Abstract This article is intended as a precis of The Main Enterprise of the World and hopes to orient those who have not read it to the symposium discussion that follows. It outlines my own version of a radical rethinking of education. Instead of holding that educational systems should be shaped so as to satisfy socio-economic constraints, interpreted narrowly in recent decades to emphasize the preparation of the young to compete in the global economy, it proposes to view education as ‘the main enterprise of the world’ (in Emerson's resonant phrase). I attempt to harmonize three important educational goals: equipping people to maintain themselves; providing the opportunity for fulfilling lives; and creating citizens who can live and work together to sustain democratic societies. The notion of fulfillment is elaborated by following J. S. Mill in emphasizing individual freedom to ‘pursue one's own good in one's own way’, and requiring the chosen project to contribute to a transhistorical pan-human enterprise. This requires a serious probing of the concept of autonomy. I argue that the reworked notion is closely linked to capacities for democratic deliberation, and, like Dewey, I view regular exchanges among citizens as crucial for genuine democracy. In light of these perspectives, shifts in the labor market, brought about by increasing automation, provide the opportunity for people to undertake rewarding (and properly respected) service work, participating throughout their lives in the education of others. The resulting position has curricular consequences, and these in turn require social and economic changes. I conclude by defending the approach I have sketched against charges of utopianism.
{"title":"The centrality of education","authors":"Philip Kitcher","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad024","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad024","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article is intended as a precis of The Main Enterprise of the World and hopes to orient those who have not read it to the symposium discussion that follows. It outlines my own version of a radical rethinking of education. Instead of holding that educational systems should be shaped so as to satisfy socio-economic constraints, interpreted narrowly in recent decades to emphasize the preparation of the young to compete in the global economy, it proposes to view education as ‘the main enterprise of the world’ (in Emerson's resonant phrase). I attempt to harmonize three important educational goals: equipping people to maintain themselves; providing the opportunity for fulfilling lives; and creating citizens who can live and work together to sustain democratic societies. The notion of fulfillment is elaborated by following J. S. Mill in emphasizing individual freedom to ‘pursue one's own good in one's own way’, and requiring the chosen project to contribute to a transhistorical pan-human enterprise. This requires a serious probing of the concept of autonomy. I argue that the reworked notion is closely linked to capacities for democratic deliberation, and, like Dewey, I view regular exchanges among citizens as crucial for genuine democracy. In light of these perspectives, shifts in the labor market, brought about by increasing automation, provide the opportunity for people to undertake rewarding (and properly respected) service work, participating throughout their lives in the education of others. The resulting position has curricular consequences, and these in turn require social and economic changes. I conclude by defending the approach I have sketched against charges of utopianism.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135573960","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT I offer some responses to the principal points raised by Ben Kotzee, Alexis Gibbs, Sheron Fraser-Burgess, and Nigel Tubbs in their commentaries on my book, The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education (MEW), and to John White's penetrating and constructive review (the four commentaries and White's review all appear in this issue). In reply to Kotzee's challenge, I argue that MEW supports an improved approach to specialized scientific education, and that worries about the future of technology are unfounded. Gibbs’ critique, I contend, assumes a one-size-fits-all approach to the arts, in an area where I am concerned to make fine differentiations. Fraser-Burgess is right to wonder how my educational program can overcome the problems of multicultural, multiracial, multiethnic societies, but I maintain that the approach to educating citizens MEW outlines is the appropriate means to address those problems. Finally, I am happy to modify my conception of the Deweyan Society by introducing the kinds of Socratic explorations Tubbs proposes. John White introduces a number of significant issues and concerns. Some of these arise, I claim, from his adoption of familiar versions of concepts MEW takes pains to explicate in new ways. Since I argue for the superiority of my explicated versions, I view the correct strategy to involve discarding the presuppositions of the traditional notions White favours. With respect to moral education, for example, White's ‘precept-centered’ conception contrasts with my emphasis on the fundamental importance of skills of mutual engagement. His most extensive discussion, on my approach to fulfilment, poses a deep challenge. Here, I attempt to clarify and motivate the concepts I deploy. With respect to his review, however, as with my exchanges with the other commentators, this response can only be the beginning of what I hope will continue to be a fruitful conversation.
