Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2275589
Volodymyr Ishchenko
ABSTRACTWhy did the Kremlin fail to rely on the ‘soft power’ to secure its interests in Ukraine and instead opt for the military invasion? At the same time, why did the Kremlin believe that Russia could achieve its goals with relatively limited forces in the course of a rapid regime-change ‘special operation’? These questions pose a puzzle for the two main arguments that dominate the vast literature on Ukrainian regionalism, which either present a largely symmetrical ‘East/West’ regional cleavage or question the salience and even the existence of any such cleavage in favor of a more fluid local diversity that the ascendant Ukrainian civic identity has ultimately encompassed. Instead, the article argues that Ukraine’s ‘regional’ cleavage could be understood as a nationally specific articulation of the class conflict common to many post-Soviet countries in the context of hegemony crisis. This perspective can better explain the disparate capacity of Ukraine’s ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-Russian’ political camps to universalize the particular class interests standing behind them and support them through civic mobilization, the rationale behind the original plan of the Russian invasion, and the reactions of supposedly ‘pro-Russian’ Ukrainian elites and regular citizens to its failure.KEYWORDS: Russia-Ukraine warUkrainian regional cleavagePolitical capitalismHegemony crisisCivil society AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Oleg Zhuravlev, the editors of the special issue and the journal, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, which helped me to improve my argument considerably.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The sanctions against Viktor Medvedchuk and his TV stations were not an isolated fact, but a step in the long series of repressive and restrictive decisions and legislation in politics, culture, and the public sphere under securitizing and nationalizing justifications parallelled with violent attacks by the nationalist civil society, which began in 2014–2015 with the repression of the Communist Party of Ukraine under decommunization laws, and continued after the sanctioning of Medvedchuk in 2021 with the blocking of almost all other major media labeled as ‘pro-Russian’ (Chemerys Citation2016; Ishchenko Citation2018a, Citation2023c, Citation2022b; Kasianov Citation2021; Way Citation2019).2 Recently, there may have been a shift among specialists on Ukraine toward the ‘twenty-two Ukraines’ approach, reflecting both the scholarly advances in the study of Ukrainian regionalism and a reaction to the Russian instrumentalization of the Ukrainian regional cleavage. However, some recent major works based on the assumption of a conflict between Ukrainian and Russian-speaking communities or between the varieties of Ukrainian national identity prove that the debate on Ukrainian regionalism is not settled (e.g. Arel and Driscoll Citation2023; Petro Citation2023).3 Many questioned
这并不适用于已加入欧盟的波罗的海国家,也许中亚部分例外,因为对这些国家来说,欧洲一体化不在议程上例如,与政府官员的非正式关系以及经常故意设计的逃税和资本外逃的法律漏洞,也促进了竞争对手对公司的敌意收购因此,例如Hale (Citation2015)分析了反复出现的继任危机在乌克兰,与工人阶级相比,中产阶级在政治参与和对“西方”议程的支持方面都有过多的代表。特别是,中产阶级的入党率明显更高(Simonchuk Citation2020, 77)。中产阶级不成比例地参与了乌克兰社会的橙色革命和亲欧盟革命,以及定期的抗议活动和公民行动主义(Beissinger Citation2022, 293-294;[j] .中国科学:自然科学,2016,(1):1 - 2。在加利西亚以外,较富裕的公民比较贫穷的受访者更有可能表达民族主义和亲西方的态度(Alexseev Citation2021;Hale and Kulyk Citation2021).13可以肯定的是,并非所有由“西方”公民社会推动的后亲欧盟运动改革都不受欢迎。例如,权力下放改革是最受赞誉的成功之一,特别是在增加税收,改善当地基础设施方面,甚至有助于乌克兰在战争期间的恢复力(Brik和Murtazashvili Citation2022;Harus and Nivyevskyi citation(2020)。有人可能会怀疑,分权改革是否不是例外证明规则的案例,因为它与当地精英的利益一致,并且与许多其他改革不同,它从来都不是西方援助或乌克兰欧洲一体化的条件,并且与跨国关系的推进只有微弱的关系(Bader Citation2020;粗柴油高温裂解Citation2020) .14点特别是通过所谓的“三明治模式”(Nitsova et al.)与外国和国际机构的合作。Citation2018)。
