We study mix-and-match compatibility choices of firms selling complementary products in a dynamic setting. Contrary to what happens in a static setting where symmetric firms choose compatibility (Matutes and Regibeau 1988), when switching costs are high and firms make price discrimination based on past purchases, symmetric firms choose incompatibility to soften future competition if the discount factor is large, which harms consumers. Interoperability increases consumer surplus at least for high switching costs. Data portability, by reducing switching costs, induces the firms to choose compatibility more often but, given a compatibility regime, benefits consumers only if a nonnegative pricing constraint binds. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D82, L86)
本文研究了动态环境下销售互补产品的企业的混搭兼容性选择。与静态环境下对称企业选择兼容性(Matutes and Regibeau 1988)相反，当转换成本高，企业根据过去的购买行为进行价格歧视时，对称企业选择不兼容性来软化未来的竞争，如果折扣系数很大，这会损害消费者。互操作性至少增加了高转换成本的消费者剩余。数据可移植性通过降低转换成本，促使公司更频繁地选择兼容性，但在给定兼容性制度的情况下，只有在非负定价约束约束下才能使消费者受益。(jel d11, d21, d43, d82, l86)
{"title":"Compatibility Choices, Switching Costs, and Data Portability","authors":"Doh-Shin Jeon, D. Menicucci, Nikrooz Nasr","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200309","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200309","url":null,"abstract":"We study mix-and-match compatibility choices of firms selling complementary products in a dynamic setting. Contrary to what happens in a static setting where symmetric firms choose compatibility (Matutes and Regibeau 1988), when switching costs are high and firms make price discrimination based on past purchases, symmetric firms choose incompatibility to soften future competition if the discount factor is large, which harms consumers. Interoperability increases consumer surplus at least for high switching costs. Data portability, by reducing switching costs, induces the firms to choose compatibility more often but, given a compatibility regime, benefits consumers only if a nonnegative pricing constraint binds. (JEL D11, D21, D43, D82, L86)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48135074","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide experimental evidence on coordination within large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world markets. We use a bank run game where the two pure-strategy equilibria can be ranked by payoff and risk dominance and a sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size effects that theory fails to predict. When the payoff-dominant strategy is risky enough, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of the behavior in large groups: unlike smaller groups of size ten, larger groups exclusively coordinate on the Pareto-inferior strategy and never coordinate on sunspots. (JEL C92, D83, D91, G21)
{"title":"Ten Isn’t Large! Group Size and Coordination in a Large-Scale Experiment","authors":"Jasmina Arifovic, Cars Hommes, Anita Kopányi-Peuker, Isabelle Salle","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200290","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200290","url":null,"abstract":"We provide experimental evidence on coordination within large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world markets. We use a bank run game where the two pure-strategy equilibria can be ranked by payoff and risk dominance and a sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size effects that theory fails to predict. When the payoff-dominant strategy is risky enough, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of the behavior in large groups: unlike smaller groups of size ten, larger groups exclusively coordinate on the Pareto-inferior strategy and never coordinate on sunspots. (JEL C92, D83, D91, G21)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136177750","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies a canonical dynamic screening problem where the agent has Markovian private information and limited commitment and the principal and the agent have different discount factors. Unequal discounting captures unequal access to capital markets. In comparison to standard models of dynamic mechanism design, the principal no longer finds it optimal to maximally back-load the agent’s information rents: a new force of inter-temporal cost of incentive provision pushes toward front-loading agents’ payoffs. The optimal contract settles into a cycle with infinite memory. The introduction of unequal discounting renders the standard relaxed-problem approach invalid for certain parameters. A simple and approximately optimal contract is then provided. (JEL D21, D61, D82, D86, L14)
{"title":"Implications of Unequal Discounting in Dynamic Contracting","authors":"Ilia Krasikov, Rohit Lamba, Thomas Mettral","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200427","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200427","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies a canonical dynamic screening problem where the agent has Markovian private information and limited commitment and the principal and the agent have different discount factors. Unequal discounting captures unequal access to capital markets. In comparison to standard models of dynamic mechanism design, the principal no longer finds it optimal to maximally back-load the agent’s information rents: a new force of inter-temporal cost of incentive provision pushes toward front-loading agents’ payoffs. The optimal contract settles into a cycle with infinite memory. The introduction of unequal discounting renders the standard relaxed-problem approach invalid for certain parameters. A simple and approximately optimal contract is then provided. (JEL D21, D61, D82, D86, L14)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136169081","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the effects of a price transparency regulation in Israeli supermarkets. Using price data collected before and after the regulation and a difference-in-difference research design, we show that price levels and price dispersion declined significantly after the regulation. Chains also began setting identical prices in all stores. We use Robert and Stahl (1993) to interpret our findings, showing that low-priced chains extensively used price advertising after prices became transparent. These chains referenced price-comparison surveys conducted by the media to induce credibility for ads. Our findings highlight the importance of price transparency and the procompetitive role of informative advertising. (JEL D22, D83, L11, L81, L82, L88, M37)