本·科泽、亚历克西斯·吉布斯、谢伦·弗雷泽-伯吉斯和奈杰尔·塔布斯在对我的著作《世界的主要事业:重新思考教育》(the Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education, MEW)的评论中提出的主要观点，以及约翰·怀特(John White)深刻而富有建设性的评论(这四篇评论和怀特的评论都出现在本期杂志上)，我将对此做出一些回应。在回答Kotzee的挑战时，我认为新经济周刊支持一种改进的专业科学教育方法，对技术未来的担忧是没有根据的。我认为，吉布斯的批评假设了一种一刀切的艺术方法，而我所关注的是在这个领域做出细微的区分。弗雷泽-伯吉斯想知道我的教育计划如何能够克服多元文化、多种族、多民族社会的问题，这是对的，但我坚持认为，《新经济学》概述的教育公民的方法是解决这些问题的适当手段。最后，我很高兴通过介绍塔布斯提出的各种苏格拉底式探索来修改我对杜威社会的概念。John White介绍了一些重要的问题和关注点。我认为，其中一些是由于他采用了熟悉的概念版本，而MEW煞费苦心地用新的方式来解释。既然我主张我的解释版本的优越性，我认为正确的策略包括抛弃怀特所支持的传统观念的前提。例如，在道德教育方面，怀特的“以戒律为中心”的概念与我对相互参与技能的基本重要性的强调形成了对比。他最广泛的讨论是关于我实现自我的方法，这构成了一个深刻的挑战。在这里，我试图澄清和激发我所部署的概念。然而，关于他的审查，正如我与其他评论员的交流一样，这一答复只能是我希望将继续是富有成果的对话的开始。
{"title":"Continuing the conversation","authors":"Philip Kitcher","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad027","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad027","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT I offer some responses to the principal points raised by Ben Kotzee, Alexis Gibbs, Sheron Fraser-Burgess, and Nigel Tubbs in their commentaries on my book, The Main Enterprise of the World: Rethinking Education (MEW), and to John White's penetrating and constructive review (the four commentaries and White's review all appear in this issue). In reply to Kotzee's challenge, I argue that MEW supports an improved approach to specialized scientific education, and that worries about the future of technology are unfounded. Gibbs’ critique, I contend, assumes a one-size-fits-all approach to the arts, in an area where I am concerned to make fine differentiations. Fraser-Burgess is right to wonder how my educational program can overcome the problems of multicultural, multiracial, multiethnic societies, but I maintain that the approach to educating citizens MEW outlines is the appropriate means to address those problems. Finally, I am happy to modify my conception of the Deweyan Society by introducing the kinds of Socratic explorations Tubbs proposes. John White introduces a number of significant issues and concerns. Some of these arise, I claim, from his adoption of familiar versions of concepts MEW takes pains to explicate in new ways. Since I argue for the superiority of my explicated versions, I view the correct strategy to involve discarding the presuppositions of the traditional notions White favours. With respect to moral education, for example, White's ‘precept-centered’ conception contrasts with my emphasis on the fundamental importance of skills of mutual engagement. His most extensive discussion, on my approach to fulfilment, poses a deep challenge. Here, I attempt to clarify and motivate the concepts I deploy. With respect to his review, however, as with my exchanges with the other commentators, this response can only be the beginning of what I hope will continue to be a fruitful conversation.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-04-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135573961","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper assesses the prospects of combining the distinctive strengths of the two major educational research programs of critical thinking and critical pedagogy—or, described more accurately, overcoming their shared limitations—in a new and superior educational objective called criticality. Several recent proposals explore the possibilities of engaging in bridgebuilding between these camps. The plan is that the distinctive strengths of these paradigms—the logical and epistemological precision of critical thinking together with the socio-political consciousness of critical pedagogy—could complement each other, while the associated adjustments to the overall picture could also help us to address their shared shortcomings. This gives us a new and more grounded educational goal of criticality, as suggested and developed independently by a growing number of thinkers (e.g. Burbules and Berk 1999; Davies 2014; Davies and Barnett 2015; Sibbett 2016; Shpeizer 2018). My article joins this on-going conversation but provides a more counter-reactionary tone by striving to vindicate the traditional mainstream conception of critical thinking. I maintain that despite their admirable ambitions, the various expressions of criticality do not succeed in combining the best parts of critical thinking and critical pedagogy, since on a deep meta-theoretical level these two paradigms have irreconcilable core principles. First, I argue that the depiction of the failures of critical thinking used to motivate criticality is to a large degree a strawman: in actuality, the existing conceptualization of critical thinking can already do the desired extra socio-political educational work, so there really is no pressing need for the suggested new augmentations. Second, the traditional worries of indoctrination, that have followed critical pedagogy since the inception of this educational movement, still remain unresolved within criticality. The only way to successfully address this concern is to lean on critical thinking as the core of our educational theory, bringing us right back to where started.
