Pub Date : 2021-06-09DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02702001
Marco Bocchese
This article investigates the stark variation in elite appraisals of the performance of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Based on an online survey of diplomats posted to the UN headquarters, this article determines which country situations under ICC scrutiny respondents regard as successes or failures and, in turn, what parameters underpin their views. It also asks about negative cases; that is, country situations that never made it to The Hague due to political considerations. This article makes a two-fold contribution to the study of international law and politics. First, it shows that diplomats conceptualize international justice in terms of ongoing prosecutions and convictions obtained. Thus, they downplay indirect effects such as positive complementarity. Interestingly, scholars and diplomats agree on the court’s fiascos, yet dissent on successes. Finally, diplomats have proved tired of political considerations obstructing international justice. Survey data reveals that they want the court to investigate situations involving major powers.
{"title":"In the Eye of the Beholder","authors":"Marco Bocchese","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02702001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02702001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article investigates the stark variation in elite appraisals of the performance of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Based on an online survey of diplomats posted to the UN headquarters, this article determines which country situations under ICC scrutiny respondents regard as successes or failures and, in turn, what parameters underpin their views. It also asks about negative cases; that is, country situations that never made it to The Hague due to political considerations. This article makes a two-fold contribution to the study of international law and politics. First, it shows that diplomats conceptualize international justice in terms of ongoing prosecutions and convictions obtained. Thus, they downplay indirect effects such as positive complementarity. Interestingly, scholars and diplomats agree on the court’s fiascos, yet dissent on successes. Finally, diplomats have proved tired of political considerations obstructing international justice. Survey data reveals that they want the court to investigate situations involving major powers.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44050470","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-06-09DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02702003
Cecilia Jacob
This article assesses recent UN reforms to enhance the organization’s capacity to prevent violent conflict. These reforms target crucial inefficiencies within the UN that have hampered effective preventive and protection practices in violent conflict and atrocities. The article argues that state actors have viewed the reform process as a site of norm contestation, and negotiations have created an avenue for compromises on the centrality of human rights and political backstopping of UN missions in volatile field contexts that are vital to better prevention and protection outcomes. Contestation by state actors is significant in steering the outcomes of institutional reform as states advance their normative agendas, and seek to integrate these preferences into new institutional structures that are open to negotiation through the reform process. A broad assessment of these reforms confirms the move toward a more pragmatic vision of peace and security in the UN to accommodate global power shifts.
{"title":"Institutionalizing Prevention at the UN","authors":"Cecilia Jacob","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02702003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02702003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 This article assesses recent UN reforms to enhance the organization’s capacity to prevent violent conflict. These reforms target crucial inefficiencies within the UN that have hampered effective preventive and protection practices in violent conflict and atrocities. The article argues that state actors have viewed the reform process as a site of norm contestation, and negotiations have created an avenue for compromises on the centrality of human rights and political backstopping of UN missions in volatile field contexts that are vital to better prevention and protection outcomes. Contestation by state actors is significant in steering the outcomes of institutional reform as states advance their normative agendas, and seek to integrate these preferences into new institutional structures that are open to negotiation through the reform process. A broad assessment of these reforms confirms the move toward a more pragmatic vision of peace and security in the UN to accommodate global power shifts.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":"179-201"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-06-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44065717","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02701003
Jess Gifkins
The formal rules governing the UN Security Council offer little insight into how negotiations are conducted on a day-to-day basis. While it is generally assumed that permanent members dominate negotiations, this article investigates avenues for influence for elected members and the UN Secretariat. Institutional power is used to show how permanent members adopt dominant positions in negotiations extending far beyond their Charter-given privileges. Dominance of permanent members is moderated, however, by the legitimacy that support from elected members brings to a resolution. Similarly, the UN Secretariat can use its legitimated authority to influence decisions. The article argues that informal practices are key in understanding how power and influence are allocated in the Council and it forms a building block for future analyses of Security Council practices. This argument also has implications for the perennial reform debates and the prospects for informal reform.
