{"title":"Self‐Esteem: On the Form of Self‐Worth Worth Having","authors":"Jessica Isserow","doi":"10.1111/papq.12434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12434","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48675949","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Habits figure in action‐explanations because of their distinctive force. But what is the force of habit, and how does it motivate us? In this paper, I argue that the force of habit is the feeling of familiarity one has with the familiar course of action, where this feeling reveals a distinctive reason for acting in the usual way. I do this by considering and rejecting a popular account of habit's force in terms of habit's apparent automaticity, by arguing that one can do something out of habit and from deliberation, before going on to defend The Familiarity View.
{"title":"The Force of Habit","authors":"William Hornett","doi":"10.1111/papq.12431","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12431","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Habits figure in action‐explanations because of their distinctive force. But what is the force of habit, and how does it motivate us? In this paper, I argue that the force of habit is the feeling of familiarity one has with the familiar course of action, where this feeling reveals a distinctive reason for acting in the usual way. I do this by considering and rejecting a popular account of habit's force in terms of habit's apparent automaticity, by arguing that one can do something out of habit and from deliberation, before going on to defend The Familiarity View.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":"156 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136292069","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Immigration, Naturalization, and the Purpose of Citizenship","authors":"D. Sharp","doi":"10.1111/papq.12428","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12428","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2023-01-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44331677","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: Inequalitiesof socialgoods between gender,racial, or other groups call outforexplanation.Suchinequalitiesmightbeexplainedbysocializationanddis-crimination.Buthistoricallysomehaveattributedtheseinequalitiestobiological differences between social groups. Such explanations are highly controversial: on theone hand, theyhavea very troublingracistand sexisthistory, but on the other hand, they are empirical claims
{"title":"Biological Explanations of Social Inequalities","authors":"D. Lowe","doi":"10.1111/papq.12427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12427","url":null,"abstract":": Inequalitiesof socialgoods between gender,racial, or other groups call outforexplanation.Suchinequalitiesmightbeexplainedbysocializationanddis-crimination.Buthistoricallysomehaveattributedtheseinequalitiestobiological differences between social groups. Such explanations are highly controversial: on theone hand, theyhavea very troublingracistand sexisthistory, but on the other hand, they are empirical claims","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-10-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46416697","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: Ontheclassicalunderstanding,anagentisfullyexcusedforanactionif and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction.
{"title":"Being Fully Excused for Wrongdoing","authors":"D. Bruno","doi":"10.1111/papq.12425","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12425","url":null,"abstract":": Ontheclassicalunderstanding,anagentisfullyexcusedforanactionif and only if performing this action was a case of faultless wrongdoing. A major motivation for this view is the apparent existence of paradigmatic types of excusing considerations, affecting fault but not wrongness. I show that three such considerations, ignorance, duress and compulsion, can be shown to have direct bearing on the permissibility of actions. The appeal to distinctly identifiable excusing considerations thus does not stand up to closer scrutiny, undermining the classical view and giving us reason to seek alternative ways of drawing the justification/excuse distinction.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-08-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47733638","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
: I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn ’ t entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘ general ’ and ‘ generic ’ , respectively – produce twoorthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of generality are sometimes run together by those writing on free will and argue that both types of generality are relevant to understanding the modality of abilities.
{"title":"On General and Non‐General Abilities","authors":"S. Kittle","doi":"10.1111/papq.12424","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12424","url":null,"abstract":": I distinguish two ways an ability might be general: (i) an ability might be general in that its possession doesn ’ t entail the possession of an opportunity; (ii) an ability might be general in virtue of pertaining to a wide range of circumstances. I argue that these two types of generality – I refer to them with the terms ‘ general ’ and ‘ generic ’ , respectively – produce twoorthogonal distinctions among abilities. I show that the two types of generality are sometimes run together by those writing on free will and argue that both types of generality are relevant to understanding the modality of abilities.","PeriodicalId":47097,"journal":{"name":"PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.9,"publicationDate":"2022-07-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45127550","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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