{"title":"Price Transparency, Media, and Informative Advertising","authors":"Itai Ater, Oren Rigbi","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200337","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200337","url":null,"abstract":"We study the effects of a price transparency regulation in Israeli supermarkets. Using price data collected before and after the regulation and a difference-in-difference research design, we show that price levels and price dispersion declined significantly after the regulation. Chains also began setting identical prices in all stores. We use Robert and Stahl (1993) to interpret our findings, showing that low-priced chains extensively used price advertising after prices became transparent. These chains referenced price-comparison surveys conducted by the media to induce credibility for ads. Our findings highlight the importance of price transparency and the procompetitive role of informative advertising. (JEL D22, D83, L11, L81, L82, L88, M37)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"133 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135962655","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
An information designer wishes to persuade agents to invest in a project of unknown quality. To do so, she must induce investment and collect feedback from these investments. Motivated by data regulations and simplicity concerns, our designer faces communication constraints. These constraints hinder her without benefiting the agents: they impose an upper bound on the induced belief spread, limiting persuasion. Nevertheless, two-rating systems (direct recommendations) are the optimal design when experimentation is needed to generate information and approximate the designer’s first-best payoff for specific feedback structures. When the designer has altruistic motives, constrained rules significantly decrease welfare. (JEL D64, D82, D83)
{"title":"Dynamic Information Design under Constrained Communication Rules","authors":"Caio Lorecchio, Daniel Monte","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200356","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200356","url":null,"abstract":"An information designer wishes to persuade agents to invest in a project of unknown quality. To do so, she must induce investment and collect feedback from these investments. Motivated by data regulations and simplicity concerns, our designer faces communication constraints. These constraints hinder her without benefiting the agents: they impose an upper bound on the induced belief spread, limiting persuasion. Nevertheless, two-rating systems (direct recommendations) are the optimal design when experimentation is needed to generate information and approximate the designer’s first-best payoff for specific feedback structures. When the designer has altruistic motives, constrained rules significantly decrease welfare. (JEL D64, D82, D83)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45067570","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies optimal contest design in contests with noisy performance. Here, contest design is a team moral hazard problem that endogenizes the assignment rule that maps performance profiles into winning probabilities. The optimal design features endogenous standards for eligibility, and the number of prizes that are awarded may be stochastic. Generally, one group of agents is identified as “first claimants” of prizes, contingent on performance exceeding a threshold of excellence. However, which group wins prizes more often depends on the designer’s objective function and the performance technologies. Finally, the approach derives endogenous, microfounded, and fully optimal contest success functions. (JEL D44, D82)
{"title":"Contest Design with Stochastic Performance","authors":"René Kirkegaard","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200422","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200422","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies optimal contest design in contests with noisy performance. Here, contest design is a team moral hazard problem that endogenizes the assignment rule that maps performance profiles into winning probabilities. The optimal design features endogenous standards for eligibility, and the number of prizes that are awarded may be stochastic. Generally, one group of agents is identified as “first claimants” of prizes, contingent on performance exceeding a threshold of excellence. However, which group wins prizes more often depends on the designer’s objective function and the performance technologies. Finally, the approach derives endogenous, microfounded, and fully optimal contest success functions. (JEL D44, D82)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43587565","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies the effects of time preferences on cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game experiment. Subjects play repeated games in the lab, all decisions at once, but stage game payoffs are paid over an extended period of time. Changing the time window of stage game payoffs (weekly or monthly) varies discount factors, and a delay for the first-stage game payoffs eliminates/weakens present bias. First, subjects with weekly payments cooperate more than subjects with monthly payments—higher discount factors promote greater cooperation. Second, the rate of cooperation is higher when there is a delay—present bias reduces cooperation. (JEL C72, C73, D91)
