Pub Date : 2023-08-07DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2240761
Nicolas Hernán Zeolla, Juan E. Santarcángelo
{"title":"Financialization, financial assets and productive investment in Latin America: evidence from large public listed companies 1995–2015","authors":"Nicolas Hernán Zeolla, Juan E. Santarcángelo","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2240761","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2240761","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42981377","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-04DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2242346
A. Borsato
{"title":"Does the Secular Stagnation hypothesis match the data? Evidence from the USA","authors":"A. Borsato","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2242346","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2242346","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44787961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-08-01DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2236533
Published in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (Vol. 46, No. 3, 2023)
发表于《后凯恩斯主义经济学杂志》2023年第46卷第3期
{"title":"Editors’ Corner","authors":"","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2236533","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2236533","url":null,"abstract":"Published in Journal of Post Keynesian Economics (Vol. 46, No. 3, 2023)","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":"60 11-12","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138512540","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2229302
C. Kerstenetzky, Marcio Alvarenga Junior, Lucas Costa, R. Bielschowsky
{"title":"Public social services and sustainable development: estimating opportunities in the global south","authors":"C. Kerstenetzky, Marcio Alvarenga Junior, Lucas Costa, R. Bielschowsky","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2229302","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2229302","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42136548","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2222705
Peter E. Earl
Abstract This paper offers a constructively critical examination of George Shackle’s theory of expectations and decision-making under uncertainty, a theory that Shackle developed because he questioned the relevance of objective probabilities as foundations for expectations. His theory is cast in terms of degrees of possibility and potential for surprise associated with disbelief that comes from imagining things that could prevent outcomes from eventuating. His idea that there may be ranges of mutually exclusive “perfectly possible” events has posed a problem for blending his thinking with the subjective probability approach, but here it is argued that this idea is flawed. Shackle’s theory of how expectations are deployed in making choices involves a reference-dependent theory of attention that results in focus on best-case and worst-case pairs of outcomes for each scheme. The paper identifies potential synergies with this idea and prospect theory and explores emotion- and satisficing-based perspectives as well as Shackle’s formal analysis of how focus outcomes are used in ranking rival schemes of action.
{"title":"Shackle’s analysis of choice under uncertainty: its strengths, weaknesses and potential synergies with rival approaches","authors":"Peter E. Earl","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2222705","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2222705","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper offers a constructively critical examination of George Shackle’s theory of expectations and decision-making under uncertainty, a theory that Shackle developed because he questioned the relevance of objective probabilities as foundations for expectations. His theory is cast in terms of degrees of possibility and potential for surprise associated with disbelief that comes from imagining things that could prevent outcomes from eventuating. His idea that there may be ranges of mutually exclusive “perfectly possible” events has posed a problem for blending his thinking with the subjective probability approach, but here it is argued that this idea is flawed. Shackle’s theory of how expectations are deployed in making choices involves a reference-dependent theory of attention that results in focus on best-case and worst-case pairs of outcomes for each scheme. The paper identifies potential synergies with this idea and prospect theory and explores emotion- and satisficing-based perspectives as well as Shackle’s formal analysis of how focus outcomes are used in ranking rival schemes of action.","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"400 - 419"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46142143","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2224029
A. Carabelli
Abstract There has been great confusion on Keynes’s notions of probability and uncertainty in recent years. Keynes believes that probability (his logical probability) is the guide of life, i.e., it is having some reasons to believe and to act. So probability is a theory of reasonable partial belief and a logic of non-demonstrative reasoning, upon which decision and action in conditions of limited knowledge, are based. (His) probability is, for Keynes, a positive, constructive, and forward-looking element of life. Limited knowledge is not a bar to decision and action. According to him, (his) probability helps us in almost all ordinary situations of life. This is the main reason why Keynes believes that ignorance and uncertainty are the two most difficult issues to tackle in life and in economics in particular. Both are related to a lack of limited knowledge. Ignorance is a lack of known reasons; Keynes writes we do not know. Keynes’s uncertainty is a much more intriguing concept than mere ignorance. Uncertainty is due to various reasons, one of them is the intrinsic incommensurability of probabilities. So, uncertainty is related to Keynes’s philosophy of measurement, a philosophy that also pervades his complex economics.