{"title":"From critical thinking to criticality and back again","authors":"H. Pettersson","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad021","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad021","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper assesses the prospects of combining the distinctive strengths of the two major educational research programs of critical thinking and critical pedagogy—or, described more accurately, overcoming their shared limitations—in a new and superior educational objective called criticality. Several recent proposals explore the possibilities of engaging in bridgebuilding between these camps. The plan is that the distinctive strengths of these paradigms—the logical and epistemological precision of critical thinking together with the socio-political consciousness of critical pedagogy—could complement each other, while the associated adjustments to the overall picture could also help us to address their shared shortcomings. This gives us a new and more grounded educational goal of criticality, as suggested and developed independently by a growing number of thinkers (e.g. Burbules and Berk 1999; Davies 2014; Davies and Barnett 2015; Sibbett 2016; Shpeizer 2018). My article joins this on-going conversation but provides a more counter-reactionary tone by striving to vindicate the traditional mainstream conception of critical thinking. I maintain that despite their admirable ambitions, the various expressions of criticality do not succeed in combining the best parts of critical thinking and critical pedagogy, since on a deep meta-theoretical level these two paradigms have irreconcilable core principles. First, I argue that the depiction of the failures of critical thinking used to motivate criticality is to a large degree a strawman: in actuality, the existing conceptualization of critical thinking can already do the desired extra socio-political educational work, so there really is no pressing need for the suggested new augmentations. Second, the traditional worries of indoctrination, that have followed critical pedagogy since the inception of this educational movement, still remain unresolved within criticality. The only way to successfully address this concern is to lean on critical thinking as the core of our educational theory, bringing us right back to where started.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46232973","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Learning about the causes and effects of human-induced climate-change is an essential aspect of contemporary environmental education. However, it is increasingly recognized that the familiar “information-dump delivery mode” (Morton, 2018) through which new facts about ecological destruction are being constantly communicated often contributes to anxiety, cognitive exhaustion, and can ultimately lead to hopelessness and paralysis in the face of ecological issues. In this article, I explore several pathways to approach environmental education (EE), beyond the presentation and transmission of ecological facts. I position my conceptual discussion around my own teaching experiences speaking about climate change with undergrad students across several Education classes through 2019 to 2021. I situate these reflections within the current discourse on education and teaching in/for the Anthropocene. Throughout this discussion, I locate various ways in which much EE fails to contribute to student’s agency and empowerment by consistently reducing complex ecological phenomena to a set of problems, mainly economic/technological, to be fixed by technocracy. I propose that a contemplative-existential perspective to EE is capable of responding to these reductions, most basically by providing opportunities and practices for students to process their own grief and emotions through recognizing the Anthropocene as an inescapable reality, but also a reality that cannot be determinately imagined or predicted.
{"title":"‘What do we talk about when we talk about climate change?’: meaningful environmental education, beyond the info-dump","authors":"Cary Campbell","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad020","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad020","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Learning about the causes and effects of human-induced climate-change is an essential aspect of contemporary environmental education. However, it is increasingly recognized that the familiar “information-dump delivery mode” (Morton, 2018) through which new facts about ecological destruction are being constantly communicated often contributes to anxiety, cognitive exhaustion, and can ultimately lead to hopelessness and paralysis in the face of ecological issues. In this article, I explore several pathways to approach environmental education (EE), beyond the presentation and transmission of ecological facts. I position my conceptual discussion around my own teaching experiences speaking about climate change with undergrad students across several Education classes through 2019 to 2021. I situate these reflections within the current discourse on education and teaching in/for the Anthropocene. Throughout this discussion, I locate various ways in which much EE fails to contribute to student’s agency and empowerment by consistently reducing complex ecological phenomena to a set of problems, mainly economic/technological, to be fixed by technocracy. I propose that a contemplative-existential perspective to EE is capable of responding to these reductions, most basically by providing opportunities and practices for students to process their own grief and emotions through recognizing the Anthropocene as an inescapable reality, but also a reality that cannot be determinately imagined or predicted.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44954207","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Advances in digital technology are changing the methods of teaching and learning. In the course of this stream of changes, the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) has become a topic of great interest and concern. The development of teaching AIs (artificial intelligences that teach), which can provide adaptive and personalized dialogue with students, has shifted the relationship between teachers and students, and has raised new questions regarding the role of teachers. The purpose of this paper is to rethink the meaning of the act of teaching, without denying its variety, and to reflect on the role of teachers in the relatively unfamiliar situation created by the emergence of AI teaching machines. To this end, I attempt, first, to re-examine the nature of teaching by considering two possible orientations: teaching as a return to homogeneity and teaching as exposure to heterogeneity. My purpose is to consider the characteristics and limitations of the teaching implemented by AI and to discuss the role of human teachers in overcoming these limitations. Second, I seek to reveal what it is for the teacher to speak, which is often understood as the most important aspect of teaching, again by way of two characterizations: the closed conversation, which converges on a conclusion, and the open conversation, oriented towards ethical responsibility. In doing this, I shall examine critically some characteristics of language used by AI teaching machines and suggest alternatives that might constitute openness to an ethical conversation. In furtherance of this, I shall consider the account of teaching that is central to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.
