Abstract Intellectually disabled students face particular barriers to epistemic participation within schooling contexts. While negative forms of bias against intellectually disabled people play an important role in creating these barriers, this paper suggests that it is often because of the best intentions of educators and peers that intellectually disabled students are vulnerable to forms of epistemic injustice. The author outlines a form of epistemic injustice that operates through an educational practice widely regarded as serving the interests of intellectually disabled students. ‘Epistemic ability profiling’ involves the identification of the epistemic consequences of disability in the service of promoting students’ best interests, or to create opportunities for their participation in epistemic communities. Epistemic ability profiling is a double-edged sword: it is important that educators understand and attend to the ways in which differences in ability shape students’ epistemic agency, and yet epistemic ability profiling operates against the background of a conceptually ableist conceptual terrain. As a result, epistemic ability profiling runs the risk of legitimating structural forms of injustice against intellectually disabled people.
{"title":"The Paradox of Epistemic Ability Profiling","authors":"Ashley Taylor","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad066","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad066","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Intellectually disabled students face particular barriers to epistemic participation within schooling contexts. While negative forms of bias against intellectually disabled people play an important role in creating these barriers, this paper suggests that it is often because of the best intentions of educators and peers that intellectually disabled students are vulnerable to forms of epistemic injustice. The author outlines a form of epistemic injustice that operates through an educational practice widely regarded as serving the interests of intellectually disabled students. ‘Epistemic ability profiling’ involves the identification of the epistemic consequences of disability in the service of promoting students’ best interests, or to create opportunities for their participation in epistemic communities. Epistemic ability profiling is a double-edged sword: it is important that educators understand and attend to the ways in which differences in ability shape students’ epistemic agency, and yet epistemic ability profiling operates against the background of a conceptually ableist conceptual terrain. As a result, epistemic ability profiling runs the risk of legitimating structural forms of injustice against intellectually disabled people.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135666847","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Charles Mills (1997) posits an epistemology of ignorance that underwrites the complicity of Whites as signatories of the racial contract. There is prevailing discourse about the complicity of White persons in perpetuating racism and whether they can experience epistemic injustice. In this paper, the claim to hermeneutical injustice, in particular, makes a further assertion that moral blameworthiness is mitigated for a subcategory of White Americans because of being socialized into a White-dominant culture of caste-based AfroSkepticism. I argue, based on Pierce’s conceptualization of doubt, as against Descartes, that AfroSkepticism is a totalizing belief system predicated on a racial group-based social epistemology and maintains a settled stance of questioning the commensurate citizenship of Blacks or American descendants of slaves. These perceived social costs warrant educational interventions that can dismantle its reasoning architecture. White AfroSkepticism poses a barrier to the teacher’s efforts to cultivate the democratic habitus in students; however, educator preparation that takes its existence into account can build on the standard classroom practices of critical social justice that promote equity, critical multicultural education, and critical thinking.
{"title":"Does Mills’s Epistemology Suggest a Hermeneutic Injustice of White AfroSkepticism?","authors":"Sheron Fraser-Burgess","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad065","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad065","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Charles Mills (1997) posits an epistemology of ignorance that underwrites the complicity of Whites as signatories of the racial contract. There is prevailing discourse about the complicity of White persons in perpetuating racism and whether they can experience epistemic injustice. In this paper, the claim to hermeneutical injustice, in particular, makes a further assertion that moral blameworthiness is mitigated for a subcategory of White Americans because of being socialized into a White-dominant culture of caste-based AfroSkepticism. I argue, based on Pierce’s conceptualization of doubt, as against Descartes, that AfroSkepticism is a totalizing belief system predicated on a racial group-based social epistemology and maintains a settled stance of questioning the commensurate citizenship of Blacks or American descendants of slaves. These perceived social costs warrant educational interventions that can dismantle its reasoning architecture. White AfroSkepticism poses a barrier to the teacher’s efforts to cultivate the democratic habitus in students; however, educator preparation that takes its existence into account can build on the standard classroom practices of critical social justice that promote equity, critical multicultural education, and critical thinking.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"217 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135823583","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper explores the concept of time in education. It argues that the neoliberal capitalist construct of time as a resource to be deployed in service of labour—ever-accelerating—has permeated education, with implications for curriculum, teaching, and learning. To slow the effects of neoliberal capitalism in schools requires a reconsideration of time that permits both different understandings of how time is encountered and different values orienting how one spends one’s time. Using Hägglund’s argument for finitude and Levinas’ idea of time as a gift, the paper articulates the philosophical rationale and pedagogical implications for making the most of one’s educational time.
