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Bodily Rights in Intentional Pregnancies 故意怀孕中的身体权利
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70000
Serena Olsaretti

In her ‘Abortion and Democratic Equality’, Japa Pallikkathayil argues that restrictive abortion laws are incompatible with equality before the law and with several core convictions from the liberal philosophical tradition, which support viewing citizens' bodily rights as inalienable in some important senses. This article raises some doubts about Pallikkathayil's arguments in the hardest case to defend: the use of surgical abortion to terminate an intentional pregnancy, especially for discretionary reasons. These doubts arise if we assume, as she does, that the fetus is a citizen. The article starts by identifying the key claims attributable to Pallikkathayil regarding what our bodily rights protect us against, before raising some questions about Pallikkathayil's argument to the effect that the bodily rights of procreators would be infringed by restrictive abortion laws in cases of intentional pregnancies and that those of fetuses would not be if those pregnancies were terminated by surgical abortion.

在她的《堕胎与民主平等》一书中,Japa Pallikkathayil认为,限制性堕胎法与法律面前的平等是不相容的,也与自由主义哲学传统的几个核心信念不相容,后者支持将公民的身体权利在某些重要意义上视为不可剥夺的。这篇文章对Pallikkathayil在最难辩护的案例中的论点提出了一些质疑:使用手术流产来终止故意怀孕,特别是出于自由裁量的原因。如果我们像她一样假设胎儿是公民,就会产生这些疑问。这篇文章首先确定了Pallikkathayil关于我们的身体权利保护我们免受的主要主张,然后对Pallikkathayil的论点提出了一些问题,即在故意怀孕的情况下,生育者的身体权利会受到限制性堕胎法的侵犯,而如果这些怀孕是通过手术流产终止的,胎儿的身体权利就不会受到侵犯。
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引用次数: 0
Openness, Priority, and Free Museums 开放、优先和免费博物馆
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-03-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70001
Jack Hume

This article develops a fairness-based criticism of the UK's policy of promoting free admissions at major museums. With a focus on geographic inequalities and per-capita museums spending, I argue that free admissions can be a surprisingly bad way of promoting cultural opportunities for disadvantaged groups. My criticism emphasises the fact that free admissions consume resources without necessarily providing targeted benefits to disadvantaged groups and addressing background inequalities. Given that museums vary in their location, visitor profile, and operating costs, this critique does not apply to all museums. It applies to the largest and most popular museums in the most advantaged areas, which can expect to keep drawing significant numbers while charging. If we are aiming to prioritise the interests of less advantaged groups, we should be in favour of charging at London's major museums, to finance ‘levelling up’ across regions, and more direct access-promoting measures in targeted outreach, collaboration, and programming.

本文对英国推动主要博物馆免费入场的政策进行了公正的批评。我关注的是地域不平等和人均博物馆支出,我认为免费入场可能是一种为弱势群体提供文化机会的糟糕方式。我的批评强调了这样一个事实,即免费招生消耗了资源,而不一定能为弱势群体提供有针对性的好处,也没有解决背景不平等问题。鉴于博物馆的地理位置、游客特征和运营成本各不相同,这一批评并不适用于所有博物馆。它适用于最有利地区最大、最受欢迎的博物馆,这些博物馆可以在收费的同时继续吸引大量游客。如果我们的目标是优先考虑弱势群体的利益,我们应该支持在伦敦的主要博物馆收费,为跨地区的“升级”提供资金,并在有针对性的推广、合作和规划中采取更直接的促进访问的措施。
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引用次数: 0
Automated Propaganda: Labeling AI-Generated Political Content Should Not be Required by Law 自动宣传:法律不应要求对人工智能生成的政治内容进行标注
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-02-24 DOI: 10.1111/japp.70002
Bartlomiej Chomanski, Lode Lauwaert

A number of scholars and policy-makers have raised serious concerns about the impact of chatbots and generative artificial intelligence (AI) on the spread of political disinformation. An increasingly popular proposal to address this concern is to pass laws that, by requiring that artificially generated and artificially disseminated content be labeled as such, aim to ensure a degree of transparency in this rapidly transforming environment. This article argues that such laws are misguided, for two reasons. We first aim to show that legally requiring the disclosure of the automated nature of bot accounts and AI-generated content is unlikely to succeed in improving the quality of political discussion on social media. This is because information that an account spreading or creating political information is a bot or a language model is itself politically relevant information, and people reason very poorly about such information. Second, we aim to show that the main motivation for these laws – the threat of coordinated disinformation campaigns (automated or not) – appears overstated.

