Brittany Lewis, Molly Calhoun, Edward G. Goetz, Anthony Damiano
This paper highlights the qualitative component of a larger mixed methodological study that explores how community stakeholders, most impacted by gentrification pressures in the Twin Cities, understand neighborhood change as it impacts their daily lives. The purpose is to expand the current theorization of gentrification through examining the lived experiences of those most impacted. We illuminate where community stakeholders' experiences align with and diverge from the common narrative themes often cited in contemporary gentrification literature such as demographic change and physical displacement. Although common narrative frames emerged, narrative distinctions also materialized. This differentiation highlights how gentrification pressures not only influence the redevelopment of physical space, but also culture and belonging in ways that can be distinctly different even in neighborhoods of close proximity. The implications suggest the importance of geographic specificity in policy and program approaches based on distinct histories of neighborhoods and their residents.
{"title":"Geographic Specificity Matters: Centering the Perspectives of Community-Based Stakeholders for a Holistic Understanding of Gentrification in the Twin Cities","authors":"Brittany Lewis, Molly Calhoun, Edward G. Goetz, Anthony Damiano","doi":"10.1111/cico.12492","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12492","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This paper highlights the qualitative component of a larger mixed methodological study that explores how community stakeholders, most impacted by gentrification pressures in the Twin Cities, understand neighborhood change as it impacts their daily lives. The purpose is to expand the current theorization of gentrification through examining the lived experiences of those most impacted. We illuminate where community stakeholders' experiences align with and diverge from the common narrative themes often cited in contemporary gentrification literature such as demographic change and physical displacement. Although common narrative frames emerged, narrative distinctions also materialized. This differentiation highlights how gentrification pressures not only influence the redevelopment of physical space, but also culture and belonging in ways that can be distinctly different even in neighborhoods of close proximity. The implications suggest the importance of geographic specificity in policy and program approaches based on distinct histories of neighborhoods and their residents.</p>","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-06-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12492","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"46438113","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Extreme poverty, violence, or persecution have traditionally been viewed as legitimate reasons for resettlement in another country. After all, theUnited States “founding fathers” fled Great Britain in pursuit of religious freedom. However, although countries benefit from incoming immigrants, increasing flows of migration from select “sending” countries has generated hostility from the native-born of “receiving” countries. During migration, the view of immigrants as victims needing humanitarian aid shifts to that of criminals requiring control. This shift perpetuates a feedback loop, confounding the status of immigrants as victims and criminals simultaneously. Migrants experience numerous vulnerabilities that increase victimization risk in their homeland and throughout the migration process. Meanwhile, the perceived threat of immigrants entering the United States (regardless of legality) increase restrictive policies. The enforcement and publicity of such policies simultaneously stigmatize immigrants and fuel the perception of vulnerability, leaving immigrants susceptible to targeting and victimization on U.S. soil. This essay begins with a brief overview of immigration and immigration policy, followed by a discussion on the Minority Threat Framework (MTF) (King andWheelock 2007) and its present focus on Latinx immigrants. “Solutions” to the immigrant “threat” are then examined in relation to subsequent postmigration immigrant victimization.
