Many philosophers and members of the public think it is wrong to procreate. If one wants children, it is permissible to adopt. But procreation is allegedly impermissible because there is some respect in which adoption is better than procreation. There are two prominent variants of such objections. First, we have a duty to help others. Adopting a child from a poor country satisfies that duty. But procreation does not. Second, adding another person to a wealthy nation through procreation contributes to climate change. But adopting does not. I show that such objections are unsound.
{"title":"Against Adoption‐Based Objections to Procreation","authors":"Scott Hill","doi":"10.1111/papq.12472","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12472","url":null,"abstract":"Many philosophers and members of the public think it is wrong to procreate. If one wants children, it is permissible to adopt. But procreation is allegedly impermissible because there is some respect in which adoption is better than procreation. There are two prominent variants of such objections. First, we have a duty to help others. Adopting a child from a poor country satisfies that duty. But procreation does not. Second, adding another person to a wealthy nation through procreation contributes to climate change. But adopting does not. I show that such objections are unsound.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"5 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"142197387","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Yes. I defend this claim against the charge of race reductionism and the charge that ‘white interests’ cannot figure meaningfully into structural explanations of racial inequality. We then distinguish two explanatory roles for white supremacy. The racial role approach attempts to trace the causal effects of white supremacy's normative white/non‐white hierarchy on life chances. The racial materialism approach treats racial inequality as an emergent feature of social orders which depend on conventional racial divisions in labor performance. Each approach emphasizes a different level of explanation for the same basic fact: white interests both drive and are served by racial inequality.
{"title":"Does White Supremacy Explain Racial Inequality?","authors":"Patrick O'Donnell","doi":"10.1111/papq.12470","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12470","url":null,"abstract":"Yes. I defend this claim against the charge of race reductionism and the charge that ‘white interests’ cannot figure meaningfully into structural explanations of racial inequality. We then distinguish two explanatory roles for white supremacy. The <jats:italic>racial role</jats:italic> approach attempts to trace the causal effects of white supremacy's normative white/non‐white hierarchy on life chances. The <jats:italic>racial materialism</jats:italic> approach treats racial inequality as an emergent feature of social orders which depend on conventional racial divisions in labor performance. Each approach emphasizes a different level of explanation for the same basic fact: white interests both drive and are served by racial inequality.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"19 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141948240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Which individuals belong to a racial group, and what determines membership? I argue that questions about membership are importantly different from questions regarding the ontology of racial categories and invite a distinctive line of inquiry. But there's a formidable challenge to providing determinate and consistent answers to membership questions: Many phenomena documented in sociology and psychology generate reasonable and systematic disagreement about membership that cannot be adjudicated by an influential variety of social constructionism. While the puzzle of racial identity remains, we emerge with a new appreciation for how racial membership is a distinctive part of it.
{"title":"Making Sense of Racial Membership","authors":"Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval","doi":"10.1111/papq.12473","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12473","url":null,"abstract":"Which individuals belong to a racial group, and what determines membership? I argue that questions about membership are importantly different from questions regarding the ontology of racial categories and invite a distinctive line of inquiry. But there's a formidable challenge to providing determinate and consistent answers to membership questions: Many phenomena documented in sociology and psychology generate reasonable and systematic disagreement about membership that cannot be adjudicated by an influential variety of social constructionism. While the puzzle of racial identity remains, we emerge with a new appreciation for how racial membership is a distinctive part of it.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"14 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-08-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141948217","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Mereological nihilists typically employ a paraphrase strategy in order to mitigate the apparent absurdity of their denial of the existence of composite objects. I argue here that the nihilist's paraphrase strategy is incomplete, because no schema for generating nihilistically acceptable paraphrases of sentences concerning material constitution has ever been given. Nor can an adequate schema be arrived at by generalising things that nihilists have already said. I fill this lacuna in the nihilist's account by developing and defending a novel paraphrase schema that makes essential reference to the determinable‐determinate relation that holds between arrangement‐properties instantiated by the simples.
{"title":"Mereological Nihilism and Material Constitution","authors":"Simon Thunder","doi":"10.1111/papq.12469","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12469","url":null,"abstract":"Mereological nihilists typically employ a paraphrase strategy in order to mitigate the apparent absurdity of their denial of the existence of composite objects. I argue here that the nihilist's paraphrase strategy is incomplete, because no schema for generating nihilistically acceptable paraphrases of sentences concerning <jats:italic>material constitution</jats:italic> has ever been given. Nor can an adequate schema be arrived at by generalising things that nihilists have already said. I fill this lacuna in the nihilist's account by developing and defending a novel paraphrase schema that makes essential reference to the determinable‐determinate relation that holds between arrangement‐properties instantiated by the simples.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"11 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-07-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141769416","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
One of the most important topics that Thomas Aquinas discusses in his extensive corpus is the love of friendship, which is a unique form of love aimed at persons. Yet Aquinas's teachings on this are perplexing, for he claims that this love always produces union between lover and beloved, and that it is always a mutual love. This implies that one's love depends on reciprocation from the beloved, which seems implausible given the possibility of phenomena such as unrequited love. A common interpretation of Aquinas's account of the love of friendship maintains that it is enough that one desires union and mutuality for such love to obtain even if such desires remain unrealized, but in this paper I reject this reading and argue that achieving union and mutuality is essential to this form of love. This novel interpretation ultimately reveals that the love of friendship is an intrinsically interpersonal act.
