There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this matter are inconsistent. For example, gamete donors who intentionally participate in the project of creating a child are thought to have few obligations to their offspring, but those who create a child accidentally are thought to have weighty obligations. Furthermore, a justification for why we are obliged to provide offspring with more than a life worth living has been elusive. To resolve this puzzle I argue that an under‐theorized element of morality, the directed duty of care, explains why we owe our offspring more than a life worth living.
{"title":"Procreative Obligations and the Directed Duty of Care","authors":"Reuven Brandt","doi":"10.1111/japp.12755","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12755","url":null,"abstract":"There is much dispute about what we owe the children we are responsible for creating. Some argue that so long as we provide offspring with lives worth living we do no wrong. Others argue that our procreative obligations are weightier and oblige us to provide (or attempt to provide) our offspring with a reasonable opportunity to thrive, or meet some other standard beyond merely providing a life worth living. Our practices and intuitions on this matter are inconsistent. For example, gamete donors who intentionally participate in the project of creating a child are thought to have few obligations to their offspring, but those who create a child accidentally are thought to have weighty obligations. Furthermore, a justification for why we are obliged to provide offspring with more than a life worth living has been elusive. To resolve this puzzle I argue that an under‐theorized element of morality, the directed duty of care, explains why we owe our offspring more than a life worth living.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141943781","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I argue that there is no morally relevant difference, based solely on motivation for enjoyment, between enjoying simulated rape with a sexbot compared to other media. In defence of this claim, I distinguish between two types of enjoyment – enjoyment qua simulation and enjoyment qua substitution – and further claim that each type of enjoyment shares corresponding similarities with either idle or surrogate fantasies. Given this, the enjoyment of one's rape fantasy is, I contend, immoral if one enjoys qua substitution one's surrogate fantasy about (for example) sexualized enslavement and rape, but not if one enjoys qua simulation one's idle fantasy about the same sexualized enslavement and rape. I therefore conclude that whether one's enjoyment is immoral depends on the motivation for the enjoyment and the type of fantasy one creates to procure it (where the motivation for enjoyment and fantasy share the same desire), and not the media used to facilitate one's fantasy and subsequent enjoyment.
{"title":"On the Morality of Enjoying Simulated Rape with Robots and by Other Fictional Means","authors":"Garry Young","doi":"10.1111/japp.12751","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12751","url":null,"abstract":"I argue that there is no morally relevant difference, based solely on motivation for enjoyment, between enjoying simulated rape with a sexbot compared to other media. In defence of this claim, I distinguish between two types of enjoyment – enjoyment <jats:italic>qua</jats:italic> simulation and enjoyment <jats:italic>qua</jats:italic> substitution – and further claim that each type of enjoyment shares corresponding similarities with either idle or surrogate fantasies. Given this, the enjoyment of one's rape fantasy is, I contend, immoral if one enjoys <jats:italic>qua</jats:italic> substitution one's surrogate fantasy about (for example) sexualized enslavement and rape, but not if one enjoys <jats:italic>qua</jats:italic> simulation one's idle fantasy about the same sexualized enslavement and rape. I therefore conclude that whether one's <jats:italic>enjoyment</jats:italic> is immoral depends on the motivation for the enjoyment and the type of fantasy one creates to procure it (where the motivation for enjoyment and fantasy share the same desire), and not the media used to facilitate one's fantasy and subsequent enjoyment.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141943782","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law. J.Waldron, 2023. Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 336 pp, $49.00 (hb)","authors":"Eric Scarffe","doi":"10.1111/japp.12754","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12754","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141884625","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Asylum seekers are rarely treated with respect. This is perhaps especially true of institutions that adjudicate the extension of refugee status. In asylum interviews, those seeking refuge are sometimes asked to reveal deeply upsetting stories of their persecution while facing hostility and distrust from their interviewers. I argue that this arises from a failure to properly balance respect with fairness. A maximally fair scheme may not promote respect because ‘fairness‐first’ systems require extensive information to make their judgements. A maximally respectful system might be unfair: without any questioning, some may free‐ride on the trust of others. This article argues that we often place too much emphasis on fairness to the detriment of respect, with a particular focus on the asylum interview. First, I outline the limited discussion of asylum interviews in political philosophy. Second, I consider striking a ‘dynamic balance’ between fairness and respect, as set out by Jonathan Wolff. Third, I argue that a highly idealised version of contemporary asylum interviews puts fairness first at the cost of respect. This fairness‐first model leads to respect deficits in how asylum seekers are treated. Finally, I consider what a respectful asylum determination system might look like, offering three possible routes: civility, humility, and abolition.