{"title":"Class or regional cleavage? The Russian invasion and Ukraine’s ‘East/West’ divide","authors":"Volodymyr Ishchenko","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2275589","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2275589","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWhy did the Kremlin fail to rely on the ‘soft power’ to secure its interests in Ukraine and instead opt for the military invasion? At the same time, why did the Kremlin believe that Russia could achieve its goals with relatively limited forces in the course of a rapid regime-change ‘special operation’? These questions pose a puzzle for the two main arguments that dominate the vast literature on Ukrainian regionalism, which either present a largely symmetrical ‘East/West’ regional cleavage or question the salience and even the existence of any such cleavage in favor of a more fluid local diversity that the ascendant Ukrainian civic identity has ultimately encompassed. Instead, the article argues that Ukraine’s ‘regional’ cleavage could be understood as a nationally specific articulation of the class conflict common to many post-Soviet countries in the context of hegemony crisis. This perspective can better explain the disparate capacity of Ukraine’s ‘pro-Western’ and ‘pro-Russian’ political camps to universalize the particular class interests standing behind them and support them through civic mobilization, the rationale behind the original plan of the Russian invasion, and the reactions of supposedly ‘pro-Russian’ Ukrainian elites and regular citizens to its failure.KEYWORDS: Russia-Ukraine warUkrainian regional cleavagePolitical capitalismHegemony crisisCivil society AcknowledgementsI would like to thank Oleg Zhuravlev, the editors of the special issue and the journal, as well as the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments, which helped me to improve my argument considerably.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The sanctions against Viktor Medvedchuk and his TV stations were not an isolated fact, but a step in the long series of repressive and restrictive decisions and legislation in politics, culture, and the public sphere under securitizing and nationalizing justifications parallelled with violent attacks by the nationalist civil society, which began in 2014–2015 with the repression of the Communist Party of Ukraine under decommunization laws, and continued after the sanctioning of Medvedchuk in 2021 with the blocking of almost all other major media labeled as ‘pro-Russian’ (Chemerys Citation2016; Ishchenko Citation2018a, Citation2023c, Citation2022b; Kasianov Citation2021; Way Citation2019).2 Recently, there may have been a shift among specialists on Ukraine toward the ‘twenty-two Ukraines’ approach, reflecting both the scholarly advances in the study of Ukrainian regionalism and a reaction to the Russian instrumentalization of the Ukrainian regional cleavage. However, some recent major works based on the assumption of a conflict between Ukrainian and Russian-speaking communities or between the varieties of Ukrainian national identity prove that the debate on Ukrainian regionalism is not settled (e.g. Arel and Driscoll Citation2023; Petro Citation2023).3 Many questioned","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"40 18","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135680485","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2275591
Michael Grätz
This study estimates the effects of women’s education on their offspring using quasi-experimental evidence from six educational reforms that increased the length of compulsory schooling in several European countries. The empirical analysis uses data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe and instrumental variable estimation to estimate the effects of female education on fertility and on children’s education. This study provides the first analysis using quasi-experimental variation in education to estimate prospective models of intergenerational effects. These models start with a birth cohort and link information on their fertility and on their children’s outcomes. These models account for the effect of female education on the probability that women have children when estimating the effect of female education. The direct effect of female education on children’s educational attainment, i.e. the effect conditional on the birth of a child, is positive. In addition, higher female education increases fertility. Therefore, the probability that a woman has a child with a high educational attainment is increased when considering the effect of female education on fertility. Studies that estimate retrospective models of intergenerational effects using reforms in the length of compulsory schooling may underestimate the total effect of female on child education.
