Review of Economics of the Household最新文献

Given that child abuse and intimate partner violence often co-occur, intra-household bargaining models provide a useful framework to investigate the relationship between macro-economic factors and child abuse. Non-cooperative bargaining models predict that labor market opportunities that benefit women improve their bargaining power and lower the risk of intimate partner violence against them. We posit that this protective effect extends to children as well. We examine the impact of gender specific wages and employment on police reported child abuse using incident level data from South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. Our results show that narrowing the gender wage gap leads to a decline in child sexual abuse reported to the police. While effects on physical abuse are similar in direction, they are not statistically significant. The findings underscore important spillover benefits of policy solutions directed towards narrowing the gender wage gap.

Lewbel and Pendakur (2021) propose a model of consumption inefficiency in collective households, based on “cooperation factors". We simplify that model to make it empirically tractable, and apply it to identify and estimate household member resource shares, and to measure the dollar cost of inefficient levels of cooperation. Using data from Bangladesh, we find that increased cooperation among household members yields the equivalent of a 13% gain in total expenditures, with most of the benefit of this gain going towards men.

The Netherlands reformed its disability insurance (DI) scheme in 2006. Reintegration incentives for employers became stronger, access to DI benefits became more difficult, and benefits became less generous. Using administrative data on all individuals who fell sick shortly before and after the reform, we study the impact of the reform on labor participation of individuals who fell sick and their spouses. Difference-in-differences estimates show, among other things, that the reform led to an increase of labor participation of the individuals who fell sick only if these individuals had a permanent job, whereas spouses responded to the DI reform in other cases, where the individuals reporting sick had a temporary job or were unemployed. More generally, the spouses respond when the sick individual’s labor market position is weak and the individual him- or herself has trouble finding or retaining employment. The effects are persistent during the 10 years after the reform. The effect on the spouse can be seen as an “added worker effect,” where additional earnings of the spouse compensate for the sick individual’s income loss so that both partners share the burden of a more stringent DI scheme. Comparing individuals reporting sick with and without partner provides further support for the notion that the responses of couples to the reform are joint decisions of the two partners.

Abstract

This paper studies the effect of transfer programs on the allocation of resources among household members. Based on a collective household model and data from Ecuador, I find important intra-household inequalities, but the transfer produces resource redistribution among household members. Unlike existing approaches, I also employ a framework that accounts for other household structures, finding that transfers impact resource allocation in extended households with children. I validate the main findings using experimental data and document that in-kind transfers are comparable to cash transfers in improving the within-household redistribution of resources. I further examine the potential implications of this reallocation of resources in several domains and find that transfers increase women’s control of resources and reduce women’s poverty. I also show that changes in women’s control of resources driven by the transfer affect the household’s consumption patterns and how households react to unexpected shocks. These results contribute to understanding better the redistributive and behavioral effects of income support programs.

This study explores the role of individual and local marriage market characteristics in whether recently wed U.S. residents “imported” a spouse instead of marrying someone already present in the country. Our findings indicate that U.S. natives and immigrants whose spouse is a “marriage migrant” (someone who arrived in the U.S. the same year as the marriage occurred) are positively selected along some dimensions but negatively along others. The results also suggest that U.S. immigration policy plays an important role in whether immigrants bring in a spouse. We further investigate the trade-offs in spouse characteristics associated with having a marriage-migrant spouse. Marriage-migrant spouses are more likely than other spouses to have characteristics that their spouse may find desirable, such as being relatively younger and less likely to have been previously married. Among naturalized citizens, differences in spousal characteristics between marriage migrants and other spouses are notably large, showcasing the desirability of someone who can easily sponsor a spouse for permanent residence.

We identify the population shares of poor hand-to-mouth households, wealthy hand-to-mouth households and non hand-to-mouth households in Belgium. We apply the methodology proposed by Kaplan & Violante (2014) and Kaplan et al., (2014) to the Belgian component of the Household Finance and Consumption Survey. We find that the fraction of hand-to-mouth households in Belgium is substantial and predominantly consists of wealthy hand-to-mouth households. We also compare the observable characteristics and marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) of the three household types. Belgian wealthy hand-to-mouth households have characteristics that resemble those of the non hand-to-mouth households, while their MPCs are often more similar to those of the poor hand-to-mouth households. This pleads for giving a unique place to each type of household when evaluating the effects of fiscal policy.