Paul Hirst’s idea of moral education is distinctive in the central role it attributes to social practices. For him, ethical principles and virtues should not be seen as abstract entities theoretically derived and then applied in education so that students learn to reason from those principles or live by those virtues. Instead, Hirst’s moral education incorporates an initiation into social practices and comes back to them by means of situated critical reflection from within those practices themselves. Embracing Hirst’s proposed central role of social practices, this paper spells out the key role that emotions play in moral education so understood and their relations with social practices. As emotions materialize our deeply held values, incorporated into lived experience, their cultivation will not simply be a matter of deliberation, but instead of the practical exploration of social practices that can nurture and sustain them.
Paul Hirst的道德教育思想的独特之处在于它赋予社会实践的核心作用。对他来说，伦理原则和美德不应该被视为抽象的实体，从理论上推导出来，然后应用于教育，让学生学会从这些原则中推理，或者按照这些美德生活。相反，赫斯特的道德教育将启蒙融入了社会实践，并通过这些实践本身的批判性反思回到了社会实践中。本文接受赫斯特提出的社会实践的中心作用，阐明了情感在如此理解的道德教育中所起的关键作用，以及它们与社会实践的关系。当情感体现我们根深蒂固的价值观，融入生活体验时，它们的培养将不仅仅是一个深思熟虑的问题，而是对能够培养和维持它们的社会实践的实际探索。
{"title":"Moral Education, Emotions, and Social Practices","authors":"A. Mejía","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad018","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad018","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Paul Hirst’s idea of moral education is distinctive in the central role it attributes to social practices. For him, ethical principles and virtues should not be seen as abstract entities theoretically derived and then applied in education so that students learn to reason from those principles or live by those virtues. Instead, Hirst’s moral education incorporates an initiation into social practices and comes back to them by means of situated critical reflection from within those practices themselves. Embracing Hirst’s proposed central role of social practices, this paper spells out the key role that emotions play in moral education so understood and their relations with social practices. As emotions materialize our deeply held values, incorporated into lived experience, their cultivation will not simply be a matter of deliberation, but instead of the practical exploration of social practices that can nurture and sustain them.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47588390","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper the potential in film for ethics education is considered and the theory of educational ethicism is defended. Some key features of ethicism are firstly outlined. Gaut’s argument about how artworks may teach ethics in an aesthetically meritorious way is also discussed. Two objections (from Kieran and Sauchelli) to Gaut’s position are secondly considered. It is argued that Gaut’s ethicism is not well placed to surmount these objections. However, I thirdly draw upon Hirst to explain why a refined species of ethicism (educational ethicism) can surmount these objections. Educational ethicism holds that artworks with ethical themes be regarded as starting points for conversations about ethics rather than conveyers of definite ethical teachings that only a normatively specified audience can grasp. Three ways that film can possess potential for ethics education are also documented: through the moral growth of the audience or by helping them to deepen understanding of an aspect of ethical experience or theory.
{"title":"On the potential in film for ethics education: In defence of educational ethicism","authors":"J. MacAllister","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad017","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad017","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In this paper the potential in film for ethics education is considered and the theory of educational ethicism is defended. Some key features of ethicism are firstly outlined. Gaut’s argument about how artworks may teach ethics in an aesthetically meritorious way is also discussed. Two objections (from Kieran and Sauchelli) to Gaut’s position are secondly considered. It is argued that Gaut’s ethicism is not well placed to surmount these objections. However, I thirdly draw upon Hirst to explain why a refined species of ethicism (educational ethicism) can surmount these objections. Educational ethicism holds that artworks with ethical themes be regarded as starting points for conversations about ethics rather than conveyers of definite ethical teachings that only a normatively specified audience can grasp. Three ways that film can possess potential for ethics education are also documented: through the moral growth of the audience or by helping them to deepen understanding of an aspect of ethical experience or theory.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44353021","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Hirst consistently listed religion as a form of knowledge. He had numerous chances to revise this position, but did not. However, whenever Hirst actually considered religion and the curriculum in specific detail, either he did so without reference to the curriculum principles of liberal education, or he implicitly or explicitly rejected his own claim that religion was a form of knowledge. In this article I hope to contribute to an appreciation of Hirst’s work by showing how attempting to understand his thinking on religious education against the background of forms of knowledge both adds to confusion about what Hirst intended the forms of knowledge to be, and hinders an understanding of what his explicitly stated curriculum position on religion actually was. I speculate that Hirst included religion as a form of knowledge only as an ‘agnostic placeholder’ acknowledging the possibility that religion might turn out to be a form of knowledge. I then offer a brief assessment of this revised interpretation of Hirst’s position from the perspective of contemporary scholarship in the philosophy of religious education.
