainty, both accentuating our awareness of possibilities that are unforeseen, and rendering us attuned to the world in anxiety rather than fear.
{"title":"COVID-19: uncertainty in a mood of anxiety","authors":"Bahar Rumelili","doi":"10.1177/00471178221149636","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221149636","url":null,"abstract":"This contribution to the Forum, Anxiety and possibility: the many future(s) of COVID-19, develops a conception of uncertainty as constituted by cognitive (awareness of possibilities) and affective (mood in which possibility is encountered) dimensions. Based on this conception, it is suggested that the COVID-19 crisis has led to a qualitative leap in our already growing sense of uncertainty, both accentuating our awareness of possibilities that are unforeseen, and rendering us attuned to the world in anxiety rather than fear.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135544949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-22DOI: 10.1177/00471178221140000
Kjølv Egeland, Benoît Pelopidas
Numerous scholars have in recent years concluded that the field of nuclear weapons policy analysis is plagued by widespread self-censorship, conformism, and enduring disconnects between accepted knowledge and available evidence. It has been hypothesized that this tendency is fostered in part by many analysts’ reliance on funding from donors with interests in the perpetuation of the existing nuclear order. In this article, we probe this hypothesis by investigating the financial links between foreign policy think tanks, on the one hand, and nuclear defence contractors and governments that espouse nuclear deterrence strategies, on the other. Relying on semi-structured interviews and a survey of the funding sources of 45 of the world’s top think tanks, we find, first, that effectively all think tanks in the sample accepted funding from nuclear vested interests and, second, that such ‘stakeholder funding’ has real effects on intellectual freedom. Given the widely-held view that democracy relies on intellectual independence, this finding calls for a serious debate about conflicts of interest in foreign policy analysis generally and nuclear policy analysis specifically.
{"title":"No such thing as a free donation? Research funding and conflicts of interest in nuclear weapons policy analysis","authors":"Kjølv Egeland, Benoît Pelopidas","doi":"10.1177/00471178221140000","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221140000","url":null,"abstract":"Numerous scholars have in recent years concluded that the field of nuclear weapons policy analysis is plagued by widespread self-censorship, conformism, and enduring disconnects between accepted knowledge and available evidence. It has been hypothesized that this tendency is fostered in part by many analysts’ reliance on funding from donors with interests in the perpetuation of the existing nuclear order. In this article, we probe this hypothesis by investigating the financial links between foreign policy think tanks, on the one hand, and nuclear defence contractors and governments that espouse nuclear deterrence strategies, on the other. Relying on semi-structured interviews and a survey of the funding sources of 45 of the world’s top think tanks, we find, first, that effectively all think tanks in the sample accepted funding from nuclear vested interests and, second, that such ‘stakeholder funding’ has real effects on intellectual freedom. Given the widely-held view that democracy relies on intellectual independence, this finding calls for a serious debate about conflicts of interest in foreign policy analysis generally and nuclear policy analysis specifically.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"87473210","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-08DOI: 10.1177/00471178221136994
Esther Barbé, Diego Badell
This article studies Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) at the United Nations (UN). SRHR, a gender equality norm that applies human rights to sexuality and reproduction, have traditionally been supported by a network of actors led by the United States (US) and the European Union. Nevertheless, a rival network has contested SRHR since their conception in the early 1990s. We study the robustness of SRHR in five UN fora between 2009 and 2020, focusing on actor constellations, productive power and norm concordance. Between 2009 and 2016, the normative status quo was maintained, except in the Human Rights Council and the Security Council. In 2017, the US joined the network of rivals and accelerated the norm’s weakening in the Security Council and the Commission on Population and Development. However, to weaken or strengthen the norm further, both networks see a need to address SRHR outside the UN.