{"title":"Making the Most of It: Thinking About Educational Time with Hägglund and Levinas","authors":"Lana Parker","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad067","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad067","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper explores the concept of time in education. It argues that the neoliberal capitalist construct of time as a resource to be deployed in service of labour—ever-accelerating—has permeated education, with implications for curriculum, teaching, and learning. To slow the effects of neoliberal capitalism in schools requires a reconsideration of time that permits both different understandings of how time is encountered and different values orienting how one spends one’s time. Using Hägglund’s argument for finitude and Levinas’ idea of time as a gift, the paper articulates the philosophical rationale and pedagogical implications for making the most of one’s educational time.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135994822","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract In this paper, the endeavour to understand how to think of education ‘after progress’, viz. in an age in which progress has become problematic, is undertaken by focusing on the theme of time. Dovetailing Klaus Mollenhauer’s reflections on the rise of the Bildungszeit at the dawn of modernity with Thomas Popkewitz’s analyses of ‘cosmopolitan time’ presiding over pedagogical reform from the 19th century to the present, I shall, first, explore this temporal configuration of modern schooling (which goes hand-in-hand with a specific understanding of the child). Against this backdrop, I shall, second, advance an interpretive hypothesis, that of substituting what will be called the child-as-migrant for the ‘cosmopolitan child’, by appropriating, in an educational key, some insights of Thomas Nail’s ‘migrant cosmopolitanism’. I shall thereby suggest an alternative view of ‘progressivity’, construed not along modern-developmentalist lines but as a form of non-conservativeness, linked with a recognition of the ekstatikon (that is, destabilizing) character of time. This will require a revisiting of some Aristotelian intuitions about time as the rhythm of movement, reinterpreted as the affective experience of that ek-statikon without which there is no potential for the new. Accordingly, ‘progressive’ education (in the different interpretation investigated here) is the concern to allow all of us as ‘migrants’ to live actively in the abode of our ek-static and unpredictable condition and, therefore, to be vulnerable to the new, without merely remaining in a taken-for-granted ethos, cosmopolitan, inclusive and progress-oriented though it may be.
{"title":"Kinopedagogy as Non-Conservative Education and Time as the Abode of Humans","authors":"Stefano Oliverio","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad064","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad064","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract In this paper, the endeavour to understand how to think of education ‘after progress’, viz. in an age in which progress has become problematic, is undertaken by focusing on the theme of time. Dovetailing Klaus Mollenhauer’s reflections on the rise of the Bildungszeit at the dawn of modernity with Thomas Popkewitz’s analyses of ‘cosmopolitan time’ presiding over pedagogical reform from the 19th century to the present, I shall, first, explore this temporal configuration of modern schooling (which goes hand-in-hand with a specific understanding of the child). Against this backdrop, I shall, second, advance an interpretive hypothesis, that of substituting what will be called the child-as-migrant for the ‘cosmopolitan child’, by appropriating, in an educational key, some insights of Thomas Nail’s ‘migrant cosmopolitanism’. I shall thereby suggest an alternative view of ‘progressivity’, construed not along modern-developmentalist lines but as a form of non-conservativeness, linked with a recognition of the ekstatikon (that is, destabilizing) character of time. This will require a revisiting of some Aristotelian intuitions about time as the rhythm of movement, reinterpreted as the affective experience of that ek-statikon without which there is no potential for the new. Accordingly, ‘progressive’ education (in the different interpretation investigated here) is the concern to allow all of us as ‘migrants’ to live actively in the abode of our ek-static and unpredictable condition and, therefore, to be vulnerable to the new, without merely remaining in a taken-for-granted ethos, cosmopolitan, inclusive and progress-oriented though it may be.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"212 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135944116","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper argues for the diversification of university-level philosophy curricula. I defend the ideal of expansionist pluralism and connect it to metaphilosophical myopia – problematically limited or constrained visions of the range of forms taken by philosophy. Expansively pluralist curricula work to challenge metaphilosophical myopia and one of its costs, namely, a specific kind of hermeneutical injustice, perpetrated against the communities and traditions shaped by the occluded forms of philosophy.