极端贫困、暴力或迫害历来被视为在另一个国家重新定居的正当理由。毕竟，美国的“开国元勋”是为了追求宗教自由而逃离英国的。然而，尽管各国从入境移民中受益，但来自某些“派遣”国家的移民流动日益增加，引起了“接收”国家土生土长的人的敌意。在移民过程中，将移民视为需要人道主义援助的受害者的观点转变为需要控制的罪犯的观点。这种转变延续了一个反馈循环，同时混淆了移民作为受害者和罪犯的身份。移徙者面临着许多脆弱性，增加了在其家园和整个移徙过程中受害的风险。与此同时，移民进入美国(不管是否合法)所带来的威胁增加了限制性政策。这些政策的执行和宣传同时使移民蒙上了污名，加剧了他们的脆弱感，使移民在美国领土上容易成为攻击目标和受害者。本文首先简要概述了移民和移民政策，然后讨论了少数民族威胁框架(MTF) (King and wheelock 2007)及其目前对拉丁裔移民的关注。移民“威胁”的“解决方案”，然后与随后的移民后受害进行审查。
{"title":"From Victim to Criminal and Back: The Minority Threat Framework's Impact on Latinx Immigrants","authors":"Krystlelynn Caraballo","doi":"10.1111/cico.12495","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12495","url":null,"abstract":"Extreme poverty, violence, or persecution have traditionally been viewed as legitimate reasons for resettlement in another country. After all, theUnited States “founding fathers” fled Great Britain in pursuit of religious freedom. However, although countries benefit from incoming immigrants, increasing flows of migration from select “sending” countries has generated hostility from the native-born of “receiving” countries. During migration, the view of immigrants as victims needing humanitarian aid shifts to that of criminals requiring control. This shift perpetuates a feedback loop, confounding the status of immigrants as victims and criminals simultaneously. Migrants experience numerous vulnerabilities that increase victimization risk in their homeland and throughout the migration process. Meanwhile, the perceived threat of immigrants entering the United States (regardless of legality) increase restrictive policies. The enforcement and publicity of such policies simultaneously stigmatize immigrants and fuel the perception of vulnerability, leaving immigrants susceptible to targeting and victimization on U.S. soil. This essay begins with a brief overview of immigration and immigration policy, followed by a discussion on the Minority Threat Framework (MTF) (King andWheelock 2007) and its present focus on Latinx immigrants. “Solutions” to the immigrant “threat” are then examined in relation to subsequent postmigration immigrant victimization.","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12495","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"42872189","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Although situating itself at the core, the mainstream is not the center that embraces and draws the diverse nation together. Although attributing to itself a singleness of purpose and resolve, the mainstream is neither uniform nor powerful in its imperialism and hegemony. Although casting the periphery beyond the bounds of civility and religion, the mainstream derives its identity, its integrity, from its representation of the other. And despite its authorship of the central tenets of democracy, the mainstream has been silent on the publication of its creed. In fact, the margin has tested and ensured the guarantees of citizenship, and the margins have been the true defender of American democracy, equality, and liberty. From that vantage, we can see the margin as mainstream.
{"title":"“The Land of the Free and the Home of the Brave”: Lessons Learned in (Im)migrant Communities","authors":"Jung Ha Kim","doi":"10.1111/cico.12496","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12496","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Although situating itself at the core, the mainstream is not the center that embraces and draws the diverse nation together. Although attributing to itself a singleness of purpose and resolve, the mainstream is neither uniform nor powerful in its imperialism and hegemony. Although casting the periphery beyond the bounds of civility and religion, the mainstream derives its identity, its integrity, from its representation of the other. And despite its authorship of the central tenets of democracy, the mainstream has been silent on the publication of its creed. In fact, the margin has tested and ensured the guarantees of citizenship, and the margins have been the true defender of American democracy, equality, and liberty. From that vantage, we can see the margin as mainstream.</p>","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12496","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44357865","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
It is now well established that the concentric zone model, developed by Ernest Burgess and elaborated by others in the Chicago School of Sociology to explain the distribution of social groups in metropolitan areas, was wrong. In the past several decades, immigrants have not only moved out of the centers of U.S. metropolitan areas, many have bypassed central cities altogether and settled directly in suburbs. Increasingly, they have done so in nontraditional gateway cities, such as those in the American South and Rustbelt, and in smaller metropolitan or nonmetropolitan areas (Singer et al. 2008). Suburban settlement has also not clearly been associated with immigrants’ “move up” or integration into the so-called Americanmainstream, as Chicago school authors argued. In many rapidly growing metropolitan areas, rising housing prices have pushed many immigrants out of their historic urban neighborhoods. While post-World War II visions of the American Dream may still pull immigrants to suburbia, the communities into which many have settled hardly reflect that dream.While Asian immigrants have high rates of settlement in middle-class, affluent, and white suburban neighborhoods, other immigrants more commonly settle into suburbs with relatively high rates of foreclosure, poverty, segregation, and other measures of disadvantage (Farrell 2016; Logan 2014). These are not the touted “opportunity neighborhoods” that provide pathways to economic mobility. In fact, compared to central city ethnic enclaves, many provide less of the social, cultural and institutional supports that have traditionally promoted the economic advancement of immigrants and their children. Chicago School scholars also failed to account for the politics within suburbs that challenge not only immigrants’ ability to settle within particular communities, but also to achieve their own purposes and pursuits within them. My research on immigrants in suburbia has sought to fill some of these gaps. It has investigated the struggles of educated, professional Asian immigrants to establish a place for themselves within largely white, middle-class suburbs in Silicon Valley. In the Washington, DC suburbs, I have examined how lower-income, primarily Latino and African immigrants have fought to maintain a presence within redeveloping neighborhoods with rising gentrification and displacement pressures.
