Paul Hirst’s reconceptualization of his epistemology provides a basis for this exploration of the various aspects of the rationale for teaching literature. The article reflects the close analysis of knowledge and the curriculum in his early work and develops insights in his later work. This leads to the identification of five strands that form the rationale for the role of literature within the curriculum. The first strand refers to the knowledge of context, cultural background, or information necessary to engage with many works of literature. The second strand concerns the role of literature in providing pleasure. The third strand considers the role of literature in offering multiple forms of understanding and insight. Strands four and five address the place of literature in the educational context. The fourth strand refers to the possibilities offered for education in language by the close study of literary texts. The fifth strand concerns the honing of the ability to propose and defend arguments in the interpretation of texts as a conduit to the development of one aspect of practical reason.
{"title":"The rationale for the teaching of literature: Its multiple strands","authors":"K. Williams, Patrick A Williams","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad009","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad009","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Paul Hirst’s reconceptualization of his epistemology provides a basis for this exploration of the various aspects of the rationale for teaching literature. The article reflects the close analysis of knowledge and the curriculum in his early work and develops insights in his later work. This leads to the identification of five strands that form the rationale for the role of literature within the curriculum. The first strand refers to the knowledge of context, cultural background, or information necessary to engage with many works of literature. The second strand concerns the role of literature in providing pleasure. The third strand considers the role of literature in offering multiple forms of understanding and insight. Strands four and five address the place of literature in the educational context. The fourth strand refers to the possibilities offered for education in language by the close study of literary texts. The fifth strand concerns the honing of the ability to propose and defend arguments in the interpretation of texts as a conduit to the development of one aspect of practical reason.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41871808","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul Hirst’s work on the nature of knowledge and its significance for education is still important, in at least two respects. One is the defence he offers of a distinctively liberal education: this is widely acknowledged, but its importance in our own time deserves greater recognition. The other, which is less often noticed, is Hirst’s avoidance of the widespread tendency to think of science as the model that all knowledge should attempt to emulate. This tendency, which in its extreme form is called scientism, represents less respect for science—which of course science deserves—than veneration of it. Wider discussion here of the part that the idea of knowledge plays in educational thinking today touches on recent work on virtue epistemology, the importance but complexity of the ideas of truth and reason, the curious rise of ‘powerful knowledge’, and recent work on the importance of philosophy in its ancient role of orienting us to reality as the home of thinking: a theme anticipated in some of the late work of Paul Hirst.
{"title":"Forms of knowledge and forms of philosophy","authors":"Richard Smith","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Paul Hirst’s work on the nature of knowledge and its significance for education is still important, in at least two respects. One is the defence he offers of a distinctively liberal education: this is widely acknowledged, but its importance in our own time deserves greater recognition. The other, which is less often noticed, is Hirst’s avoidance of the widespread tendency to think of science as the model that all knowledge should attempt to emulate. This tendency, which in its extreme form is called scientism, represents less respect for science—which of course science deserves—than veneration of it. Wider discussion here of the part that the idea of knowledge plays in educational thinking today touches on recent work on virtue epistemology, the importance but complexity of the ideas of truth and reason, the curious rise of ‘powerful knowledge’, and recent work on the importance of philosophy in its ancient role of orienting us to reality as the home of thinking: a theme anticipated in some of the late work of Paul Hirst.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45047000","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul Hirst’s writings about the nature of educational theory continue to be important to the field of education. In this paper I unpack and analyse in some detail his conception of educational theory. I centre my discussion on three issues. First, I look at the ‘big picture’, how Hirst situates educational theory between the foundational disciplines and educational practice, and in so doing endows it with a specific function. His view is contrasted with the view of D.J. O’Connor; the discussion between the two of them is well-known. Second, with the big picture in place, I inquire deeper into Hirst’s view of the raison d’être of educational theory. Here his views are compared with those of the German philosopher of education Erich Weniger. Finally, I discuss Hirst’s later revisions of his view, most notably his argument that the justification of educational theory by the foundational disciplines is not enough. Educational theory must also pass the test of practice, he claims. I judge this to be a considerable change, one that blurs the big picture rather than making it clearer.
