The aim of this article is to examine how markets enable companionship to be disconnected from the concept of friendship thus enabling an illusion of companionship without the demands of friendship. As friendship is a crucial early relationship for children, this is particularly germane to the world of education. It recognises the previous lack of philosophical attention to the idea of companionship—a key factor in friendship—and that this omission contributes to a lack of clarity on a variety of issues. Starting with a brief outline of companion friendship, the article examines the idea of the ‘intimate work’ of friendship within the market domain by considering three illustrative examples: first, rent-a-friend; secondly paid companionship; ending with companionate robots for children. It then concludes by contending that this is an important issue for children and their development and thus for education.
{"title":"Friendship, markets and companionate robots for children","authors":"Mary Healy","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad039","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad039","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The aim of this article is to examine how markets enable companionship to be disconnected from the concept of friendship thus enabling an illusion of companionship without the demands of friendship. As friendship is a crucial early relationship for children, this is particularly germane to the world of education. It recognises the previous lack of philosophical attention to the idea of companionship—a key factor in friendship—and that this omission contributes to a lack of clarity on a variety of issues. Starting with a brief outline of companion friendship, the article examines the idea of the ‘intimate work’ of friendship within the market domain by considering three illustrative examples: first, rent-a-friend; secondly paid companionship; ending with companionate robots for children. It then concludes by contending that this is an important issue for children and their development and thus for education.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-07-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41662911","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Even though the university has the potential to help humanity in what amounts to a paradigmatic transition, it has been very restrictive and very selective in the kinds of knowledges it validates. In fact, the kinds of knowledges in which it has excelled are those most responsible for the paradigmatic crisis in which humanity finds itself. In a nutshell, the paradigmatic change calls for cognitive justice, justice for the different ways of knowing that circulate in society. Cognitive justice is the polar opposite of ‘anything goes’. The assumption is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice, justice among knowledges. Looking back, while privileging one specific kind of knowledge and, indeed, granting it a cognitive monopoly, the university has been the privileged site for producing and legitimating cognitive injustice. As a result, the immense epistemic diversity of the world has been ignored or suppressed. In the following, I will identify the problem and the promise for overcoming it.
{"title":"The epistemologies of the South and the future of the university","authors":"B. Santos","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad038","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad038","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Even though the university has the potential to help humanity in what amounts to a paradigmatic transition, it has been very restrictive and very selective in the kinds of knowledges it validates. In fact, the kinds of knowledges in which it has excelled are those most responsible for the paradigmatic crisis in which humanity finds itself. In a nutshell, the paradigmatic change calls for cognitive justice, justice for the different ways of knowing that circulate in society. Cognitive justice is the polar opposite of ‘anything goes’. The assumption is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice, justice among knowledges. Looking back, while privileging one specific kind of knowledge and, indeed, granting it a cognitive monopoly, the university has been the privileged site for producing and legitimating cognitive injustice. As a result, the immense epistemic diversity of the world has been ignored or suppressed. In the following, I will identify the problem and the promise for overcoming it.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41818673","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this essay, we outline the central thesis of our recent book: A Platonic Theory of Moral Education: Cultivating Virtue in Contemporary Democratic Classrooms. We argue that the ethical, epistemological, political, and metaphysical doctrines typically attributed to Plato are not doctrines Plato holds, or at least are not doctrines that he holds in the way he is interpreted to have done. We claim that if we understand Plato’s relationship to these supposed doctrines better, we would discover that Plato’s views are not wildly implausible or ill-suited for contemporary democracies and the schooling they provide for their children. Rather, they are plausible and well-suited to contemporary democratic education. This essay briefly outlines some of our reasons for holding this position.
