Abstract Who is recognised as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy influence both the content of a philosophical education and academic philosophy’s continuing demographic skew. The ‘philosophical who’ and the ‘philosophical what’ themselves are a partial function of matters that have been passed over in collective silence, even if that now feels to some like a silence belonging to the distant past. This paper discusses some philosophical silences regarding race, gender, and disability in the context of reflection on philosophical education and on philosophical practice in the public sphere. It focuses on Charles Mills’ writings on race, Susan Babbitt’s on race and gender, and on more collaboratively-generated work on eugenics and disability.
{"title":"Philosophical Silences: Race, Gender, Disability, and Philosophical Practice","authors":"Robert A Wilson","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad076","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad076","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Who is recognised as a philosopher and what counts as philosophy influence both the content of a philosophical education and academic philosophy’s continuing demographic skew. The ‘philosophical who’ and the ‘philosophical what’ themselves are a partial function of matters that have been passed over in collective silence, even if that now feels to some like a silence belonging to the distant past. This paper discusses some philosophical silences regarding race, gender, and disability in the context of reflection on philosophical education and on philosophical practice in the public sphere. It focuses on Charles Mills’ writings on race, Susan Babbitt’s on race and gender, and on more collaboratively-generated work on eugenics and disability.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"114 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A C Nikolaidis, Winston C Thompson, Miranda Fricker
Abstract In her groundbreaking book, Epistemic Injustice, renowned moral philosopher and social epistemologist Miranda Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice to draw attention to the pervasive impact of epistemic oppression on marginalized social groups. Fricker’s account spurred a flurry of scholarship regarding the discriminatory impact of epistemic injustice and gave birth to a domain of philosophical inquiry that has extended far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. In this interview, Fricker responds to questions posed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. Thompson that address the ways in which epistemic injustice intersects with education as a human endeavor and social institution. In doing so, Fricker reflects on her motivations in writing her book more than 15 years ago and explicitly addresses some of the most significant contributions of the concept of epistemic injustice as a tool for analyzing issues in education. She also offers insights on the purpose of education, outlines educational manifestations of epistemic injustice, and discusses the virtues that educators must exhibit and inculcate in their students in order for epistemic justice to obtain.
著名道德哲学家、社会认识论家米兰达·弗里克在其开创性著作《认知不公》中创造了“认知不公”一词，以引起人们对认知压迫对边缘社会群体普遍影响的关注。弗里克的描述激发了一系列关于认知不公正的歧视性影响的学术研究，并催生了一个远远超出哲学学科界限的哲学探究领域。在这次采访中，Fricker回答了a.c. Nikolaidis和Winston C. Thompson提出的问题，这些问题解决了认知不公正与教育作为人类努力和社会制度的交叉方式。在此过程中，弗里克反思了她15年前写这本书的动机，并明确指出了认知不公正概念作为分析教育问题的工具的一些最重要的贡献。她还对教育的目的提出了见解，概述了认识不公正的教育表现，并讨论了为了获得认识公正，教育者必须向学生展示和灌输的美德。
{"title":"Education, epistemic justice, and truthfulness: Miranda Fricker interviewed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. Thompson","authors":"A C Nikolaidis, Winston C Thompson, Miranda Fricker","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad075","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad075","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In her groundbreaking book, Epistemic Injustice, renowned moral philosopher and social epistemologist Miranda Fricker coined the term epistemic injustice to draw attention to the pervasive impact of epistemic oppression on marginalized social groups. Fricker’s account spurred a flurry of scholarship regarding the discriminatory impact of epistemic injustice and gave birth to a domain of philosophical inquiry that has extended far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy. In this interview, Fricker responds to questions posed by A. C. Nikolaidis and Winston C. Thompson that address the ways in which epistemic injustice intersects with education as a human endeavor and social institution. In doing so, Fricker reflects on her motivations in writing her book more than 15 years ago and explicitly addresses some of the most significant contributions of the concept of epistemic injustice as a tool for analyzing issues in education. She also offers insights on the purpose of education, outlines educational manifestations of epistemic injustice, and discusses the virtues that educators must exhibit and inculcate in their students in order for epistemic justice to obtain.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"112 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134957202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Whenever justification of classroom punishment has been attempted it has usually been on grounds that punishment acts either appropriately pedagogically, teaching students how to behave morally, or is a necessary evil that enables the practical running of the school so that it may carry out its educational business. By itself the first justification leaves punishment in schools as only an extension of wider social attitudes about the virtue of punishing perceived moral wrongdoing, rather than providing any distinct argument for punishment specific to the special circumstances of the school. By highlighting an entanglement between the moral and the conventional, and between discipline and punishment, within the context of the school, I shall argue that the essentially contested nature of education and its purpose, and the related question of the school’s suitability as a venue for it, means that the school’s most promising defence of its use of punishment—that punishment of students might somehow be necessary for enabling the important educative business of the school—becomes undone. Schooling and education are not necessarily synonymous, and as schools provide only one vision of education—and this vision is contestable—then upholding the business of any one school in order for it to achieve its particular unsettled and disputed purpose is not a morally sufficient reason to coerce a student’s compliance through regimes of ‘harm intended as harm.’