{"title":"On Keynes’s probability and uncertainty","authors":"A. Carabelli","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2224029","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2224029","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract There has been great confusion on Keynes’s notions of probability and uncertainty in recent years. Keynes believes that probability (his logical probability) is the guide of life, i.e., it is having some reasons to believe and to act. So probability is a theory of reasonable partial belief and a logic of non-demonstrative reasoning, upon which decision and action in conditions of limited knowledge, are based. (His) probability is, for Keynes, a positive, constructive, and forward-looking element of life. Limited knowledge is not a bar to decision and action. According to him, (his) probability helps us in almost all ordinary situations of life. This is the main reason why Keynes believes that ignorance and uncertainty are the two most difficult issues to tackle in life and in economics in particular. Both are related to a lack of limited knowledge. Ignorance is a lack of known reasons; Keynes writes we do not know. Keynes’s uncertainty is a much more intriguing concept than mere ignorance. Uncertainty is due to various reasons, one of them is the intrinsic incommensurability of probabilities. So, uncertainty is related to Keynes’s philosophy of measurement, a philosophy that also pervades his complex economics.","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"465 - 492"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42797946","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2222721
David Dequech
Abstract This article comments on Donald Katzner’s “The Problem with Probability.” Professor Katzner criticizes any approach that uses probability to deal with “Knightian uncertainty.” The present article attempts to promote and improve the dialogue between proponents of different approaches to uncertainty and probability, as well as between different proponents of Post Keynesian economics. In this regard, this article highlights (a) the difference between Knightian risk and Savage’s uncertainty, (b) the acceptance into mainstream economics of approaches that go beyond both, (c) the fact that Keynes’s writings of the mid-1930s combined uncertainty with probability and weight in crucial parts of his theory, and (d) some comments on Shackle by authors in the Keynes literature. This article also intends to provide food for thought, hopefully stimulating Professor Katzner and other sympathizers of Shackle’s conception of uncertainty to reconsider the statement or the implication that uncertainty of the strongest type relevant in economic reality is synonymous with complete ignorance about the future.
{"title":"Types of uncertainty and probability: some remarks","authors":"David Dequech","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2222721","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2222721","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article comments on Donald Katzner’s “The Problem with Probability.” Professor Katzner criticizes any approach that uses probability to deal with “Knightian uncertainty.” The present article attempts to promote and improve the dialogue between proponents of different approaches to uncertainty and probability, as well as between different proponents of Post Keynesian economics. In this regard, this article highlights (a) the difference between Knightian risk and Savage’s uncertainty, (b) the acceptance into mainstream economics of approaches that go beyond both, (c) the fact that Keynes’s writings of the mid-1930s combined uncertainty with probability and weight in crucial parts of his theory, and (d) some comments on Shackle by authors in the Keynes literature. This article also intends to provide food for thought, hopefully stimulating Professor Katzner and other sympathizers of Shackle’s conception of uncertainty to reconsider the statement or the implication that uncertainty of the strongest type relevant in economic reality is synonymous with complete ignorance about the future.","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"440 - 449"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41923257","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2222707
Donald W. Katzner
Abstract Knightian uncertainty is the circumstance in which there is not enough information available to quantitatively measure in terms of probability the uncertainty that is present. Economic decision makers usually face that kind of uncertainty when attempting to determine their best route forward into the future. But instead of confronting Knightian uncertainty head on, economists generally have assumed it away by opting instead to employ what Knight called risk as measured by probability. But there are serious questions about whether probability has the capacity to coral in a meaningful way the uncertainty many decision makers actually face, and whether its use in models of decision making provides an appropriately relevant and realistic explanation of what is going on. This paper argues that it does not by examining the meaning of the probability concept as it relates to the true uncertain environment the decision maker faces. It also suggests that the alternative measure of surprise introduced by Shackle not only returns such analyses to the more realistic realm of Knightian uncertainty, but is also a workable and suitable replacement for probability in explanations of decision making that need to account for the unpredictability of the future.