{"title":"The effects of female education on child education: a prospective analysis","authors":"Michael Grätz","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2275591","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2275591","url":null,"abstract":"This study estimates the effects of women’s education on their offspring using quasi-experimental evidence from six educational reforms that increased the length of compulsory schooling in several European countries. The empirical analysis uses data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe and instrumental variable estimation to estimate the effects of female education on fertility and on children’s education. This study provides the first analysis using quasi-experimental variation in education to estimate prospective models of intergenerational effects. These models start with a birth cohort and link information on their fertility and on their children’s outcomes. These models account for the effect of female education on the probability that women have children when estimating the effect of female education. The direct effect of female education on children’s educational attainment, i.e. the effect conditional on the birth of a child, is positive. In addition, higher female education increases fertility. Therefore, the probability that a woman has a child with a high educational attainment is increased when considering the effect of female education on fertility. Studies that estimate retrospective models of intergenerational effects using reforms in the length of compulsory schooling may underestimate the total effect of female on child education.","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135680478","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2275604
Maximilian Weber, Daniela Grunow, Yanran Chen, Steffen Eger
ABSTRACTIncoming refugees from Ukraine are currently encountering a wave of solidarity that is seen, according to some, in stark contrast to the solidarity experienced by earlier groups of refugees i.e. from Syria during the so-called ‘immigration crisis’ in 2015. We aim to inform this debate on solidarity bias by collecting and analyzing quantitative data on (anti-)solidarity statements posted on Twitter during both waves of refugee immigration. We assess how social solidarity towards refugees differed between 2015 and the current wave of refugees fleeing Ukraine. To this end, we collect and analyze a longitudinal dataset of refugee-related tweets selected via hashtags and covering the period between January 2015 and August 2022. We first annotate the tweets for (anti-)solidarity expressions towards refugees. On these annotations, we train a supervised machine learning model and use it to automatically label over 2.3 million tweets. We assess the automatically labeled data for how statements related to refugee (anti-)solidarity developed and differed for distinct groups of refugees. Our findings show that in relative terms, refugee solidarity was expressed more often in tweets during September 2015 compared to March 2022. However, we find some evidence of solidarity bias in March 2022.KEYWORDS: Social solidaritycrisesrefugeesNatural Language Processing AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank the participants of the ConTrust lunch seminar 04–2022, the participants of the Workshop ‘The Comparative Politics of Solidarity’, held at Politicologenetmaal 2023 in Leuven, Belgium, and anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Replication filesThe Python code for data cleaning and analysis is available at https://zenodo.org/record/8232678.Additional informationFundingDaniela Grunow would like to acknowledge funding from the German Research Foundation (FOR 5173, no. 439346934) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (funding code 01UG2114). Steffen Eger gratefully acknowledges support from the German Research Foundation (Heisenberg grant EG 375/5–1). Steffen Eger's NLLG group is further supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research via the grant “Metrics4NLG”.
{"title":"Social solidarity with Ukrainian and Syrian refugees in the twitter discourse. A comparison between 2015 and 2022","authors":"Maximilian Weber, Daniela Grunow, Yanran Chen, Steffen Eger","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2275604","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2275604","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIncoming refugees from Ukraine are currently encountering a wave of solidarity that is seen, according to some, in stark contrast to the solidarity experienced by earlier groups of refugees i.e. from Syria during the so-called ‘immigration crisis’ in 2015. We aim to inform this debate on solidarity bias by collecting and analyzing quantitative data on (anti-)solidarity statements posted on Twitter during both waves of refugee immigration. We assess how social solidarity towards refugees differed between 2015 and the current wave of refugees fleeing Ukraine. To this end, we collect and analyze a longitudinal dataset of refugee-related tweets selected via hashtags and covering the period between January 2015 and August 2022. We first annotate the tweets for (anti-)solidarity expressions towards refugees. On these annotations, we train a supervised machine learning model and use it to automatically label over 2.3 million tweets. We assess the automatically labeled data for how statements related to refugee (anti-)solidarity developed and differed for distinct groups of refugees. Our findings show that in relative terms, refugee solidarity was expressed more often in tweets during September 2015 compared to March 2022. However, we find some evidence of solidarity bias in March 2022.KEYWORDS: Social solidaritycrisesrefugeesNatural Language Processing AcknowledgmentsThe authors would like to thank the participants of the ConTrust lunch seminar 04–2022, the participants of the Workshop ‘The Comparative Politics of Solidarity’, held at Politicologenetmaal 2023 in Leuven, Belgium, and anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments on earlier drafts of this paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Replication filesThe Python code for data cleaning and analysis is available at https://zenodo.org/record/8232678.Additional informationFundingDaniela Grunow would like to acknowledge funding from the German Research Foundation (FOR 5173, no. 439346934) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (funding code 01UG2114). Steffen Eger gratefully acknowledges support from the German Research Foundation (Heisenberg grant EG 375/5–1). Steffen Eger's NLLG group is further supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research via the grant “Metrics4NLG”.","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"41 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135680895","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-06DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2275592
