Pub Date : 2022-07-04DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02802003
K. Haack, Margaret P. Karns, Jean Murray
Gender equality has long been a goal within the UN system, particularly for women’s representation among the professional staff. Yet it was more an aspiration than the target of serious action, let alone with leadership from the UN Secretary-General. It could not be addressed, however, without adequate data revealing women’s absences. Building a dataset based on Human Resources Statistics Reports has enabled the authors to show the patterns in the UN Secretariat and the secretariats of eighteen agencies, funds, and programs. The analysis reveals persistent gender-specific conceptualizations of issue areas as more masculine (e.g., peace, security, finance, trade) or feminine (health, human rights, population), creating “glass walls” and “glass ceilings” that have limited women’s appointments to high-level positions in certain areas. The results reveal the limits of goal setting, the slowness of change, and the difference that leadership from the UN Secretary-General can make in the UN’s “long march” toward gender equality.
{"title":"From Aspiration to Commitment","authors":"K. Haack, Margaret P. Karns, Jean Murray","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02802003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Gender equality has long been a goal within the UN system, particularly for women’s representation among the professional staff. Yet it was more an aspiration than the target of serious action, let alone with leadership from the UN Secretary-General. It could not be addressed, however, without adequate data revealing women’s absences. Building a dataset based on Human Resources Statistics Reports has enabled the authors to show the patterns in the UN Secretariat and the secretariats of eighteen agencies, funds, and programs. The analysis reveals persistent gender-specific conceptualizations of issue areas as more masculine (e.g., peace, security, finance, trade) or feminine (health, human rights, population), creating “glass walls” and “glass ceilings” that have limited women’s appointments to high-level positions in certain areas. The results reveal the limits of goal setting, the slowness of change, and the difference that leadership from the UN Secretary-General can make in the UN’s “long march” toward gender equality.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"1 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41800731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-04DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02802007
Francesco Giumelli, A. Weber
This article analyzes the role of UN sanctions in the context of peace negotiations in South Sudan from the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013 until the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015. Drawing on the literature regarding third-party intervention in civil wars, it explores whether the UN sanctions regime—established in March 2015—was conceived as an instrument of leverage to get the parties to agree to a settlement. The article asks two questions: Have sanctions and mediation been coordinated? Has the interlink between sanctions and mediation been successful? First, there has been little coordination between sanctions and mediation. Second, UN sanctions did not appear to play a crucial role in the mediation process. This analysis is based on desk research and nineteen interviews with officials from the UN, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and other regional actors conducted between 2017 and 2018.
{"title":"UN Sanctions as Leverage in Mediation Processes?","authors":"Francesco Giumelli, A. Weber","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02802007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article analyzes the role of UN sanctions in the context of peace negotiations in South Sudan from the outbreak of the civil war in December 2013 until the signing of the peace agreement in August 2015. Drawing on the literature regarding third-party intervention in civil wars, it explores whether the UN sanctions regime—established in March 2015—was conceived as an instrument of leverage to get the parties to agree to a settlement. The article asks two questions: Have sanctions and mediation been coordinated? Has the interlink between sanctions and mediation been successful? First, there has been little coordination between sanctions and mediation. Second, UN sanctions did not appear to play a crucial role in the mediation process. This analysis is based on desk research and nineteen interviews with officials from the UN, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and other regional actors conducted between 2017 and 2018.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43842311","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-04DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02802004
Z. Hudáková
While sanctions and mediation are often used to address the same conflict situations, they are usually employed without significant coordination. Focusing on a rare case of a mediator successfully wielding the threat of sanctions, this article explores the utility of sanctions for mediation in the Yemeni political transition during the mandate of UN special adviser Jamal Benomar. Although the transition ultimately derailed, the analysis shows that the threat of sanctions can be used in different phases of the mediation process to provide mediators with the leverage needed to convince conflict parties to engage in negotiations, break stalemates during talks, nudge parties toward an agreement, or persuade potential spoilers to refrain from undermining the implementation of the negotiated agreement. Their success, however, not only depends on the degree of convergence between the application of the two instruments, but also on the type of target, regional support, and institutional backing.
