In the context of the recent revival of virtue ethics, the notion of character formation under the rational guidance of Aristotle's notion of phronesis, or practical wisdom, has been exalted as the principal aim of moral education. However, this is not unproblematic insofar as the promotion of Aristotelian phronesis seems to operate on rather different levels or to be ambivalent between the two rather different (and demonstrably separable) aims or goals of fostering reasonably sound deliberation and judgment concerning “right” or good (moral or other) agency or action and the allegedly optimal (empirical) psychological ordering of cognition and affect to the end of good or commendable human character. In this paper, David Carr argues that while the first of these aims is by and large educationally acceptable and defensible, the second is neither a desirable nor coherent educational goal.
{"title":"The Practical Wisdom of Phronesis in the Education of Purported Virtuous Character","authors":"David Carr","doi":"10.1111/edth.12570","DOIUrl":"10.1111/edth.12570","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In the context of the recent revival of virtue ethics, the notion of character formation under the rational guidance of Aristotle's notion of <i>phronesis</i>, or practical wisdom, has been exalted as the principal aim of moral education. However, this is not unproblematic insofar as the promotion of Aristotelian <i>phronesis</i> seems to operate on rather different levels or to be ambivalent between the two rather different (and demonstrably separable) aims or goals of fostering reasonably sound deliberation and judgment concerning “right” or good (moral or other) agency or action and the allegedly optimal (empirical) psychological ordering of cognition and affect to the end of good or commendable human character. In this paper, David Carr argues that while the first of these aims is by and large educationally acceptable and defensible, the second is neither a desirable nor coherent educational goal.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-05-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.12570","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48354960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Nearly everyone recognizes the fact of deep pluralism: it is hard to deny that contemporary America is characterized by widespread diversity of beliefs, practices, and values. We disagree, not on this reality, but on the way we should respond to the pluralism around us. In this paper, Emily G. Wenneborg discusses one of the most common responses to pluralism in contemporary philosophy of education: autonomy-based liberalism. She praises liberalism for its attempt to navigate certain tensions that accompany its approach to pluralism. At the same time, she raises several critiques of liberalism as a response to pluralism, particularly with regard to religious communities and belief systems. She suggests that trust provides a better framework than autonomy for educating in and for deep pluralism.
几乎每个人都认识到深度多元化的事实:很难否认,当代美国的特点是信仰、实践和价值观的广泛多样性。我们的分歧不是在这一现实上,而是在我们应对我们周围的多元化的方式上。在本文中,Emily G. Wenneborg讨论了当代教育哲学中对多元主义最常见的回应之一:基于自治的自由主义。她赞扬了自由主义在走向多元主义的过程中试图克服某些紧张关系。同时,她对自由主义提出了一些批评,认为自由主义是对多元主义的回应,特别是在宗教社区和信仰体系方面。她认为,在教育和深度多元化方面,信任提供了比自主更好的框架。
{"title":"In Search of an Adequate Response to Pluralism: A Critical Analysis of Liberalism in Philosophy of Education","authors":"Emily G. Wenneborg","doi":"10.1111/edth.12564","DOIUrl":"10.1111/edth.12564","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Nearly everyone recognizes the fact of deep pluralism: it is hard to deny that contemporary America is characterized by widespread diversity of beliefs, practices, and values. We disagree, not on this reality, but on the way we should respond to the pluralism around us. In this paper, Emily G. Wenneborg discusses one of the most common responses to pluralism in contemporary philosophy of education: autonomy-based liberalism. She praises liberalism for its attempt to navigate certain tensions that accompany its approach to pluralism. At the same time, she raises several critiques of liberalism as a response to pluralism, particularly with regard to religious communities and belief systems. She suggests that trust provides a better framework than autonomy for educating in and for deep pluralism.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.12564","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48406871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, John Tillson defends an approach to deciding the aims and content of public schooling from the critique of Public Reason Liberalism. The approach that he defends is an unrestricted pairing of the Epistemic Criterion and of the Momentousness Criterion. On the Epistemic Criterion, public schooling should align students' credence with credibility. On the Momentousness Criterion, public schooling ought to include content that it is costly for children to lack the correct view about, where they are otherwise unlikely to have it. Public Reason Liberals seek to restrict both the Epistemic and Momentousness Criteria to within a range that is acceptable to politically reasonable citizens. In response, Tillson argues, first, that the considerations that encourage Public Reason Liberalism instead motivate unrestricted versions of the Epistemic and Momentousness Criteria; and, second, that Public Reason Liberalism faces a dilemma, that it either entails absurd consequences or must undermine itself in addressing these.
