Journal of Applied Philosophy最新文献

According to the obscuring objection against mainstream political philosophy, there has been a long-standing dominant research paradigm focusing on distributive justice. This has made it difficult to call attention to important social facts, such as discrimination and oppression. The purpose of this article is not to defend the claim that mainstream political philosophy obscures important social facts. We instead focus on how obscuring arises. There are undoubtedly several different forces at play in the development of a research field, but the focus here is to spell out mechanisms that enforce obscuring which draw from influential theories in pragmatics. The account starts with the assumption that conversations are structured around mutual assumptions among interlocutors. We argue that the contents of these mutual assumptions represent certain general norms for efficient conversation and unequal social power among interlocutors, both of which constitute an important part of how obscuring arises.

Ours is an age of incessant hustle, where resting increasingly seems like a privilege out of reach for many or else a liability to be undertaken sparingly and with discretion. In this context, we might wonder whether we have lost sight of the importance of taking a break. What place might rest have in leading a meaningful life? Unfortunately, recent philosophical theories of meaning in life have not only neglected the importance of rest but also reinforced our cultural obsession with the value of activity and the pursuit of achievements. In contrast to this prevailing tendency, this article will begin by offering an analysis of rest as the temporary suspension of active involvement in projects for the sake of rejuvenation. I then argue that rest can genuinely imbue our lives with meaning, yet not all conceptions of meaningful rest are equally existentially significant.

In this article, we argue that felt discontinuity of self plays a role in recovery from substance use disorders. We rely on a view of the self that identifies continuity of the self with the maintenance of a self-concept, and we use it to propose an explanation of how individuals with substance use disorders form concepts of self around those disorders. We argue further that individuals can experience a discontinuity of self, that is, an identity crisis, in two ways. First, a person with a substance use disorder might experience a discontinuity of self when they attempt to maintain a self established prior to developing a substance use disorder. This type of identity crisis might motivate recovery as the individual will seek to resolve it through attempts to maintain an earlier concept of self that is not centered on substance use. Second, a person might experience a discontinuity of self as they seek to establish a self that is not grounded in substance use, which might make recovery more difficult by the need to establish a new concept of self.

This article develops a fairness-based criticism of the UK's policy of promoting free admissions at major museums. With a focus on geographic inequalities and per-capita museums spending, I argue that free admissions can be a surprisingly bad way of promoting cultural opportunities for disadvantaged groups. My criticism emphasises the fact that free admissions consume resources without necessarily providing targeted benefits to disadvantaged groups and addressing background inequalities. Given that museums vary in their location, visitor profile, and operating costs, this critique does not apply to all museums. It applies to the largest and most popular museums in the most advantaged areas, which can expect to keep drawing significant numbers while charging. If we are aiming to prioritise the interests of less advantaged groups, we should be in favour of charging at London's major museums, to finance ‘levelling up’ across regions, and more direct access-promoting measures in targeted outreach, collaboration, and programming.

Pallikkathayil argues that restrictions on abortion are inconsistent with the usual demands that states place on their citizens. States don't require their citizens to make their bodies available for the protection of other people's interests. Yet, when abortion is restricted, women who can be pregnant are less entitled than other citizens to decide on how their bodies are to be used; then, states fail to treat women as equal before the law. The argument is supposed to hold even if one assumes that fetuses at various stages of development are as morally considerable as (already born) children, and even if, moreover, fetuses have passive citizenship status – that is, if they have claims to state protection. Pallikkathayil's argument comes at excessive theoretical costs, ruling out (a) general duties to help others in the protection of vital interests via relatively non-burdening donation, e.g. of blood, and (b) plausible although demanding special duties of procreative parents. Nevertheless, I agree with Pallikkathayil's conclusion that existing legal restrictions on abortion violate the state's duty to treat its citizens as equals, and are hence illegitimate; namely, because they fail to hold all procreators - whether or not gestational - equally liable. 

Many arguments in the popular discourse around climate change seem intended to give the impression that climate action is an absurd endeavor. These ‘climate absurdist’ arguments are reflected in the question: ‘if the climate is going to change anyway, why should we care about anthropogenic climate change?’ Classic absurdist philosophy suggests that absurdity (also called ‘the absurd’) arises due to a conflict between our desire for meaning and a universe that seems devoid of meaning. Others argue the absurd is not a consequence of specific facts about the universe but is rather a matter of perspective – we live our lives with a seriousness that can always be undercut by ‘stepping back’ and viewing our goals and aspirations with indifference. Although climate absurdist claims are structured similarly to classic absurdist claims (positing a conflict between our climate stabilizing efforts and specific physical facts like a constantly changing climate), I argue that climate absurdist arguments are primarily rhetorical claims intended to encourage the listener to ‘step back’ and view our climate stabilizing efforts on a geologic or cosmic scale, where they can appear insignificant. I show that this approach results in a self-defeating argument that cannot justify climate inaction.