{"title":"Otherwise than Teaching by Artificial Intelligence","authors":"Sang-eun Lee","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad019","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad019","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Advances in digital technology are changing the methods of teaching and learning. In the course of this stream of changes, the emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) has become a topic of great interest and concern. The development of teaching AIs (artificial intelligences that teach), which can provide adaptive and personalized dialogue with students, has shifted the relationship between teachers and students, and has raised new questions regarding the role of teachers. The purpose of this paper is to rethink the meaning of the act of teaching, without denying its variety, and to reflect on the role of teachers in the relatively unfamiliar situation created by the emergence of AI teaching machines. To this end, I attempt, first, to re-examine the nature of teaching by considering two possible orientations: teaching as a return to homogeneity and teaching as exposure to heterogeneity. My purpose is to consider the characteristics and limitations of the teaching implemented by AI and to discuss the role of human teachers in overcoming these limitations. Second, I seek to reveal what it is for the teacher to speak, which is often understood as the most important aspect of teaching, again by way of two characterizations: the closed conversation, which converges on a conclusion, and the open conversation, oriented towards ethical responsibility. In doing this, I shall examine critically some characteristics of language used by AI teaching machines and suggest alternatives that might constitute openness to an ethical conversation. In furtherance of this, I shall consider the account of teaching that is central to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-22","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46302560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul Hirst’s idea of moral education is distinctive in the central role it attributes to social practices. For him, ethical principles and virtues should not be seen as abstract entities theoretically derived and then applied in education so that students learn to reason from those principles or live by those virtues. Instead, Hirst’s moral education incorporates an initiation into social practices and comes back to them by means of situated critical reflection from within those practices themselves. Embracing Hirst’s proposed central role of social practices, this paper spells out the key role that emotions play in moral education so understood and their relations with social practices. As emotions materialize our deeply held values, incorporated into lived experience, their cultivation will not simply be a matter of deliberation, but instead of the practical exploration of social practices that can nurture and sustain them.
Paul Hirst的道德教育思想的独特之处在于它赋予社会实践的核心作用。对他来说，伦理原则和美德不应该被视为抽象的实体，从理论上推导出来，然后应用于教育，让学生学会从这些原则中推理，或者按照这些美德生活。相反，赫斯特的道德教育将启蒙融入了社会实践，并通过这些实践本身的批判性反思回到了社会实践中。本文接受赫斯特提出的社会实践的中心作用，阐明了情感在如此理解的道德教育中所起的关键作用，以及它们与社会实践的关系。当情感体现我们根深蒂固的价值观，融入生活体验时，它们的培养将不仅仅是一个深思熟虑的问题，而是对能够培养和维持它们的社会实践的实际探索。
{"title":"Moral Education, Emotions, and Social Practices","authors":"A. Mejía","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Paul Hirst’s idea of moral education is distinctive in the central role it attributes to social practices. For him, ethical principles and virtues should not be seen as abstract entities theoretically derived and then applied in education so that students learn to reason from those principles or live by those virtues. Instead, Hirst’s moral education incorporates an initiation into social practices and comes back to them by means of situated critical reflection from within those practices themselves. Embracing Hirst’s proposed central role of social practices, this paper spells out the key role that emotions play in moral education so understood and their relations with social practices. As emotions materialize our deeply held values, incorporated into lived experience, their cultivation will not simply be a matter of deliberation, but instead of the practical exploration of social practices that can nurture and sustain them.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47588390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper the potential in film for ethics education is considered and the theory of educational ethicism is defended. Some key features of ethicism are firstly outlined. Gaut’s argument about how artworks may teach ethics in an aesthetically meritorious way is also discussed. Two objections (from Kieran and Sauchelli) to Gaut’s position are secondly considered. It is argued that Gaut’s ethicism is not well placed to surmount these objections. However, I thirdly draw upon Hirst to explain why a refined species of ethicism (educational ethicism) can surmount these objections. Educational ethicism holds that artworks with ethical themes be regarded as starting points for conversations about ethics rather than conveyers of definite ethical teachings that only a normatively specified audience can grasp. Three ways that film can possess potential for ethics education are also documented: through the moral growth of the audience or by helping them to deepen understanding of an aspect of ethical experience or theory.