{"title":"An Error of Punishment Defences in the Context of Schooling","authors":"DaN McKee","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad077","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad077","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Whenever justification of classroom punishment has been attempted it has usually been on grounds that punishment acts either appropriately pedagogically, teaching students how to behave morally, or is a necessary evil that enables the practical running of the school so that it may carry out its educational business. By itself the first justification leaves punishment in schools as only an extension of wider social attitudes about the virtue of punishing perceived moral wrongdoing, rather than providing any distinct argument for punishment specific to the special circumstances of the school. By highlighting an entanglement between the moral and the conventional, and between discipline and punishment, within the context of the school, I shall argue that the essentially contested nature of education and its purpose, and the related question of the school’s suitability as a venue for it, means that the school’s most promising defence of its use of punishment—that punishment of students might somehow be necessary for enabling the important educative business of the school—becomes undone. Schooling and education are not necessarily synonymous, and as schools provide only one vision of education—and this vision is contestable—then upholding the business of any one school in order for it to achieve its particular unsettled and disputed purpose is not a morally sufficient reason to coerce a student’s compliance through regimes of ‘harm intended as harm.’","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"33 23","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136281954","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In more than half of its states, the USA has recently passed or proposed legislation to limit or ban public educational curricular reference to race, gender, sexuality, or other identity topics. The stated justifications for these legislative moves are myriad, but they share a foundational claim; namely, these topics are asserted to be politically and socially divisive such that they ought not to be included within state-controlled schools. In this paper, we consider the claims of divisiveness regarding these topics and explore whether, even if taken in good faith, the popular versions of these arguments and actions are epistemically defensible. We conclude that these bans are an epistemic injustice and therefore argue for their end. The article proceeds to consider the foundational claims of epistemic injustice, followed by the invocation of epistemic standards by which the arguments for these bans can be evaluated. The article then transitions to a close application of these standards, weighing the possible epistemic gains and losses. Before concluding, we consider objections and explore the social and epistemic significance of these issues.
{"title":"Epistemic Injustice? Banning ‘critical race theory’, ‘divisive topics’, and ‘embedded racism’ in the classroom","authors":"Henry Lara-Steidel, Winston C Thompson","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad069","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad069","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In more than half of its states, the USA has recently passed or proposed legislation to limit or ban public educational curricular reference to race, gender, sexuality, or other identity topics. The stated justifications for these legislative moves are myriad, but they share a foundational claim; namely, these topics are asserted to be politically and socially divisive such that they ought not to be included within state-controlled schools. In this paper, we consider the claims of divisiveness regarding these topics and explore whether, even if taken in good faith, the popular versions of these arguments and actions are epistemically defensible. We conclude that these bans are an epistemic injustice and therefore argue for their end. The article proceeds to consider the foundational claims of epistemic injustice, followed by the invocation of epistemic standards by which the arguments for these bans can be evaluated. The article then transitions to a close application of these standards, weighing the possible epistemic gains and losses. Before concluding, we consider objections and explore the social and epistemic significance of these issues.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135976132","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Journal Article Accepted manuscript Inclusion, democracy and philosophy of education Democratic education as inclusion, Nuraan Davids and Yusef Waghid (2022). Lanham Maryland: Lexington Books Get access Penny Enslin Penny Enslin School of Education, University of Glasgow Email: penny.enslin@glasgow.ac.uk, Phone: 077 5867 4462, 12 Ferguson Avenue Milngavie G62 7TE UK https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6395-8588 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy of Education, qhad071, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad071 Published: 31 October 2023 Article history Received: 11 January 2022 Revision received: 03 March 2023 Accepted: 07 June 2023 Published: 31 October 2023