{"title":"Paul Hirst and religious education’s curriculum question; or, how Hirst never thought religion was a form of knowledge at all","authors":"D. Aldridge","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad014","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad014","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Hirst consistently listed religion as a form of knowledge. He had numerous chances to revise this position, but did not. However, whenever Hirst actually considered religion and the curriculum in specific detail, either he did so without reference to the curriculum principles of liberal education, or he implicitly or explicitly rejected his own claim that religion was a form of knowledge. In this article I hope to contribute to an appreciation of Hirst’s work by showing how attempting to understand his thinking on religious education against the background of forms of knowledge both adds to confusion about what Hirst intended the forms of knowledge to be, and hinders an understanding of what his explicitly stated curriculum position on religion actually was. I speculate that Hirst included religion as a form of knowledge only as an ‘agnostic placeholder’ acknowledging the possibility that religion might turn out to be a form of knowledge. I then offer a brief assessment of this revised interpretation of Hirst’s position from the perspective of contemporary scholarship in the philosophy of religious education.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45421082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In a candid autobiographical chapter (Hirst 2010), which numbers among his last writings, Paul Hirst subjects his upbringing within a fundamentalist Christian sect to searching moral appraisal. He concludes that his parents wronged him by religiously indoctrinating him, stifling his emotional development, and arbitrarily restricting his range of valuable morally permissible experiences. This upbringing undermined his autonomy and—more fundamentally, on his account—kept him from living the life he had most reason to live. Surprisingly, however, Hirst suggests that his parents had a right to initiate him into this conservative religious life, though the wider community owed him a more non-directive form of religious education to temper it. This is a striking concession to the scope of parental rights, especially in view of Hirst’s complaint that the emotional repression required by his parents was to ‘distort [his] experience and understanding of [himself] and others in ways that persisted well into [his] adult life’. Engaging with Hirst's evaluation of his upbringing, I argue for a narrower range of parental rights than Hirst–one which excludes a parental moral right to religious initiation–and provide an account of the kind of emotional experiences to which children plausibly have a right.
{"title":"The Aims of Upbringing, Reasonable Affect, and Parental Rights: A Response to Paul Hirst’s Autobiographical Reflections","authors":"John Tillson","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad016","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad016","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In a candid autobiographical chapter (Hirst 2010), which numbers among his last writings, Paul Hirst subjects his upbringing within a fundamentalist Christian sect to searching moral appraisal. He concludes that his parents wronged him by religiously indoctrinating him, stifling his emotional development, and arbitrarily restricting his range of valuable morally permissible experiences. This upbringing undermined his autonomy and—more fundamentally, on his account—kept him from living the life he had most reason to live. Surprisingly, however, Hirst suggests that his parents had a right to initiate him into this conservative religious life, though the wider community owed him a more non-directive form of religious education to temper it. This is a striking concession to the scope of parental rights, especially in view of Hirst’s complaint that the emotional repression required by his parents was to ‘distort [his] experience and understanding of [himself] and others in ways that persisted well into [his] adult life’. Engaging with Hirst's evaluation of his upbringing, I argue for a narrower range of parental rights than Hirst–one which excludes a parental moral right to religious initiation–and provide an account of the kind of emotional experiences to which children plausibly have a right.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43374344","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
The question of the role of theory in initial teacher education was one that interested Paul Hirst throughout his long and distinguished academic career. When the story of teacher education in England is told by philosophers of education and, crucially, by teacher educators, we are reminded of Hirst’s contribution in two significant respects, as someone who both taught teachers and commented on the aim, purpose, and structure of teacher education. First, in the wake of the Robbins report, Hirst supported Peters in helping to establish education at London’s Institute of Education (IOE) as an academic subject which promoted theory, particularly philosophy, suited to the needs of pre-service teachers. Secondly, several decades later, Hirst provided invaluable comment on the influential Oxford Internship programme. This provision re-imagined the one-year professional programmes for postgraduates entering teaching as a partnership between schools and universities. Hirst’s commentary, while generous and supportive, argued that teachers needed greater attention paid to the pursuit of ‘rational public defence’ during their pre-service formation than was evident in the ‘practical theorising’ approach that underpins internship. Having examined Hirst’s contribution to and commentary on teacher education as a philosopher of education, I will argue that his example continues to offer insight today. In these neo-liberal times, there are ad hoc opportunities for philosophy of education to continue to be included meaningfully in teachers’ professional formation, although the extent and reach it can exercise are limited where the dominant discourse describes teachers as being ‘trained’ rather than educated. I offer examples of theory developing in practice, building on established ideas of what is appropriate.