{"title":"Respect and Asylum","authors":"Rebecca Buxton","doi":"10.1111/japp.12750","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12750","url":null,"abstract":"Asylum seekers are rarely treated with respect. This is perhaps especially true of institutions that adjudicate the extension of refugee status. In asylum interviews, those seeking refuge are sometimes asked to reveal deeply upsetting stories of their persecution while facing hostility and distrust from their interviewers. I argue that this arises from a failure to properly balance respect with fairness. A maximally fair scheme may not promote respect because ‘fairness‐first’ systems require extensive information to make their judgements. A maximally respectful system might be unfair: without any questioning, some may free‐ride on the trust of others. This article argues that we often place too much emphasis on fairness to the detriment of respect, with a particular focus on the asylum interview. First, I outline the limited discussion of asylum interviews in political philosophy. Second, I consider striking a ‘dynamic balance’ between fairness and respect, as set out by Jonathan Wolff. Third, I argue that a highly idealised version of contemporary asylum interviews puts fairness first at the cost of respect. This fairness‐first model leads to respect deficits in how asylum seekers are treated. Finally, I consider what a respectful asylum determination system might look like, offering three possible routes: civility, humility, and abolition.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-07-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141515611","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A number of Black writers have cast Black marriage in a state of emergency – Black folks are not getting (or staying) married like they used to. Yet in seeking to address the Black marriage problem many have left marriage's ‘monogamous‐only’ condition unexamined. In this article, I take a different approach. I draw on a long‐standing prevalence of de facto non‐monogamy among those marked Black and argue that the numerical constraint making marriage between two people violates equal treatment. To make the case, I show how anti‐non‐monogamy attitudes have been racialized in ways that are expressive of anti‐Blackness. In my view, the effects of this racialization include ongoing and disproportionate impacts on an already burdened group – Black polyamorists. A failure to reform the monogamous‐only condition of marriage tacitly endorses anti‐non‐monogamous attitudes of the past where Black intimate relationships were thought inferior and therefore deserving of an inferior social standing. Finally, I look to an account of minimal marriage as a site of possibility for establishing a marriage institution that is more just in relation to equal treatment and a site of repair for racialized non‐monogamists whose historical denial to accessing marriage has had the effect of accumulated social and political disadvantage.
{"title":"Polyamory in Black: A Companion Justification for Minimal Marriage","authors":"Justin L. Clardy","doi":"10.1111/japp.12749","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12749","url":null,"abstract":"A number of Black writers have cast Black marriage in a state of emergency – Black folks are not getting (or staying) married like they used to. Yet in seeking to address the Black marriage problem many have left marriage's ‘monogamous‐only’ condition unexamined. In this article, I take a different approach. I draw on a long‐standing prevalence of <jats:italic>de facto</jats:italic> non‐monogamy among those marked Black and argue that the numerical constraint making marriage between two people violates equal treatment. To make the case, I show how anti‐non‐monogamy attitudes have been racialized in ways that are expressive of anti‐Blackness. In my view, the effects of this racialization include ongoing and disproportionate impacts on an already burdened group – Black polyamorists. A failure to reform the monogamous‐only condition of marriage tacitly endorses anti‐non‐monogamous attitudes of the past where Black intimate relationships were thought inferior and therefore deserving of an inferior social standing. Finally, I look to an account of minimal marriage as a site of possibility for establishing a marriage institution that is more just in relation to equal treatment and a site of repair for racialized non‐monogamists whose historical denial to accessing marriage has had the effect of accumulated social and political disadvantage.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141501957","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Political theorists frequently utilize the ‘firm–state analogy’ (FSA) to support the arguments for democratic governance in firms. This article presents the FSA as an analogy with both justificatory and epistemic functions. Its justificatory function provides valid justificatory strategies for workplace democracy, while its epistemic function offers models that shape the understanding of corporate power. In this article, four limitations of the justificatory function of the FSA are identified: (i) the problem of ambiguity, (ii) the boundary problem, (iii) the issue of normative redundancy, and (iv) the universality problem. Furthermore, the article argues that the epistemic function of the FSA fails to adequately address some of the most concerning forms of corporate power wielded by large, particularly multinational, corporations in the realm of international trade. As a result, the FSA misses crucial reasons for the normative desirability of democracy in corporate governance.
