Pub Date : 2023-12-04DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2287255
Miah Hammond-Errey
{"title":"Big data, emerging technologies and the characteristics of ‘good intelligence’","authors":"Miah Hammond-Errey","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2287255","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2287255","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"33 26","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138602651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2263947
Rory Cormac, Dan Lomas
{"title":"Research note: ‘a cuckoo in the diplomatic service nest’: freedom of information and the ‘English Desk’ of the Information Research Department (IRD)","authors":"Rory Cormac, Dan Lomas","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2263947","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2263947","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"6 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135634362","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2272327
Tim Wilson
"Uncivil War: the British Army and the Troubles, 1966-1975." Intelligence and National Security, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919–1921: The development of political and military policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.2. Edward Burke, An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2018.3. J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence. New York: Basic Books, 1978, 131.4. The BAOR was the United Kingdom’s main land contribution to NATO. Headquartered at JHQ Rheindahlen in West Germany between 1954 and 2013. The BAOR was commanded by a general and consisted – in peacetime – of British I Corps and supporting units. In 1969 the BAOR deployed some 53,000 troops.5. The PIRA emerged in December 1969 after a split within the IRA and the Irish Republican movement. By 1972 it had succeeded the Official IRA (OIRA) as the dominant Republican paramilitary organisation.6. The MRF was a covert intelligence-gathering and counterinsurgency unit of the British Army. It was formed in Northern Ireland in 1971 and disbanded in late 1972.
{"title":"Uncivil War: the British Army and the Troubles, 1966-1975 <b>Uncivil War: the British Army and the Troubles, 1966-1975</b> , by Huw Bennett, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2023, 427 pp., £25 (Hbk), ISBN: 9781107136380","authors":"Tim Wilson","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2272327","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2272327","url":null,"abstract":"\"Uncivil War: the British Army and the Troubles, 1966-1975.\" Intelligence and National Security, ahead-of-print(ahead-of-print), pp. 1–2 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Charles Townshend, The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919–1921: The development of political and military policies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975.2. Edward Burke, An Army of Tribes: British Army Cohesion, Deviancy and Murder in Northern Ireland. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2018.3. J. Bowyer Bell, A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence. New York: Basic Books, 1978, 131.4. The BAOR was the United Kingdom’s main land contribution to NATO. Headquartered at JHQ Rheindahlen in West Germany between 1954 and 2013. The BAOR was commanded by a general and consisted – in peacetime – of British I Corps and supporting units. In 1969 the BAOR deployed some 53,000 troops.5. The PIRA emerged in December 1969 after a split within the IRA and the Irish Republican movement. By 1972 it had succeeded the Official IRA (OIRA) as the dominant Republican paramilitary organisation.6. The MRF was a covert intelligence-gathering and counterinsurgency unit of the British Army. It was formed in Northern Ireland in 1971 and disbanded in late 1972.","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135636212","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-05DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2270607
Neveen Abdalla
In the US, national security outcomes tend to be categorised as either the responsibility of the intelligence or policy community. Few discuss systemic outcomes emanating from the requirements and priorities (R&P) process, a top-level collaborative effort that determines national security objectives and establishes the means to address them. Here, a holistic model is introduced to examine the R&P process alongside the binary functions of intelligence and policy, and tested against two mandates of the US response to the Rwandan genocide: evacuation of American expats, and broader intervention. Such macroscopic investigations can better identify the root causes of national security outcomes.