一些学者和政策制定者对聊天机器人和生成式人工智能(AI)对政治虚假信息传播的影响提出了严重担忧。为解决这一问题,一项日益受欢迎的建议是通过法律,要求人为产生和人为传播的内容贴上这样的标签,目的是确保在这个迅速变化的环境中有一定程度的透明度。本文认为这样的法律是被误导的,原因有二。我们首先旨在表明,法律上要求披露机器人账户和人工智能生成内容的自动化性质,不太可能成功地提高社交媒体上政治讨论的质量。这是因为传播或创造政治信息的账户是机器人或语言模型的信息本身就是政治相关信息,人们对这些信息的推理非常差。其次,我们的目标是表明,制定这些法律的主要动机——协调的虚假信息活动(无论是否自动化)的威胁——似乎被夸大了。
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引用次数: 0
Procreative Liability and Equality before the Law 生育责任与法律面前人人平等
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-02-12 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12792
Anca Gheaus

Pallikkathayil argues that restrictions on abortion are inconsistent with the usual demands that states place on their citizens. States don't require their citizens to make their bodies available for the protection of other people's interests. Yet, when abortion is restricted, women who can be pregnant are less entitled than other citizens to decide on how their bodies are to be used; then, states fail to treat women as equal before the law. The argument is supposed to hold even if one assumes that fetuses at various stages of development are as morally considerable as (already born) children, and even if, moreover, fetuses have passive citizenship status – that is, if they have claims to state protection. Pallikkathayil's argument comes at excessive theoretical costs, ruling out (a) general duties to help others in the protection of vital interests via relatively non-burdening donation, e.g. of blood, and (b) plausible although demanding special duties of procreative parents. Nevertheless, I agree with Pallikkathayil's conclusion that existing legal restrictions on abortion violate the state's duty to treat its citizens as equals, and are hence illegitimate; namely, because they fail to hold all procreators - whether or not gestational - equally liable. 

Pallikkathayil认为,对堕胎的限制与国家对其公民的通常要求不一致。各州并不要求公民为了保护他人的利益而牺牲自己的身体。然而,当堕胎受到限制时,能够怀孕的妇女比其他公民更没有权利决定如何使用她们的身体;然后,各州没有在法律面前平等对待妇女。即使人们假设处于不同发育阶段的胎儿在道德上与(已经出生的)孩子一样重要,而且即使胎儿具有被动的公民身份——也就是说,如果他们要求得到国家的保护,这个论点也应该成立。Pallikkathayil的论点以过高的理论成本为基础,排除了(a)通过相对无负担的捐赠(例如献血)来帮助他人保护重要利益的一般义务,以及(b)虽然要求生育父母的特殊义务,但看似合理。然而,我同意Pallikkathayil的结论,即现有的对堕胎的法律限制违反了国家平等对待公民的义务,因此是不合法的;也就是说,因为他们不能让所有的生殖者——无论是否处于妊娠期——承担同等责任。
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引用次数: 0
Climate Absurdism 气候荒诞主义
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12797
Daniel G. Dick

Many arguments in the popular discourse around climate change seem intended to give the impression that climate action is an absurd endeavor. These ‘climate absurdist’ arguments are reflected in the question: ‘if the climate is going to change anyway, why should we care about anthropogenic climate change?’ Classic absurdist philosophy suggests that absurdity (also called ‘the absurd’) arises due to a conflict between our desire for meaning and a universe that seems devoid of meaning. Others argue the absurd is not a consequence of specific facts about the universe but is rather a matter of perspective – we live our lives with a seriousness that can always be undercut by ‘stepping back’ and viewing our goals and aspirations with indifference. Although climate absurdist claims are structured similarly to classic absurdist claims (positing a conflict between our climate stabilizing efforts and specific physical facts like a constantly changing climate), I argue that climate absurdist arguments are primarily rhetorical claims intended to encourage the listener to ‘step back’ and view our climate stabilizing efforts on a geologic or cosmic scale, where they can appear insignificant. I show that this approach results in a self-defeating argument that cannot justify climate inaction.

围绕气候变化的流行话语中的许多论点似乎意在给人一种印象,即气候行动是一项荒谬的努力。这些“气候荒诞主义者”的观点反映在这个问题上:“如果气候无论如何都会变化,我们为什么要关心人为的气候变化?”经典的荒诞主义哲学认为,荒谬(也被称为“荒谬”)是由于我们对意义的渴望与似乎缺乏意义的宇宙之间的冲突而产生的。另一些人则认为荒谬不是宇宙中特定事实的结果,而是观点的问题——我们严肃地生活着,但总是会被“退后一步”和冷漠地看待我们的目标和愿望所削弱。尽管气候荒诞主义者的主张与经典荒诞主义者的主张结构相似(假设我们的气候稳定努力与不断变化的气候等具体物理事实之间存在冲突),但我认为气候荒诞主义者的论点主要是修辞性的主张,旨在鼓励听众“退后一步”,从地质或宇宙尺度来看待我们的气候稳定努力,在那里它们可能显得微不足道。我指出,这种做法导致了一种弄巧成拙的论点,不能为气候不作为辩护。
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引用次数: 0
Abortion and Democratic Equality 堕胎与民主平等
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12785
Japa Pallikkathayil