{"title":"Metaphilosophical myopia and the ideal of expansive pluralism","authors":"Ian James Kidd","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad060","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper argues for the diversification of university-level philosophy curricula. I defend the ideal of expansionist pluralism and connect it to metaphilosophical myopia – problematically limited or constrained visions of the range of forms taken by philosophy. Expansively pluralist curricula work to challenge metaphilosophical myopia and one of its costs, namely, a specific kind of hermeneutical injustice, perpetrated against the communities and traditions shaped by the occluded forms of philosophy.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136080017","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This article deals with the educational challenge of responding to the pending ecological crisis (and many other future apocalyptic scenarios that haunt our imagination). It seems we are living in a time when we have given up on the idea that progress is possible or desirable, and this questions education at its roots. In order to find a proper educational response that befits our time, it is requested that we gain a new sense of orientation (which is no longer aimed at progress). This is an idea I pick up from the recent work of Bruno Latour, which is the focus of the first part of the paper. In the second part, I start fleshing out what this new orientation could look like by turning to the work of Immanuel Kant (usually regarded as one of the most outspoken defenders of education geared to progress). Nonetheless, I try to read Kant against himself, so as to show how orientation can be understood in a non-modernist manner. I connect this in the third part to the radically immanent and empiricist work of William James, and draw out in the final section how a combined reading of Kant and James offers the orientation we need.
{"title":"Reading Kant as a radical empiricist Or how to find an orientation for education after progress","authors":"Joris Vlieghe","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad058","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad058","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This article deals with the educational challenge of responding to the pending ecological crisis (and many other future apocalyptic scenarios that haunt our imagination). It seems we are living in a time when we have given up on the idea that progress is possible or desirable, and this questions education at its roots. In order to find a proper educational response that befits our time, it is requested that we gain a new sense of orientation (which is no longer aimed at progress). This is an idea I pick up from the recent work of Bruno Latour, which is the focus of the first part of the paper. In the second part, I start fleshing out what this new orientation could look like by turning to the work of Immanuel Kant (usually regarded as one of the most outspoken defenders of education geared to progress). Nonetheless, I try to read Kant against himself, so as to show how orientation can be understood in a non-modernist manner. I connect this in the third part to the radically immanent and empiricist work of William James, and draw out in the final section how a combined reading of Kant and James offers the orientation we need.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"119 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141735","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract Activists have challenged the reach of the carceral state into higher education. Whether calling out the exclusion of currently and formerly incarcerated people from higher education or the ways campus police perpetuate the racial and economic biases that plague the US criminal legal system, these voices offer insights that higher education leaders should take seriously. Yet, these challenges are often met with appeals to safety, which purport to override concerns about the harms produced by extension of the criminal legal system into educational contexts. Campus safety debates offer an opportunity to examine the role of wilful ignorance in the perpetuation of systemic injustices on college and university campuses, highlighting tensions between the testimony of those challenging these systems and practices and prevailing narratives around safety. In analysing the operation of wilful ignorance in this context, we will focus on campus policing as a manifestation of carcerality in higher education. We argue that the perpetuation of policing in higher education in the USA reflects wilful White ignorance that represents both an epistemic and moral failing on the part of higher education leaders.