{"title":"Beyond the Veto","authors":"Jess Gifkins","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701003","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701003","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The formal rules governing the UN Security Council offer little insight into how negotiations are conducted on a day-to-day basis. While it is generally assumed that permanent members dominate negotiations, this article investigates avenues for influence for elected members and the UN Secretariat. Institutional power is used to show how permanent members adopt dominant positions in negotiations extending far beyond their Charter-given privileges. Dominance of permanent members is moderated, however, by the legitimacy that support from elected members brings to a resolution. Similarly, the UN Secretariat can use its legitimated authority to influence decisions. The article argues that informal practices are key in understanding how power and influence are allocated in the Council and it forms a building block for future analyses of Security Council practices. This argument also has implications for the perennial reform debates and the prospects for informal reform.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":"1-24"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46005644","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02701006
Rebecca Ray
Multilateral development banks (MDB s) are a growing source of development finance, with nearly two trillion dollars in assets. They have developed a wide array of governance structures, with implications for the distribution of members’ control over those assets. This paper measures that power distribution in 28 MDB s using Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices and members’ relative voting power on MDB governance boards. It uses these calculations to create a typology of MDB governance structures: creditor-led MDB s distribute power among non-borrowers, core borrower-led MDB s distribute power among a few central borrowers, and mutual aid-oriented MDB s distribute power among a wide group of borrowers. Finally, it explores the impact of the creation of two new MDB s, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, and finds that while they do not dramatically alter the global landscape they do allow significantly greater access to capital for some borrowers.
多边开发银行(MDB )是一个日益增长的发展融资来源，拥有近2万亿美元的资产。它们已经形成了一系列广泛的治理结构，对成员对这些资产的控制权的分配产生了影响。本文使用Penrose-Banzhaf和Shapley-Shubik权力指数和成员在MDB治理委员会的相对投票权来衡量28个MDB 中的权力分配。它利用这些计算创建了多边开发银行治理结构的类型:债权人主导的多边开发银行 在非借款人中分配权力，核心借款人主导的多边开发银行 在少数中心借款人中分配权力，以互助为导向的多边开发银行 在广泛的借款人群体中分配权力。最后，报告探讨了亚洲基础设施投资银行(aiib)和新开发银行(new Development Bank)这两个新成立的多边开发银行 的影响，发现它们虽然没有显著改变全球格局，但确实大大增加了一些借款人获得资本的机会。
{"title":"Who Controls Multilateral Development Finance?","authors":"Rebecca Ray","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701006","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701006","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 Multilateral development banks (MDB s) are a growing source of development finance, with nearly two trillion dollars in assets. They have developed a wide array of governance structures, with implications for the distribution of members’ control over those assets. This paper measures that power distribution in 28 MDB s using Penrose-Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices and members’ relative voting power on MDB governance boards. It uses these calculations to create a typology of MDB governance structures: creditor-led MDB s distribute power among non-borrowers, core borrower-led MDB s distribute power among a few central borrowers, and mutual aid-oriented MDB s distribute power among a wide group of borrowers. Finally, it explores the impact of the creation of two new MDB s, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, and finds that while they do not dramatically alter the global landscape they do allow significantly greater access to capital for some borrowers.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44887630","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02701002
Irene V. Langran
The internationalization of medical services—including organ transplantations—is driven by advances in technology and integration of trade. Patients in need of organ transplants began to seek these services outside their countries of origin in the 1980s and 1990s, and this practice expanded in the ensuing decades. While these transplants yielded benefits to some, abuses included human trafficking, preying on vulnerable populations, and negative outcomes in health equity. This case study of efforts to regulate the international transplant trade yields important findings for our understanding of global health governance. First, it provides support to the “globalization reformers” who maintain that if globalization’s benefits are to be widely distributed, institutional mechanisms must be enacted. Second, it provides another example of the externalities that occur when health concerns are absent, poorly represented, or weakened in trade negotiations. Finally, it demonstrates limits of a global health regime that lacks a centralized authority.
{"title":"Challenges to Global Health Governance from the International Trade in Organ Transplants","authors":"Irene V. Langran","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701002","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701002","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 The internationalization of medical services—including organ transplantations—is driven by advances in technology and integration of trade. Patients in need of organ transplants began to seek these services outside their countries of origin in the 1980s and 1990s, and this practice expanded in the ensuing decades. While these transplants yielded benefits to some, abuses included human trafficking, preying on vulnerable populations, and negative outcomes in health equity. This case study of efforts to regulate the international transplant trade yields important findings for our understanding of global health governance. First, it provides support to the “globalization reformers” who maintain that if globalization’s benefits are to be widely distributed, institutional mechanisms must be enacted. Second, it provides another example of the externalities that occur when health concerns are absent, poorly represented, or weakened in trade negotiations. Finally, it demonstrates limits of a global health regime that lacks a centralized authority.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":"95-117"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48534515","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02701005
Thurid Bahr, Anna Holzscheiter, Laura Pantzerhielm
How do regime complexes as social orders affect relations among international organizations (IO s)? This article explores this question by studying the longitudinal development of interorganizational practices and the social meanings attached to these practices that constitute a regime complex. Adopting a practice lens, our analysis redirects scholarly attention from rationalist accounts of strategic interactions between IO s to the study of patterned “doings” among actors in regime complexes. The mixed-methods analysis of interorganizational practices between eight IO s in the global health regime complex shows that cooperation among IO s is not primarily the outcome of rational responses to problems of collective action. Rather, IO s engage in similar types of practices because they want to be considered “good” IO s that follow a repertoire of habitual and appropriate practices. In turn, interorganizational practices create social meanings that constrain IO s. The approach put forward in this paper demonstrates the ordering effect of practices on the global health regime complex.