由欧内斯特·伯吉斯(Ernest Burgess)提出并由芝加哥社会学学派的其他人进一步阐述的同心区模型，现在已经被公认为是错误的，该模型用来解释大都市地区社会群体的分布。在过去的几十年里，移民不仅搬出了美国大都市区的中心，而且许多人完全绕过中心城市，直接在郊区定居。在非传统的门户城市，如美国南部和锈带，以及较小的大都市或非大都市地区，他们越来越多地这样做(Singer et al. 2008)。正如芝加哥学派的作者所言，郊区定居与移民的“向上移动”或融入所谓的美国主流之间也没有明显的联系。在许多快速发展的大都市地区，不断上涨的房价迫使许多移民离开了历史悠久的城市社区。尽管二战后的美国梦可能仍会把移民吸引到郊区，但许多人定居的社区很难反映出这个梦想。虽然亚洲移民在中产阶级、富人和白人郊区的定居率很高，但其他移民更普遍地定居在丧失抵押品赎回权、贫困、种族隔离和其他不利因素相对较高的郊区(Farrell 2016;洛根2014)。这些都不是被吹捧的“机会社区”，提供经济流动的途径。事实上，与中心城市的少数民族聚居区相比，许多聚居区提供的社会、文化和制度支持更少，而传统上，这些支持促进了移民及其子女的经济发展。芝加哥学派的学者们也没有考虑到郊区的政治，这不仅挑战了移民在特定社区定居的能力，也挑战了移民在社区内实现自己的目标和追求的能力。我对郊区移民的研究试图填补其中的一些空白。它调查了受过教育的专业亚洲移民在硅谷以白人中产阶级为主的郊区为自己争取一席之地的斗争。在华盛顿特区的郊区，我研究了低收入移民，主要是拉丁裔和非洲移民，是如何努力在重新开发的社区中保持存在的，这些社区面临着日益加剧的中产阶级化和流离失所的压力。
{"title":"Out of the Urban Shadows: Uneven Development and Spatial Politics in Immigrant Suburbs","authors":"Willow S. Lung-Amam","doi":"10.1111/cico.12494","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12494","url":null,"abstract":"It is now well established that the concentric zone model, developed by Ernest Burgess and elaborated by others in the Chicago School of Sociology to explain the distribution of social groups in metropolitan areas, was wrong. In the past several decades, immigrants have not only moved out of the centers of U.S. metropolitan areas, many have bypassed central cities altogether and settled directly in suburbs. Increasingly, they have done so in nontraditional gateway cities, such as those in the American South and Rustbelt, and in smaller metropolitan or nonmetropolitan areas (Singer et al. 2008). Suburban settlement has also not clearly been associated with immigrants’ “move up” or integration into the so-called Americanmainstream, as Chicago school authors argued. In many rapidly growing metropolitan areas, rising housing prices have pushed many immigrants out of their historic urban neighborhoods. While post-World War II visions of the American Dream may still pull immigrants to suburbia, the communities into which many have settled hardly reflect that dream.While Asian immigrants have high rates of settlement in middle-class, affluent, and white suburban neighborhoods, other immigrants more commonly settle into suburbs with relatively high rates of foreclosure, poverty, segregation, and other measures of disadvantage (Farrell 2016; Logan 2014). These are not the touted “opportunity neighborhoods” that provide pathways to economic mobility. In fact, compared to central city ethnic enclaves, many provide less of the social, cultural and institutional supports that have traditionally promoted the economic advancement of immigrants and their children. Chicago School scholars also failed to account for the politics within suburbs that challenge not only immigrants’ ability to settle within particular communities, but also to achieve their own purposes and pursuits within them. My research on immigrants in suburbia has sought to fill some of these gaps. It has investigated the struggles of educated, professional Asian immigrants to establish a place for themselves within largely white, middle-class suburbs in Silicon Valley. In the Washington, DC suburbs, I have examined how lower-income, primarily Latino and African immigrants have fought to maintain a presence within redeveloping neighborhoods with rising gentrification and displacement pressures.","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12494","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"48686202","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Over the last decades, the global flow of international migrants has grown dramatically. In 2019, the number of migrants peaked at 271.6 million, an increase of 50.7 million since 2010 and of 97.8 million since 2000. Although Europe and North America were the most favored destinations for the majority of migrants in the 20th century, the destinations for international migrants have significantly diversified in the first two decades of the 21st century, with high numbers of migrants settling in every region of the world. To illustrate this global movement, Figure 1 provides an overview of migration trends by region of destination. Although northern America and Europe continue to receive a majority of migrants, their collective share has decreased from 56 percent in 2000 to 52 percent in 2019 (or 141 million migrants). Over the same period, northern Africa and western Asia reported the most significant increase. The number of migrants arriving in these regions more than doubled from 20.3 million in 2000 to 48.6 million in 2019, making these two regions the next largest migrant destinations behind North America and Europe. While northern African countries such as Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were major sending sources of immigrants to Europe, this trend has been reversed as