{"title":"On Deciding The Aims and Content of Public Schooling","authors":"John Tillson","doi":"10.1111/edth.12568","DOIUrl":"10.1111/edth.12568","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, John Tillson defends an approach to deciding the aims and content of public schooling from the critique of Public Reason Liberalism. The approach that he defends is an unrestricted pairing of the Epistemic Criterion and of the Momentousness Criterion. On the Epistemic Criterion, public schooling should align students' credence with credibility. On the Momentousness Criterion, public schooling ought to include content that it is costly for children to lack the correct view about, where they are otherwise unlikely to have it. Public Reason Liberals seek to restrict both the Epistemic and Momentousness Criteria to within a range that is acceptable to politically reasonable citizens. In response, Tillson argues, first, that the considerations that encourage Public Reason Liberalism instead motivate unrestricted versions of the Epistemic and Momentousness Criteria; and, second, that Public Reason Liberalism faces a dilemma, that it either entails absurd consequences or must undermine itself in addressing these.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.12568","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49608614","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholarly accounts of the training of pity in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Emile focus on how Emile's tutor activates the psychological mechanisms necessary for the feeling of pity in book 4 of the text. This account is inadequate, for it fails to show how Emile acquires the evaluative ability to make the judgment about who deserves pity as well as the willingness to adjudicate his own and others' interests. In this article, Wing Sze Leung argues that books 1 through 3 lay the foundation by developing in Emile the attitudes and dispositions that guide him in his judgment-making about which kind of life he should pursue. Books 4 and 5 then develop Emile's ability to make interpersonal judgments of pity through habituated practice. By gradually cultivating Emile's sensitivity to the potential conflict between his self-interests and others' well-being, as well as the resolution to refrain from infringing on others' interests and to pursue the common good, Rousseau's long-term educational project molds Emile's disposition to act as justice demands. The article concludes with a brief response to some criticisms about Rousseau's educational project.
{"title":"Pity and Justice in Rousseau's Emile: Developing a Concern for the Common Good","authors":"Wing Sze Leung","doi":"10.1111/edth.12566","DOIUrl":"10.1111/edth.12566","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Scholarly accounts of the training of pity in Jean-Jacques Rousseau's <i>Emile</i> focus on how Emile's tutor activates the psychological mechanisms necessary for the feeling of pity in book 4 of the text. This account is inadequate, for it fails to show how Emile acquires the evaluative ability to make the judgment about who deserves pity as well as the willingness to adjudicate his own and others' interests. In this article, Wing Sze Leung argues that books 1 through 3 lay the foundation by developing in Emile the attitudes and dispositions that guide him in his judgment-making about which kind of life he should pursue. Books 4 and 5 then develop Emile's ability to make interpersonal judgments of pity through habituated practice. By gradually cultivating Emile's sensitivity to the potential conflict between his self-interests and others' well-being, as well as the resolution to refrain from infringing on others' interests and to pursue the common good, Rousseau's long-term educational project molds Emile's disposition to act as justice demands. The article concludes with a brief response to some criticisms about Rousseau's educational project.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.12566","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45516318","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper, Sarah Stitzlein considers the consequences of honesty on our democracy, especially for citizens' ability to engage in civic inquiry together as they face shared problems. Honesty is a key component of a well-functioning democracy; it develops trust and fosters the sorts of relationships among citizens that enable civic dialogue and reasoning. Post-truth attitudes and truth decay pose serious obstacles to good civic reasoning as citizens struggle to draw clear distinctions between fact and opinion, weigh personal beliefs and emotions over facts, and increasingly distrust traditionally respected sources of information. Stitzlein employs a Deweyan pragmatist account of truth and a distinctly social account of democracy to build a case for foregrounding honesty in the development of citizens. She describes how schools can employ communities of inquiry to cultivate habits of honesty within citizenship education. She explains how a better democracy — one grounded in a wider understanding of social life and relationships — might head off the temptation to be dishonest for self-serving reasons, focusing on how dishonesty jeopardizes our relationships to each other as citizens and our ability to engage in civic reasoning together to fulfill shared goals.
