{"title":"Why they keep missing: An empirical investigation of sovereign bond ratings and their timing","authors":"M. El-Shagi, Gregor von Schweinitz","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12301","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12301","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42038263","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine how research and development (R&D) has contributed to income inequality in the Group of Seven (G7) countries from 1870 to 2016. Using newly developed panel data models that incorporate interactive fixed effects, we find that R&D is negatively associated with income inequality. Non-parametric models that allow us to capture the time-varying effect of R&D suggest that this average effect has been negative for most of this period. We find that legal origin moderates the relationship between R&D and income inequality and that the relationship is stronger for common law countries. We also examine three channels through which R&D could affect income inequality – economic growth, trade and employment – and find that economic growth and trade are mechanisms through which R&D transmits to income inequality. Of these two mediators, we find that the negative relationship between R&D and income inequality is mainly channelling through economic growth.
{"title":"R&D intensity and income inequality in the G7: 1870–2016","authors":"S. A. Churchill, B. Peng, R. Smyth, Quanda Zhang","doi":"10.1111/SJPE.12298","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJPE.12298","url":null,"abstract":"We examine how research and development (R&D) has contributed to income inequality in the Group of Seven (G7) countries from 1870 to 2016. Using newly developed panel data models that incorporate interactive fixed effects, we find that R&D is negatively associated with income inequality. Non-parametric models that allow us to capture the time-varying effect of R&D suggest that this average effect has been negative for most of this period. We find that legal origin moderates the relationship between R&D and income inequality and that the relationship is stronger for common law countries. We also examine three channels through which R&D could affect income inequality – economic growth, trade and employment – and find that economic growth and trade are mechanisms through which R&D transmits to income inequality. Of these two mediators, we find that the negative relationship between R&D and income inequality is mainly channelling through economic growth.","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-09-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJPE.12298","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42916049","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Variation in the labour market rewards to vocational qualifications in the UK","authors":"S. McIntosh, Damon Morris","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12299","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/sjpe.12299","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44927304","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Issue Information","authors":"","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12216","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12216","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/sjpe.12216","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48288244","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Law enforcement officers can engage in two forms of corruption. Bribery, which arises when officers accept bribes from criminals, and extortion when officers demand payments from law-abiders. While bribery is mutually beneficial to both parties and therefore easy to explain, explaining extortion is more challenging because it only benefits one party; namely, the extortionist officer. The prior literature assumes that extortion is feasible because the enforcer can threaten to frame law-abiders. However, this requires the enforcer to already know whether the agent is a criminal or a law- abider. In contrast, this paper develops a model in which extortion occurs before the official has fully ascertained whether a suspect is a criminal or not. Specifically, officers choose whether to become competent or incompetent and incompetent enforcers cannot distinguish between criminals and law-abiding citizens while competent officers can. We show that incompetent officials can engage in extortion where law-abiders are forced to pay bribes along with criminals or harassment where law-abiders are investigated but not punished. Consequently, permitting extortion affects not only the level of crime directly but also officers’ incentives to become competent, which in turn affects deterrence. Accordingly, in contrast to the prior literature we show that compliance in an equilibrium with more extortion is not always lower than one in which there is no extortion. Rather, what matters for policy decisions is who engages in extortion; that is, whether the competent or incompetent extort.
{"title":"Does it matter who extorts? Extortion by competent and incompetent enforcers","authors":"A. Samuel, Ajit Mishra","doi":"10.1111/SJPE.12300","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJPE.12300","url":null,"abstract":"Law enforcement officers can engage in two forms of corruption. Bribery, which arises when officers accept bribes from criminals, and extortion when officers demand payments from law-abiders. While bribery is mutually beneficial to both parties and therefore easy to explain, explaining extortion is more challenging because it only benefits one party; namely, the extortionist officer. The prior literature assumes that extortion is feasible because the enforcer can threaten to frame law-abiders. However, this requires the enforcer to already know whether the agent is a criminal or a law- abider. In contrast, this paper develops a model in which extortion occurs before the official has fully ascertained whether a suspect is a criminal or not. Specifically, officers choose whether to become competent or incompetent and incompetent enforcers cannot distinguish between criminals and law-abiding citizens while competent officers can. We show that incompetent officials can engage in extortion where law-abiders are forced to pay bribes along with criminals or harassment where law-abiders are investigated but not punished. Consequently, permitting extortion affects not only the level of crime directly but also officers’ incentives to become competent, which in turn affects deterrence. Accordingly, in contrast to the prior literature we show that compliance in an equilibrium with more extortion is not always lower than one in which there is no extortion. Rather, what matters for policy decisions is who engages in extortion; that is, whether the competent or incompetent extort.","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJPE.12300","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44133896","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Populism, Financial Crises and Banking Policies: Economics and Psychology","authors":"Federico Favaretto, D. Masciandaro","doi":"10.1111/SJPE.12297","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJPE.12297","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJPE.12297","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48056715","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"The transmission of partner mental health to individual life satisfaction: Estimates from a longitudinal household survey","authors":"Paul McNamee, S. Mendolia, Oleg Yerokhin","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12296","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12296","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/sjpe.12296","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44449100","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Uncertainty, firm entry, and investment dynamics","authors":"Stelios Giannoulakis","doi":"10.1111/SJPE.12293","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJPE.12293","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJPE.12293","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49633489","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Adversities in Syria and their relation to their physical and mental health conditions as Syrian refugees in Turkey","authors":"M. Balcılar, J. Nugent, Jiahui Xu","doi":"10.1111/sjpe.12295","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/sjpe.12295","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-08-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/sjpe.12295","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42369145","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Monetary policy when the objectives of central bankers are imperfectly observable","authors":"F. Salsano","doi":"10.1111/SJPE.12294","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/SJPE.12294","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47171,"journal":{"name":"Scottish Journal of Political Economy","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1,"publicationDate":"2021-07-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/SJPE.12294","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49390471","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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