We present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule. (JEL D43, D44, D83)
{"title":"Slope Takers in Anonymous Markets","authors":"Daniel Quint, Marek Weretka","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220078","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220078","url":null,"abstract":"We present a learning-based selection argument for Linear Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a Walrasian auction. Endowments vary stochastically; traders model residual supply as linear, estimate its slope from past trade data, and periodically update these estimates. In the standard setting with quadratic preferences, we show that this learning process converges to the unique LBN. Anonymity and statistical learning therefore support this commonly used equilibrium selection rule. (JEL D43, D44, D83)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"134 6","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135161013","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privatization in many autocracies. Calibrating to Russian and Chinese data, simulations to mid-twenty-first century display widening wealth gaps between elites and the populace. Anocracies mitigate this outcome. (JEL D31, D72, K11, L33, O17, P26, P36)
{"title":"The Dynamics of Property Rights in Modern Autocracies","authors":"Dan Cao, Roger Lagunoff","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210229","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210229","url":null,"abstract":"We study a dynamic model of property appropriation in autocracies. To maintain the appearance of the rule of law, an autocrat reassigns property only when the reassignment is acceptable to all affected citizens. Nevertheless, the autocrat can appropriate public and private property by exploiting enforcement gaps. After an adjustment period, wealth shares of public property and the private property of out-groups decline. The model rationalizes the connection between wealth inequality and privatization in many autocracies. Calibrating to Russian and Chinese data, simulations to mid-twenty-first century display widening wealth gaps between elites and the populace. Anocracies mitigate this outcome. (JEL D31, D72, K11, L33, O17, P26, P36)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951731","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender’s service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling models that there is overinvestment in the action and that the possibility of misrepresentation may in fact improve welfare given self-reported signaling. (JEL D82, D83, I23, I26, J24)
{"title":"Self-Reported Signaling","authors":"Thomas Jungbauer, Michael Waldman","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210204","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210204","url":null,"abstract":"In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender’s service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling models that there is overinvestment in the action and that the possibility of misrepresentation may in fact improve welfare given self-reported signaling. (JEL D82, D83, I23, I26, J24)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"22 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135872869","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the past decades the number of news outlets has increased dramatically, but the quality of news products has declined. We propose a model to reconcile these facts where consumers’ attention allocation decisions not only depend on but also affect news outlets’ quality choices. When competition is intensified by new entries, the informativeness of the news industry rises. Thus, attention is diverted from existing outlets, reducing their incentives to improve news quality, which begets a downward spiral. Furthermore, when attention becomes cheaper, a larger number of news outlets can be accommodated in equilibrium, but news quality still falls. (JEL D83, L15, L82)
{"title":"Competition for Attention and News Quality","authors":"Heng Chen, Wing Suen","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210259","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210259","url":null,"abstract":"Over the past decades the number of news outlets has increased dramatically, but the quality of news products has declined. We propose a model to reconcile these facts where consumers’ attention allocation decisions not only depend on but also affect news outlets’ quality choices. When competition is intensified by new entries, the informativeness of the news industry rises. Thus, attention is diverted from existing outlets, reducing their incentives to improve news quality, which begets a downward spiral. Furthermore, when attention becomes cheaper, a larger number of news outlets can be accommodated in equilibrium, but news quality still falls. (JEL D83, L15, L82)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42926889","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the implications of the disclosure regime of ratings on the level of information released to the public. Specifically, we compare mandatory and voluntary disclosure. We analyze a model where the potential issuers are initially endowed with homogeneous soft information about their values before paying to acquire ratings. We find that for every accuracy level of the issuers’ initial information, voluntary disclosure results in a more informative equilibrium than mandatory disclosure. This finding identifies a dimension in which the existing European Union regulations that impose the mandatory disclosure of ratings may lead to a loss of information to the public. (JEL D21, D42, D43, D82, D83, G24)
{"title":"Disclosure in Markets for Ratings","authors":"R. Weksler, Boaz Zik","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210214","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210214","url":null,"abstract":"We study the implications of the disclosure regime of ratings on the level of information released to the public. Specifically, we compare mandatory and voluntary disclosure. We analyze a model where the potential issuers are initially endowed with homogeneous soft information about their values before paying to acquire ratings. We find that for every accuracy level of the issuers’ initial information, voluntary disclosure results in a more informative equilibrium than mandatory disclosure. This finding identifies a dimension in which the existing European Union regulations that impose the mandatory disclosure of ratings may lead to a loss of information to the public. (JEL D21, D42, D43, D82, D83, G24)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45162264","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever production is successful, and workers holding references are hired with certainty in the ensuing period. Compared to a setting without references: the bonus-contract offers are lower, yet the workers’ equilibrium effort is higher. Profits and welfare are higher, yet aggregate worker welfare is lower. Also, firms do not fully internalize the incentive effect of references and could typically increase profits and welfare by jointly raising bonuses. (JEL D82, D86, E24, J33, J41, L25, M51)