{"title":"“Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick”","authors":"Z. Hudáková","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02802004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 While sanctions and mediation are often used to address the same conflict situations, they are usually employed without significant coordination. Focusing on a rare case of a mediator successfully wielding the threat of sanctions, this article explores the utility of sanctions for mediation in the Yemeni political transition during the mandate of UN special adviser Jamal Benomar. Although the transition ultimately derailed, the analysis shows that the threat of sanctions can be used in different phases of the mediation process to provide mediators with the leverage needed to convince conflict parties to engage in negotiations, break stalemates during talks, nudge parties toward an agreement, or persuade potential spoilers to refrain from undermining the implementation of the negotiated agreement. Their success, however, not only depends on the degree of convergence between the application of the two instruments, but also on the type of target, regional support, and institutional backing.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44629612","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-04DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02802005
C. Portela, Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux
The UN frequently employs sanctions on the same conflicts where it attempts mediation. While both efforts carry a UN stamp, they follow different political logics that are not always coherent with each other: sanctions are enacted by the UN Security Council, while mediation is led by a special representative/envoy of the UN Secretary-General, often on the basis of a Security Council mandate. This article explores two UN interventions in Libya that combined mediation with mandatory sanctions: the conflict leading to the overthrow of the Muammar Qaddafi regime (2011) and the civil war that ensued when the country was split between the first elected parliament and its successor (2014–2015). The Libyan case illustrates that the coherence of mediation and sanctions ultimately depends on the UN Security Council unity of purpose.
{"title":"UN Security Council Sanctions and Mediation in Libya","authors":"C. Portela, Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02802005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The UN frequently employs sanctions on the same conflicts where it attempts mediation. While both efforts carry a UN stamp, they follow different political logics that are not always coherent with each other: sanctions are enacted by the UN Security Council, while mediation is led by a special representative/envoy of the UN Secretary-General, often on the basis of a Security Council mandate. This article explores two UN interventions in Libya that combined mediation with mandatory sanctions: the conflict leading to the overthrow of the Muammar Qaddafi regime (2011) and the civil war that ensued when the country was split between the first elected parliament and its successor (2014–2015). The Libyan case illustrates that the coherence of mediation and sanctions ultimately depends on the UN Security Council unity of purpose.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49165395","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-07-04DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02802002
T. Biersteker, Rebecca Brubaker, D. Lanz
Sanctions and mediation are often applied simultaneously by the UN, but there has been little systematic exploration of their interrelationships. Drawing on research from the Sanctions and Mediation Project (SMP), both complications and complementarities can be identified. Sanctions can complicate mediation by fostering exclusion, emboldening nonsanctioned parties, closing mediation space, undercutting mediator impartiality, and forcing premature agreements. At the same time, sanctions can complement mediation by deterring spoilers, breaking stalemates, incentivizing cooperation, modifying cost-benefit calculations, ensuring broad participation in talks, and facilitating the onset of talks. The conditions under which complementarity can be enhanced include UN Security Council unity, focus and coherence of mandates, and regional cooperation. This article concludes with policy recommendations for different institutional actors and some suggestions for future research.
{"title":"Exploring the Relationships between UN Sanctions and Mediation","authors":"T. Biersteker, Rebecca Brubaker, D. Lanz","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02802002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02802002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Sanctions and mediation are often applied simultaneously by the UN, but there has been little systematic exploration of their interrelationships. Drawing on research from the Sanctions and Mediation Project (SMP), both complications and complementarities can be identified. Sanctions can complicate mediation by fostering exclusion, emboldening nonsanctioned parties, closing mediation space, undercutting mediator impartiality, and forcing premature agreements. At the same time, sanctions can complement mediation by deterring spoilers, breaking stalemates, incentivizing cooperation, modifying cost-benefit calculations, ensuring broad participation in talks, and facilitating the onset of talks. The conditions under which complementarity can be enhanced include UN Security Council unity, focus and coherence of mandates, and regional cooperation. This article concludes with policy recommendations for different institutional actors and some suggestions for future research.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-07-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46223006","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02801007
T. Weiss, Rorden Wilkinson
This article focuses on the vast number of people who make global governance happen. It probes the role of the unknown people in the “middle” who are largely absent from scholarly gaze: professionals, service teams, and others who act behind the scenes. They are not at the top of public and private organizations (“global governors” in the literature), but they keep the lights on. They accomplish the policy, operational, and support work to move the needle of global governance institutions of all varieties from the local to global. These largely invisible and unheard populations—at least in the scholarly and policy literatures—make global governance work. The “missing middle” is not confined to the everyday contributions of professionals in intergovernmental secretariats because contemporary global governance is not synonymous with international organization, but concerns networked forms of public authority that may or may not include secretariats or states.
