Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

Speciesism, broadly understood as the view that species membership is a morally relevant property, has been a central topic of debate within animal ethics for around 50 years. However, in all this time, animal ethicists have paid relatively scant attention to the nature of species membership itself. This seems potentially regrettable, since species membership's precise nature is presumably highly pertinent to the question of its exact moral relevance. Here, I advocate for a ‘species-focused’ approach to assessing speciesism, arguing that, in debating the merits of speciesism, animal ethicists should (i) centre the nature of species membership, and (ii) consult philosophers of biology. Adherence to this second prescription appears necessary since a lot of what philosophers of biology believe regarding the nature of species membership appears contrary to what many animal ethicists have seemingly assumed.

Ordinary interactions are the primary vehicle through which we show respect, give social pleasure, and grease the wheels of healthy sociality. When we do an interactional wrong to someone, we not only convey disrespect by disregarding their interactional needs, but also cause them social pain and erode healthy social relations. Interactional ethics – the study of the ethics of interacting – concerns both our conduct within our interactions and our broader interactional style. The existing philosophical literature in this area has not yet provided a detailed analysis of the three discrete stages of an ordinary interaction – the initiation stage, the execution stage, and the conclusion stage – or of the specific wrongs beyond disrespect that we can do at each stage. This article develops novel and useful tools to analyse interactional wrongs that both compromise our wellbeing by causing us social pain and threaten healthy sociality. It then distinguishes various patterns of interactional wrongdoing – i.e. interactional vices – that we can manifest as we seek to control with whom we interact and how.

When states cooperate in refugee protection and implement a scheme with fixed rules allocating refugees to host states, should they consider refugees' interests and preferences regarding where they receive protection? This article briefly examines the kinds of preferences and interests that are relevant to both refugees and states before discussing the moral principles determining the respective weight that should be attributed to them. We conclude that states must adhere to some minimal constraints concerning the consideration of refugees' concerns, and should promote some further moral goals that go beyond these constraints. Finally, we suggest a scheme that meets all the moral demands we argued for and seems feasible without posing serious threats to the destination states.

This article describes a paradoxical phenomenon arising from the fact that those who act rightly often pay a price for doing so. The paradox is that the very thing – acting rightly – that incurs the cost also makes the cost (especially) undeserved. In explicating the paradox, I distinguish between two kinds of cost (internal and external), two kinds of unfairness (intrinsic and comparative), and two manifestations of the paradox (prospective and retrospective). I suggest that the problem generated by the paradox of desert arises and becomes steadily more pronounced as we regress through three kinds of cases. I then consider and reject an attempt to dissolve the paradox, and I discuss the relevance of the paradox for questions about the extent of duty. Finally, I consider a concern about drawing attention to the paradox of desert.

This article explores the ethics of state borrowing to fulfil global responsibilities. Although borrowing may appear attractive in the face of budgetary pressures and an increased number of crises in a changing global order, the article argues that borrowing to fulfil global responsibilities is generally morally problematic. It presents two main objections to borrowing. First, borrowing is often likely to be unfair intergenerationally, violating the ‘Just Borrowing Principle’. Second, borrowing demonstrates a lack of sufficient commitment, violating the ‘Taking a Stand Principle’, and therefore weakens the expressivist justification of measures to fulfil global responsibilities.