{"title":"On the potential in film for ethics education: In defence of educational ethicism","authors":"J. MacAllister","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper the potential in film for ethics education is considered and the theory of educational ethicism is defended. Some key features of ethicism are firstly outlined. Gaut’s argument about how artworks may teach ethics in an aesthetically meritorious way is also discussed. Two objections (from Kieran and Sauchelli) to Gaut’s position are secondly considered. It is argued that Gaut’s ethicism is not well placed to surmount these objections. However, I thirdly draw upon Hirst to explain why a refined species of ethicism (educational ethicism) can surmount these objections. Educational ethicism holds that artworks with ethical themes be regarded as starting points for conversations about ethics rather than conveyers of definite ethical teachings that only a normatively specified audience can grasp. Three ways that film can possess potential for ethics education are also documented: through the moral growth of the audience or by helping them to deepen understanding of an aspect of ethical experience or theory.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44353021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hirst consistently listed religion as a form of knowledge. He had numerous chances to revise this position, but did not. However, whenever Hirst actually considered religion and the curriculum in specific detail, either he did so without reference to the curriculum principles of liberal education, or he implicitly or explicitly rejected his own claim that religion was a form of knowledge. In this article I hope to contribute to an appreciation of Hirst’s work by showing how attempting to understand his thinking on religious education against the background of forms of knowledge both adds to confusion about what Hirst intended the forms of knowledge to be, and hinders an understanding of what his explicitly stated curriculum position on religion actually was. I speculate that Hirst included religion as a form of knowledge only as an ‘agnostic placeholder’ acknowledging the possibility that religion might turn out to be a form of knowledge. I then offer a brief assessment of this revised interpretation of Hirst’s position from the perspective of contemporary scholarship in the philosophy of religious education.
{"title":"Paul Hirst and religious education’s curriculum question; or, how Hirst never thought religion was a form of knowledge at all","authors":"D. Aldridge","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Hirst consistently listed religion as a form of knowledge. He had numerous chances to revise this position, but did not. However, whenever Hirst actually considered religion and the curriculum in specific detail, either he did so without reference to the curriculum principles of liberal education, or he implicitly or explicitly rejected his own claim that religion was a form of knowledge. In this article I hope to contribute to an appreciation of Hirst’s work by showing how attempting to understand his thinking on religious education against the background of forms of knowledge both adds to confusion about what Hirst intended the forms of knowledge to be, and hinders an understanding of what his explicitly stated curriculum position on religion actually was. I speculate that Hirst included religion as a form of knowledge only as an ‘agnostic placeholder’ acknowledging the possibility that religion might turn out to be a form of knowledge. I then offer a brief assessment of this revised interpretation of Hirst’s position from the perspective of contemporary scholarship in the philosophy of religious education.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45421082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a candid autobiographical chapter (Hirst 2010), which numbers among his last writings, Paul Hirst subjects his upbringing within a fundamentalist Christian sect to searching moral appraisal. He concludes that his parents wronged him by religiously indoctrinating him, stifling his emotional development, and arbitrarily restricting his range of valuable morally permissible experiences. This upbringing undermined his autonomy and—more fundamentally, on his account—kept him from living the life he had most reason to live. Surprisingly, however, Hirst suggests that his parents had a right to initiate him into this conservative religious life, though the wider community owed him a more non-directive form of religious education to temper it. This is a striking concession to the scope of parental rights, especially in view of Hirst’s complaint that the emotional repression required by his parents was to ‘distort [his] experience and understanding of [himself] and others in ways that persisted well into [his] adult life’. Engaging with Hirst's evaluation of his upbringing, I argue for a narrower range of parental rights than Hirst–one which excludes a parental moral right to religious initiation–and provide an account of the kind of emotional experiences to which children plausibly have a right.