A central tenet of the liberal tradition in political philosophy is that citizens must be able to relate to one another as equals. I argue that this commitment to what has been called democratic equality is in tension with legal prohibitions on abortion prior to fetal viability. The most minimal commitment of democratic equality is equality before the law, which requires that the state treat like cases alike. My primary argument focuses on showing how this requirement cannot be reconciled with restrictive abortion laws given the other laws and practices common in liberal democracies. This is so even if we think of fetuses as citizens, as I suggest we should. Moreover, the changes states would need to make to their other laws and practices to bring them into line with restrictive abortion laws are intuitively deeply disturbing. I give a secondary argument showing how these intuitive reactions may be vindicated by more substantive reflection on democratic equality and its presuppositions. But the primary argument has force for anyone who rejects the extensive state control over citizens' bodies that would be needed to reconcile restrictive abortion laws with equality before the law, even if they do so on other grounds.

政治哲学中自由主义传统的一个核心原则是,公民必须能够平等地相互联系。我认为,这种对所谓民主平等的承诺与法律上禁止在胎儿生存能力之前堕胎的规定是矛盾的。民主平等最基本的承诺是法律面前人人平等,这要求国家一视同仁。我的主要论点是,鉴于自由民主国家常见的其他法律和做法,这一要求如何与限制性堕胎法不协调。即使我们像我建议的那样,将胎儿视为公民,情况也是如此。此外,各州需要对其他法律和实践做出改变,以使其与限制性堕胎法保持一致,这在直觉上令人深感不安。我给出了一个次要的论点,表明这些直觉反应如何可以通过对民主平等及其前提的更实质性的反思来证明。但是,对于任何反对国家对公民身体的广泛控制的人来说,主要的论点都是有说服力的,这种控制是调和限制性堕胎法与法律面前人人平等所必需的,即使他们基于其他理由这样做。
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引用次数: 0
Emergent Discrimination: Should We Protect Algorithmic Groups? 紧急歧视:我们应该保护算法群体吗?
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-02-05 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12793
Jannik Zeiser

Discrimination is usually thought of in terms of socially salient groups, such as race or gender. Some scholars argue that the rise of algorithmic decision-making poses a challenge to this notion. Algorithms are not bound by a social view of the world. Therefore, they may not only inherit pre-existing social biases and injustices but may also discriminate based on entirely new categories that have little or no meaning to humans at all, such as ‘being born on a Tuesday’. Should this prospect change how we theorize about discrimination, and should we protect these algorithmic groups, as some have suggested? I argue that the phenomenon is adequately described as ‘discrimination’ when a group is systematically disadvantaged. At present, we lack information about whether any algorithmic group meets this criterion, so it is difficult to protect such groups. Instead, we should prevent algorithms from disproportionately disadvantaging certain individuals, and I outline strategies for doing so.

歧视通常被认为是针对社会上突出的群体,如种族或性别。一些学者认为,算法决策的兴起对这一概念构成了挑战。算法不受社会世界观的约束。因此,他们可能不仅继承了先前存在的社会偏见和不公正,还可能基于对人类几乎没有意义的全新类别进行歧视,例如“出生在星期二”。这种前景是否应该改变我们对歧视的理论化,我们是否应该像一些人建议的那样保护这些算法群体?我认为,当一个群体在系统上处于不利地位时,这种现象被恰当地描述为“歧视”。目前,我们缺乏关于是否有算法组满足这一标准的信息,因此很难保护这样的组。相反,我们应该防止算法不成比例地使某些人处于不利地位,我将概述这样做的策略。
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引用次数: 0
Evaluating the Free Speech Objection to Removing Tainted Political Symbols 论言论自由对移除污点政治符号的反对
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12795
Tuomas W. Manninen

In recent years, several philosophers have argued that statues which are morally tainted ought to be removed from public display. One objection to this claim is the free speech objection: removing the statues constitutes a violation of free speech rights. This objection suffers from two flaws. First, it is rarely articulated to its fullest potential. Second, the free speech objection is largely dismissed by philosophers who support the statues' removal. In this article, I will aim to rectify this situation by providing three different formulations of the free speech objection, based, respectively, on First Amendment jurisprudence, on Mill's consequentialist defense of free speech, and on Susan Dwyer's non-consequentialist defense of the same. After formulating the three versions of the objection, I will consider them against the alleged duty to remove tainted statues and argue that even under the strongest formulation of the free speech objection, it does not amount to a defeater to the duty.