{"title":"True Love Is Reciprocal: Thomas Aquinas on the Love of Friendship","authors":"James Kintz","doi":"10.1111/papq.12460","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12460","url":null,"abstract":"One of the most important topics that Thomas Aquinas discusses in his extensive corpus is the love of friendship, which is a unique form of love aimed at persons. Yet Aquinas's teachings on this are perplexing, for he claims that this love always produces union between lover and beloved, and that it is always a mutual love. This implies that one's love depends on reciprocation from the beloved, which seems implausible given the possibility of phenomena such as unrequited love. A common interpretation of Aquinas's account of the love of friendship maintains that it is enough that one desires union and mutuality for such love to obtain even if such desires remain unrealized, but in this paper I reject this reading and argue that achieving union and mutuality is essential to this form of love. This novel interpretation ultimately reveals that the love of friendship is an intrinsically interpersonal act.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"24 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141190225","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
I develop an egalitarian account of what's objectionable about coercion. The account is rooted in the idea that certain relationships, like those of master to slave or lord to peasant, are relationships of subordination or domination. These relationships are morally objectionable. Such relationships are in part constituted by asymmetries of power. A master subordinates a slave because the master has more power over the slave than vice versa. Coercion is objectionable, I argue, because it creates such asymmetries of power and so creates relationships of subordination. This account, moreover, illuminates what's wrong with blackmail, exploitation, withholding aid, and compulsion.
{"title":"The Egalitarian Objection to Coercion","authors":"Adam Lovett","doi":"10.1111/papq.12463","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12463","url":null,"abstract":"I develop an egalitarian account of what's objectionable about coercion. The account is rooted in the idea that certain relationships, like those of master to slave or lord to peasant, are relationships of subordination or domination. These relationships are morally objectionable. Such relationships are in part constituted by asymmetries of power. A master subordinates a slave because the master has more power over the slave than vice versa. Coercion is objectionable, I argue, because it creates such asymmetries of power and so creates relationships of subordination. This account, moreover, illuminates what's wrong with blackmail, exploitation, withholding aid, and compulsion.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"77 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"141190224","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, I discuss two different metaethical challenges based on population ethical impossibility results. According to the anti‐realist challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the existence of objective moral facts. According to the skeptical challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the reliability of our moral intuitions. My aim is to systematically explore and evaluate these challenges. In addition to clarifying the issues, I argue that population ethical impossibility results do not in fact support any anti‐realist or skeptical conclusions.
{"title":"Impossible Ethics: Do Population Ethical Impossibility Results Support Moral Skepticism and/or Anti‐Realism?","authors":"Victor Moberger","doi":"10.1111/papq.12462","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12462","url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, I discuss two different metaethical challenges based on population ethical impossibility results. According to the <jats:italic>anti‐realist</jats:italic> challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the existence of objective moral facts. According to the <jats:italic>skeptical</jats:italic> challenge, the results pose a serious threat to the reliability of our moral intuitions. My aim is to systematically explore and evaluate these challenges. In addition to clarifying the issues, I argue that population ethical impossibility results <jats:italic>do not</jats:italic> in fact support any anti‐realist or skeptical conclusions.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"126 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140928626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Socrates provides an argument at the end of the Apology that he believes gives hope that death is a blessing. This argument, grounded on the claim that death is one of two things, has been the subject of much derision and some recent defense. In this essay, I build on the work of other sympathetic commentators to show that Socrates' argument, when taken in context, not only makes good sense, but unifies Socrates' speech into a cohesive exhortation toward virtue.
{"title":"Socrates' Final Argument in Apology","authors":"Mark Robert Taylor","doi":"10.1111/papq.12458","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12458","url":null,"abstract":"Socrates provides an argument at the end of the <jats:italic>Apology</jats:italic> that he believes gives hope that death is a blessing. This argument, grounded on the claim that death is one of two things, has been the subject of much derision and some recent defense. In this essay, I build on the work of other sympathetic commentators to show that Socrates' argument, when taken in context, not only makes good sense, but unifies Socrates' speech into a cohesive exhortation toward virtue.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"23 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-05-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140928624","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues – like honesty, fair‐mindedness, and patience – are counterexamples to Aristotle's doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but taking it seriously also allows us to gain substantial insight into particular virtues. Failure to take the doctrine seriously, moreover, exposes us to the risk of mistaking certain vices for virtues.
{"title":"Defending the Doctrine of the Mean Against Counterexamples: A General Strategy","authors":"Nicholas Colgrove","doi":"10.1111/papq.12457","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12457","url":null,"abstract":"Aristotle's doctrine of the mean states that each moral virtue stands opposed to two types of vice: one of excess and one of deficiency, respectively. Critics claim that some virtues – like honesty, fair‐mindedness, and patience – are counterexamples to Aristotle's doctrine. Here, I develop a generalizable strategy to defend the doctrine of the mean against such counterexamples. I argue that not only is the doctrine of the mean defensible, but taking it seriously also allows us to gain substantial insight into particular virtues. Failure to take the doctrine seriously, moreover, exposes us to the risk of mistaking certain vices for virtues.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"46 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140634237","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature.
{"title":"Indirect Defenses of Speciesism Make No Sense","authors":"François Jaquet","doi":"10.1111/papq.12459","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12459","url":null,"abstract":"Animal ethicists often distinguish between direct and indirect defenses of speciesism, where the former appeal to species membership and the latter invoke other features that are simply associated with it. The main extant charge against indirect defenses rests on the empirical claim that any feature other than membership in our species is either absent in some humans or present in some nonhumans. This paper challenges indirect defenses with a new argument, which presupposes no such empirical claim. Instead, the argument from discordance resorts to the following principle: a certain feature can only justify discriminating on the basis of that feature.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"232 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2024-04-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"140615630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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