{"title":"Chasing gender equality norms: the robustness of sexual and reproductive health and rights","authors":"Esther Barbé, Diego Badell","doi":"10.1177/00471178221136994","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221136994","url":null,"abstract":"This article studies Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) at the United Nations (UN). SRHR, a gender equality norm that applies human rights to sexuality and reproduction, have traditionally been supported by a network of actors led by the United States (US) and the European Union. Nevertheless, a rival network has contested SRHR since their conception in the early 1990s. We study the robustness of SRHR in five UN fora between 2009 and 2020, focusing on actor constellations, productive power and norm concordance. Between 2009 and 2016, the normative status quo was maintained, except in the Human Rights Council and the Security Council. In 2017, the US joined the network of rivals and accelerated the norm’s weakening in the Security Council and the Commission on Population and Development. However, to weaken or strengthen the norm further, both networks see a need to address SRHR outside the UN.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"82181543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-07DOI: 10.1177/00471178221141603
H. Ryan
In the British popular imagination, ‘twinning’ is perhaps most commonly associated with mayoral delegations, civic ceremonies and the post-war peacebuilding project in Europe. However, the model and practice of twinning has also been utilised to develop an impressive array of political, economic and cultural relationships that connect geographically remote communities and institutions all across the globe. Among these relationships are a number of twinnings that have emerged as a part of wider movements to extend political solidarity to peoples and communities facing forms of tyranny and persecution. Despite the renewed interest in the politics and practice of solidarity, ‘twinning for solidarity’ has been scarcely addressed in academic research to date. This paper seeks to redirect the scholarly gaze towards this phenomenon by taking a closer look at transnational relationships that were forged across British and Nicaraguan localities in the aftermath of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution. Building on an empirical base of research undertaken over 3 years, it promises to (a) trace why and how ‘twinning’ emerged within the broader repertoire of solidarity initiatives at this time; and (b) explore just what twinning has and might yet achieve in the particular context of political solidarity.
{"title":"Twinning for solidarity: building affective communities in the aftermath of the Nicaraguan Revolution","authors":"H. Ryan","doi":"10.1177/00471178221141603","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221141603","url":null,"abstract":"In the British popular imagination, ‘twinning’ is perhaps most commonly associated with mayoral delegations, civic ceremonies and the post-war peacebuilding project in Europe. However, the model and practice of twinning has also been utilised to develop an impressive array of political, economic and cultural relationships that connect geographically remote communities and institutions all across the globe. Among these relationships are a number of twinnings that have emerged as a part of wider movements to extend political solidarity to peoples and communities facing forms of tyranny and persecution. Despite the renewed interest in the politics and practice of solidarity, ‘twinning for solidarity’ has been scarcely addressed in academic research to date. This paper seeks to redirect the scholarly gaze towards this phenomenon by taking a closer look at transnational relationships that were forged across British and Nicaraguan localities in the aftermath of the 1979 Sandinista Revolution. Building on an empirical base of research undertaken over 3 years, it promises to (a) trace why and how ‘twinning’ emerged within the broader repertoire of solidarity initiatives at this time; and (b) explore just what twinning has and might yet achieve in the particular context of political solidarity.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"76199272","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-12-04DOI: 10.1177/00471178221136993
Matthew Rendall
Why is daredevil aggression like Russia’s war on Ukraine such an important factor in world politics? Neither offensive nor defensive realists give a fully satisfactory answer. This paper maintains that the problem lies in their shared assumption that states pursue security. Tracing neorealism’s roots in evolutionary economics, and hence indirectly in biological theories of natural selection, I argue that many policies are compatible with state survival. What is hard is surviving as a great power. States that rise to that rank, and remain there, behave as if they sought to maximize their influence, not their security. This Darwinian competition selects in favor of states with expansionist institutions and ideologies. Failing to recognize this phenomenon risks conferring a spurious legitimacy on imperialism. At the same time, neorealists have also committed a fallacy familiar to biologists: assuming that traits enhancing group fitness are selected even when they diminish fitness in intragroup competition. Whereas interstate competition selects in great powers for traits that promote influence-maximization, with the spread of democracy, intrastate competition increasingly selects for security-seeking. Yet the former process sometimes still dominates the latter, above all in authoritarian great powers.
{"title":"Realism, reckless states, and natural selection","authors":"Matthew Rendall","doi":"10.1177/00471178221136993","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178221136993","url":null,"abstract":"Why is daredevil aggression like Russia’s war on Ukraine such an important factor in world politics? Neither offensive nor defensive realists give a fully satisfactory answer. This paper maintains that the problem lies in their shared assumption that states pursue security. Tracing neorealism’s roots in evolutionary economics, and hence indirectly in biological theories of natural selection, I argue that many policies are compatible with state survival. What is hard is surviving as a great power. States that rise to that rank, and remain there, behave as if they sought to maximize their influence, not their security. This Darwinian competition selects in favor of states with expansionist institutions and ideologies. Failing to recognize this phenomenon risks conferring a spurious legitimacy on imperialism. At the same time, neorealists have also committed a fallacy familiar to biologists: assuming that traits enhancing group fitness are selected even when they diminish fitness in intragroup competition. Whereas interstate competition selects in great powers for traits that promote influence-maximization, with the spread of democracy, intrastate competition increasingly selects for security-seeking. Yet the former process sometimes still dominates the latter, above all in authoritarian great powers.","PeriodicalId":47031,"journal":{"name":"International Relations","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.6,"publicationDate":"2022-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"84280776","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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