{"title":"Hirst on educational theory","authors":"T. Kvernbekk","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Paul Hirst’s writings about the nature of educational theory continue to be important to the field of education. In this paper I unpack and analyse in some detail his conception of educational theory. I centre my discussion on three issues. First, I look at the ‘big picture’, how Hirst situates educational theory between the foundational disciplines and educational practice, and in so doing endows it with a specific function. His view is contrasted with the view of D.J. O’Connor; the discussion between the two of them is well-known. Second, with the big picture in place, I inquire deeper into Hirst’s view of the raison d’être of educational theory. Here his views are compared with those of the German philosopher of education Erich Weniger. Finally, I discuss Hirst’s later revisions of his view, most notably his argument that the justification of educational theory by the foundational disciplines is not enough. Educational theory must also pass the test of practice, he claims. I judge this to be a considerable change, one that blurs the big picture rather than making it clearer.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43707626","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Was Paul Hirst ever a Deweyan?","authors":"J. Dan","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46285300","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul Hirst’s philosophical ‘conversion’ from forms of knowledge to forms of social practices was largely prompted by his radical reappraisal of the philosophical underpinnings that had validated his classic conception of liberal education. The primary motivation for Hirst’s later works was to remedy his own neglect of practical reason, whose sharp distinction from theoretical reason he acknowledged he had failed to appreciate. There is much to commend in his ‘practical’ turn. The main challenge that remains, however, is that the social practices view is something of a ‘foundationalist’ two-part picture, where overwhelming priority is given to practical reason. I appreciate the importance of the two issues Hirst puts on the table, in his debate with Wilfred Carr particularly and in his later works more generally: the issues of cultivating phronesis and of making sense of the practical character of critical-reflective activities. But I argue that addressing these issues fully requires us to recognize that neither theoretical nor practical rationality can be intelligible apart from the other. To press the point home, I review the analogous debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether to accept, and how to understand, the view that rational conceptuality in a relevant sense pervades not only deliberation and propositional thinking but also perception and embodied coping skills. I conclude by briefly considering the prospect that the legacy of Hirst and recent discussions around human nature, practical rationality, and the formation of reason will interactively enrich our philosophical-educational scholarship.
{"title":"Practical Rationality in Education: Beyond the Hirst–Carr Debate","authors":"Koichiro Misawa","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhac002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhac002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Paul Hirst’s philosophical ‘conversion’ from forms of knowledge to forms of social practices was largely prompted by his radical reappraisal of the philosophical underpinnings that had validated his classic conception of liberal education. The primary motivation for Hirst’s later works was to remedy his own neglect of practical reason, whose sharp distinction from theoretical reason he acknowledged he had failed to appreciate. There is much to commend in his ‘practical’ turn. The main challenge that remains, however, is that the social practices view is something of a ‘foundationalist’ two-part picture, where overwhelming priority is given to practical reason. I appreciate the importance of the two issues Hirst puts on the table, in his debate with Wilfred Carr particularly and in his later works more generally: the issues of cultivating phronesis and of making sense of the practical character of critical-reflective activities. But I argue that addressing these issues fully requires us to recognize that neither theoretical nor practical rationality can be intelligible apart from the other. To press the point home, I review the analogous debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell over whether to accept, and how to understand, the view that rational conceptuality in a relevant sense pervades not only deliberation and propositional thinking but also perception and embodied coping skills. I conclude by briefly considering the prospect that the legacy of Hirst and recent discussions around human nature, practical rationality, and the formation of reason will interactively enrich our philosophical-educational scholarship.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46590848","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Moral Education in a Secular Society, Paul Hirst offers accounts of the content and justification of morality and the aims and methods of moral education. My own recent book, A Theory of Moral Education, does the same. Here I explore the similarities and differences between our theories. In the first part of the essay, I outline what Hirst calls the ‘sophisticated view of education’, which I wholeheartedly endorse, and highlight his attention to the noncognitive as well as the cognitive aspects of morality. In the second part, I explain how Hirst’s transcendental justification of morality differs from my contractarian justification, and trace the implications of this difference for our respective accounts of moral education.