近年来,一些哲学家认为,有道德污点的雕像应该从公共场所移除。反对这种说法的一个理由是反对言论自由:移除雕像构成了对言论自由权的侵犯。这一反对意见有两个缺陷。首先,它很少能充分发挥其潜力。其次,言论自由的反对意见在很大程度上被支持拆除雕像的哲学家们驳回。在这篇文章中,我将通过提供三种不同的言论自由反对的表述来纠正这种情况,分别基于第一修正案的法理学,基于穆勒对言论自由的结果主义辩护,以及基于苏珊·德怀尔对言论自由的非结果主义辩护。在阐述了三种反对意见之后,我将考虑它们是否反对所谓的移除受污染雕像的义务,并辩称,即使在言论自由反对意见最强烈的表述下,这也不等于反对这项义务。
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引用次数: 0
Institutionalized Policy Evaluation within the Democratic System: Why? When? How? 民主制度下的制度化政策评价:为什么?什么时候?如何?
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-02-04 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12796
Corrado Fumagalli

Philosophers have expressed concerns about elite capture at various stages of the democratic decision-making process. However, there has been no sustained normative analysis of government-driven feedback platforms that enable different actors to formulate recommendations for revising or canceling existing laws and policies. My article addresses and fills this gap. I contend that government-driven feedback platforms serve a dual purpose of influencing the policy-making process and demonstrating that decisions are open to revision. I also argue that these feedback platforms are intended to generate a normatively salient, forward-looking, and balanced integration of technical knowledge and local knowledge, establishing the epistemic foundation for future deliberation. I then provide three normative standards that serve as a guide to balance expert knowledge with citizens' experience and values.

哲学家们对精英在民主决策过程的各个阶段被俘获表示担忧。然而,对政府驱动的反馈平台没有持续的规范分析,这些平台使不同的行为者能够制定修改或取消现有法律和政策的建议。我的文章解决并填补了这一空白。我认为,政府驱动的反馈平台具有双重目的,即影响决策过程,并表明决策是可以修改的。我还认为,这些反馈平台旨在产生规范上突出的、前瞻性的、平衡的技术知识和本地知识的整合,为未来的审议建立认知基础。然后,我提供了三个规范性标准,作为平衡专家知识与公民经验和价值观的指南。
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引用次数: 0
Pregnancy, Gender Identity, Autonomy, and Trust 怀孕、性别认同、自主和信任
IF 0.7 2区 哲学 Q4 ETHICS Pub Date : 2025-01-29 DOI: 10.1111/japp.12789
Amy Mullin

I ask what is required for pregnant trans and gender diverse (TGD) people to receive trustworthy reproductive healthcare which supports their autonomy. My focus is on wanted pregnancies. I understand interpersonal trust as a positive attitude towards the competence and motivation or commitment of a person trusted in a particular role, such as a healthcare professional, and autonomy as self-governance shaped by what one cares about. I conceive of autonomy as relational and potentially enhanced or damaged by social interactions. I argue that mainstream bioethical conceptions of autonomy can accommodate my claims about how the autonomy of pregnant TGD persons can be diminished or supported, especially in relation to trust. I argue that support for the autonomy of pregnant TGD persons requires acknowledgement and understanding of their gender identity even when it is not relevant to their healthcare. My discussion has implications for whether morality requires us to affirm trans identities and what this means in healthcare. I conclude with remarks about what else we can learn by centering the experiences of pregnant TGD persons.

我问,怀孕的跨性别和性别多样化(TGD)的人需要什么才能获得值得信赖的生殖保健,支持他们的自主权。我关注的是意外怀孕。我将人际信任理解为一种积极的态度,即对在特定角色中被信任的人(如医疗保健专业人员)的能力、动机或承诺持积极态度,而自主性则是由个人所关心的事情形成的自我治理。我认为自主性是一种关系,可能会被社会互动所增强或破坏。我认为,自主的主流生物伦理概念可以适应我的主张,即怀孕的TGD人的自主权如何被削弱或支持,特别是在信任方面。我认为,支持怀孕的TGD人的自主权需要承认和理解她们的性别认同,即使这与她们的医疗保健无关。我的讨论涉及道德是否要求我们确认跨性别身份,以及这在医疗保健领域意味着什么。最后,我想谈谈我们还能从怀孕的TGD患者的经历中学到什么。
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引用次数: 0
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Journal of Applied Philosophy
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