{"title":"Teaching Honesty and Improving Democracy in the Post-Truth Era","authors":"Sarah Stitzlein","doi":"10.1111/edth.12565","DOIUrl":"10.1111/edth.12565","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this paper, Sarah Stitzlein considers the consequences of honesty on our democracy, especially for citizens' ability to engage in civic inquiry together as they face shared problems. Honesty is a key component of a well-functioning democracy; it develops trust and fosters the sorts of relationships among citizens that enable civic dialogue and reasoning. Post-truth attitudes and truth decay pose serious obstacles to good civic reasoning as citizens struggle to draw clear distinctions between fact and opinion, weigh personal beliefs and emotions over facts, and increasingly distrust traditionally respected sources of information. Stitzlein employs a Deweyan pragmatist account of truth and a distinctly social account of democracy to build a case for foregrounding honesty in the development of citizens. She describes how schools can employ communities of inquiry to cultivate habits of honesty within citizenship education. She explains how a better democracy — one grounded in a wider understanding of social life and relationships — might head off the temptation to be dishonest for self-serving reasons, focusing on how dishonesty jeopardizes our relationships to each other as citizens and our ability to engage in civic reasoning together to fulfill shared goals.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.12565","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47382096","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
What is pedagogy, exactly? Merriam-Webster defines it simply as “the art, science, or profession of teaching.” In contemporary academic discourse, however, pedagogy is generally left undefined — with its apparent implicit meanings ranging anywhere from a specific “model for teaching” (e.g., behaviorist or progressivist instruction) to a broadly political philosophy of education in general (most famously, a “pedagogy of the oppressed”). In this paper, Norm Friesen and Hanno Su follow the Continental pedagogical tradition in giving pedagogy a general but explicit definition. They do so by looking at how pedagogy arises both in everyday life and in school as unavoidably ethical activity undertaken primarily for the sake of the young person or child. Such activities, the authors maintain, are structured not so much by processes, methods, and outcomes, but by irresolvable oppositions and the tensions between them. They illustrate this inductively through a series of images and examples — moving gradually from ones involving parenting and early childhood to ones from elementary and secondary schooling. In this way, Friesen and Su show that pedagogy is not so much one or more ideologically focused or evidence-based instructional or psychological approaches to be mastered by a professional or teaching specialist. It is instead an independent but ethically informed practical perspective — one that can (and has) been extended to form a distinctively pedagogical theory and discipline. As such, it is something that is not only a part of our everyday life and culture, but arguably of all human cultures.