{"title":"Resisting Policing in Higher Education: Willful White Ignorance in the Campus Safety Debate","authors":"Rebecca M Taylor, Martha Perez-Mugg","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad062","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad062","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract Activists have challenged the reach of the carceral state into higher education. Whether calling out the exclusion of currently and formerly incarcerated people from higher education or the ways campus police perpetuate the racial and economic biases that plague the US criminal legal system, these voices offer insights that higher education leaders should take seriously. Yet, these challenges are often met with appeals to safety, which purport to override concerns about the harms produced by extension of the criminal legal system into educational contexts. Campus safety debates offer an opportunity to examine the role of wilful ignorance in the perpetuation of systemic injustices on college and university campuses, highlighting tensions between the testimony of those challenging these systems and practices and prevailing narratives around safety. In analysing the operation of wilful ignorance in this context, we will focus on campus policing as a manifestation of carcerality in higher education. We argue that the perpetuation of policing in higher education in the USA reflects wilful White ignorance that represents both an epistemic and moral failing on the part of higher education leaders.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141560","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
ABSTRACT It is a common contention that education done uncritically and unreflectively may serve to sustain and justify the status quo, in terms of mechanisms of cultural or racial privileging and marginalization. This article explores an argument made from within anti-oppressive education theory and advocated by theorist Kevin Kumashiro, namely that transformative education must entail altering harmful citational practices. I see two shortcomings in relation to this argument: first, its focus on discursive practice entails a prerequisite of high discursive literacy. Second, it may lead to a failure to give credit to people’s intentions, risking a conflation of honest mistakes and wilful ignorance, and depriving us of theoretical nuance. While a well-argued and important call, I argue in this article that both shortcomings lead to the risk of a polarized conversation. Focusing on cultural, ethnic, and racial categorization, and using social studies as an illustration, it is suggested that applying notions from the theoretical concept of epistemic injustice may open up a space for granting nuanced credit to people’s intentions, thereby mitigating the risk of polarization. Rather than viewing attention to outcome and attention to intention as oppositional to one another, it is argued that both theoretical perspectives may benefit from the insights of the other. By applying needed context-specificity and nuance to categorizations of dominance and marginalization in individual discursive exchange, this can be done without granting priority to the experience of dominantly situated knowers.
{"title":"How the notion of epistemic injustice can mitigate polarisation in a conversation about cultural, ethnic and racial categorisations","authors":"Ingvill Bjørnstad Åberg","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad061","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad061","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT It is a common contention that education done uncritically and unreflectively may serve to sustain and justify the status quo, in terms of mechanisms of cultural or racial privileging and marginalization. This article explores an argument made from within anti-oppressive education theory and advocated by theorist Kevin Kumashiro, namely that transformative education must entail altering harmful citational practices. I see two shortcomings in relation to this argument: first, its focus on discursive practice entails a prerequisite of high discursive literacy. Second, it may lead to a failure to give credit to people’s intentions, risking a conflation of honest mistakes and wilful ignorance, and depriving us of theoretical nuance. While a well-argued and important call, I argue in this article that both shortcomings lead to the risk of a polarized conversation. Focusing on cultural, ethnic, and racial categorization, and using social studies as an illustration, it is suggested that applying notions from the theoretical concept of epistemic injustice may open up a space for granting nuanced credit to people’s intentions, thereby mitigating the risk of polarization. Rather than viewing attention to outcome and attention to intention as oppositional to one another, it is argued that both theoretical perspectives may benefit from the insights of the other. By applying needed context-specificity and nuance to categorizations of dominance and marginalization in individual discursive exchange, this can be done without granting priority to the experience of dominantly situated knowers.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"124 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141561","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract This paper examines the ‘voluntarism’ challenge for achieving testimonial justice and advocates the virtue of just acceptance of testimony as the right target for efforts to alleviate testimonial injustice. First, we review the credibility deficit case of interpersonal testimonial injustice and explain how the doxastic voluntarism problem poses a challenge to redressing such testimonial injustice. Specifically, the voluntarism problem seems to rule out straightforward control over what and whom people believe; thus, the solution to the problem of testimonial injustice cannot lie in voluntarily self-correcting unjust credibility judgments and replacing them with just testimonial beliefs. Second, we identify three distinctive characteristics of acceptance of testimony, as distinct from belief, and argue that, while it might be difficult to form credibility judgements completely voluntarily, it is easier to control one’s attitude of acceptance towards speakers’ testimony. We hold that shifting focus from testimonial belief to acceptance can overcome the problem of (synchronic) involuntarism about testimonial belief. Third, we articulate a vision of a virtue of just acceptance of testimony that can move a hearer to collect the right evidence to reliably find the answer to whether a speaker’s testimony is true. Finally, we demonstrate that encouraging people to take a virtuous attitude of just acceptance towards speakers’ testimony forms the basis of a remedial vision of education that can play a distinctive role in fostering the virtue of just acceptance aimed at testimonial justice.