Mengxuan Li, Yekaterina Chzhen
ABSTRACTThis study investigates the relationship between multidimensional household poverty and cognitive and behavioural development during the formative years of childhood (from 9 months to 9 years), using nationally representative longitudinal data from Ireland for the cohort of children born in 2007-2008. The results indicate substantial inequalities in Irish children’s cognitive and behavioural outcomes at age 9 by multidimensional poverty duration. Children with at least one spell in poverty (out of four interviews) have worse cognitive and behavioural outcomes. Dynamic structural equation models provide evidence in support of a hybrid family investment/family stress model. Although family investment processes account for some of the cumulative effects of childhood poverty on cognitive outcomes, family stress processes help explain the links between poverty and both cognitive and behaviour outcomes in early childhood. Overall, poverty is strongly related to child outcomes over time via the direct effects of current poverty on child outcomes and path dependency in both poverty and child outcomes over time. There are also indirect effects via the two child outcomes reinforcing each other as children grow older (with the effects of behaviour problems dominating those of cognitive ability), even as the parental investment and maternal stress pathways become less pronounced.KEYWORDS: Early childhoodchild povertycognitive abilitybehaviour problemsgrowing up in Ireland AcknowledgementsThe authors wish to thank Richard Layte, Jan Skopek, and PhD students at the Department of Sociology at Trinity College Dublin for their feedback on earlier versions of this study, as well as participants in the 2021 European Consortium for Sociological Research Annual Conference, the 2021 Growing Up in Ireland conference, and the 2023 Spring Meeting of the Research Committee 28 on Social Stratification and Mobility of the International Sociological Association. Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) is funded by the Department of Children and Youth Affairs (DCYA). It is managed by DCYA in association with the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Results in this report are based on analyses of data from Research Microdata Files provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Neither the CSO nor DCYA take any responsibility for the views expressed or the outputs generated from these analyses.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
{"title":"Parental investment or parenting stress? Examining the links between poverty and child development in Ireland","authors":"Mengxuan Li, Yekaterina Chzhen","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2275592","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2275592","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis study investigates the relationship between multidimensional household poverty and cognitive and behavioural development during the formative years of childhood (from 9 months to 9 years), using nationally representative longitudinal data from Ireland for the cohort of children born in 2007-2008. The results indicate substantial inequalities in Irish children’s cognitive and behavioural outcomes at age 9 by multidimensional poverty duration. Children with at least one spell in poverty (out of four interviews) have worse cognitive and behavioural outcomes. Dynamic structural equation models provide evidence in support of a hybrid family investment/family stress model. Although family investment processes account for some of the cumulative effects of childhood poverty on cognitive outcomes, family stress processes help explain the links between poverty and both cognitive and behaviour outcomes in early childhood. Overall, poverty is strongly related to child outcomes over time via the direct effects of current poverty on child outcomes and path dependency in both poverty and child outcomes over time. There are also indirect effects via the two child outcomes reinforcing each other as children grow older (with the effects of behaviour problems dominating those of cognitive ability), even as the parental investment and maternal stress pathways become less pronounced.KEYWORDS: Early childhoodchild povertycognitive abilitybehaviour problemsgrowing up in Ireland AcknowledgementsThe authors wish to thank Richard Layte, Jan Skopek, and PhD students at the Department of Sociology at Trinity College Dublin for their feedback on earlier versions of this study, as well as participants in the 2021 European Consortium for Sociological Research Annual Conference, the 2021 Growing Up in Ireland conference, and the 2023 Spring Meeting of the Research Committee 28 on Social Stratification and Mobility of the International Sociological Association. Growing Up in Ireland (GUI) is funded by the Department of Children and Youth Affairs (DCYA). It is managed by DCYA in association with the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Results in this report are based on analyses of data from Research Microdata Files provided by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). Neither the CSO nor DCYA take any responsibility for the views expressed or the outputs generated from these analyses.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"40 24","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135680479","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2271982
Juan J. Fernández, Céline Teney
ABSTRACTThe utilitarian approach to pro-EU attitudes – noting that citizens establish their preferences based on their perceived self-interest – remains the dominant one in the social science literature on these attitudes. Yet previous work following this approach has overlooked the role of subjective financial insecurity. Based on prospect theory and marginal utility theory, we argue that individuals who feel financially insecure determine their preference for further European unification in terms of the gains and losses for themselves and that, since they are disproportionately sensitive to economic losses, they display more risk aversion and oppose further macro-political changes in the form of further European unification. Using hybrid models and 15 waves of a representative panel survey conducted in the Netherlands and covering 2008–2023, the evidence strongly supports our expectation. Controlling for individual education, occupational status, individual income, gender and age, subjective financial insecurity is cross-sectionally and longitudinally related to support for European integration. People generally feeling financially insecure (those who over time increased their feeling of financial insecurity) display significantly less support for further European unification than people who generally feel financially secure (people who over time did not feel more financially insecure).KEYWORDS: AttitudesEuropean Unionfinancial insecurityperceptionspanel datathe Netherlands AcknowledgementsWe are grateful to Stephan Dochow-Sondershaus, Carl-Friedrich Elmer, Antonio Jaime-Castillo, Giuseppe Pietrantuono and participants in the 2023 Annual Conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) for their feedback regarding previous versions of this study. We are also grateful to the two anonymous referees for their insightful comments, which have helped to improve the manuscript.