{"title":"Modelling the intelligence requirements and priorities process: the US response to the Rwandan genocide","authors":"Neveen Abdalla","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2270607","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2270607","url":null,"abstract":"In the US, national security outcomes tend to be categorised as either the responsibility of the intelligence or policy community. Few discuss systemic outcomes emanating from the requirements and priorities (R&P) process, a top-level collaborative effort that determines national security objectives and establishes the means to address them. Here, a holistic model is introduced to examine the R&P process alongside the binary functions of intelligence and policy, and tested against two mandates of the US response to the Rwandan genocide: evacuation of American expats, and broader intervention. Such macroscopic investigations can better identify the root causes of national security outcomes.","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"85 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135725254","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-03DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2274142
Murray Place, Rhys Ball
ABSTRACTBounded by current legislation, the New Zealand Intelligence Community (NZIC) is explicitly limited from conducting any form of Covert Action, or what is increasingly being called within New Zealand, Effects Operations. This article aims to understand whether this policy remains both operationally fit for purpose and consistent with the New Zealand public’s understanding and expectations in a time of significant geopolitical and domestic security uncertainty. Supported by 2022 research which surveyed New Zealand public perceptions of the NZIC and the tolerances of Effects Operations, we seek to establish, through an examination of Covert Action policy amongst Five Eyes partners and New Zealand intelligence literature, an understanding of a working definition of Effects Operations, and show that despite previous thinking linked to ethical challenges related to the conduct of such activity, the wider New Zealand public is likely to be supportive of some form of NZIC Effects Operations mandate in the service of national security policy goals. This research thus further reinforces recent independent assessments that the current NZIC legislation, the 2017 Intelligence and Security Act, is not completely fit for purpose and remains overly restrictive in a way that limits future policy options like Effects Operations and needs to be further considered. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.2. Rogers and Mawdsley, “Turning the Dial,” 2021.3. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 249.4. R George, Intelligence and Strategy, 2013, 156; see also, Alan Breakspear, “A New Definition of Intelligence,” 2013, 678–93,; DeVine, “Covert Action and Clandestine Activities” 2019,; Erwin, “Covert Action: Legislative Background,” 2013,; Cormac et al.,, “What Constitutes Successful Covert Action?” 2022, 111–28,; Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black” 2018,: 477–94,; Cormac, ”Disruption and Deniable Interventionism” 2017, 169–91,; Warner, ‘A Matter of Trust’, 2019, 33–42.5. Christopher Andrew, The Secret World, 2018, 690.6. Ibid., 690–91.7. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.8. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Chapter 8.9. Ibid., 263.10. Cormac and Aldrich, “Grey Is the New Black”.11. Ibid., 487–88.12. Ibid., 488.13. Ibid., 480; Joseph and Poznansky, “Media Technology, Covert Action,” 2018, 320–35.14. Cormac and Aldrich, Grey Is the New Black; see also, Graphika and Stanford, ‘Unheard Voice’, 2022.15. Grey Zone activity is contemporary terminology for activity short of warfare. Covert Action is an activity within the theory of the Grey Zone.16. Monaghan, “Bad Idea,” 2021.17. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 2016, 3–14; Intelligence and Security Act 2017.18. Cullen and Reddy, “Intelligence and Security,” 83–84; Gee and Patman, ‘Small State or Minor Power?’, 2021, 38.19. Cullen and Reddy, “Intell