{"title":"‘Pursuing rational public defence’: Paul Hirst on teacher education","authors":"J. Orchard","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad013","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad013","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The question of the role of theory in initial teacher education was one that interested Paul Hirst throughout his long and distinguished academic career. When the story of teacher education in England is told by philosophers of education and, crucially, by teacher educators, we are reminded of Hirst’s contribution in two significant respects, as someone who both taught teachers and commented on the aim, purpose, and structure of teacher education. First, in the wake of the Robbins report, Hirst supported Peters in helping to establish education at London’s Institute of Education (IOE) as an academic subject which promoted theory, particularly philosophy, suited to the needs of pre-service teachers. Secondly, several decades later, Hirst provided invaluable comment on the influential Oxford Internship programme. This provision re-imagined the one-year professional programmes for postgraduates entering teaching as a partnership between schools and universities. Hirst’s commentary, while generous and supportive, argued that teachers needed greater attention paid to the pursuit of ‘rational public defence’ during their pre-service formation than was evident in the ‘practical theorising’ approach that underpins internship. Having examined Hirst’s contribution to and commentary on teacher education as a philosopher of education, I will argue that his example continues to offer insight today. In these neo-liberal times, there are ad hoc opportunities for philosophy of education to continue to be included meaningfully in teachers’ professional formation, although the extent and reach it can exercise are limited where the dominant discourse describes teachers as being ‘trained’ rather than educated. I offer examples of theory developing in practice, building on established ideas of what is appropriate.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43846943","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This article attempts to show how Hirst’s earlier work on forms of knowledge, and his later work on education as an inculcation into practices, have close connections, closer than those made explicit in his own writings. In fact, it can be argued that, in some sense, the idea of a practice is fundamental to understanding the ways in which knowledge is organized, and thus to the epistemic claim that knowledge is organized differently according to the various ways in which it is acquired and evaluated. This approach allows us to make a distinction between disciplines and subjects that in turn allows us to distinguish knowledge-seeking from knowledge transmitting activities, particularly in the context of school subjects and thus to bring out more clearly the relationship between the practical side of knowledge acquisition and evaluation, on the one hand, and the structure of the knowledge thus acquired, on the other. By doing this, we can see an underlying unity in Hirst’s concerns that is not so obvious at first sight.
{"title":"Subjects, Disciplines and Practices","authors":"C. Winch","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad015","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad015","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article attempts to show how Hirst’s earlier work on forms of knowledge, and his later work on education as an inculcation into practices, have close connections, closer than those made explicit in his own writings. In fact, it can be argued that, in some sense, the idea of a practice is fundamental to understanding the ways in which knowledge is organized, and thus to the epistemic claim that knowledge is organized differently according to the various ways in which it is acquired and evaluated. This approach allows us to make a distinction between disciplines and subjects that in turn allows us to distinguish knowledge-seeking from knowledge transmitting activities, particularly in the context of school subjects and thus to bring out more clearly the relationship between the practical side of knowledge acquisition and evaluation, on the one hand, and the structure of the knowledge thus acquired, on the other. By doing this, we can see an underlying unity in Hirst’s concerns that is not so obvious at first sight.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44877773","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
{"title":"Paul Hirst as a liminal figure and modernising moralist","authors":"James C Conroy","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad006","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47526523","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper introduces this Special Issue celebrating the writing and professional work of Paul Hirst. The international range of contributors include scholars who knew him and his work in his heyday, as well younger generations of philosophers of education. In this Introduction the editors, in conversation, first introduce the papers on Hirst’s early work on liberal education and the nature of knowledge, and then go on to his later turn to advocacy of an education centred on social practices and his discussions of the nature of educational theory and teacher education. They consider those papers that refer to his work on the place of the arts in education and those involving detailed exploration of his work in moral and religious education. The extensive nature of his high-level administrative work in London and Cambridge, as well as nationally, is also recognised. A paper based on his personal correspondence reveals the lively man behind the work. An Appendix to this Introduction includes two extensive bibliographies, of Hirst’s writings and of critical discussions of his work.
