EDUCATIONAL THEORY最新文献

AI tutors are promised to expand access to personalized learning, improving student achievement and addressing disparities in resources available to students across socioeconomic contexts. The rapid development and introduction of AI tutors raises fundamental questions of epistemic trust in education. What criteria should guide students' critical assessments of the epistemic trustworthiness of these new technologies? And furthermore, how should these technologies and the environments in which they are situated be designed to improve their epistemic trustworthiness? In this article, Nicolas Tanchuk and Rebecca Taylor argue for a shared responsibility model of epistemic trust that includes a duty to collaboratively improve the epistemic environment. Building off prior frameworks, the model they advance identifies five higher-order criteria to assess the epistemic credibility of individuals, tools, and institutions and to guide the co-creation of the epistemic environment: (1) epistemic motivation, (2) epistemic inclusivity, (3) epistemic accountability, (4) epistemic accuracy, and (5) reciprocal epistemic transparency.

How should Deweyan educators teach their students about engaging in efforts to bring about social change in a political context marked by polarization, power differentials, and oppression? In this article, Joshua Forstenzer argues that Deweyan educators must encourage their students to engage in pluralistic and creative experiments rather than teach a pre-set model for social change. To this end, he engages with two critiques: one formulated by Lee Benson, Ira Harkavy, and John Puckett according to which Dewey's pedagogic vision failed to be sufficiently practically minded; the other formulated by Aaron Schutz — drawing on Saul Alinsky's theory of community organizing — according to which Deweyan educators fail to be meaningfully politically minded, because their democratic faith blinds them to the role of conflict in real politics. In response, this article argues that the Deweyan outlook is closer to Alinsky's than Schutz assumes and that it demands that we Deweyan educators introduce our students to a rich diversity of voices and traditions that address the concrete conditions of social change to provide our students with a fullness of civic experiences, as well as a depth of political and social ideas to challenge the status quo.

Recent calls by legislators to exclude “divisive concepts” and histories from our curricula pose a challenge to the development of students' epistemic responsibility and agency in classrooms. In this paper, Martha Perez-Mugg examines the classroom as a space for the development of epistemic responsibility, ultimately suggesting that digital literacy and civic reasoning skills underpin students' development as responsible epistemic agents. In doing so, she connects epistemic responsibility to civic reasoning and digital literacy as central aspects of democratic deliberation. Further, she offers a social epistemological framework for understanding the classroom as a core venue for the development of epistemic responsibility. In the end, Perez-Mugg explores the pedagogical implications that might arise from a deep commitment to cultivating epistemic responsibility for students.

This paper examines the relationship between educators' epistemic character and their professional responsibilities, arguing that the role of educator carries unique epistemic obligations. Drawing on virtue epistemology and the ethics of belief, Jeff Standley contends that these obligations stem from education's core epistemic aims: cultivating knowledge and understanding, teaching reliable methods of inquiry, and fostering intellectual virtues. The paper demonstrates how educators' epistemic character influences their ability to navigate complex epistemic environments, serve as role models, and avoid impediments to teaching caused by evidentially unsupported beliefs. While acknowledging that perfect epistemic character is unattainable, Standley argues for a “good enough” standard where educators must at minimum avoid significant intellectual vices that could hinder responsible epistemic inquiry and harm student development. He concludes by considering practical implications for educator recruitment and development, advocating for greater attention to epistemic qualities in these processes.

Like other papers in this symposium, this essay approaches the question of responsible belief through the lens of social epistemology: what are the processes by which knowledge claims, evidence, perspectives, and arguments get shared within knowledge-making communities? In this paper, Nicholas Burbules argues that these processes are essentially communicative, and that we need to examine the conditions that make such communication knowledge-productive. Among these conditions are the enactment of communicative virtues: skills, attitudes, habits, and dispositions that are more likely to support responsible dialogue and deliberation about knowledge claims. In this argument, each of these communicative virtues is actually a cluster of interrelated qualities, not a laundry list of discrete items. Burbules explores how these virtues are learned and enacted in practice, not things that people “have” or possess. Finally, he discusses a number of potential candidates for consideration as communicative virtues.

In this article, Jan Frode Haugseth discusses a multidimensional model of educational engagement by outlining Laurent Thévenot's regimes of engagement in an educational setting. Haugseth argues that six intertwined regimes of educational engagement could be perceived to exist in tension with each other: formality, justice, familiarity, exploration, love/care, and retreat, all reflecting the relationship between cognition, bodies, and the environment (immediate surroundings as well as cultural and historical configurations). The regimes are simultaneously valid on a personal level, as engagement is established and maintained individually, and on a collective level, since engagement is shared and negotiated in a dynamic social space. The regimes differ from and complement each other, providing notions of benefits, tensions, and investments, while allowing for various forms of confidence and doubt. Many researchers study the causes of dropout and disengagement without a clear idea of what engagement truly entails: when students engage in all the rich facets of educational engagement and are able to freely transition among regimes, they develop a real sense of power over their own education.

In this article, derria byrd contends that more robust interrogation of the organizational contribution to inequity in higher education would be aided by understanding higher education organizations as social actors. Organizational social actor theory demonstrates that colleges and universities are more than inert contexts in which marginalized students' experiences and outcomes play out. They are entities that possess unique dispositional orientations, motives, and inclinations toward action. This conceptual article argues that engagement with institutional habitus, grounded in Pierre Bourdieu's theory of practice, situates colleges and universities as social actors whose structural positions generate interests, beliefs, and behaviors that tend to constrain opportunity for students. The concept shifts the empirical gaze from students to colleges and universities in examinations of education inequity and facilitates analysis of how colleges' social position and the organizational identity, opportunities, and limitations it engenders support and/or inhibit organizational practice, including transformation toward equity. byrd crafts this argument in five parts: (1) exploration of organizational social actorhood theory, (2) overview of Bourdieu's theoretical framework and key conceptual tools, (3) expansions on Bourdieu's foundational formula to demonstrate how institutional habitus supplements the theorist's framework, (4) purposeful engagement with critiques of how institutional habitus has been employed in educational research, and (5) guiding principles for empirical engagement with institutional habitus. Throughout, byrd employs a collective case study of three college campuses to ground the theoretical review in empirical realities and uncover the invisible influence of social power on organizational practice. Given Bourdieu's attention to higher education and broad concern for systemic inequities reproduced at this level, this article focuses on higher education but has implications for educational research more broadly.

This study aims to contribute to the ongoing scholarly conversation about education through the lenses of the German philosophy of Bildung and the American philosophy of pragmatism. More concretely, in this article, the two philosophies are represented by the traditions of critical-constructive Didaktik, based on Wolfgang Klafki's work, and transactional realism, based on John Dewey's. Against the background of the widespread outcomes-based modes of education today, the authors seek to shed light on the necessary reconceptualization of schooling and teaching and to explore the possibilities for constructive routes forward for curriculum theorizing. They outline the aspects of knowledge and the learning concepts that the two philosophies share and those about which they differ. The authors also analyze the consequences that these similarities and differences have for the educational approaches of critical-constructive Didaktik and transactional realism. Finally, the authors present an empirical example from a Swedish year-eight classroom, drawing conclusions based on their findings and considering corresponding implications about the two traditions' potential to contribute to an understanding of teaching as a pedagogical responsibility.