{"title":"Testimonial Justice and the Voluntarism Problem: The Virtue of Just Acceptance","authors":"Kunimasa Sato, Ben Kotzee","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad063","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad063","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract This paper examines the ‘voluntarism’ challenge for achieving testimonial justice and advocates the virtue of just acceptance of testimony as the right target for efforts to alleviate testimonial injustice. First, we review the credibility deficit case of interpersonal testimonial injustice and explain how the doxastic voluntarism problem poses a challenge to redressing such testimonial injustice. Specifically, the voluntarism problem seems to rule out straightforward control over what and whom people believe; thus, the solution to the problem of testimonial injustice cannot lie in voluntarily self-correcting unjust credibility judgments and replacing them with just testimonial beliefs. Second, we identify three distinctive characteristics of acceptance of testimony, as distinct from belief, and argue that, while it might be difficult to form credibility judgements completely voluntarily, it is easier to control one’s attitude of acceptance towards speakers’ testimony. We hold that shifting focus from testimonial belief to acceptance can overcome the problem of (synchronic) involuntarism about testimonial belief. Third, we articulate a vision of a virtue of just acceptance of testimony that can move a hearer to collect the right evidence to reliably find the answer to whether a speaker’s testimony is true. Finally, we demonstrate that encouraging people to take a virtuous attitude of just acceptance towards speakers’ testimony forms the basis of a remedial vision of education that can play a distinctive role in fostering the virtue of just acceptance aimed at testimonial justice.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135141557","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Abstract The aim of this article is to rethink the relation between education and progress, claiming that discourses of progress tend to project specific visions of the future and thereby instrumentalize education to achieve these visions while foreclosing other possible futures. The first part of the paper argues that the historical pact between education and progress has been recently recast in terms of learning. Learning receives at the same time an economic and a political interpretation in this context, turning issues such as unemployment or social justice into learning problems. What both interpretations seem to share, however, is that learning is conceived of as a pathway to futures already known. Drawing on the philosophy of Isabelle Stengers, in whose work the concept of learning acquires a vital position, the article reframes learning in terms of a situated encounter made possible within an artificial environment, whereby the future is not being projected, but becomes thoroughly problematic—a matter of collective concern. Recent calls to ‘learn to live with’ Covid-19, but also the effects of climate change, form the point of departure for reworking the concept of learning from the inside out.
{"title":"Learning After Progress? Isabelle Stengers, Artificial Learning, and the Future as Problem","authors":"Hans Schildermans","doi":"10.1093/jopedu/qhad059","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1093/jopedu/qhad059","url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The aim of this article is to rethink the relation between education and progress, claiming that discourses of progress tend to project specific visions of the future and thereby instrumentalize education to achieve these visions while foreclosing other possible futures. The first part of the paper argues that the historical pact between education and progress has been recently recast in terms of learning. Learning receives at the same time an economic and a political interpretation in this context, turning issues such as unemployment or social justice into learning problems. What both interpretations seem to share, however, is that learning is conceived of as a pathway to futures already known. Drawing on the philosophy of Isabelle Stengers, in whose work the concept of learning acquires a vital position, the article reframes learning in terms of a situated encounter made possible within an artificial environment, whereby the future is not being projected, but becomes thoroughly problematic—a matter of collective concern. Recent calls to ‘learn to live with’ Covid-19, but also the effects of climate change, form the point of departure for reworking the concept of learning from the inside out.","PeriodicalId":47223,"journal":{"name":"JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION","volume":"98 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135688833","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"教育学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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