countries in western Asia and northern Europe have received significant numbers of unauthorizedmigrants,1 including Syrian refugees. In 2018, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan together hosted 5.2 million Syrian refugees or 77 percent of the Syrian refugee population around the world (Todd 2019). Among international migrants, many left as a result of forced migration (UNHCR 2019). In 2019, an unprecedented 70.8 million people escaped their hometowns, often fleeing for their lives. This population consists of 41.3 million internally displaced people, 25.9 million refugees, and 3.5 million asylum seekers (UNHCR 2020). The majority were forced to leave due to wars and local conflicts, climate change, and natural disasters, or a “well-founded fear of persecution” on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political views (UN General Assembly 1951). In light of these trends, this article addresses two related questions. First, which border policies do many countries in the global North adopt to cope with refugees? Second, which policies can facilitate refugee integration and self-sufficiency? According to the UNHCR (2020), about 37,000 people uproot their lives every day. This is the equivalent of one person every 2 seconds leaving his or her home with little hope of an eventual return and with few possessions but the clothes on their backs. From central
{"title":"The Borders around Us: Forced Migration and the Politics of Border Control","authors":"Van C. Tran","doi":"10.1111/cico.12498","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12498","url":null,"abstract":"Over the last decades, the global flow of international migrants has grown dramatically. In 2019, the number of migrants peaked at 271.6 million, an increase of 50.7 million since 2010 and of 97.8 million since 2000. Although Europe and North America were the most favored destinations for the majority of migrants in the 20th century, the destinations for international migrants have significantly diversified in the first two decades of the 21st century, with high numbers of migrants settling in every region of the world. To illustrate this global movement, Figure 1 provides an overview of migration trends by region of destination. Although northern America and Europe continue to receive a majority of migrants, their collective share has decreased from 56 percent in 2000 to 52 percent in 2019 (or 141 million migrants). Over the same period, northern Africa and western Asia reported the most significant increase. The number of migrants arriving in these regions more than doubled from 20.3 million in 2000 to 48.6 million in 2019, making these two regions the next largest migrant destinations behind North America and Europe. While northern African countries such as Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia were major sending sources of immigrants to Europe, this trend has been reversed as countries in western Asia and northern Europe have received significant numbers of unauthorizedmigrants,1 including Syrian refugees. In 2018, Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan together hosted 5.2 million Syrian refugees or 77 percent of the Syrian refugee population around the world (Todd 2019). Among international migrants, many left as a result of forced migration (UNHCR 2019). In 2019, an unprecedented 70.8 million people escaped their hometowns, often fleeing for their lives. This population consists of 41.3 million internally displaced people, 25.9 million refugees, and 3.5 million asylum seekers (UNHCR 2020). The majority were forced to leave due to wars and local conflicts, climate change, and natural disasters, or a “well-founded fear of persecution” on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political views (UN General Assembly 1951). In light of these trends, this article addresses two related questions. First, which border policies do many countries in the global North adopt to cope with refugees? Second, which policies can facilitate refugee integration and self-sufficiency? According to the UNHCR (2020), about 37,000 people uproot their lives every day. This is the equivalent of one person every 2 seconds leaving his or her home with little hope of an eventual return and with few possessions but the clothes on their backs. From central","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12498","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49602907","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Scholars and the public alike expect children of immigrants without a college degree to fail to assimilate into U.S. society (see for example Haller et al. 2011). Our research, however, leads us to a more optimistic point of view regarding the recent incorporation of working-class children of immigrants, although this