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Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2222711
G. Skillman, Roberto Veneziani
Abstract Underscoring the economic significance of the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, Don Katzner forcefully challenges the continued dominance of the expected utility model based on subjective probability in macroeconomic analysis and offers in its place a simple yet elegant model of decision making inspired by the pioneering work of G.L.S. Shackle. In doing so, Katzner lends support to a research program to identify a more coherent and empirically grounded theory of decision making under uncertainty. Our paper makes three contributions to this program. First, we argue that the appropriate choice of a model of individual behavior under uncertainty cannot be adjudicated merely on logical, a priori grounds, but must ultimately be based on consistency with observed behavior. There are many internally consistent models and their external conditions of validity hardly ever rely on inconceivable scenarios. Second, while Katzner’s model certainly provides a plausible foundation for understanding choice under uncertainty, we suggest that it is somewhat underdetermined. It requires further theoretical articulation to yield testable predictions which differentiate it from competing approaches. Third, we discuss recent experimental findings that may need to be addressed by any satisfactory theoretical account of decision making under uncertainty.
{"title":"The problem(s) with representing decision processes under uncertainty","authors":"G. Skillman, Roberto Veneziani","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2222711","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2222711","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Underscoring the economic significance of the Knightian distinction between risk and uncertainty, Don Katzner forcefully challenges the continued dominance of the expected utility model based on subjective probability in macroeconomic analysis and offers in its place a simple yet elegant model of decision making inspired by the pioneering work of G.L.S. Shackle. In doing so, Katzner lends support to a research program to identify a more coherent and empirically grounded theory of decision making under uncertainty. Our paper makes three contributions to this program. First, we argue that the appropriate choice of a model of individual behavior under uncertainty cannot be adjudicated merely on logical, a priori grounds, but must ultimately be based on consistency with observed behavior. There are many internally consistent models and their external conditions of validity hardly ever rely on inconceivable scenarios. Second, while Katzner’s model certainly provides a plausible foundation for understanding choice under uncertainty, we suggest that it is somewhat underdetermined. It requires further theoretical articulation to yield testable predictions which differentiate it from competing approaches. Third, we discuss recent experimental findings that may need to be addressed by any satisfactory theoretical account of decision making under uncertainty.","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"420 - 439"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47278122","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-07-03DOI: 10.1080/01603477.2023.2222737
Andres F. Cantillo
Abstract The article with the title “The Problem With Probability” suggests an interesting connection between Knightian uncertainty and Shackle’s Potential Surprise Function. The paper offers additional support to the formal analysis of uncertainty proper. Nevertheless, it suffers from insufficiencies in the definitions and classifications related to the concept of probability and time. Readers can complement it with Shackle’s assessment of probability and with Cantillo’s analysis of the Potential Surprise Function as a language whose main function is to serve as a means for engendering the future.
{"title":"The problem with probability: comment","authors":"Andres F. Cantillo","doi":"10.1080/01603477.2023.2222737","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/01603477.2023.2222737","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The article with the title “The Problem With Probability” suggests an interesting connection between Knightian uncertainty and Shackle’s Potential Surprise Function. The paper offers additional support to the formal analysis of uncertainty proper. Nevertheless, it suffers from insufficiencies in the definitions and classifications related to the concept of probability and time. Readers can complement it with Shackle’s assessment of probability and with Cantillo’s analysis of the Potential Surprise Function as a language whose main function is to serve as a means for engendering the future.","PeriodicalId":47197,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Post Keynesian Economics","volume":"46 1","pages":"450 - 464"},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48425282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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