{"title":"Working for References","authors":"Samuel Häfner, Curtis R. Taylor","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210299","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210299","url":null,"abstract":"We analyze the incentive and welfare consequences of job references in a large economy marked by moral hazard, limited liability, exogenous job separation, and structural unemployment. In the firm-optimal equilibrium, employers provide references whenever production is successful, and workers holding references are hired with certainty in the ensuing period. Compared to a setting without references: the bonus-contract offers are lower, yet the workers’ equilibrium effort is higher. Profits and welfare are higher, yet aggregate worker welfare is lower. Also, firms do not fully internalize the incentive effect of references and could typically increase profits and welfare by jointly raising bonuses. (JEL D82, D86, E24, J33, J41, L25, M51)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135872123","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Marco Stenborg Petterson, David Seim, Jesse M. Shapiro
We study the problem of learning about the effect of one market-level variable (e.g., price) on another (e.g., quantity) in the presence of shocks to unobservables (e.g., preferences). We show that economic intuitions about the plausible size of the shocks can be informative about the parameter of interest. We illustrate with a main application to the grain market. (JEL D83, E23, G13, Q11)
{"title":"Bounds on a Slope from Size Restrictions on Economic Shocks","authors":"Marco Stenborg Petterson, David Seim, Jesse M. Shapiro","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210365","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210365","url":null,"abstract":"We study the problem of learning about the effect of one market-level variable (e.g., price) on another (e.g., quantity) in the presence of shocks to unobservables (e.g., preferences). We show that economic intuitions about the plausible size of the shocks can be informative about the parameter of interest. We illustrate with a main application to the grain market. (JEL D83, E23, G13, Q11)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"54 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135872871","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers that supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The mechanism underlying this exclusion is that the compensation required by the retailer to renounce selling the rival product erodes with its buyer power. We further show that our theory holds when buyer power differs across manufacturers or when the retailer can strategically narrow (or expand) its product assortment. (JEL D42, D43, K21, L42, L60, L81)
{"title":"A Buyer Power Theory of Exclusive Dealing and Exclusionary Bundling","authors":"Claire Chambolle, Hugo Molina","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210191","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210191","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a unified theory of exclusive dealing and exclusionary bundling. In a framework with two competing manufacturers that supply their product(s) through a monopolist retailer, we show that buyer power restores the profitability of such practices involving inefficient exclusion. The mechanism underlying this exclusion is that the compensation required by the retailer to renounce selling the rival product erodes with its buyer power. We further show that our theory holds when buyer power differs across manufacturers or when the retailer can strategically narrow (or expand) its product assortment. (JEL D42, D43, K21, L42, L60, L81)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"31 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134951506","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players’ bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez-faire policy—i.e., no cap—is optimal when the designer maximizes the aggregate bid. The results also generate novel practical implications. (JEL C72, D44, D82)
{"title":"Bid Caps in Noisy Contests","authors":"Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Yuxuan Zhu","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220046","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220046","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players’ bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez-faire policy—i.e., no cap—is optimal when the designer maximizes the aggregate bid. The results also generate novel practical implications. (JEL C72, D44, D82)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42736736","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts’ disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits underreaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on the procedure used to exploit the data. (JEL C78, D82, D83)
{"title":"Bargaining over Treatment Choice under Disagreement","authors":"Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Robert J. Gary-Bobo","doi":"10.1257/mic.20210392","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20210392","url":null,"abstract":"A group of experts with different prior beliefs must choose a treatment. A dataset is made public and leads to revisions of beliefs. We propose a model where the experts’ disagreements are resolved through bargaining, using the Nash bargaining solution. Experts bargain after disclosure of the dataset. Bargaining may lead to an inefficient use of information in a strong sense: experts receive a lower payoff in every state and for any prior belief (i.e., inadmissibility). Bargaining exhibits underreaction to information as compared to the normative solution in which experts bargain ex ante on the procedure used to exploit the data. (JEL C78, D82, D83)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45131170","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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