{"title":"Plato’s Legacy: Alive and Well","authors":"Mark E Jonas, Yoshiaki Nakazawa","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad047","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad047","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this essay, we outline the central thesis of our recent book: A Platonic Theory of Moral Education: Cultivating Virtue in Contemporary Democratic Classrooms. We argue that the ethical, epistemological, political, and metaphysical doctrines typically attributed to Plato are not doctrines Plato holds, or at least are not doctrines that he holds in the way he is interpreted to have done. We claim that if we understand Plato’s relationship to these supposed doctrines better, we would discover that Plato’s views are not wildly implausible or ill-suited for contemporary democracies and the schooling they provide for their children. Rather, they are plausible and well-suited to contemporary democratic education. This essay briefly outlines some of our reasons for holding this position.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"8 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135143325","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Plato scholarship in education is currently experiencing a marked renaissance. In the last half decade, dozens of articles have been published in the journals of philosophy of education that engage with Plato’s educational vision, and several book-length treatments have appeared at major publishing houses alongside these articles. From one perspective, this development might seem surprising, even baffling. Plato, as we hear from countless, seemingly reliable sources, is a metaphysician par excellence. He believes in a dubious realm of forms that somehow stands above or behind the things we see in the world. He claims that all learning is ultimately recollection from a time in which our soul resided in this realm, before it was infused into our bodies at birth. He is a trenchant critic of democracy. Given these credentials, it would seem that Plato has very little to say to us in post-metaphysical democratic societies and especially to teachers who hope to have a bit more success than Socrates. And yet the authors of the aforementioned works on Plato argue the very opposite. Plato is an indispensable conversation partner for contemporary educational philosophy and theory, they maintain, and overlooking his insights would seriously impoverish our conceptions and methods of education. This suite of papers aims to provide a helpful overview of the contemporary debate concerning Plato’s educational legacy and show that it provides important guidance for educators today.
{"title":"Reevaluating Plato’s Legacy to Education: An Introduction to the Suite","authors":"Douglas W Yacek","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad044","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad044","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Plato scholarship in education is currently experiencing a marked renaissance. In the last half decade, dozens of articles have been published in the journals of philosophy of education that engage with Plato’s educational vision, and several book-length treatments have appeared at major publishing houses alongside these articles. From one perspective, this development might seem surprising, even baffling. Plato, as we hear from countless, seemingly reliable sources, is a metaphysician par excellence. He believes in a dubious realm of forms that somehow stands above or behind the things we see in the world. He claims that all learning is ultimately recollection from a time in which our soul resided in this realm, before it was infused into our bodies at birth. He is a trenchant critic of democracy. Given these credentials, it would seem that Plato has very little to say to us in post-metaphysical democratic societies and especially to teachers who hope to have a bit more success than Socrates. And yet the authors of the aforementioned works on Plato argue the very opposite. Plato is an indispensable conversation partner for contemporary educational philosophy and theory, they maintain, and overlooking his insights would seriously impoverish our conceptions and methods of education. This suite of papers aims to provide a helpful overview of the contemporary debate concerning Plato’s educational legacy and show that it provides important guidance for educators today.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135143326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Corrected proof Rethinking philosophy for children: Agamben and education as pure means Get access T. E. Lewis and I. JasinskiLondon: Bloomsbury, 2022, 156pp, Hardback: £85.50 Paperback: £26.09 ISBN 978-1-350-13357-0 (hardcover) Claire Cassidy Claire Cassidy Strathclyde Institute of Education, Lord Hope Building, St James Road, Glasgow G4 0LT, Scotland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy of Education, qhad041, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad041 Published: 03 August 2023 Article history Published: 03 August 2023 Corrected and typeset: 20 September 2023
期刊文章更正证明重新思考儿童哲学:阿甘本和教育作为纯粹的手段获取T. E. Lewis和I. jasinskildon: Bloomsbury, 2022, 156页，精装:85.50英镑平装:26.09英镑ISBN 978-1-350-13357-0(精装)Claire Cassidy Claire Cassidy Strathclyde教育研究所，Lord Hope Building, St James Road, Glasgow g40lt, Scotland搜索作者的其他作品:牛津学术谷歌学者教育哲学杂志，qhad041, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad041出版日期:2023年8月3日文章历史出版日期:2023年8月3日校正和排版:2023年9月20日
{"title":"Rethinking philosophy for children: Agamben and education as pure means","authors":"Claire Cassidy","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad041","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad041","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Corrected proof Rethinking philosophy for children: Agamben and education as pure means Get access T. E. Lewis and I. JasinskiLondon: Bloomsbury, 2022, 156pp, Hardback: £85.50 Paperback: £26.09 ISBN 978-1-350-13357-0 (hardcover) Claire Cassidy Claire Cassidy Strathclyde Institute of Education, Lord Hope Building, St James Road, Glasgow G4 0LT, Scotland Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy of Education, qhad041, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad041 Published: 03 August 2023 Article history Published: 03 August 2023 Corrected and typeset: 20 September 2023","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135046172","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article proposes to reconceive moral education on the model of spiritual practice. Such an education would be defined not by its content—that is, explicit instruction about moral rules or particular virtues—but rather by the form of its constituent activities. Drawing on the works of both Plato and Foucault, the article addresses questions about the epistemic complexity of virtue raised in Mark E. Jonas and Yoshiaka Nakzawa’s A Platonic Theory of Moral Education. It then goes on to suggest that the form of spiritual practice is uniquely suited to the cultivation of virtue understood on their Platonic model.