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 We hereafter use ‘European unification’ and ‘European integration’ as synonyms.2 Although support for further European integration and EU support are not synonymous and sometimes even have different determinants (e.g. van den Hoogen et al. Citation2022), in this section we focus on the latter as it has been the main theme of the debate between utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches to EU-related attitudes.3 ‘How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?’ for the retrospective version and ‘What are your expectations for the next 12 months: will the next 12 months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the financial situation of your household?’ for the prospective version.4 In this paper we make use of data of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences) panel administered by Centerdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands).5 Replication files for all models are available at https://figsh
{"title":"Subjective financial insecurity and support for European unification","authors":"Juan J. Fernández, Céline Teney","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2271982","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2271982","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe utilitarian approach to pro-EU attitudes – noting that citizens establish their preferences based on their perceived self-interest – remains the dominant one in the social science literature on these attitudes. Yet previous work following this approach has overlooked the role of subjective financial insecurity. Based on prospect theory and marginal utility theory, we argue that individuals who feel financially insecure determine their preference for further European unification in terms of the gains and losses for themselves and that, since they are disproportionately sensitive to economic losses, they display more risk aversion and oppose further macro-political changes in the form of further European unification. Using hybrid models and 15 waves of a representative panel survey conducted in the Netherlands and covering 2008–2023, the evidence strongly supports our expectation. Controlling for individual education, occupational status, individual income, gender and age, subjective financial insecurity is cross-sectionally and longitudinally related to support for European integration. People generally feeling financially insecure (those who over time increased their feeling of financial insecurity) display significantly less support for further European unification than people who generally feel financially secure (people who over time did not feel more financially insecure).KEYWORDS: AttitudesEuropean Unionfinancial insecurityperceptionspanel datathe Netherlands AcknowledgementsWe are grateful to Stephan Dochow-Sondershaus, Carl-Friedrich Elmer, Antonio Jaime-Castillo, Giuseppe Pietrantuono and participants in the 2023 Annual Conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research (WAPOR) for their feedback regarding previous versions of this study. We are also grateful to the two anonymous referees for their insightful comments, which have helped to improve the manuscript.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 We hereafter use ‘European unification’ and ‘European integration’ as synonyms.2 Although support for further European integration and EU support are not synonymous and sometimes even have different determinants (e.g. van den Hoogen et al. Citation2022), in this section we focus on the latter as it has been the main theme of the debate between utilitarian and non-utilitarian approaches to EU-related attitudes.3 ‘How does the financial situation of your household now compare with what it was 12 months ago?’ for the retrospective version and ‘What are your expectations for the next 12 months: will the next 12 months be better, worse or the same, when it comes to the financial situation of your household?’ for the prospective version.4 In this paper we make use of data of the LISS (Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences) panel administered by Centerdata (Tilburg University, The Netherlands).5 Replication files for all models are available at https://figsh","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"71 5","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135270931","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-11-01DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2275602
Babs Jacobs, Rolf van der Velden
The association between parental SES and children’s educational outcomes is one of the key topics in stratification research. Although most differences between social groups are explained by initial differences in performance, the influence of family resources associated with children’s basic skills is still poorly understood. We therefore developed a skills attainment model, focusing on the relative contribution of three family resources: parents’ own basic skills at age 12, other parental skills developed in education and financial resources in the household. In addition, we examine potential heterogeneity across social groups. We develop a unique dataset, the Intergenerational Transmission of Skills dataset, covering 25,000 Dutch parents and 41,000 children. It includes high-quality test scores in math and language, similarly measured among parents and children, and detailed register information on educational attainment and income. Using structural equation modeling, we find that about one-fifth of children’s basic skills is explained by the three parental resources. Of this explained variance, 69 percent is related to parent’s basic skills, 21 percent to other parental skills developed in education and 10 percent to household income. We find no substantial differences in the transmission across sex, between low- and high-income families and between low- and high-educated parents.