{"title":"A Celebration of the Writing and Professional Work of Paul Hirst introduction","authors":"Patricia White, D. Bridges","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad011","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad011","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This paper introduces this Special Issue celebrating the writing and professional work of Paul Hirst. The international range of contributors include scholars who knew him and his work in his heyday, as well younger generations of philosophers of education. In this Introduction the editors, in conversation, first introduce the papers on Hirst’s early work on liberal education and the nature of knowledge, and then go on to his later turn to advocacy of an education centred on social practices and his discussions of the nature of educational theory and teacher education. They consider those papers that refer to his work on the place of the arts in education and those involving detailed exploration of his work in moral and religious education. The extensive nature of his high-level administrative work in London and Cambridge, as well as nationally, is also recognised. A paper based on his personal correspondence reveals the lively man behind the work. An Appendix to this Introduction includes two extensive bibliographies, of Hirst’s writings and of critical discussions of his work.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46573828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In Paul Hirst’s later writings, he states that his earlier idea that ‘a good life is one of rational autonomy is both inadequate and mistaken’. Instead of rational autonomy, he argues that the main constituent of the good life is the satisfaction of needs and interests in relevant social practices; therefore, the main aim of education should be initiation into social practices. I concur with Hirst regarding the problematic nature of views that take the individual, rational, autonomous moral subject as their educational starting point. Furthermore, like Hirst, I see that the problematic separation of moral thinking and action is embedded in these views. However, I disagree with Hirst regarding the justification of Aristotelian theory, on which he bases his new account. Instead, I defend a pragmatist justification for what I see as the most important dimension of Hirst’s later shift in thinking in his moral theory. Utilizing resources from such pragmatists as Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, Israel Scheffler and Nicholas Rescher, I outline an account in which there is no dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason: both reason and emotion belong to nature and work in collaboration, and moral thinking and action can be learned and improved in responsible social practices.
{"title":"The Rejection of Rational Autonomy as an Educational Ideal? In Search of a Philosophical Justification for Radical Change in Paul Hirst’s Thinking","authors":"K. Holma","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad012","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad012","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 In Paul Hirst’s later writings, he states that his earlier idea that ‘a good life is one of rational autonomy is both inadequate and mistaken’. Instead of rational autonomy, he argues that the main constituent of the good life is the satisfaction of needs and interests in relevant social practices; therefore, the main aim of education should be initiation into social practices. I concur with Hirst regarding the problematic nature of views that take the individual, rational, autonomous moral subject as their educational starting point. Furthermore, like Hirst, I see that the problematic separation of moral thinking and action is embedded in these views. However, I disagree with Hirst regarding the justification of Aristotelian theory, on which he bases his new account. Instead, I defend a pragmatist justification for what I see as the most important dimension of Hirst’s later shift in thinking in his moral theory. Utilizing resources from such pragmatists as Charles S. Peirce, John Dewey, Israel Scheffler and Nicholas Rescher, I outline an account in which there is no dichotomy between theoretical and practical reason: both reason and emotion belong to nature and work in collaboration, and moral thinking and action can be learned and improved in responsible social practices.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42888903","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Drawing extensively on letters sent to me by him over fifty years, this paper tries to present a vivid picture of Paul Hirst in different aspects of his life. The first section covers the huge amount of work he did at the universities of London and Cambridge—in teaching and writing philosophy of education, high-level administrative university responsibilities, and involvement in national education policy. This is followed by a glimpse into his passion for music, especially opera. Final sections show him as an academic mentor and friend.
{"title":"Work, Music, and Friendship","authors":"Patricia White","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad010","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad010","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Drawing extensively on letters sent to me by him over fifty years, this paper tries to present a vivid picture of Paul Hirst in different aspects of his life. The first section covers the huge amount of work he did at the universities of London and Cambridge—in teaching and writing philosophy of education, high-level administrative university responsibilities, and involvement in national education policy. This is followed by a glimpse into his passion for music, especially opera. Final sections show him as an academic mentor and friend.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46561493","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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