may be changing in the aftermath of COVID-19. Focusing on the working-class children of Mexican immigrants in Dallas, Texas, we find that they have built on their parents’ positions, and successfully incorporated into society, despite working-class jobs and relatively low levels of education. In 2019, the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington Metropolitan Statistical Area (thereafter DFW) “ranked first in the annual rate of job growth and second in the number of jobs added over the year” (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019). Dallas, with nearly a third of the population identifying as Mexican, and 38.3 percent identifying as Hispanic or Latino in the 2010 Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), offers many employment opportunities for children of Mexican immigrants. In this article, we argue that DFW has recently provided a context whereby working-class children of Mexican immigrants fulfill their dreams of achieving a good life and experience intergenerational mobility—and in their perspective believe that they are fulfilling the American Dream.We interviewed 25 children of Mexican immigrants ages 18–28 about their experiences with the education system, the world of work, and their sense of belonging to American society. Our respondents have typically worked in low-status jobs in blue-collar and service industries such as construction, restaurant work, and truck driving. In this article we focus on their labor market experiences and what they mean for intergenerational mobility. While their experiences allow us to question some of the assumptions about the trajectories of the children of immigrants in the United States, the emergence of the coronavirus may mean setbacks for these children of immigrants. Waldinger and Perlmann (1999) (see also Perlmann and Roger 1999) have noted that the incorporation of children of immigrants takes place within a context of a class-based society and that "the children of working-class immigrants will take up the same type of positions as occupied by their parents" (p.251). However, in contrast to the class reproduction thesis (see also Willis 1977), the children of Mexican immigrants in our study, for the most part, do not enter into the same types of positions as their parents; while they still
{"title":"Working-Class Children of Mexican Immigrants in Dallas, Texas","authors":"Amy Lutz, Dalia Abdelhady","doi":"10.1111/cico.12497","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12497","url":null,"abstract":"Scholars and the public alike expect children of immigrants without a college degree to fail to assimilate into U.S. society (see for example Haller et al. 2011). Our research, however, leads us to a more optimistic point of view regarding the recent incorporation of working-class children of immigrants, although this may be changing in the aftermath of COVID-19. Focusing on the working-class children of Mexican immigrants in Dallas, Texas, we find that they have built on their parents’ positions, and successfully incorporated into society, despite working-class jobs and relatively low levels of education. In 2019, the Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington Metropolitan Statistical Area (thereafter DFW) “ranked first in the annual rate of job growth and second in the number of jobs added over the year” (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2019). Dallas, with nearly a third of the population identifying as Mexican, and 38.3 percent identifying as Hispanic or Latino in the 2010 Census (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), offers many employment opportunities for children of Mexican immigrants. In this article, we argue that DFW has recently provided a context whereby working-class children of Mexican immigrants fulfill their dreams of achieving a good life and experience intergenerational mobility—and in their perspective believe that they are fulfilling the American Dream.We interviewed 25 children of Mexican immigrants ages 18–28 about their experiences with the education system, the world of work, and their sense of belonging to American society. Our respondents have typically worked in low-status jobs in blue-collar and service industries such as construction, restaurant work, and truck driving. In this article we focus on their labor market experiences and what they mean for intergenerational mobility. While their experiences allow us to question some of the assumptions about the trajectories of the children of immigrants in the United States, the emergence of the coronavirus may mean setbacks for these children of immigrants. Waldinger and Perlmann (1999) (see also Perlmann and Roger 1999) have noted that the incorporation of children of immigrants takes place within a context of a class-based