{"title":"The Aims of Upbringing, Reasonable Affect, and Parental Rights: A Response to Paul Hirst’s Autobiographical Reflections","authors":"John Tillson","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a candid autobiographical chapter (Hirst 2010), which numbers among his last writings, Paul Hirst subjects his upbringing within a fundamentalist Christian sect to searching moral appraisal. He concludes that his parents wronged him by religiously indoctrinating him, stifling his emotional development, and arbitrarily restricting his range of valuable morally permissible experiences. This upbringing undermined his autonomy and—more fundamentally, on his account—kept him from living the life he had most reason to live. Surprisingly, however, Hirst suggests that his parents had a right to initiate him into this conservative religious life, though the wider community owed him a more non-directive form of religious education to temper it. This is a striking concession to the scope of parental rights, especially in view of Hirst’s complaint that the emotional repression required by his parents was to ‘distort [his] experience and understanding of [himself] and others in ways that persisted well into [his] adult life’. Engaging with Hirst's evaluation of his upbringing, I argue for a narrower range of parental rights than Hirst–one which excludes a parental moral right to religious initiation–and provide an account of the kind of emotional experiences to which children plausibly have a right.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43374344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question of the role of theory in initial teacher education was one that interested Paul Hirst throughout his long and distinguished academic career. When the story of teacher education in England is told by philosophers of education and, crucially, by teacher educators, we are reminded of Hirst’s contribution in two significant respects, as someone who both taught teachers and commented on the aim, purpose, and structure of teacher education. First, in the wake of the Robbins report, Hirst supported Peters in helping to establish education at London’s Institute of Education (IOE) as an academic subject which promoted theory, particularly philosophy, suited to the needs of pre-service teachers. Secondly, several decades later, Hirst provided invaluable comment on the influential Oxford Internship programme. This provision re-imagined the one-year professional programmes for postgraduates entering teaching as a partnership between schools and universities. Hirst’s commentary, while generous and supportive, argued that teachers needed greater attention paid to the pursuit of ‘rational public defence’ during their pre-service formation than was evident in the ‘practical theorising’ approach that underpins internship. Having examined Hirst’s contribution to and commentary on teacher education as a philosopher of education, I will argue that his example continues to offer insight today. In these neo-liberal times, there are ad hoc opportunities for philosophy of education to continue to be included meaningfully in teachers’ professional formation, although the extent and reach it can exercise are limited where the dominant discourse describes teachers as being ‘trained’ rather than educated. I offer examples of theory developing in practice, building on established ideas of what is appropriate.
{"title":"‘Pursuing rational public defence’: Paul Hirst on teacher education","authors":"J. Orchard","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The question of the role of theory in initial teacher education was one that interested Paul Hirst throughout his long and distinguished academic career. When the story of teacher education in England is told by philosophers of education and, crucially, by teacher educators, we are reminded of Hirst’s contribution in two significant respects, as someone who both taught teachers and commented on the aim, purpose, and structure of teacher education. First, in the wake of the Robbins report, Hirst supported Peters in helping to establish education at London’s Institute of Education (IOE) as an academic subject which promoted theory, particularly philosophy, suited to the needs of pre-service teachers. Secondly, several decades later, Hirst provided invaluable comment on the influential Oxford Internship programme. This provision re-imagined the one-year professional programmes for postgraduates entering teaching as a partnership between schools and universities. Hirst’s commentary, while generous and supportive, argued that teachers needed greater attention paid to the pursuit of ‘rational public defence’ during their pre-service formation than was evident in the ‘practical theorising’ approach that underpins internship. Having examined Hirst’s contribution to and commentary on teacher education as a philosopher of education, I will argue that his example continues to offer insight today. In these neo-liberal times, there are ad hoc opportunities for philosophy of education to continue to be included meaningfully in teachers’ professional formation, although the extent and reach it can exercise are limited where the dominant discourse describes teachers as being ‘trained’ rather than educated. I offer examples of theory developing in practice, building on established ideas of what is appropriate.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43846943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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