{"title":"Family resources and children’s skills: development of a skills attainment model","authors":"Babs Jacobs, Rolf van der Velden","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2275602","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2275602","url":null,"abstract":"The association between parental SES and children’s educational outcomes is one of the key topics in stratification research. Although most differences between social groups are explained by initial differences in performance, the influence of family resources associated with children’s basic skills is still poorly understood. We therefore developed a skills attainment model, focusing on the relative contribution of three family resources: parents’ own basic skills at age 12, other parental skills developed in education and financial resources in the household. In addition, we examine potential heterogeneity across social groups. We develop a unique dataset, the Intergenerational Transmission of Skills dataset, covering 25,000 Dutch parents and 41,000 children. It includes high-quality test scores in math and language, similarly measured among parents and children, and detailed register information on educational attainment and income. Using structural equation modeling, we find that about one-fifth of children’s basic skills is explained by the three parental resources. Of this explained variance, 69 percent is related to parent’s basic skills, 21 percent to other parental skills developed in education and 10 percent to household income. We find no substantial differences in the transmission across sex, between low- and high-income families and between low- and high-educated parents.","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"5 2","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135271643","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-26DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2270049
Ole Brüggemann
{"title":"Employees’ perceptions of co-workers’ internal promotion penalties: the role of gender, parenthood and part-time","authors":"Ole Brüggemann","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2270049","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2270049","url":null,"abstract":"","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"1 4","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134908129","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-18DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2268150
Iryna Maidanik
ABSTRACTThe Russian invasion into Ukraine prompted a large-scale population exodus. The data reveal fluctuating cross-border movements characterized by an initial outflow (February–April 2022), followed by a period of return and stabilization (May–September 2022), then a renewed outflow caused by missile attacks on civilians (October 2022–February 2023), and oscillating migrations during Spring 2023. These oscillations during Spring 2023 are possibly linked to refugees visiting Ukraine for Easter and the activation of border crossings due to the high holiday season that began in late spring. This essay reviews several data sources to address decisions of Ukrainians to relocate. It argues that immobility perspective is crucial to understand the dynamics of migration in Ukraine.KEYWORDS: Forced migrationinternal displacementUkraineRussian–Ukrainian warSUBJECT CLASSIFICATION CODES: J15J17I31 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The net migration rate for a given period of time is the difference between the number of border crossing into the country and the number of border crossing out of there.2 The respondents were asked to answer the question: ‘What were the most important decisions you had to make since the beginning of the full-scale war until today?’Additional informationNotes on contributorsIryna MaidanikIryna Maidanik is a senior research fellow in the migration studies department of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine. She holds a PhD degree in Sociology. She has around 70 publications, among them – two personal books.