{"title":"The Epistemology of Corporate Power: The Limits of the Firm–State Analogy","authors":"Chi Kwok","doi":"10.1111/japp.12748","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12748","url":null,"abstract":"Political theorists frequently utilize the ‘firm–state analogy’ (FSA) to support the arguments for democratic governance in firms. This article presents the FSA as an analogy with both justificatory and epistemic functions. Its justificatory function provides valid justificatory strategies for workplace democracy, while its epistemic function offers models that shape the understanding of corporate power. In this article, four limitations of the justificatory function of the FSA are identified: (i) the problem of ambiguity, (ii) the boundary problem, (iii) the issue of normative redundancy, and (iv) the universality problem. Furthermore, the article argues that the epistemic function of the FSA fails to adequately address some of the most concerning forms of corporate power wielded by large, particularly multinational, corporations in the realm of international trade. As a result, the FSA misses crucial reasons for the normative desirability of democracy in corporate governance.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-06-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141501958","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In European countries (excluding the UK and Ireland), official statistics do not use racial or ethnic categories, but instead rely on proxies to collect data about discrimination. In the German microcensus, the proxy category adopted is ‘migration background’ (Migrationshintergrund): an individual has a ‘migration background’ when one or more of their parents does not have German citizenship by birth. We apply a coupled ethical‐epistemic analysis to the ‘migration background’ category to illuminate how the epistemic issues contribute to ethical ones. Our central claim is that these ethical‐epistemic issues with the ‘migration background’ category are best analysed in terms of Charles Mills's ‘white ignorance’. Appealing to Annette Martín's structural account of white ignorance, we highlight the cyclical reinforcement of ignorance and racial injustice in the use of the ‘migration background’ variable. Colourblind eliminativism about race perpetuates the use of ‘migration background’, which sustains and intensifies racial injustices.
{"title":"Who Counts in Official Statistics? Ethical‐Epistemic Issues in German Migration and the Collection of Racial or Ethnic Data","authors":"Daniel James, Morgan Thompson, Tereza Hendl","doi":"10.1111/japp.12737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12737","url":null,"abstract":"In European countries (excluding the UK and Ireland), official statistics do not use racial or ethnic categories, but instead rely on proxies to collect data about discrimination. In the German microcensus, the proxy category adopted is ‘migration background’ (<jats:italic>Migrationshintergrund</jats:italic>): an individual has a ‘migration background’ when one or more of their parents does not have German citizenship by birth. We apply a coupled ethical‐epistemic analysis to the ‘migration background’ category to illuminate how the epistemic issues contribute to ethical ones. Our central claim is that these ethical‐epistemic issues with the ‘migration background’ category are best analysed in terms of Charles Mills's ‘white ignorance’. Appealing to Annette Martín's structural account of white ignorance, we highlight the cyclical reinforcement of ignorance and racial injustice in the use of the ‘migration background’ variable. Colourblind eliminativism about race perpetuates the use of ‘migration background’, which sustains and intensifies racial injustices.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141152181","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article develops a theory of indirect discrimination by analyzing a series of lawsuits that challenged hospital relocations in the 1970s. In these cases, civil rights groups argued that the relocation of hospitals from cities to suburbs was a form of racial discrimination. Although these lawsuits failed, I aim to support the plaintiffs' arguments that the hospital relocations were discriminatory. Drawing on three recent theories – those of Benjamin Eidelson, Deborah Hellman, and Sophia Moreau – I develop an account of indirect discrimination that is rooted in resource‐specific equality rights such as those found in international human rights law. Building on this account, I argue that the human right to health equity can explain why the hospital relocations were discriminatory.