摘要受现行立法的限制，新西兰情报界(NZIC)被明确限制进行任何形式的秘密行动，或者在新西兰越来越多地被称为“影响行动”。本文旨在了解在地缘政治和国内安全存在重大不确定性的情况下，这一政策在操作上是否符合目的，是否符合新西兰公众的理解和期望。2022年的一项研究调查了新西兰公众对NZIC的看法和对效果行动的容忍程度，我们试图通过对五眼合作伙伴之间的秘密行动政策和新西兰情报文献的审查，建立对效果行动工作定义的理解，并表明尽管之前的想法与此类活动的行为相关的道德挑战有关，更广泛的新西兰公众可能会支持某种形式的NZIC影响行动授权，为国家安全政策目标服务。因此，这项研究进一步强化了最近的独立评估，即目前的NZIC立法，即2017年的情报和安全法，并不完全符合目的，并且在某种程度上仍然过于严格，限制了未来的政策选择，如影响操作，需要进一步考虑。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。美国、英国、加拿大、澳大利亚和新西兰。罗杰斯和莫兹利，《拨动拨号盘》，2021.3。《情报:从秘密到政策》，第249.4页。R George，《情报与战略》，2013,156;另见Alan Breakspear，《智能的新定义》，2013，第678-93页;迪瓦恩，《秘密行动和秘密活动》，2019;Erwin，《秘密行动:立法背景》，2013;Cormac等人，《成功的秘密行动是什么?》“2022,111-28，;科马克和奥尔德里奇，《灰色生活》(Grey Is the New Black) 2018，第477-94页;科马克，“破坏与可否认的干预主义”，2017,169-91;华纳，《信任问题》，2019,33-42.5。克里斯托弗·安德鲁，《秘密世界》，2018年，690.6。出处同上,690 - 91.7。科马克和奥尔德里奇，《新黑人格蕾》《情报:从秘密到政策》，第8.9章。如上,263.10。科马克和奥尔德里奇，《新黑人格蕾》出处同上,487 - 88.12。如上,488.13。出处同上,480;Joseph和Poznansky，“媒体技术，秘密行动”，2018,320-35.14。科马克和奥尔德里奇，《新黑人格蕾》;另见Graphika和Stanford，《未被听到的声音》，2022.15。灰色地带活动是指战争以外的活动。秘密行动是灰色地带理论中的一种活动。莫纳汉，《坏主意》，2021.17。Cullen和Reddy，“情报与安全”，2016,3-14;《2017.18情报与安全法》卡伦和雷迪，《情报与安全》，83-84页;吉和帕特曼，“小国还是小国?”， 2021, 38.19。卡伦和雷迪，《情报与安全》，83-84.20页。《2017.21情报与安全法》Ibid.22。吉尔伯特和埃利，“剃光头和Sonnenrads”，2020,280-94;罗杰斯，《引渡Kim Dotcom》，2015年，第46-57页;罗杰斯和莫兹利，《拨动拨号盘》;史密斯，“紧急与重要”，2019年，第13-37页;Gillespie和Breen，“安全情报机构”，2021,676-95.23。布雷迪，《魔法武器》，2017年，43.24。新西兰安全情报局，“年度报告2021”，2021,35.25。巴特斯比，《新西兰恐怖主义幽灵》，2019年，第45.26页。反恐镇压法新西兰皇家调查委员会，引文2020，第10.28页。同前。新西兰皇家调查委员会，Citation2020，章节2.5.29。30.出于对苏联在新西兰境内无限制的影响的关切，军情五处总干事于1948年和ASIO总干事于1956年相继提出报告，这在很大程度上影响了NZSIS的建立。沃顿，“新西兰安全情报的发展”，2012.31。罗杰斯，《情报与安全法》，2018,657-92;沃顿，《新西兰安全情报的发展》，1993年。亨特，间谍和革命者”，2007;沃顿，“新西兰安全情报的发展”，第6.33章。1969年新西兰安全情报服务法;沃顿，《新西兰安全情报的发展》34。新西兰安全情报服务法1969.35。新西兰安全情报局，“NZSIS任务的演变性质”36。巴特斯比和鲍尔，《幽灵之眼:新西兰和五只眼睛》，9.37。Tonkin-Covell，《收藏家》，2000.38。Filer，《新西兰的信号情报》，2019,2.39。当时被称为新西兰安全部门。Filer，“新西兰的信号情报”，3.41。出处同上,5 - 6.42。2003年政府通信安全局法案，第8.43条。2003年政府通信安全局法案，第8A(b)条。 萨特和必应，“联邦调查局表示它已经破坏了黑客工具”，2023.45年5月10日。Kitteridge，《合规审查》，2013年6月。《2013年情报与安全委员会修正案》第9.47条。针对间谍活动、外国干涉和恐怖主义的立法漏洞正是本报告所指的。48.注意到在《卡伦-雷迪报告》发表时，《林恩·玛尔袭击案》后的《2002年反恐法引用修正案》尚未制定。《2017年情报与安全法》第13条和16.49条。ISA综述，2017,2023,213.50。《2017年情报与安全法》第16(c).51条。美国法典:美国法典第50卷第3093条。迪瓦恩，“秘密行动和秘密活动”，2019年，4.53。如上,4.54。《情报:从秘密到政策》第263.55页。1994年情报服务法。Ibid.57。《1994年情报服务法》第1(b)条。《情报:从秘密到政策》，492.59。1994年情报服务法，第1.60条。《1994年情报服务法》第3(1)(a)条。《1994年情报服务法》第3(2)条。《2001年情报服务法》第6(1)(e)条。2001年情报服务法，第6(2)条。2001年情报服务法，第6(2)条。Hanson and Uren，《政策简报》，2018.66。Hanson and Uren, 6-8;和澳大利亚信号局，REDSPICE, 6.67。《2001年情报服务法》第7(e)(ii)条。Hanson and Uren， <政策简报>，9.69。1979年澳大利亚安全情报组织法，第17(2)条。1979年澳大利亚安全情报组织法。三世;3.71部门。Chubb，“对澳大利亚恐怖主义的看法:1978-2019”，2020.72。国家安全和情报审查机构，《战略与国际研究中心减少威胁活动审查》，2020年，第2.73期。1985年加拿大安全情报服务法，第12.1.74条。国家安全和情报审查机构，《战略与国际研究中心减少威胁活动的审查》，75页。如上,2.76。库珀，“2017年渥太华破坏CSIS调查时，针对温哥华锡克教徒的印度领事馆网络继续‘有增无减’，”2023.77。Ibid.78。《2019年通信安全建立法案》第19.79条。同上，第30.80段。巴特斯比，《新西兰恐怖主义幽灵》，36.81分。新西兰皇家调查委员会，Citation2020.82。如上,分。10;章2.5;45.83段。如上,分。10;章2.5;47.84段。帕特曼和索斯盖特，《国家安全和监视》，85页。这项调查在研究人员的社交网络上发布，并在新西兰一个关注情报和国防的热门Instagram页面上发布——Instagram
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Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2272349
Carles Ortola
ABSTRACTCausation has traditionally been an under-theorized topic. Until Hendrickson’s work, very little effort had been devoted to creating a compelling theory of causation in intelligence analysis. In line with the recent attempts to integrate intelligence theory with philosophy, this article is intended to contribute to the philosophy of intelligence by defining a dedicated account of causation for it. The Unified Theory for Intelligence Analysis, as this account of causation is named, is intended to integrate into a single account Betts’ Normal and Exceptional Theories as well as Hendrickson’s target challenges. It is then proved that a pluralistic account of causation that combines both counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation is the most successful option. Finally, it is shown that Bayesian tools are the natural manifestation of this Unified Theory, and that Subjective Logic can help refute criticism against Bayesianism in intelligence analysis. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Phythian, “Intelligence Analysis and Social Science Methods: Exploring the Potential for and Possible Limits of Mutual Learning,” 601.2. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice.3. Kaupi, “Counterterrorism Analysis 101,” 47.4. Phythian, “Intelligence Analysis and Social Science Methods: Exploring the Potential for and Possible Limits of Mutual Learning,” p. 605.5. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security, p. 57.6. Laplace’s demon is a hypothetical being that has perfect knowledge of the position and momentum of every particle in the universe. If such a being existed, it could use this knowledge to predict the future with certainty. Laplace and his contemporaries believed that the universe was deterministic, meaning that every event was caused by a previous event and could be predicted with perfect knowledge. However, later research showed that the universe is not deterministic at the quantum level, meaning that there is an element of randomness in nature. This led to the crisis of classical determinism and the development of probabilistic quantum mechanics, which is a more accurate description of the world.7. Minkel, “If the Universe Were a Computer”.8. Phythian, ‘Intelligence Analysis and Social Science Methods: Exploring the Potential for and Possible Limits of Mutual Learning’. P. 603.9. Hendrickson, Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts: A Multidimensional Approach of Traits, Techniques, and Targets.10. Heuer, “The Evolution of Structured Analytic Techniques,” p. 4.11. Hendrickson, Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts: A Multidimensional Approach of Traits, Techniques, and Targets.12. According to Hendrickson, there is an epistemic continuum from data collection to strategic advice, and it can be divided into four separate stages that can be added up depending on the kind of intelligence to be produced. I
{"title":"A Unified Theory for Intelligence Analysis","authors":"Carles Ortola","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2272349","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2272349","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTCausation has traditionally been an under-theorized topic. Until Hendrickson’s work, very little effort had been devoted to creating a compelling theory of causation in intelligence analysis. In line with the recent attempts to integrate intelligence theory with philosophy, this article is intended to contribute to the philosophy of intelligence by defining a dedicated account of causation for it. The Unified Theory for Intelligence Analysis, as this account of causation is named, is intended to integrate into a single account Betts’ Normal and Exceptional Theories as well as Hendrickson’s target challenges. It is then proved that a pluralistic account of causation that combines both counterfactual and probabilistic accounts of causation is the most successful option. Finally, it is shown that Bayesian tools are the natural manifestation of this Unified Theory, and that Subjective Logic can help refute criticism against Bayesianism in intelligence analysis. Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Phythian, “Intelligence Analysis and Social Science Methods: Exploring the Potential for and Possible Limits of Mutual Learning,” 601.2. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the Gap between Scholarship and Practice.3. Kaupi, “Counterterrorism Analysis 101,” 47.4. Phythian, “Intelligence Analysis and Social Science Methods: Exploring the Potential for and Possible Limits of Mutual Learning,” p. 605.5. Betts, Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and Power in American National Security, p. 57.6. Laplace’s demon is a hypothetical being that has perfect knowledge of the position and momentum of every particle in the universe. If such a being existed, it could use this knowledge to predict the future with certainty. Laplace and his contemporaries believed that the universe was deterministic, meaning that every event was caused by a previous event and could be predicted with perfect knowledge. However, later research showed that the universe is not deterministic at the quantum level, meaning that there is an element of randomness in nature. This led to the crisis of classical determinism and the development of probabilistic quantum mechanics, which is a more accurate description of the world.7. Minkel, “If the Universe Were a Computer”.8. Phythian, ‘Intelligence Analysis and Social Science Methods: Exploring the Potential for and Possible Limits of Mutual Learning’. P. 603.9. Hendrickson, Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts: A Multidimensional Approach of Traits, Techniques, and Targets.10. Heuer, “The Evolution of Structured Analytic Techniques,” p. 4.11. Hendrickson, Reasoning for Intelligence Analysts: A Multidimensional Approach of Traits, Techniques, and Targets.12. According to Hendrickson, there is an epistemic continuum from data collection to strategic advice, and it can be divided into four separate stages that can be added up depending on the kind of intelligence to be produced. I","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"150 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135371559","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-24DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2272326