{"title":"Moral Education as the Practice of Virtue","authors":"Rachel Ann Longa","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad048","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad048","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article proposes to reconceive moral education on the model of spiritual practice. Such an education would be defined not by its content—that is, explicit instruction about moral rules or particular virtues—but rather by the form of its constituent activities. Drawing on the works of both Plato and Foucault, the article addresses questions about the epistemic complexity of virtue raised in Mark E. Jonas and Yoshiaka Nakzawa’s A Platonic Theory of Moral Education. It then goes on to suggest that the form of spiritual practice is uniquely suited to the cultivation of virtue understood on their Platonic model.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135143766","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Is a neo-Platonic theory of moral education better than a neo-Aristotelian one, because the former offers a dialogue method that teachers can use in universities to induce epiphanies in students, in order to jump-start the moral development of those with a rather vicious character? In this paper, this claim, put forward by Jonas and Nakazawa in their book A Platonic Theory of Moral Education, is evaluated. Admittedly, the Nicomachean Ethics, which came to us in the form of a collection of edited lecture notes, gives the impression that Aristotle was not interested in dialogue. But by looking at the dialogical form of the Ethics and by consulting some of his ideas on logic, I show that Aristotle’s oeuvre does include valuable ideas about how teachers may conduct dialogues with their students. These dialogues may not yield epiphanies and will not convert vicious adults, but they are suitable for reaching most students and can appeal to their emotions and practical wisdom. While Jonas and Nakazawa argue that Plato and Aristotle only agree on the centrality of habituation, imitation, and role-modelling in their accounts of moral education, I conclude that dialogue should be added to that list.
{"title":"Should teachers use Platonic or Aristotelian dialogues for the moral education of young people?","authors":"Wouter Sanderse","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad045","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad045","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Is a neo-Platonic theory of moral education better than a neo-Aristotelian one, because the former offers a dialogue method that teachers can use in universities to induce epiphanies in students, in order to jump-start the moral development of those with a rather vicious character? In this paper, this claim, put forward by Jonas and Nakazawa in their book A Platonic Theory of Moral Education, is evaluated. Admittedly, the Nicomachean Ethics, which came to us in the form of a collection of edited lecture notes, gives the impression that Aristotle was not interested in dialogue. But by looking at the dialogical form of the Ethics and by consulting some of his ideas on logic, I show that Aristotle’s oeuvre does include valuable ideas about how teachers may conduct dialogues with their students. These dialogues may not yield epiphanies and will not convert vicious adults, but they are suitable for reaching most students and can appeal to their emotions and practical wisdom. While Jonas and Nakazawa argue that Plato and Aristotle only agree on the centrality of habituation, imitation, and role-modelling in their accounts of moral education, I conclude that dialogue should be added to that list.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135143327","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In A Platonic Theory of Moral Education, Mark Jonas and Yoshiaki Nakazawa have argued that Plato outlines a theory of virtue education. Alkis Kotsonis has similarly argued that Plato articulated a theory of intellectual character education. I think that Jonas, Nakazawa, and Kotsonis have opened a productive line of enquiry on this matter, and I expand on their work in this paper by identifying connections between Plato’s work and the contemporary discourse on character education, which features four domains of virtues: moral, intellectual, civic, and performance virtues. Plato’s treatment of virtue, I argue, not only can be mapped onto the contemporary treatment of character education but it also further demonstrates that cultivating virtue—the project of character education—was a paramount concern for Plato.