{"title":"The Effects of Time Preferences on Cooperation: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games","authors":"Jeongbin Kim","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200195","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200195","url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies the effects of time preferences on cooperation in an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game experiment. Subjects play repeated games in the lab, all decisions at once, but stage game payoffs are paid over an extended period of time. Changing the time window of stage game payoffs (weekly or monthly) varies discount factors, and a delay for the first-stage game payoffs eliminates/weakens present bias. First, subjects with weekly payments cooperate more than subjects with monthly payments—higher discount factors promote greater cooperation. Second, the rate of cooperation is higher when there is a delay—present bias reduces cooperation. (JEL C72, C73, D91)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.4,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"45211543","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents’ information leads to another stable state. (JEL C78, D83)
{"title":"A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information","authors":"Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200411","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200411","url":null,"abstract":"We provide a framework for studying two-sided matching markets with incomplete information. The framework accommodates two-sided incomplete information as well as heterogeneous information among the agents. We propose a notion called stability for a market state, which, based upon agents’ information structure, requires (i) individual rationality, (ii) no blocking, and (iii) information stability. The novelty of our stability notion lies in how the agents evaluate a blocking prospect in the presence of general two-sided incomplete information. We show that a stable state exists; moreover, if a state is stable, then coarsening agents’ information leads to another stable state. (JEL C78, D83)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136169083","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Sam Cosaert, Alexandros Theloudis, Bertrand Verheyden
Spending time with a spouse is a major gain from marriage. We extend the classical collective model of the household to allow for togetherness between spouses. Togetherness takes the form of joint leisure and joint care for children. Using revealed preference conditions and Dutch data over the years 2009–2012, we find that households are willing to pay €1.20 per hour—10 percent of the average wage—to convert private leisure to joint leisure and €2.10 per hour to convert private childcare to joint childcare. Our results suggest togetherness is an important component of household time use despite being overlooked in the economics literature. (JEL D12, D13, J12, J13, J16, J22)
{"title":"Togetherness in the Household","authors":"Sam Cosaert, Alexandros Theloudis, Bertrand Verheyden","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200220","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200220","url":null,"abstract":"Spending time with a spouse is a major gain from marriage. We extend the classical collective model of the household to allow for togetherness between spouses. Togetherness takes the form of joint leisure and joint care for children. Using revealed preference conditions and Dutch data over the years 2009–2012, we find that households are willing to pay €1.20 per hour—10 percent of the average wage—to convert private leisure to joint leisure and €2.10 per hour to convert private childcare to joint childcare. Our results suggest togetherness is an important component of household time use despite being overlooked in the economics literature. (JEL D12, D13, J12, J13, J16, J22)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"44 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135499814","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fabricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project’s quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strategies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabricated and a later stage in which evidence is always authentic. Our findings shed light on the dynamics of R&D, quality assurance, and drug approval. (JEL D82, D83, L15)
{"title":"Sequential Learning","authors":"Yair Antler, Daniel Bird, Santiago Oliveros","doi":"10.1257/mic.20200352","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200352","url":null,"abstract":"We develop a model in which two players sequentially and publicly examine a project. In our model the player who moves first can fabricate evidence to influence the second mover, which creates a moral hazard problem. We find that early strategic uncertainty can mitigate this problem. In particular, for intermediate prior beliefs about the project’s quality, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is in mixed strategies and consists of an early stage in which evidence may be fabricated and a later stage in which evidence is always authentic. Our findings shed light on the dynamics of R&D, quality assurance, and drug approval. (JEL D82, D83, L15)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":"226 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"136177749","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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