Jesse Heley
{"title":"Warship 2023 <b>Warship 2023</b> , edited by John Jordan, London, Osprey, 2023, 224 pp., Illustrated throughout with black-and-white photographs, £45 (hbk), ISBN: 9781472857132","authors":"Jesse Heley","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2272326","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2272326","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"55 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135322027","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2211872
R. Gerald Hughes, Martin Plaut
{"title":"The Evolution of African Intelligence Cultures","authors":"R. Gerald Hughes, Martin Plaut","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2211872","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2211872","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"19 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135825335","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-17DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2269512
David Easter
From 1944 the State Department attempted to improve its communications security by creating a Division of Cryptography and mechanising the encryption process. This article assesses the effectiveness of these reforms and shows that State’s new cipher equipment had cryptographic vulnerabilities. Moreover, the department was unable to maintain physical security at the Moscow embassy and through espionage and technical surveillance the KGB broke the ciphers and read American communications. The paper concludes by analysing the impact of this security failure, including the claim that intercepted messages influenced Stalin’s decision to approve the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950.
{"title":"State Department cipher machines and communications security in the early Cold War, 1944–1965","authors":"David Easter","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2269512","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2269512","url":null,"abstract":"From 1944 the State Department attempted to improve its communications security by creating a Division of Cryptography and mechanising the encryption process. This article assesses the effectiveness of these reforms and shows that State’s new cipher equipment had cryptographic vulnerabilities. Moreover, the department was unable to maintain physical security at the Moscow embassy and through espionage and technical surveillance the KGB broke the ciphers and read American communications. The paper concludes by analysing the impact of this security failure, including the claim that intercepted messages influenced Stalin’s decision to approve the North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950.","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135993128","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-13DOI: 10.1080/02684527.2023.2269517
Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández
{"title":"Learning for times of uncertainty <b>Estimative intelligence in European foreign policymaking. Learning lessons from an era of surprise</b> , edited by Christoph Meyer, Eva Michaels, Nikki Ikani, Aviva Guttmann, Michael S. Goodman, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2022, 370 pp., £85.00 (Hardback), ISBN: 9781399505512","authors":"Antonio M. Díaz-Fernández","doi":"10.1080/02684527.2023.2269517","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2023.2269517","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47048,"journal":{"name":"Intelligence and National Security","volume":"45 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135853783","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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