{"title":"The “Missing Middle”","authors":"T. Weiss, Rorden Wilkinson","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02801007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02801007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article focuses on the vast number of people who make global governance happen. It probes the role of the unknown people in the “middle” who are largely absent from scholarly gaze: professionals, service teams, and others who act behind the scenes. They are not at the top of public and private organizations (“global governors” in the literature), but they keep the lights on. They accomplish the policy, operational, and support work to move the needle of global governance institutions of all varieties from the local to global. These largely invisible and unheard populations—at least in the scholarly and policy literatures—make global governance work. The “missing middle” is not confined to the everyday contributions of professionals in intergovernmental secretariats because contemporary global governance is not synonymous with international organization, but concerns networked forms of public authority that may or may not include secretariats or states.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44163082","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02801006
Amelie Thürmer, Elena Meyer-Clement
Over the past few decades, cities have become increasingly active in global climate governance. Although most research on city agency has focused on democratic (often Western) cities, the climate-related activities of Chinese cities in global city networks have also expanded, raising the question of whether cities from nondemocratic political systems can be international actors or whether they are merely extensions of their national governments. This article examines how the Chinese Party-state’s institutions and governing instruments shape cities’ global agency and how these structures impact the work of various city networks operating in China. To this end, it analyzes policy reports, documents, and original interview data collected from city network representatives. The findings demonstrate that city networks in China walk a fine line between their door-opening function for cities to global climate governance and their role as transmitters of the central government’s gatekeeping function, thereby sustaining the hierarchical control structures of the Chinese Party-state.
{"title":"Global City Agency and Multilevel Governance in China","authors":"Amelie Thürmer, Elena Meyer-Clement","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02801006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02801006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Over the past few decades, cities have become increasingly active in global climate governance. Although most research on city agency has focused on democratic (often Western) cities, the climate-related activities of Chinese cities in global city networks have also expanded, raising the question of whether cities from nondemocratic political systems can be international actors or whether they are merely extensions of their national governments. This article examines how the Chinese Party-state’s institutions and governing instruments shape cities’ global agency and how these structures impact the work of various city networks operating in China. To this end, it analyzes policy reports, documents, and original interview data collected from city network representatives. The findings demonstrate that city networks in China walk a fine line between their door-opening function for cities to global climate governance and their role as transmitters of the central government’s gatekeeping function, thereby sustaining the hierarchical control structures of the Chinese Party-state.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42813752","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02801005
M. Ayoob
{"title":"Taliban Victory Poses No Threat to International Society","authors":"M. Ayoob","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02801005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02801005","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44860008","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2022-03-08DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02801004
Stephanie Strobl
This article examines institutional independence using the examples of the World Health Organization (WHO) and of the Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC s) in a theoretical and a practical approach. It highlights the two different sources of authority of the WHO Secretariat, based on conditional negotiated legitimacy and epistemologically derived legitimacy, and how this authority is threatened by an increase in state party influence beyond what is envisaged in the WHO’s institutional setup. As a practical example, the article uses the PHEIC determinations, when the criteria as set out in the International Health Regulations (IHR) are not sufficient to explain the director-general’s decision to determine a PHEIC. Instead, this article offers evidence of state party influence. This challenge to the WHO’s legitimacy leads to a lack of institutional independence and, subsequently, to a declining basis for cooperation.
{"title":"Rethinking Institutional Independence","authors":"Stephanie Strobl","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02801004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02801004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article examines institutional independence using the examples of the World Health Organization (WHO) and of the Public Health Emergencies of International Concern (PHEIC s) in a theoretical and a practical approach. It highlights the two different sources of authority of the WHO Secretariat, based on conditional negotiated legitimacy and epistemologically derived legitimacy, and how this authority is threatened by an increase in state party influence beyond what is envisaged in the WHO’s institutional setup. As a practical example, the article uses the PHEIC determinations, when the criteria as set out in the International Health Regulations (IHR) are not sufficient to explain the director-general’s decision to determine a PHEIC. Instead, this article offers evidence of state party influence. This challenge to the WHO’s legitimacy leads to a lack of institutional independence and, subsequently, to a declining basis for cooperation.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2022-03-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44715828","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
京公网安备 11010802042870号
京ICP备2023020795号-1
扫码关注我们
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：