Medicine Health Care and Philosophy最新文献

The carbon emissions of global health care activities make up 4-5% of total world emissions, placing it on par with the food sector. Carbon emissions are particularly relevant for health care because of climate change health hazards. Doctors and health care professionals must connect their health care delivery with carbon emissions and minimize resource use when possible as a part of their obligation to do no harm. Given that reducing carbon is a global ethical priority, the informed consent process in health care delivery must change. I argue that the expanded role of bioethicists in this climate crisis is to promote and support "green informed consent:" the sharing of climate information with patients, offering options for lower-carbon health care, and accepting the patient's right to decline treatments which are deemed too carbon intensive for their values.

The ethics review of qualitative health research poses various challenges that are due to a mismatch between the current practice of ethics review and the nature of qualitative methodology. The process of obtaining ethics approval for a study by a research ethics committee before the start of a research study has been described as "procedural ethics" and the identification and handling of ethical issues by researchers during the research process as "ethics in practice." While some authors dispute and other authors defend the use of procedural ethics in relation to qualitative health research, there is general agreement that it needs to be supplemented with ethics in practice. This article aims to provide an illustration of research ethics in practice by reflecting on the ways in which we identified and addressed ethical and methodological issues that arose in the context of an interview study with mental health service users and relatives. We describe the challenges we faced and the solutions we found in relation to the potential vulnerability of research participants, the voluntariness of consent, the increase of participant access and the heterogeneity of the sample, the protection of privacy and internal confidentiality, and the consideration of personal and contextual factors.

The aim of the study is to rethink the ethics of advanced motherhood. In the literature, delayed childbearing is usually discussed in the context of reproductive justice, and in relationship to ethical issues associated with the use and risk of assisted reproductive technologies. We aim to go beyond these more "traditional" ways in which reproductive ethics is framed by revisiting ethics itself through the lens of the figure of the so-called "older" mother. For this purpose, we start by exploring some of the deep seated socio-cultural discourses in the context of procreation: ageism, ableism and the widespread bias towards geneticism and pronatalism. Afterwards, we provide a critical overview of the key arguments against or in support of advanced motherhood. We then briefly discuss how entrenchment by both sides has produced an impasse in the debate on the ethics of advanced motherhood and proceed by arguing that it is fundamental to bring about a change in this narrative. For this purpose, we will revisit the feminist usage of the concept of vulnerability which will allow us both to criticize culturally prescribed norms about motherhood and to address the painful reality of age-related fertility decline. In the last section, we argue that instead of defining "older" motherhood as an ethical problem, we should problematize the fact that female reproductive ageing is an understudied and ill-sourced topic. We believe that allocating resources to research to better understand female reproductive ageing is not only ethically permissible, but might even be ethically desirable.

Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person's digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients' testimony and treatment preferences, which can be instances of epistemic injustice. We first explain what epistemic injustice is, and why it is argued to be an extensive problem in health and disability settings. We then explain why epistemic injustice is more likely to apply with even greater force in psychiatric contexts, and especially where digital phenotyping may be involved. Finally, we offer some tentative suggestions of how epistemic injustice can be minimised in digital psychiatry.

The global crisis of COVID-19 pandemic has considerably accelerated the use of teleconsultation (consultation between the patient and the doctor via video platforms). While it has some obvious benefits and drawbacks for both the patient and the doctor, it is important to consider-how teleconsultation impacts the quality of the patient-doctor relationship? I will approach this question through the lens of phenomenology of the body, focusing on the question-what happens to the patient objectification in teleconsultation? To answer this question I will adopt a phenomenological approach combining both insights drawn from the phenomenological tradition, i.e., the concepts of the lived body and the object body, and the results from the phenomenologically informed qualitative research study on the patient experience of teleconsultation. The theoretical background against which I have developed this study comprises discussions within the field of phenomenology of medicine regarding the different sources of patient objectification within clinical encounter and the arguments concerning the negative impact that objectification has on the quality of care. I will argue that a factor that has frequently been identified within phenomenology of medicine as the main source of patient objectification in clinical encounters, namely, the internalized gaze of the clinician, is diminished during teleconsultation, increasing patient's sense of agency, decreasing her sense of alienation and opening up the possibility for a closer relationship between the patient and the health care provider, all of which lead to the transformation of the hierarchical patient-health care professional relationship.

The biopsychosocial model (BPSM) is increasingly influential in medical research and practice. Several philosophers and scholars of health have criticized the BPSM for lacking meaningful scientific content. This article extends those critiques by showing how the BPSM's epistemic weaknesses have led to certain problems in medical discourse. Despite its lack of content, many researchers have mistaken the BPSM for a scientific model with explanatory power. This misapprehension has placed researchers in an implicit bind. There is an expectation that applications of the BPSM will deliver insights about disease; yet the model offers no tools for producing valid (or probabilistically true) knowledge claims. I argue that many researchers have, unwittingly, responded to this predicament by developing certain patterns of specious argumentation I call "wayward BPSM discourse." The arguments of wayward discourse share a common form: They appear to deliver insights about disease gleaned through applications of the BPSM; on closer inspection, however, we find that the putative conclusions presented are actually assertions resting on question-begging arguments, appeals to authority, and conceptual errors. Through several case studies of BPSM articles and literatures, this article describes wayward discourse and its effects. Wayward discourse has introduced into medicine forms of conceptual instability that threaten to undermine various lines of research. It has also created a potentially potent vector of medicalization. Fixing these problems will likely require reimposing conceptual rigor on BPSM discourse.

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic we are witnessing a significant rise in mental illness diagnosis and corresponding anti-depressant prescription uptake. The drug response to this situation is unsurprising and reinforces the dominant role (neuro)biology continues to undertake within modern psychiatry. In contrast to this biologically informed, medicalised approach, the World Health Organisation (WHO) issued a statement stressing the causal role of psychological and social factors.Using the concept of ontological insecurity, contextualised within the WHO guidance, the interrelation of psychological and social factors is illuminated, and a psychosocial framework is produced as a means of understanding the mental health consequence of the post-Covid-19 fallout.The psychosocial framework generated provides a rationale to revise and reprioritise how we engage with the biopsychosocial model that is intended to underpin modern psychiatry. This framework establishes a connection between psychological and social theory which are too often addressed as disparate terrains within mental health services and policy creation.

Abortion remains a controversial topic, with pro-life and pro-choice advocates clashing fiercely. However, public polling demonstrates that the vast majority of the Western public holds a middle position: being in favour of abortion but not in all circumstances nor at any time. The intuitions held by the majority seem to imply a contradiction: two early foetuses at the same point in development have different moral statuses. Providing coherent philosophical grounding for this intuition has proved challenging. Solutions given by philosophers such as Feinberg, Harman and Räsänen are complex and do not fully account for the lived experience of pregnancy loss. This article argues for a relational ontological construction of human personhood as the basis of foetal personhood. This approach takes seriously the literature of pregnancy loss and the lived experiences of pregnant persons. Focusing on the manner in which persons relate to early foetuses (especially pregnant persons), provides a coherent ground for distinct foetal value. Importantly, this approach is both simple and intuitive. Therefore, it can be more easily adopted by middle. To counter an implied equality of human relationality, the article argues for a clear hierarchy based on relational proximity that affirms pregnant persons? primary role in deciding the moral significance of foetal termination.