{"title":"Hirst on rational moral education","authors":"Michael Hand","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhac003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhac003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In Moral Education in a Secular Society, Paul Hirst offers accounts of the content and justification of morality and the aims and methods of moral education. My own recent book, A Theory of Moral Education, does the same. Here I explore the similarities and differences between our theories. In the first part of the essay, I outline what Hirst calls the ‘sophisticated view of education’, which I wholeheartedly endorse, and highlight his attention to the noncognitive as well as the cognitive aspects of morality. In the second part, I explain how Hirst’s transcendental justification of morality differs from my contractarian justification, and trace the implications of this difference for our respective accounts of moral education.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45994541","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paul Hirst, Education and Epistemic Injustice","authors":"Alessia Marabini","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhac004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhac004","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"61590974","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Paul Hirst’s defence of liberal education and his forms of knowledge thesis are likely to seem out of step with contemporary calls to decolonise knowledge by ‘delinking’ it from ‘Western’ Enlightenment traditions. In view of the decolonial challenge, and emphasising too that Hirst’s work should be located in its time, we consider the extent to which his account of liberal education still has a place in the postcolonial era. We outline Hirst’s defence of liberal education and how it changed over time, and show how philosophy of education in the tradition in which he has been so influential departed from Hirst’s account of liberal education, with some of these trends anticipating postcolonial imperatives. While there is a pressing need for attention to the significance of colonialism in philosophy of education, the discipline has moved on and diversified considerably over the last half century, including by developing more expansive conceptions of liberal education with the potential to contribute to the postcolonial project. Some elements of Hirst’s defence of liberal education are compatible with the postcolonial project, but it would need adjustment to make it relevant to the postcolonial era. After addressing the postcolonial critique of liberal thought in general as complicit in colonialism, we conclude by assessing what contribution Hirst’s conception of liberal education could make to the postcolonial project, noting a degree of openness to aspects of the decolonial project.
{"title":"Paul Hirst, Liberal Education and the Postcolonial Project","authors":"S. Daniels, P. Enslin","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhac001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhac001","url":null,"abstract":"Paul Hirst’s defence of liberal education and his forms of knowledge thesis are likely to seem out of step with contemporary calls to decolonise knowledge by ‘delinking’ it from ‘Western’ Enlightenment traditions. In view of the decolonial challenge, and emphasising too that Hirst’s work should be located in its time, we consider the extent to which his account of liberal education still has a place in the postcolonial era. We outline Hirst’s defence of liberal education and how it changed over time, and show how philosophy of education in the tradition in which he has been so influential departed from Hirst’s account of liberal education, with some of these trends anticipating postcolonial imperatives. While there is a pressing need for attention to the significance of colonialism in philosophy of education, the discipline has moved on and diversified considerably over the last half century, including by developing more expansive conceptions of liberal education with the potential to contribute to the postcolonial project. Some elements of Hirst’s defence of liberal education are compatible with the postcolonial project, but it would need adjustment to make it relevant to the postcolonial era. After addressing the postcolonial critique of liberal thought in general as complicit in colonialism, we conclude by assessing what contribution Hirst’s conception of liberal education could make to the postcolonial project, noting a degree of openness to aspects of the decolonial project.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42808546","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hirst always highlighted knowledge when reflecting on the school curriculum. He replaced his early focus on liberal education, the development of mind and theoretical knowledge by emphasising the practical and practices as a curriculum starting point and for the framing of educational aims. In this paper I explore links between Hirst’s philosophical treatment of knowledge and some currently contested aspects of UK government education policies. I also note some ways in which his work relates to selected present-day debates in philosophy of education. Examples of UK government policy will include Ofsted’s definition of learning as a ‘change in long-term memory’ and the ways in which they place ‘logical sequencing’ at the heart of teaching, learning and curriculum. Their learning definition treats knowledge as an individual asset rather than something about individuals as embedded in the social world of practices, a perspective more in keeping with Hirst’s later views. The critique of individualistic notions of knowledge and learning includes some explorations of how learners move into the ‘space of reasons’. Where I draw attention to relationships between Hirst’s thought and contemporary philosophy of education debates, I do not always draw any definite conclusions.