{"title":"The forced migration from Ukraine after the full scale Russian invasion: dynamics and decision making drivers","authors":"Iryna Maidanik","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2268150","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2268150","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe Russian invasion into Ukraine prompted a large-scale population exodus. The data reveal fluctuating cross-border movements characterized by an initial outflow (February–April 2022), followed by a period of return and stabilization (May–September 2022), then a renewed outflow caused by missile attacks on civilians (October 2022–February 2023), and oscillating migrations during Spring 2023. These oscillations during Spring 2023 are possibly linked to refugees visiting Ukraine for Easter and the activation of border crossings due to the high holiday season that began in late spring. This essay reviews several data sources to address decisions of Ukrainians to relocate. It argues that immobility perspective is crucial to understand the dynamics of migration in Ukraine.KEYWORDS: Forced migrationinternal displacementUkraineRussian–Ukrainian warSUBJECT CLASSIFICATION CODES: J15J17I31 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 The net migration rate for a given period of time is the difference between the number of border crossing into the country and the number of border crossing out of there.2 The respondents were asked to answer the question: ‘What were the most important decisions you had to make since the beginning of the full-scale war until today?’Additional informationNotes on contributorsIryna MaidanikIryna Maidanik is a senior research fellow in the migration studies department of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine. She holds a PhD degree in Sociology. She has around 70 publications, among them – two personal books.","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135824837","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Pub Date : 2023-10-11DOI: 10.1080/14616696.2023.2267638
Ru Gao, Devi Sacchetto
ABSTRACTResearch on the childcare arrangements of migrant families has primarily focused on transnational childcare practices or childcare-work reconciliation in the host society, without paying appropriate attention to the dynamic and complex negotiation processes that underlie mobility-childcare coordination. This study proposes the concept of transnational childcare bricolage to explore how Chinese migrant families in Italy mobilize and (re)assemble transnationally located and/or unconventional resources and constantly (re)adjust childcare arrangements to achieve a nuanced match between evolving childcare demand and capacity. The study draws on in-depth interviews with members from 50 Chinese migrant families in Italy, as well as participant observation and multi-sited ethnographic observation. Through analyses of their mobility-childcare negotiation processes, we illustrate how migrant families from different social class backgrounds navigate the complexities and contingencies embedded within a family-state-transnational triad. Additionally, our research questions the ethnicized division of care work between migrants and natives, highlighting common experiences of marginalization and work-care tensions faced by women of similar socio-economic positioning, regardless of their ethnicity and/or nationality.KEYWORDS: Transnational mobilitychildcaretransnational childcare bricolageChinese migrant familyItaly AcknowledgementsWe would like to express our sincere gratitude to the reviewers and Professor Francesca Alice Vianello for their thoughtful and constructive comments, which greatly contributed to improving the quality of our manuscript.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In this article, we use business ownership as an analytical marker for social class positions within the specific context of Chinese migrants’ childcare strategies. We acknowledge that class identities and distinctions can be fluid, multifaceted, and situated on a continuum, as well as shaped by various factors, such as occupation, income, education, social status, and cultural capital. Nevertheless, our analysis of the interviewees’ experiences revealed the influential role of family businesses in shaping Chinese migrants’ childcare arrangements, which is consistent with the findings from prior studies (e.g., Ceccagno Citation2007; Citation2016; Krause and Bressan Citation2018). In our analysis of 50 Chinese migrant families, we observed limited ambiguity in class distinctions based on business ownership, as none of the interviewed parents occupied white-collar or managerial positions. Such occupations only have minimal representation within the overall employment landscape of Chinese migrants in Italy (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali Citation2022: 19).2 http://dati.istat.it/, retrieved 2023, 04, 26.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Univer
