Oxford Journal of Legal Studies最新文献

To date, welfare protections have failed animals. In this context, many animal advocates and scholars have supported recognition of animal rights. Animal rights theory, however, remains underdeveloped. This article contributes to the development of animal rights theory and, in this respect, proposes the utilisation of sentience and intrinsic worth concepts as a pluralist foundation for prospective animal rights. Sentience and intrinsic worth as a conceptual underpinning for animal rights hold clear benefits in that (i) the concepts are already embedded in many legal systems, (ii) sentience would enable the development of animal rights to be built on the established interest theory of rights, and (iii) sentience directly links to the justification of rights as being primarily concerned with the prevention of pain and suffering.

Criminal trials and proportional prison sentences are generally seen as the most suitable way to deal with perpetrators of atrocity crimes. Notwithstanding, traditionally conceived criminal penalties, such as imprisonment, may discourage active responsibility-taking by offenders, disaffect victims by not meeting their needs and impede meaningful engagement between perpetrators and survivors. Arguably, alternative criminal sanctions may be appropriate punishment even for atrocity crimes when tried in transitional societies. Using the case of Colombia, this article analyses the justifications of punishment for atrocities in transitional contexts and discusses the adequacy of alternative criminal sanctions as penalties for atrocity crimes. It concludes that under certain conditions, alternative sanctions can be a viable punishment option that may promote active responsibility-taking and contribute to repairing harm, reintegrating offenders into the community and (re)constructing relationships while serving expressive rationales.

The article systematically assesses the extent to which the Administration (Restrictions on Disposal etc. to Connected Persons) Regulations 2021 achieve the goal of the government to quell the negative perceptions of pre-pack administration. The pre-pack has generated much criticism from disenfranchised groups who regard the practice with much suspicion. These criticisms have triggered questions as to whether and how to structure the regulation of pre-packs. The article introduces original frames through which to distinguish the competing regulatory visions of the pre-pack, as well as to systematically evaluate the regulatory frameworks that have been introduced. The evaluation reveals a gap between the regulatory visions of the critics and the regulator. This gap has impacted the reception and effectiveness of successive regulatory frameworks. Combining its frames with the expectation gap theory, the article offers a critical assessment of the 2021 reforms, which address most but not all the criticisms of the pre-pack.

In Legal Directives and Practical Reasons, Noam Gur has presented a novel account, called the dispositional model, to explain how law bears on our normative practical reasons. Gur holds that his model is superior to the current models, namely the standard weighing model and Joseph Raz's exclusionary model. Although his work provides useful insights into the practical impact of law, I argue that: (i) his challenge against the exclusionary model is valid only insofar as one accepts Raz's normal justification thesis and dependence thesis; (ii) his argument against the weighing model misses its target, because it attacks the model as a decision-making method, not as an account of practical reason; and (iii) his dispositional model solely constitutes a decision-making strategy and does not offer a third alternative answer to the question of how law affects our normative practical reasons. Hence, the dispositional model is not a competitor to the weighing and the exclusionary model, and the problem of accounting for the normativity of law remains.

For centuries, parliamentary privilege has stood as a bar against judicial review over the internal affairs of Parliament. The literature surrounding parliamentary privilege has mostly been about the scope of the privilege; few have discussed if the existence of the privilege itself is justified. This article undertakes that task, by examining parliamentary privilege as a defence against judicial review. Three propositions will be made. First, in the context of judicial review, parliamentary privilege is defined by the outer limits of the principle of exclusive cognisance. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689 adds nothing. Second, parliamentary privilege as it relates to judicial review is incompatible with the two prevailing models of the separation of powers. Third, six arguments that may be made in favour of parliamentary privilege will be refuted. Accordingly, parliamentary privilege should no longer provide a defence towards judicial review.