{"title":"What Is Pedagogy? Discovering the Hidden Pedagogical Dimension","authors":"Norm Friesen, Hanno Su","doi":"10.1111/edth.12569","DOIUrl":"10.1111/edth.12569","url":null,"abstract":"<p>What is pedagogy, exactly? <i>Merriam-Webster</i> defines it simply as “the art, science, or profession of teaching.” In contemporary academic discourse, however, pedagogy is generally left undefined — with its apparent implicit meanings ranging anywhere from a specific “model for teaching” (e.g., behaviorist or progressivist instruction) to a broadly political philosophy of education in general (most famously, a “pedagogy of the oppressed”). In this paper, Norm Friesen and Hanno Su follow the Continental pedagogical tradition in giving pedagogy a general but explicit definition. They do so by looking at how pedagogy arises both in everyday life and in school as unavoidably ethical activity undertaken primarily for the sake of the young person or child. Such activities, the authors maintain, are structured not so much by processes, methods, and outcomes, but by irresolvable oppositions and the tensions between them. They illustrate this inductively through a series of images and examples — moving gradually from ones involving parenting and early childhood to ones from elementary and secondary schooling. In this way, Friesen and Su show that pedagogy is not so much one or more ideologically focused or evidence-based instructional or psychological approaches to be mastered by a professional or teaching specialist. It is instead an independent but ethically informed practical perspective — one that can (and has) been extended to form a distinctively pedagogical theory and discipline. As such, it is something that is not only a part of our everyday life and culture, but arguably of all human cultures.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/edth.12569","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48530106","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reading Plato's Dialogues to Enhance Learning and Inquiry: Exploring Socrates' Use of Protreptic for Student Engagement, Mason MarshallRoutledge, 2021, Pp. 223.","authors":"Róbert Jack","doi":"10.1111/edth.12562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12562","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50150312","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Reading Plato's Dialogues to Enhance Learning and Inquiry: Exploring Socrates' Use of Protreptic for Student Engagement","authors":"R. Jack","doi":"10.1111/edth.12562","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12562","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46708089","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The Transformative Classroom: Philosophical Foundations and Practical Applications Douglas W. Yacek Routledge Press, 2021, Pp. 195.","authors":"Dini Metro-Roland","doi":"10.1111/edth.12563","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/edth.12563","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"50150311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In an increasingly globalized world, empathy has been identified as a core competency of future global citizens and thus as an important skill to be fostered in global citizenship education (GCE). Despite this, however, what empathy is, and how it can play the pivotal role often claimed for it in the literature, have not been adequately explored. Here, Eirik Risberg argues that, pace the common conception of empathy, empathy should not be construed narrowly, as an affective concept, but broadly, as a cognitive and epistemic concept. Drawing on recent work in philosophy and psychology, Risberg explores a suggestion that construes empathy as a complex self-directed perspective-taking of the situation of another. While this may constitute a conception of empathy that is more modest than the most ardent proponents of empathy would like, it has the benefit of avoiding the objections that have been leveled against empathy as a moral concept and thus allows us to maintain that empathy is a valuable skill to be cultivated in educating global citizens for the twenty-first century.
{"title":"Fostering Empathy in Global Citizenship Education: Necessary, Desirable, or Simply Misguided?","authors":"Eirik Julius Risberg","doi":"10.1111/edth.12546","DOIUrl":"10.1111/edth.12546","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In an increasingly globalized world, empathy has been identified as a core competency of future global citizens and thus as an important skill to be fostered in global citizenship education (GCE). Despite this, however, what empathy <i>is</i>, and <i>how</i> it can play the pivotal role often claimed for it in the literature, have not been adequately explored. Here, Eirik Risberg argues that, <i>pace</i> the common conception of empathy, empathy should not be construed narrowly, as an affective concept, but broadly, as a cognitive and epistemic concept. Drawing on recent work in philosophy and psychology, Risberg explores a suggestion that construes empathy as a complex self-directed perspective-taking of the situation of another. While this may constitute a conception of empathy that is more modest than the most ardent proponents of empathy would like, it has the benefit of avoiding the objections that have been leveled against empathy as a moral concept and thus allows us to maintain that empathy is a valuable skill to be cultivated in educating global citizens for the twenty-first century.</p>","PeriodicalId":47134,"journal":{"name":"EDUCATIONAL THEORY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43235494","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}