{"title":"Understanding Regime Complexes through a Practice Lens","authors":"Thurid Bahr, Anna Holzscheiter, Laura Pantzerhielm","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701005","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701005","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 How do regime complexes as social orders affect relations among international organizations (IO s)? This article explores this question by studying the longitudinal development of interorganizational practices and the social meanings attached to these practices that constitute a regime complex. Adopting a practice lens, our analysis redirects scholarly attention from rationalist accounts of strategic interactions between IO s to the study of patterned “doings” among actors in regime complexes. The mixed-methods analysis of interorganizational practices between eight IO s in the global health regime complex shows that cooperation among IO s is not primarily the outcome of rational responses to problems of collective action. Rather, IO s engage in similar types of practices because they want to be considered “good” IO s that follow a repertoire of habitual and appropriate practices. In turn, interorganizational practices create social meanings that constrain IO s. The approach put forward in this paper demonstrates the ordering effect of practices on the global health regime complex.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"35 11","pages":"71-94"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"41244037","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02701001
J. Alger, Jane Lister, Peter Dauvergne
A handful of companies dominate the world’s shipping industry. These firms have gained political leverage over the global governance of container shipping in particular. Intriguingly, in recent years the Danish conglomerate Maersk—the world’s biggest container and shipping vessel company since the mid-1990s—has been using its influence to push for higher environmental standards for the industry as a whole. To some extent these initiatives are helping to promote environmental efficiencies, cleaner fuels, and greener technology. But they are also raising costs for small and midsized companies with extremely low profit margins, further enhancing the competitiveness of the biggest shipping conglomerates in an increasingly oligopolistic market. While voluntary self-governance by companies such as Maersk is incrementally improving the environmental management of global shipping, it is also further concentrating governance power within a few transnational corporations, potentially taking more ambitious regulation off the agenda.
{"title":"Corporate Governance and the Environmental Politics of Shipping","authors":"J. Alger, Jane Lister, Peter Dauvergne","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701001","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701001","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 A handful of companies dominate the world’s shipping industry. These firms have gained political leverage over the global governance of container shipping in particular. Intriguingly, in recent years the Danish conglomerate Maersk—the world’s biggest container and shipping vessel company since the mid-1990s—has been using its influence to push for higher environmental standards for the industry as a whole. To some extent these initiatives are helping to promote environmental efficiencies, cleaner fuels, and greener technology. But they are also raising costs for small and midsized companies with extremely low profit margins, further enhancing the competitiveness of the biggest shipping conglomerates in an increasingly oligopolistic market. While voluntary self-governance by companies such as Maersk is incrementally improving the environmental management of global shipping, it is also further concentrating governance power within a few transnational corporations, potentially taking more ambitious regulation off the agenda.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":"144-166"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48545812","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02701004
M. Silva
When international organizations take measures that seem to go against the national interests of a Member State, is withdrawal inevitable? What do past cases reveal about how the extreme decision of withdrawal has been contained? This article examines the case of Brazil and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which is part of the Organization of American States (OAS). Having received a harsh decision by the Commission, Brazil first threatened to leave OAS, but later mobilized diplomatic strategies to reform its Commission. What happened between a first reaction that considered withdrawal and the final decision to work to reform the system? The article advances the argument that containing international organization withdrawal benefits from the convergence and mutual reinforcement provided by internationally engaged institutions, bureaucrats committed to multilateralism, and a democratic leadership. The case helps to recognize the relevant intrastate variables that play out in the decision-making process that may eventually lead to withdrawal.
