Philosophical Psychology最新文献

{"title":"Why do people seem to be more utilitarian in VR than in questionnaires?","authors":"Bartosz Maćkiewicz, Jan Wodowski, Joanna Andrusiewicz","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2282060","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2282060","url":null,"abstract":"Several experimental studies on moral judgment and moral decision-making show that in virtual reality people tend to make more “characteristically utilitarian” decisions than when responding to sta...","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"17 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138547997","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Testing thrasymachus’ hypothesis: the psychological processes behind power justification","authors":"Francesco Rigoli","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2290166","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2290166","url":null,"abstract":"Research on distributive justice has shown that people’s judgments on how to distribute resources justly are shaped by various criteria including equity, need, equality, and prior ownership. Yet, a...","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"232 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505376","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Correlative externalism about colour phenomenology","authors":"Adam Balmer","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2290181","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2290181","url":null,"abstract":"Externalism about colour phenomenology claims that the phenomenal character of colour experiences is determined by mind-independent properties of perceptual objects. The structural mismatch argumen...","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"205 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-12-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505385","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Rational intuitions: How reason underlies deontological moral judgments","authors":"Arjan S. Heir","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2290172","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2290172","url":null,"abstract":"Joshua Greene’s dual process account contends that deontological moral judgments are the result of intuitions that are automatic, emotional and arational. Deontological intuitions cannot be trusted...","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"213 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-11-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505382","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Narrative self-constitution as embodied practice","authors":"Katsunori Miyahara, Shogo Tanaka","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2286281","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2286281","url":null,"abstract":"Narrative views of the self argue that we constitute our self in self-narratives. Embodied views hold that our self is shaped through embodied experiences. In that case, what is the relation betwee...","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"218 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-11-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505379","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Linguistic justice in academic philosophy: the rise of English and the unjust distribution of epistemic goods","authors":"Peter Finocchiaro, Timothy Perrine","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2284243","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2284243","url":null,"abstract":"English continues to rise as the lingua franca of academic philosophy. Philosophers from all types of linguistic backgrounds use it to communicate with each other across the globe. In this paper, w...","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"210 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-11-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505384","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Affordances from a control viewpoint","authors":"Joëlle Proust","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2274489","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2274489","url":null,"abstract":"Perceiving an armchair prepares us to sit. Reading the first line in a text prepares us to read it. This article proposes that the affordance construct used to explain reactive potentiation of beha...","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"215 ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.4,"publicationDate":"2023-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"138505381","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Who did it? Moral wrongness for us and them in the UK, US, and Brazil","authors":"Paulo Sérgio Boggio, Gabriel Gaudêncio Rêgo, Jim A.C. Everett, Graziela Bonato Vieira, Rose Graves, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTMorality has traditionally been described in terms of an impartial and objective “moral law”, and moral psychological research has largely followed in this vein, focusing on abstract moral judgments. But might our moral judgments be shaped not just by what the action is, but who is doing it? We looked at ratings of moral wrongness, manipulating whether the person doing the action was a friend, a refugee, or a stranger. We looked at these ratings across various moral foundations, and conducted the study in Brazil, US, and UK samples. Our most robust and consistent findings are that purity violations were judged more harshly when committed by ingroup members and less harshly when committed by the refugees in comparison to the unspecified agents, the difference between refugee and unspecified agents decays from liberals to conservatives, i.e., conservatives judge them more harshly than liberals do, and Brazilians participants are harsher than the US and UK participants. Our results suggest that purity violations are judged differently according to who committed them and according to the political ideology of the judges. We discuss the findings in light of various theories of groups dynamics, such as moral hypocrisy, moral disengagement, and the black sheep effect.KEYWORDS: Moral foundations theoryblack sheep effectmoral hypocrisymoral judgmentrefugeesingroupoutgroup Disclosure statementThere were no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with a direct financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in the manuscript. All authors contributed to manuscript writing and approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.Open practices statementData, materials, and analysis codes can be found in the OSF website via the following link: https://osf.io/ge2mk/?view_only=82e54b480c5e40a38cd5530ab7032c77Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2278637Additional informationFundingThis research was supported by CAPES - PRINT (Programa Institucional de Internacionalização; Grant # 88887.310255/2018-00), CAPESP – PROEX (Grant 3 04236/2021), CNPq - INCT (National Institute of Science and Technology on Social and Affective Neuroscience, grant #. 