This essay introduces a new type of measure of social welfare, where populations are evaluated by their resemblance to an optimum population, which is an (in principle) possible population with the highest degree of social welfare, relative to some circumstances. Here, it is argued to be the largest possible population where everyone fares maximally well. The new measure is responsive to quality of welfare, equality of welfare and the number of people. It satisfies dominance and negative monotonicity, and it avoids both the repugnant conclusion and a reverse repugnant conclusion for comparisons relative to our future on earth.
{"title":"Measuring Social Welfare by Proximity to an Optimum Population","authors":"Karin Enflo","doi":"10.1111/papq.12406","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12406","url":null,"abstract":"This essay introduces a new type of measure of social welfare, where populations are evaluated by their resemblance to an <i>optimum population</i>, which is an (in principle) possible population with the highest degree of social welfare, relative to some circumstances. Here, it is argued to be the largest possible population where everyone fares maximally well. The new measure is responsive to quality of welfare, equality of welfare and the number of people. It satisfies <i>dominance</i> and <i>negative monotonicity</i>, and it avoids both the repugnant conclusion and a reverse repugnant conclusion for comparisons relative to our future on earth.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"40 3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138512497","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"A Partnership for the Ages","authors":"Richard H. Dees","doi":"10.1111/papq.12407","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12407","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-03-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49300645","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: I first clarify the idea that blameworthiness requires consciousness as the view that one can be blameworthy only for what is a response to a reason of which one is conscious. Next I develop the following argument: blameworthiness requires exercising control in a way distinctive of persons and doing this, in view of what it is to be a person, requires responding to a reason of which one is conscious.Then I defend thisargumentfrom an objectioninspired byArpalyand Schroeder according to which responding to moral reasons suffices for exercising control distinctive of persons.
{"title":"Blameworthiness, Control, and Consciousness\u0000 Or\u0000 A\u0000 Consciousness Requirement and an Argument\u0000 For\u0000 It","authors":"M. Hatcher","doi":"10.1111/papq.12405","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12405","url":null,"abstract":": I first clarify the idea that blameworthiness requires consciousness as the view that one can be blameworthy only for what is a response to a reason of which one is conscious. Next I develop the following argument: blameworthiness requires exercising control in a way distinctive of persons and doing this, in view of what it is to be a person, requires responding to a reason of which one is conscious.Then I defend thisargumentfrom an objectioninspired byArpalyand Schroeder according to which responding to moral reasons suffices for exercising control distinctive of persons.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46211240","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems.
{"title":"Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence","authors":"Marc‐Kevin Daoust","doi":"10.1111/papq.12404","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12404","url":null,"abstract":": What is structural rationality? Specifically, what is the distinctive feature of structural requirements of rationality? Some philosophers have argued, roughly, that the distinctive feature of structural requirements is coherence. But what does coherence mean, exactly? Or, at least, what do structuralists about rationality have in mind when they claim that structural rationality is coherence? This issue matters for making progress in various active debates concerning rationality. In this paper, I analyze three strategies for figuring out what coherence means in the debates on structural rationality. I argue that these strategies face problems.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48867817","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: The ‘ black box ’ in Stoic axiology refers to the mysterious connection betweentheinputofStoicdeliberation(reasonsgeneratedbythevalueofindiffer-ents)andtheoutput(appropriateactions).Inthispaper,IpeerintotheblackboxbydrawingananalogybetweenStoicandKantianaxiology.Thevalueanddis-value of indifferents is intrinsic, but conditional . An extrinsic condition on the value of a token indifferent is that one ’ s selection of that indifferent is sanctioned by context-relative ethical principles. The value of an indifferent that does not meetthisconditionis normatively silenced, suchthatit fails toconstitutea reason for action.
{"title":"The Black Box in Stoic Axiology","authors":"Michael Vazquez","doi":"10.1111/papq.12399","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12399","url":null,"abstract":": The ‘ black box ’ in Stoic axiology refers to the mysterious connection betweentheinputofStoicdeliberation(reasonsgeneratedbythevalueofindiffer-ents)andtheoutput(appropriateactions).Inthispaper,IpeerintotheblackboxbydrawingananalogybetweenStoicandKantianaxiology.Thevalueanddis-value of indifferents is intrinsic, but conditional . An extrinsic condition on the value of a token indifferent is that one ’ s selection of that indifferent is sanctioned by context-relative ethical principles. The value of an indifferent that does not meetthisconditionis normatively silenced, suchthatit fails toconstitutea reason for action.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-01-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41832912","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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