关于移民家庭托儿安排的研究主要集中在东道国社会的跨国托儿实践或托儿-工作协调方面,而没有适当关注流动-托儿协调背后的动态和复杂的谈判过程。本研究提出了跨国托儿拼装的概念,以探讨在意大利的中国移民家庭如何调动和(重新)组装跨国和/或非常规资源,并不断(重新)调整托儿安排,以实现不断变化的托儿需求和能力之间的微妙匹配。本研究通过对意大利50个中国移民家庭成员的深入访谈,以及参与式观察和多地点民族志观察。通过对流动-儿童保育谈判过程的分析,我们说明了来自不同社会阶层背景的移民家庭如何在家庭-国家-跨国三位一体中应对复杂性和偶然性。此外,我们的研究对移民和本地人之间护理工作的种族分工提出了质疑,强调了具有相似社会经济地位的妇女所面临的边缘化和工作护理紧张关系的共同经历,无论其种族和/或国籍如何。关键词:跨国流动儿童保育跨国托儿拼贴中国移民家庭意大利致谢感谢审稿人和Francesca Alice Vianello教授的周到和建设性意见,对提高我们稿件的质量做出了很大的贡献。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1在本文中,我们将企业所有权作为社会阶层地位的分析标记,并将其置于中国流动人口育儿策略的特定背景下。我们承认,阶级身份和区别可以是流动的、多方面的、处于连续统一体的,并受到职业、收入、教育、社会地位和文化资本等各种因素的影响。然而,我们对受访者经历的分析揭示了家族企业在塑造中国移民儿童保育安排方面的重要作用,这与之前的研究结果一致(例如,Ceccagno Citation2007;Citation2016;Krause and Bressan Citation2018)。在我们对50个中国移民家庭的分析中,我们观察到基于企业所有权的阶级区分有限的模糊性,因为受访的父母都没有担任白领或管理职位。这些职业在意大利中国移民的整体就业格局中只占最小的代表性(Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali Citation2022: 19)。2 http://dati.istat.it/,检索2023,04,26。本工作由北京外国语大学中央高校基本科研业务费资助,批准号:215500121003。高如,意大利帕多瓦大学社会科学博士,现任北京外国语大学欧洲语言与文化学院讲师。她的研究专长是中国和意大利的人口流动和文化互动领域。Devi Sacchetto是帕多瓦大学的工作社会学教授。主要研究方向为劳动力迁移与劳动力过程。他就这些主题发表了大量文章。他与加布里埃拉·阿尔贝蒂合著的《移民劳工的政治》一书预计将于2024年1月由布里斯托尔大学出版社出版。
{"title":"Constructing a transnational childcare bricolage: Chinese migrant families in Italy coordinating transnational mobility and childcare","authors":"Ru Gao, Devi Sacchetto","doi":"10.1080/14616696.2023.2267638","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2023.2267638","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTResearch on the childcare arrangements of migrant families has primarily focused on transnational childcare practices or childcare-work reconciliation in the host society, without paying appropriate attention to the dynamic and complex negotiation processes that underlie mobility-childcare coordination. This study proposes the concept of transnational childcare bricolage to explore how Chinese migrant families in Italy mobilize and (re)assemble transnationally located and/or unconventional resources and constantly (re)adjust childcare arrangements to achieve a nuanced match between evolving childcare demand and capacity. The study draws on in-depth interviews with members from 50 Chinese migrant families in Italy, as well as participant observation and multi-sited ethnographic observation. Through analyses of their mobility-childcare negotiation processes, we illustrate how migrant families from different social class backgrounds navigate the complexities and contingencies embedded within a family-state-transnational triad. Additionally, our research questions the ethnicized division of care work between migrants and natives, highlighting common experiences of marginalization and work-care tensions faced by women of similar socio-economic positioning, regardless of their ethnicity and/or nationality.KEYWORDS: Transnational mobilitychildcaretransnational childcare bricolageChinese migrant familyItaly AcknowledgementsWe would like to express our sincere gratitude to the reviewers and Professor Francesca Alice Vianello for their thoughtful and constructive comments, which greatly contributed to improving the quality of our manuscript.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 In this article, we use business ownership as an analytical marker for social class positions within the specific context of Chinese migrants’ childcare strategies. We acknowledge that class identities and distinctions can be fluid, multifaceted, and situated on a continuum, as well as shaped by various factors, such as occupation, income, education, social status, and cultural capital. Nevertheless, our analysis of the interviewees’ experiences revealed the influential role of family businesses in shaping Chinese migrants’ childcare arrangements, which is consistent with the findings from prior studies (e.g., Ceccagno Citation2007; Citation2016; Krause and Bressan Citation2018). In our analysis of 50 Chinese migrant families, we observed limited ambiguity in class distinctions based on business ownership, as none of the interviewed parents occupied white-collar or managerial positions. Such occupations only have minimal representation within the overall employment landscape of Chinese migrants in Italy (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali Citation2022: 19).2 http://dati.istat.it/, retrieved 2023, 04, 26.Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Univer","PeriodicalId":47392,"journal":{"name":"European Societies","volume":"129 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-10-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136097266","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}