Smart contracts govern transactions using the blockchain as the enforcing medium. They may be a cheaper form of governance of transactions compared to traditional contracts, the hierarchy of firms, and relational contracts. However, I argue that smart contracts do not eliminate transaction costs; rather, they can increase them, particularly when considering the issue of ex-post efficiency-enhancing adaptation. Thus, while smart contracts offer a new theoretical and practical way to govern transactions, they are not without challenges and limitations.
Blockchain, tokens, smart contracts, and decentralized autonomous organization (DAO) are increasingly shaping discussions in media and research. The aim of this contribution is to explore how governance theory can clarify these concepts and how the application of theory to this new problem can also enrich governance theory itself.
We focus on the technical environment (blockchain and tokens) that is at the heart of this new form of organization. By exploiting the intrinsic attributes of blockchain (decentralization, immutability, and transparency), smart contracts and DAOs are coordination mechanisms that expand the possibilities of interagent interactions and horizontal coordination, eliminating information asymmetries and the need for trusted third parties. In addition, by taking advantage of the transparency and immutability inherent in blockchain, smart contracts and DAOs make it possible to find and record agreements securely, automating contractual clauses.
We argue that these technologies have a significant potential to renew the contractual approach to governance and to overcome some of the limitations of traditional theory.