{"title":"Indirect Discrimination and the Hospital Relocation Cases","authors":"Brian Hutler","doi":"10.1111/japp.12740","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12740","url":null,"abstract":"This article develops a theory of indirect discrimination by analyzing a series of lawsuits that challenged hospital relocations in the 1970s. In these cases, civil rights groups argued that the relocation of hospitals from cities to suburbs was a form of racial discrimination. Although these lawsuits failed, I aim to support the plaintiffs' arguments that the hospital relocations were discriminatory. Drawing on three recent theories – those of Benjamin Eidelson, Deborah Hellman, and Sophia Moreau – I develop an account of indirect discrimination that is rooted in resource‐specific equality rights such as those found in international human rights law. Building on this account, I argue that the human right to health equity can explain why the hospital relocations were discriminatory.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141116651","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Essays on the ethics of monuments tend to focus on their morality in relation to domestic populations. In this article we turn our attention to how the principles we favor for the ‘ingroup’ apply to various ‘outgroups’, including foreigners and foreign governments, guest workers, visiting scholars, forcibly annexed or colonized peoples, and migrant communities. It argues that nations have a prima facie moral right to erect and maintain monuments offensive to foreigners and foreign governments or (in the case of institutions) rivals. Furthermore, we hold that whereas prospective immigrants have little standing to advocate for the removal of monuments they find offensive in their receiving countries, those who have been forcibly annexed have a much greater claim to inoffensive memorialization, contingent on their willingness to be countrymen with the descendants of their former oppressors and principles of reasonably charitable interpretation. Lastly, the article advocates for the protection of heritage landscapes from foreign influence and highlights the responsibilities of migrant populations to avoid memorializing their old grievances in ways that undermine the interests of their adopted nations.
{"title":"Offensive Heritage in an Era of Globalization and Mass Migration","authors":"Dan Demetriou, Ajume H. Wingo","doi":"10.1111/japp.12738","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12738","url":null,"abstract":"Essays on the ethics of monuments tend to focus on their morality in relation to domestic populations. In this article we turn our attention to how the principles we favor for the ‘ingroup’ apply to various ‘outgroups’, including foreigners and foreign governments, guest workers, visiting scholars, forcibly annexed or colonized peoples, and migrant communities. It argues that nations have a prima facie moral right to erect and maintain monuments offensive to foreigners and foreign governments or (in the case of institutions) rivals. Furthermore, we hold that whereas prospective immigrants have little standing to advocate for the removal of monuments they find offensive in their receiving countries, those who have been forcibly annexed have a much greater claim to inoffensive memorialization, contingent on their willingness to be countrymen with the descendants of their former oppressors and principles of reasonably charitable interpretation. Lastly, the article advocates for the protection of heritage landscapes from foreign influence and highlights the responsibilities of migrant populations to avoid memorializing their old grievances in ways that undermine the interests of their adopted nations.","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2024-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140979979","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"How to Pool Risks across Generations: The Case for Collective Pensions. M. Otsuka, 2023. Oxford, Oxford University Press. viii + 109 pp, £40.00 (hb)","authors":"Ezekiel Vergara","doi":"10.1111/japp.12739","DOIUrl":"10.1111/japp.12739","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47057,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Applied Philosophy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.7,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140931055","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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