{"title":"Knowing and learning: From Hirst to OFSTED","authors":"Andrew John Davis","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Hirst always highlighted knowledge when reflecting on the school curriculum. He replaced his early focus on liberal education, the development of mind and theoretical knowledge by emphasising the practical and practices as a curriculum starting point and for the framing of educational aims. In this paper I explore links between Hirst’s philosophical treatment of knowledge and some currently contested aspects of UK government education policies. I also note some ways in which his work relates to selected present-day debates in philosophy of education. Examples of UK government policy will include Ofsted’s definition of learning as a ‘change in long-term memory’ and the ways in which they place ‘logical sequencing’ at the heart of teaching, learning and curriculum. Their learning definition treats knowledge as an individual asset rather than something about individuals as embedded in the social world of practices, a perspective more in keeping with Hirst’s later views. The critique of individualistic notions of knowledge and learning includes some explorations of how learners move into the ‘space of reasons’. Where I draw attention to relationships between Hirst’s thought and contemporary philosophy of education debates, I do not always draw any definite conclusions.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44306417","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper revisits the battle between Summerhill school and the Department for Education and Employment following the damning Ofsted inspection in 1999 that demanded changes to the school’s practice. The focus of the discussion is Paul Hirst’s involvement in the subsequent inspection of Summerhill following the school’s victory against Ofsted in their 2000 appeal at the Independent Schools Tribunal. Drawing on contemporary commentaries on the Ofsted inspection and the court case, alongside Hirst’s work on curriculum and early criticisms of this work, I explore what is meant by “a broad and balanced curriculum” – a phrase that lay at the heart of Ofsted’s case against Summerhill. The discussion will question some of the commonly posited oppositions between “progressive” and “liberal” education, and will suggest that such a framing of the issues is an unhelpful way to understand the radical challenge posed by democratic schools such as Summerhill. In focusing on the daily life and ethos of Summerhill as part of an attempt to build and nurture a democratic community, I explore the possibility that Summerhill’s broad conception of learning and curriculum, reflected in the school’s organization and ethos, lends itself to a less narrow and more socially-oriented conception of curriculum that is in line with Hirst’s later work on social practices.
本文回顾了1999年英国教育标准局（Ofsted）要求改变学校做法的严厉检查之后，萨默希尔学校（Summerhill school）与教育和就业部（Department for Education and Employment）之间的斗争。讨论的焦点是保罗·赫斯特（Paul Hirst）在2000年独立学校法庭（Independent Schools Tribunal）对英国教育标准局（Ofsted）的上诉中获胜后，参与了随后对Summerhill的检查。根据对Ofsted检查和法庭案件的当代评论，以及赫斯特关于课程的工作和对这项工作的早期批评，我探讨了什么是“广泛而平衡的课程”——这是Ofsted起诉Summerhill案件的核心短语。这场讨论将质疑“进步”教育和“自由”教育之间的一些常见对立，并表明这种问题框架对理解Summerhill等民主学校带来的根本挑战毫无帮助。作为建立和培育民主社区的努力的一部分，我关注萨默希尔的日常生活和精神，探讨了萨默希尔对学习和课程的广泛概念，反映在学校的组织和精神中，这有助于形成一种不那么狭隘、更注重社会的课程观，这与赫斯特后来关于社会实践的著作相一致。
{"title":"Democratic Practice and Curriculum Objectives; Paul Hirst’s visit to Summerhill","authors":"J. Suissa","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper revisits the battle between Summerhill school and the Department for Education and Employment following the damning Ofsted inspection in 1999 that demanded changes to the school’s practice. The focus of the discussion is Paul Hirst’s involvement in the subsequent inspection of Summerhill following the school’s victory against Ofsted in their 2000 appeal at the Independent Schools Tribunal. Drawing on contemporary commentaries on the Ofsted inspection and the court case, alongside Hirst’s work on curriculum and early criticisms of this work, I explore what is meant by “a broad and balanced curriculum” – a phrase that lay at the heart of Ofsted’s case against Summerhill. The discussion will question some of the commonly posited oppositions between “progressive” and “liberal” education, and will suggest that such a framing of the issues is an unhelpful way to understand the radical challenge posed by democratic schools such as Summerhill. In focusing on the daily life and ethos of Summerhill as part of an attempt to build and nurture a democratic community, I explore the possibility that Summerhill’s broad conception of learning and curriculum, reflected in the school’s organization and ethos, lends itself to a less narrow and more socially-oriented conception of curriculum that is in line with Hirst’s later work on social practices.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48826599","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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