{"title":"Inclusion, democracy and philosophy of education <i>Democratic education as inclusion</i>, Nuraan Davids and Yusef Waghid (2022). Lanham Maryland: Lexington Books","authors":"Penny Enslin","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad071","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad071","url":null,"abstract":"Journal Article Accepted manuscript Inclusion, democracy and philosophy of education Democratic education as inclusion, Nuraan Davids and Yusef Waghid (2022). Lanham Maryland: Lexington Books Get access Penny Enslin Penny Enslin School of Education, University of Glasgow Email: penny.enslin@glasgow.ac.uk, Phone: 077 5867 4462, 12 Ferguson Avenue Milngavie G62 7TE UK https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6395-8588 Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Philosophy of Education, qhad071, https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad071 Published: 31 October 2023 Article history Received: 11 January 2022 Revision received: 03 March 2023 Accepted: 07 June 2023 Published: 31 October 2023","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"65 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135976456","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s seminal book Epistemic Injustice, philosophy of education scholarship has been mostly limited to analyses of culprit-based epistemic injustice in education. This has left structural manifestations relatively underexplored with great detriment to those who are most vulnerable to experience such injustice. This paper aims to address this oversight and open up avenues for further research by exploring approaches to theorizing structural epistemic injustice in education and envisioning efficacious remedies. The author identifies three approaches: one that focuses on educational institutions, one that focuses on institutional processes that impact educational outcomes, and one that focuses on epistemological processes that are internal to education. While the approaches differ as to their explanatory power and ease of implementation, it is argued that all three demonstrate that epistemic injustice in education is often the result of structural factors which cannot be attributed to individual epistemic agents. The author concludes by suggesting that educational philosophers must examine each of these approaches in greater depth to make significant progress in disrupting the impact of epistemic injustice in education.
{"title":"Epistemic Injustice in Education: Exploring Structural Approaches, Envisioning Structural Remedies","authors":"A C Nikolaidis","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad074","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad074","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s seminal book Epistemic Injustice, philosophy of education scholarship has been mostly limited to analyses of culprit-based epistemic injustice in education. This has left structural manifestations relatively underexplored with great detriment to those who are most vulnerable to experience such injustice. This paper aims to address this oversight and open up avenues for further research by exploring approaches to theorizing structural epistemic injustice in education and envisioning efficacious remedies. The author identifies three approaches: one that focuses on educational institutions, one that focuses on institutional processes that impact educational outcomes, and one that focuses on epistemological processes that are internal to education. While the approaches differ as to their explanatory power and ease of implementation, it is argued that all three demonstrate that epistemic injustice in education is often the result of structural factors which cannot be attributed to individual epistemic agents. The author concludes by suggesting that educational philosophers must examine each of these approaches in greater depth to make significant progress in disrupting the impact of epistemic injustice in education.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"65 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135976454","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article analyses arguments and concerns about the emergence of feelings of anger among students, when issues of injustice are encountered in the study of the subject civic education. The aim is to determine the extent to which such concerns supply grounds for regulating anger as counterproductive. In particular, it is argued that to encourage students to forgo all feelings of anger that might be aroused by issues of injustice that students have encountered in civic education—in the name of positive psychology and students’ well-being—not only constitutes a form of ‘affective injustice’, but also unfairly asks students to engage in harmful emotion regulation that reproduces existing exclusions. A crucial task for civic education is to provide learning spaces in which teachers and students can explore the affective complexities of political anger and its consequences.
{"title":"Political Anger, Affective Injustice and Civic Education","authors":"Michalinos Zembylas","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad073","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad073","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article analyses arguments and concerns about the emergence of feelings of anger among students, when issues of injustice are encountered in the study of the subject civic education. The aim is to determine the extent to which such concerns supply grounds for regulating anger as counterproductive. In particular, it is argued that to encourage students to forgo all feelings of anger that might be aroused by issues of injustice that students have encountered in civic education—in the name of positive psychology and students’ well-being—not only constitutes a form of ‘affective injustice’, but also unfairly asks students to engage in harmful emotion regulation that reproduces existing exclusions. A crucial task for civic education is to provide learning spaces in which teachers and students can explore the affective complexities of political anger and its consequences.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"195 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135976455","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, I introduce a special case of epistemic injustice that I call structural contributory injustice. This conception aims to capture some dimensions of how policy—separately from individual agential interactions—can generate epistemic injustice at a group level. I first locate the case within Kristie Dotson’s original conception of contributory injustice. I then consider one potential case of structural contributory injustice—namely, the policy problem of significant financial risk burden on students considering university in the United States. Finally, I consider potential policy reforms in response to this injustice.