{"title":"Platonic Character Education","authors":"Avi I Mintz","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad050","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad050","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In A Platonic Theory of Moral Education, Mark Jonas and Yoshiaki Nakazawa have argued that Plato outlines a theory of virtue education. Alkis Kotsonis has similarly argued that Plato articulated a theory of intellectual character education. I think that Jonas, Nakazawa, and Kotsonis have opened a productive line of enquiry on this matter, and I expand on their work in this paper by identifying connections between Plato’s work and the contemporary discourse on character education, which features four domains of virtues: moral, intellectual, civic, and performance virtues. Plato’s treatment of virtue, I argue, not only can be mapped onto the contemporary treatment of character education but it also further demonstrates that cultivating virtue—the project of character education—was a paramount concern for Plato.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"127 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135143329","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT Educators are conflicted about whether school provides an appropriate space to teach ethics. Still, they want to develop the moral character of their students, and most of these efforts have used various citizenship values to address our frustration with students’ ‘lack of character’. Recently, a wave of work in the philosophy of education has rejuvenated discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which forms the backbone for programmes that many schools are now adopting. Mark Jonas and Yoshiaki Nakazawa, however, argue that schools should revisit Plato’s pedagogical methods, as well. If educators want to develop virtue in students, they need to understand the mechanism behind moral development. Guided by Plato, they argue that expert teachers use psychological, pedagogical, and philosophical reasoning to induce epiphanies in students, then guide them through virtue-oriented rehabituation. The goal of this article is to explore the legitimacy of Jonas and Nakazawa’s Platonic theory. I begin by describing the state of modern democratic education and its relationship to teaching ethics. I argue that character development is the appropriate route educators should take but that Jonas and Nakazawa’s theory only gives educators a partial understanding of how to do so. They give a plausible model for how our best educators are effective, but we are left wanting a much more robust, instructive picture. I suggest that we need a broader overhaul of the way we view education in a modern democratic society; character development must proceed from a different normative picture of the individual’s place in society.
{"title":"The Limits of Platonic Modeling and Moral Education: A View from the Classroom","authors":"Matthew J Berk","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad046","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Educators are conflicted about whether school provides an appropriate space to teach ethics. Still, they want to develop the moral character of their students, and most of these efforts have used various citizenship values to address our frustration with students’ ‘lack of character’. Recently, a wave of work in the philosophy of education has rejuvenated discussion of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which forms the backbone for programmes that many schools are now adopting. Mark Jonas and Yoshiaki Nakazawa, however, argue that schools should revisit Plato’s pedagogical methods, as well. If educators want to develop virtue in students, they need to understand the mechanism behind moral development. Guided by Plato, they argue that expert teachers use psychological, pedagogical, and philosophical reasoning to induce epiphanies in students, then guide them through virtue-oriented rehabituation. The goal of this article is to explore the legitimacy of Jonas and Nakazawa’s Platonic theory. I begin by describing the state of modern democratic education and its relationship to teaching ethics. I argue that character development is the appropriate route educators should take but that Jonas and Nakazawa’s theory only gives educators a partial understanding of how to do so. They give a plausible model for how our best educators are effective, but we are left wanting a much more robust, instructive picture. I suggest that we need a broader overhaul of the way we view education in a modern democratic society; character development must proceed from a different normative picture of the individual’s place in society.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"125 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135143767","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Building on Jonas and Nakazawa’s recent work (A Platonic Theory of Moral Education), my aim in this paper is to address two widespread misunderstandings of Plato’s ideas about education. The first is that the Platonic theory of education is nonegalitarian, promoting an educational system that justifies and perpetuates a caste-based society. The second is that the Platonic conception of the virtuous agent is primitive and far inferior to the Aristotelian conception, especially concerning the psychological make-up of the virtuous agent. By exploring some of the ways these misreadings can be countered, I defend the value of the Platonic educational theory for contemporary education and show the value of Jonas and Nakazawa’s project.
{"title":"Plato’s Legacy to Education: Addressing Two Misunderstandings","authors":"Alkis Kotsonis","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad049","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Building on Jonas and Nakazawa’s recent work (A Platonic Theory of Moral Education), my aim in this paper is to address two widespread misunderstandings of Plato’s ideas about education. The first is that the Platonic theory of education is nonegalitarian, promoting an educational system that justifies and perpetuates a caste-based society. The second is that the Platonic conception of the virtuous agent is primitive and far inferior to the Aristotelian conception, especially concerning the psychological make-up of the virtuous agent. By exploring some of the ways these misreadings can be countered, I defend the value of the Platonic educational theory for contemporary education and show the value of Jonas and Nakazawa’s project.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"11 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135143328","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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