{"title":"An Intrastate Approach to the Withdrawal from International Organizations","authors":"M. Silva","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701004","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701004","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 When international organizations take measures that seem to go against the national interests of a Member State, is withdrawal inevitable? What do past cases reveal about how the extreme decision of withdrawal has been contained? This article examines the case of Brazil and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which is part of the Organization of American States (OAS). Having received a harsh decision by the Commission, Brazil first threatened to leave OAS, but later mobilized diplomatic strategies to reform its Commission. What happened between a first reaction that considered withdrawal and the final decision to work to reform the system? The article advances the argument that containing international organization withdrawal benefits from the convergence and mutual reinforcement provided by internationally engaged institutions, bureaucrats committed to multilateralism, and a democratic leadership. The case helps to recognize the relevant intrastate variables that play out in the decision-making process that may eventually lead to withdrawal.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":"49-70"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"47707944","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-18DOI: 10.1163/19426720-02701007
Javier Vadell, Clarisa Giaccaglia
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Brazil became a crucial player as the principal advocate of South American integration. To Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) was added the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), reaffirming regional policies around the idea of “South America.” Today, however, the withdrawal of Brazilian leadership along with the reversals and loss of focus in UNASUR and Mercosur have damaged the credibility of the region’s initiatives, as well as finding South America’s common voice. Despite this, this article argues that Brazil has not entirely disengaged from the region or abandoned the principle of regionalism. Recognition of Latin America’s distinctive history the authors to construct a model that incorporates complexity and disorder in which Brazil’s institutional political development will have significant repercussions for the future of the region.
在二十一世纪初，巴西作为南美洲一体化的主要倡导者，成为一个至关重要的参与者。除了Mercado Común del Sur(南方共同市场)之外，还增加了南美国家联盟(UNASUR)，重申了围绕“南美”理念的区域政策。然而，今天，巴西领导人的退出，以及南美国家联盟和南方共同市场的逆转和重点的丧失，损害了该地区倡议的可信度，也损害了南美洲寻找共同声音的机会。尽管如此，本文认为巴西并没有完全脱离该地区或放弃地区主义原则。认识到拉丁美洲独特的历史，作者构建了一个包含复杂性和无序性的模型，其中巴西的制度政治发展将对该地区的未来产生重大影响。
{"title":"Brazil’s Role in Latin America’s Regionalism","authors":"Javier Vadell, Clarisa Giaccaglia","doi":"10.1163/19426720-02701007","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-02701007","url":null,"abstract":"\u0000 At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Brazil became a crucial player as the principal advocate of South American integration. To Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) was added the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), reaffirming regional policies around the idea of “South America.” Today, however, the withdrawal of Brazilian leadership along with the reversals and loss of focus in UNASUR and Mercosur have damaged the credibility of the region’s initiatives, as well as finding South America’s common voice. Despite this, this article argues that Brazil has not entirely disengaged from the region or abandoned the principle of regionalism. Recognition of Latin America’s distinctive history the authors to construct a model that incorporates complexity and disorder in which Brazil’s institutional political development will have significant repercussions for the future of the region.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"27 1","pages":"25-48"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42784755","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2021-02-09DOI: 10.1163/19426720-01501008
T. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, R. Jolly
This book is about the Third UN: the ecology of supportive non-state actors—intellectuals, scholars, consultants, think tanks, NGOs, the for-profit private sector, and the media—that interacts with the intergovernmental machinery of the First UN (member states) and the Second UN (staff members of international secretariats) to formulate and refine ideas and decision-making at key junctures in policy processes. Some advocate for particular ideas, others help analyze or operationalize their testing and implementation; many thus help the UN “think.” While think tanks, knowledge brokers, and epistemic communities are phenomena that have entered both the academic and policy lexicons, their intellectual role remains marginal to analyses of such intergovernmental organizations as the United Nations. The Third UN in this volume connotes those working toward knowledge and normative advances for the realization of the values underlying the UN Charter; the book does not discuss armed belligerents and criminals, the main focus of previous analyses of non-state actors and the UN system.
{"title":"The \"Third\" United Nations","authors":"T. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, R. Jolly","doi":"10.1163/19426720-01501008","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01501008","url":null,"abstract":"This book is about the Third UN: the ecology of supportive non-state actors—intellectuals, scholars, consultants, think tanks, NGOs, the for-profit private sector, and the media—that interacts with the intergovernmental machinery of the First UN (member states) and the Second UN (staff members of international secretariats) to formulate and refine ideas and decision-making at key junctures in policy processes. Some advocate for particular ideas, others help analyze or operationalize their testing and implementation; many thus help the UN “think.” While think tanks, knowledge brokers, and epistemic communities are phenomena that have entered both the academic and policy lexicons, their intellectual role remains marginal to analyses of such intergovernmental organizations as the United Nations. The Third UN in this volume connotes those working toward knowledge and normative advances for the realization of the values underlying the UN Charter; the book does not discuss armed belligerents and criminals, the main focus of previous analyses of non-state actors and the UN system.","PeriodicalId":47262,"journal":{"name":"Global Governance","volume":"28 1","pages":"123-142"},"PeriodicalIF":1.2,"publicationDate":"2021-02-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"73867385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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