{"title":"Epistemic injustice in educational policy: An account of structural contributory injustice","authors":"Megan L Bogia","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad070","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad070","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I introduce a special case of epistemic injustice that I call structural contributory injustice. This conception aims to capture some dimensions of how policy—separately from individual agential interactions—can generate epistemic injustice at a group level. I first locate the case within Kristie Dotson’s original conception of contributory injustice. I then consider one potential case of structural contributory injustice—namely, the policy problem of significant financial risk burden on students considering university in the United States. Finally, I consider potential policy reforms in response to this injustice.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"151 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136311470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article explores the philosopher Alice Crary’s ideas about ethics, literature, and nonhuman animals. Through studying certain works of literature, Crary writes, readers can see aspects of animals’ moral characteristics that are difficult to perceive outside of literary study. To illustrate and extend Crary’s argument, the article presents a reading of John Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men, a novella that is taught frequently in secondary schools and that has been reevaluated by critics as offering insights into social inequality and animal welfare. Drawing upon and adapting Crary’s work, which does not address questions of pedagogy, the article describes forms of instruction that enable students reading Of Mice and Men and other works of literature to explore the moral lives of animals. Thus, a key contribution of this project is its explanation of how educators can use philosophy to open pedagogy to new ways of seeing and assessing animals’ moral characteristics.
本文探讨了哲学家爱丽丝·克拉里关于伦理、文学和非人类动物的观点。克拉里写道，通过研究某些文学作品，读者可以看到动物道德特征的某些方面，这些方面在文学研究之外很难被感知。为了说明和扩展克雷的观点，本文介绍了约翰·斯坦贝克(John Steinbeck)的《人鼠之间》(of Mice and Men)，这是一本中篇小说，在中学经常被教授，评论家们重新评价它，认为它提供了对社会不平等和动物福利的见解。这篇文章借鉴并改编了克拉里的著作，并没有解决教育学的问题，而是描述了让学生在阅读《人鼠之间》和其他文学作品时探索动物道德生活的教学形式。因此，这个项目的一个关键贡献是它解释了教育者如何利用哲学来打开教育学，以新的方式来看待和评估动物的道德特征。
{"title":"Of Mice, Men, and Ethics: Literary Study and Moral Concern for Nonhuman Animals","authors":"Ross Collin","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad072","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad072","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article explores the philosopher Alice Crary’s ideas about ethics, literature, and nonhuman animals. Through studying certain works of literature, Crary writes, readers can see aspects of animals’ moral characteristics that are difficult to perceive outside of literary study. To illustrate and extend Crary’s argument, the article presents a reading of John Steinbeck’s Of Mice and Men, a novella that is taught frequently in secondary schools and that has been reevaluated by critics as offering insights into social inequality and animal welfare. Drawing upon and adapting Crary’s work, which does not address questions of pedagogy, the article describes forms of instruction that enable students reading Of Mice and Men and other works of literature to explore the moral lives of animals. Thus, a key contribution of this project is its explanation of how educators can use philosophy to open pedagogy to new ways of seeing and assessing animals’ moral characteristics.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"21 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134907147","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, I show that there is a bidirectional relationship between gender-based social norms and gender-segregated education policies that excludes girls from knowledge production within the Iranian school system. I argue that gender segregation in education reproduces hermeneutic inequality through the reinforcement of epistemic segregation as a form of epistemic injustice. In particular, I focus on gender-based instructional epistemic injustice, which refers to a set of epistemic practices that actively exclude a student or an education professional in their capacity as a knower from the process of knowledge production within an education system based on gender dynamics, roles, norms, or expectations. This, in addition, has an impact on schoolboys through the reproduction of active ignorance. I conclude that in societies such as Iran, where highly gendered norms play out in the school system and are further reinforced by that system, the result is not limited to gender segregation itself, but extends beyond it to a form of epistemic injustice that wrongs students by reproducing and reinforcing those highly gendered norms.
{"title":"From Gender Segregation to Epistemic Segregation: A Case Study of the School System in Iran","authors":"Shadi Heidarifar","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad068","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad068","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, I show that there is a bidirectional relationship between gender-based social norms and gender-segregated education policies that excludes girls from knowledge production within the Iranian school system. I argue that gender segregation in education reproduces hermeneutic inequality through the reinforcement of epistemic segregation as a form of epistemic injustice. In particular, I focus on gender-based instructional epistemic injustice, which refers to a set of epistemic practices that actively exclude a student or an education professional in their capacity as a knower from the process of knowledge production within an education system based on gender dynamics, roles, norms, or expectations. This, in addition, has an impact on schoolboys through the reproduction of active ignorance. I conclude that in societies such as Iran, where highly gendered norms play out in the school system and are further reinforced by that system, the result is not limited to gender segregation itself, but extends beyond it to a form of epistemic injustice that wrongs students by reproducing and reinforcing those highly gendered norms.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"19 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135510735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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