: I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or i-maxims: maxim tokens as adoptedby particularrational beings. Atthe second levelareabstract maxims, or a-maxims: abstract principles distinct from any individual who adopts them. At the third level are maxim kinds, or k-maxims: sets of various action-guiding principles that are grouped on the basis of their content. In this paper, I argue for the thesis that i-maxims are the locus of assessment in Kant ’ s ethics.
{"title":"The Apple of Kant's Ethics: i‐Maxims as the Locus of Assessment","authors":"S. Kahn","doi":"10.1111/papq.12422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12422","url":null,"abstract":": I want to distinguish between maxims at three levels of abstraction. At the first level are what I shall call individual maxims, or i-maxims: maxim tokens as adoptedby particularrational beings. Atthe second levelareabstract maxims, or a-maxims: abstract principles distinct from any individual who adopts them. At the third level are maxim kinds, or k-maxims: sets of various action-guiding principles that are grouped on the basis of their content. In this paper, I argue for the thesis that i-maxims are the locus of assessment in Kant ’ s ethics.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46929063","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay examines the case for relativism about future contingents in light of a distinction between two ways of interpreting the ‘branching time’ framework. The first step of the relativist argument is to argue for the ‘Non-Determination Thesis’, the view that there is no unique actual future. The second step is to argue from the Non-Determination Thesis to relativism. I show that first step of this argument fails. But despite that result, the second step is still of interest, since one might hold the Non-Determination Thesis on alternative grounds. I then argue that whether the second step of the argument succeeds depends on how the branches in question are interpreted. If the branches are ersatz possible worlds, then the argument for relativism might go through. But if the branches are concrete parts of a ‘branching multiverse’, then the argument for relativism turns out to make implausible assumptions about the nature of personal identity over time.
{"title":"Relativism and Two Kinds of Branching Time","authors":"Dilip Ninan","doi":"10.1111/papq.12418","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12418","url":null,"abstract":"This essay examines the case for relativism about future contingents in light of a distinction between two ways of interpreting the ‘branching time’ framework. The first step of the relativist argument is to argue for the ‘Non-Determination Thesis’, the view that there is no unique actual future. The second step is to argue from the Non-Determination Thesis to relativism. I show that first step of this argument fails. But despite that result, the second step is still of interest, since one might hold the Non-Determination Thesis on alternative grounds. I then argue that whether the second step of the argument succeeds depends on how the branches in question are interpreted. If the branches are ersatz possible worlds, then the argument for relativism might go through. But if the branches are concrete parts of a ‘branching multiverse’, then the argument for relativism turns out to make implausible assumptions about the nature of personal identity over time.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48370718","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Disagreement, the Independence Thesis, and the Value of Repeated Reasoning","authors":"Ethan Brauer","doi":"10.1111/papq.12419","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12419","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41473924","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition, this problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as My Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value.
{"title":"Second Thoughts About My Favourite Theory","authors":"J. Gustafsson","doi":"10.1111/papq.12408","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12408","url":null,"abstract":": A straightforward way to handle moral uncertainty is simply to follow the moral theory in which you have most credence. This approach is known as My Favourite Theory. In this paper, I argue that, in some cases, My Favourite Theory prescribes choices that are, sequentially, worse in expected moral value than the opposite choices according to each moral theory you have any credence in. In addition, this problem generalizes to other approaches that avoid intertheoretic comparisons of value, such as My Favourite Option, the Borda Rule, Variance Normalization and the Principle of Maximizing Expected Normalized Moral Value.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46720013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant experiences have in common, is largely considered as a substantial issue in the philosophy of pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure. The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward a new approach to pleasure. To do this, I first show that, although the approach stemming from the heterogeneity problem – what I call the heterogeneity approach – has led to an interesting discussion on the essence of pleasure, it has significant methodological problems that make it unlikely to make more progress. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which has been surprisingly overlooked so far, and which seeks to determine what, if any, the natural kind of pleasure would consist in. This approach overcomes the obstacles which the heterogeneity approach is confronted with. It also broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research.
{"title":"From the Heterogeneity Problem to a Natural‐Kind Approach to Pleasure","authors":"A. Broi","doi":"10.1111/papq.12417","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12417","url":null,"abstract":"The heterogeneity problem, which stems from the alleged difficulty of finding out what all pleasant experiences have in common, is largely considered as a substantial issue in the philosophy of pleasure, one that is usually taken as the starting point for theorizing about the essence of pleasure. The goal of this paper is to move the focus away from the heterogeneity problem and toward a new approach to pleasure. To do this, I first show that, although the approach stemming from the heterogeneity problem – what I call the heterogeneity approach – has led to an interesting discussion on the essence of pleasure, it has significant methodological problems that make it unlikely to make more progress. I thus propose a natural-kind approach to pleasure, which has been surprisingly overlooked so far, and which seeks to determine what, if any, the natural kind of pleasure would consist in. This approach overcomes the obstacles which the heterogeneity approach is confronted with. It also broadens the investigation of pleasure by enabling the use of a larger range of methodological tools, thus opening new promising directions for research.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49490784","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Your Mother Should Know: Pregnancy, the Ethics of Abortion and Knowledge through Acquaintance of Moral Value","authors":"Fiona Woollard","doi":"10.1111/papq.12416","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12416","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47834045","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Bearing Witness: The Duty of Non‐indifference and the Case for Reading the News","authors":"Brookes Brown","doi":"10.1111/papq.12411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12411","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41771573","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Understanding the Relationship Between Disability and Enhancement","authors":"Lysette Chaproniere","doi":"10.1111/papq.12410","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12410","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-05-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46936486","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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