406463/2022-0). PSB is supported by a CNPq researcher fellowship (309905/2019-2). GVB was supported by a scientific initiation grant: nº 2017/11131-0, São Paulo Research Foundation (FAPESP). GGR was supported by a postdoc grant: nº 2019/26665-5 (FAPESP). WSA was supported by John Templeton Foundation grant 62280. JACE was supported by a Philip Leverhulme Prize from the Leverhulme Trust (PLP-2021-095).","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"52 44","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"134902338","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"(The possibility of) responsibility for delusions","authors":"Marie van Loon","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2279244","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2279244","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn this paper I argue that a prominent account of doxastic responsibility, Epistemic Reasons-Responsiveness can be amended to avoid two problems with its treatment of delusions. I do so by appealing to Carolina Flores’ recent work on the evidence-responsiveness of delusions: by excluding what Flores calls masking factors from the mechanism of reasons-responsiveness, we are able to accommodate the possibility for individuals with delusions to be responsible for their belief. I conclude by motivating that this possibility is one we should care about.KEYWORDS: Delusionsdoxastic responsibilityreasons-responsivenessirrationality AcknowledgementsI am indebted to two anonymous referees for their invaluable comments and challenges on two previous versions of this paper. My thanks also to Miriam Schleifer McCormick for reading and sharing her insights on an early draft. I am thankful to audiences at The Value of Irrationality workshop (University of Zurich), the Responsibility, Psychopathology & Stigma conference (University of Antwerp), and the DGPhil 7th Graduate Conference (University of Erlangen) for their feedback on earlier version of this work.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. For the sake of this discussion, I take delusions to be beliefs, following Bortolotti (Citation2012) and Bayne and Pacherie (Citation2005). This view about the nature of delusions is of course debated. This assumption is justified insofar the discussion at hand is only relevant under this assumption, reasons-responsiveness being a property of beliefs and not of acceptances (Dub, Citation2017; Frankish, Citation2009, Citation2012), imaginings (Currie & Ravenscroft, Citation2002), or other entities delusions are sometimes thought to be.2. Against this classic tenet of contemporary epistemology, some philosophers defend a voluntarist position (Peels, Citation2015; Steup, Citation2017).3. McHugh (Citation2017), p. 27514. McHugh (Citation2017), p. 27515. McHugh, following Schleifer McCormick (Citation2011; Schleifer McCormick, Citation2014), Steup (Citation2008) and the original instigators of the Reasons-Responsiveness view, Fischer and Ravizza (Citation1998).6. I suspect that this worry touches on the very much debated question of epistemic agency. Briefly put, the question, “is there genuine epistemic agency?” or put differently, “do we believe for reasons in the same way we act and decide for reasons?” is a dividing and multifaceted one. Engaging with this question is beyond both the scope and the relevance of the present work. Therefore, I prefer not to stir up the hornet’s nest. Let me simply stress that this paper assumes with other scholars working on doxastic responsibility that there is epistemic agency.7. The individuation of mechanism raises, (in)famously, some thorny questions (Ginet, Citation2006; McKenna, Citation2013). They strongly parallel questions involved in what is known in epistemology as the pro","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":" 24","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135286526","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}

{"title":"Social kind generics and the dichotomizing perspective","authors":"Will Fraker","doi":"10.1080/09515089.2023.2276307","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2276307","url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTGenerics about social kinds (or GSKs) frequently propagate descriptions that carry normative force (e.g., “women are emotional”). Some philosophers of language attribute this to GSKs’ tendency to transmit essentialist beliefs about social kinds. According to these accounts, utterances of GSKs implicate that there is something in the nature of social kinds that causes them to possess the properties described, and that individual members of these social kinds therefore ought to exhibit (or be expected to exhibit) these properties. Here, I draw on empirical evidence to suggest an alternative account. According to my framework, an utterance of a GSK implicates a distinction between the social kind described and its salient conceptual opposite, producing what I call a dichotomizing perspective. For example, “women are emotional” suggests that men are not. Importantly, such distinctions frequently persist in the societal common ground as a function of social power, in part due to their alignment with hierarchical social structures between dichotomized social kinds. This enables such GSKs to perpetuate biased patterns of attention, expectation, and behavior even in the absence of essentialist belief.KEYWORDS: Genericssocial kindspragmaticspsychological essentialismdichotomizing perspectivesocial structure AcknowledgementsThank you to Dan Weiskopf for the sustained support, insightful conversation, and many rounds of patient, thoughtful feedback. Thank you to Christie Hartley and Andrea Scarantino for the helpful comments and conversations about earlier drafts of the paper.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).","PeriodicalId":47485,"journal":{"name":"Philosophical Psychology","volume":"58 3","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0,"publicationDate":"2023-11-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"135725429","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}