Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

The best-performing AI systems, such as deep neural networks, tend to be the ones that are most difficult to control and understand. For this reason, scholars worry that the use of AI would lead to so-called responsibility gaps, that is, situations in which no one is morally responsible for the harm caused by AI, because no one satisfies the so-called control condition and epistemic condition of moral responsibility. In this article, I acknowledge that there is a significant challenge around responsibility and AI. Yet I don't think that this challenge is best captured in terms of a responsibility gap. Instead, I argue for the opposite view, namely that there is responsibility abundance, that is, a situation in which numerous agents are responsible for the harm caused by AI, and that the challenge comes from the difficulties of dealing with such abundance in practice. I conclude by arguing that reframing the challenge in this way offers distinct dialectic and theoretical advantages, promising to help overcome some obstacles in the current debate surrounding ‘responsibility gaps’.

Recent work in philosophy of technology has come to bear on the question of responsibility gaps. Some authors argue that the increase in the autonomous capabilities of decision-making systems makes it impossible to properly attribute responsibility for AI-based outcomes. In this article we argue that one important, and often neglected, feature of recent debates on responsibility gaps is how this debate maps on to old debates in responsibility theory. More specifically, we suggest that one of the key questions that is still at issue is the significance of the reactive attitudes, and how these ought to feature in our theorizing about responsibility. We will therefore provide a new descriptive categorization of different perspectives with respect to responsibility gaps. Such reflection can provide analytical clarity about what is at stake between the various interlocutors in this debate. The main upshot of our account is the articulation of a way to frame this ‘new’ debate by drawing on the rich intellectual history of ‘old’ concepts. By regarding the question of responsibility gaps as being concerned with questions of metaphysical priority, we see that the problem of these gaps lies not in any advanced technology, but rather in how we think about responsibility.

It is widely known that criminal punishment, especially imprisonment, has negative effects for innocent persons, most notably the families of prisoners. This is an issue attracting increasing attention from penal theorists and philosophers. Adding to this literature, this article examines the extent to which incarceration of a parent is consistent with fundamental rights that are often ascribed to children. In particular, we focus on children's rights against being separated from their parents. To this end, we begin with a discussion of the philosophical basis for children's rights against being separated from their parents against their will. Drawing from recent work by Kimberley Brownlee and Matthew Liao, we argue that children have such a right and that it is grounded in children's welfare interest and the importance of parent–child relationships for children to develop adequately into autonomous agents. We then examine three arguments why imprisoning a parent is justified despite the fact that children have a right against being separated from their parents. For each of these arguments, we argue that while they may show the imprisonment of a particular parent to be sometimes compatible with respecting the right against parent–child separation, an extensive use of imprisonment as punishment of the sort that persists in many states is not.

National humiliation is increasingly being used as a way of explaining certain kinds of international conflict. In this article, I argue that while such explanations are presented on the back of plausible assumptions about emotion, such assumptions also make it unlikely that humiliation can play the myriad of explanatory roles attributed to it, for example, to explain the rise of Hitler, growing Chinese antagonism towards the West, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and so on. In response, I consider some other ways humiliation may play a role in international conflict and argue that what are likely to be most relevant are not humiliating experiences, felt by individuals or groups, but rather humiliation narratives, which are often used as a discursive mechanism to justify conflict. This is important because it means a nation's willingness to engage in international conflict depends not on something which seems intractable (that is, the emotions felt by its citizens), but something more malleable: the narratives it accepts as frames for historical events.

Synthetic content, which has been produced by generative artificial intelligence, is beginning to spread through the public sphere. Increasingly, we find ourselves exposed to convincing ‘deepfakes’ and powerful chatbots in our online environments. How should we mitigate the emerging risks to individuals and society? This article argues that labelling synthetic content in public forums is an essential first step. While calls for labelling have already been growing in volume, no principled argument has yet been offered to justify this measure (which inevitably comes with some additional costs). Rectifying that deficit, I conduct a close examination of our epistemic and expressive interests in identifying synthetic content as such. In so doing, I develop a cumulative case for social media platforms to enforce a labelling duty. I argue that this represents an important element of good platform governance, helping to shore up the integrity of our contemporary public discourse, which takes place increasingly online.

Having a child is one of the highest-carbon decisions made by affluent individuals. Does this uncomfortable fact mean they should limit biological family size? This salient question also forces attention to two key issues. One is just how demanding individual climate justice duties are. The other is the danger of ‘ivory tower’ reasoning by privileged philosophers. On some topics, it is imperative carefully to integrate philosophical discussion with sociological and psychological research. Assuming individual climate justice duties include cutting one's carbon impact, the discussion goes as follows. Should affluent couples and individuals have no biological children, because of the carbon cost? Not unless emissions-cutting duties are extremely demanding, or we make dangerous, generalised socio-psychological assumptions. Is there any individual duty to consider carbon impact when determining family size? Yes, because individual emissions-cutting duties are more than trivially demanding. Should all duty-bearers ‘stop at’ some fixed maximum number of biological kids? Not unless that number is one and we are prepared to accept very demanding individual emissions-cutting duties and make problematic sociological assumptions. Finally, the article outlines three further individual duties following from the ‘uncomfortable fact’: to raise good climate citizens, become activists, and cut the family carbon footprint.

The notion of uncommandability has been central to how we perceive our emotional lives, and particularly romantic love. According to this notion, while we can control how we treat people, we have little control over how we feel about them. The argument from uncommandability is often evoked as a way of sidestepping moral obligations regarding our romantic emotions. One challenge to uncommandability is the potential to manipulate our emotions through psychopharmaceuticals. Much of the debate on so-called ‘love drugs’ has concerned the permissibility and worth of these interventions. By comparison, there has been less exploration of their implications for moral obligation and responsibility. How might the emergence of these interventions change what can be emotionally demanded of us? We ultimately suggest that it is necessary to view the complex morality of our emotional lives through different evaluative paradigms: one concerning moral duty and obligation, where we have no claim to each other's romantic love irrespective of its commandability, and the other concerning the appropriateness of our reactive attitudes, where we are at times justified in feeling morally injured by another person on account of their failure to love us, regardless of whether they had control in the matter.