society and that \"the children of working-class immigrants will take up the same type of positions as occupied by their parents\" (p.251). However, in contrast to the class reproduction thesis (see also Willis 1977), the children of Mexican immigrants in our study, for the most part, do not enter into the same types of positions as their parents; while they still","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12497","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44254268","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Few Americans would guess that from 2014 to 2017, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Greenville, South Carolina, were among the top ten metropolitan areas where population growth was attributable to immigrants (New American Economy [NAE] [27]) New York City, home to at least 3 million immigrants (Office of Immigrant Affairs [28]), is still the dominant end destination for immigrants and refugees, but not for refugees in their first placement Table 1 shows the placement of refugees by New York State metropolitan areas, the number of refugees settled in each city, and how the cities were ranked nationally by the number of refugees resettled in each from 2007 to 2016 The onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020 will continue to slow the number of refugees entering Buffalo;the combined reaction of the federal government regarding refugee policy and the coronavirus will be felt for decades at the local level [Extracted from the article] Copyright of City & Community is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use This abstract may be abridged No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract (Copyright applies to all Abstracts )
{"title":"Cities and Immigrants: The Local in Anti-Immigration Federal Policies","authors":"Robert M. Adelman","doi":"10.1111/cico.12493","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12493","url":null,"abstract":"Few Americans would guess that from 2014 to 2017, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Cincinnati, Ohio, and Greenville, South Carolina, were among the top ten metropolitan areas where population growth was attributable to immigrants (New American Economy [NAE] [27]) New York City, home to at least 3 million immigrants (Office of Immigrant Affairs [28]), is still the dominant end destination for immigrants and refugees, but not for refugees in their first placement Table 1 shows the placement of refugees by New York State metropolitan areas, the number of refugees settled in each city, and how the cities were ranked nationally by the number of refugees resettled in each from 2007 to 2016 The onslaught of the COVID-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020 will continue to slow the number of refugees entering Buffalo;the combined reaction of the federal government regarding refugee policy and the coronavirus will be felt for decades at the local level [Extracted from the article] Copyright of City & Community is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use This abstract may be abridged No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract (Copyright applies to all Abstracts )","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12493","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"44315669","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Despite the doubling in size of the middle class and the significant housing increase in Turkey, little research has examined housing outcomes of middle-income households, particularly relative to affluent households. The housing increase and 2007 Mortgage Law could have reduced housing differences between middle-income and affluent households, but the rise in gated communities could have increased these differences. Using data from Turkey's 2012 Household and Budget Survey, we find that middle-income households are significantly less likely than affluent households to own their homes and live in larger homes, and among owner-occupiers, in homes of higher value. Less pronounced differences are found in their residence in newer homes. Fewer differences in housing outcomes exist between middle- and lower-income households, particularly among owner-occupiers. These results suggest that the most affluent households, rather than the poorest households, are likely isolating themselves from other households, thereby affecting the future well-being of middle-income households.
{"title":"Housing Outcomes in Turkey: How Do Middle-Income Households Fare?","authors":"Samantha Friedman, Aysenur Kurtulus, Ismet Koc","doi":"10.1111/cico.12483","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12483","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Despite the doubling in size of the middle class and the significant housing increase in Turkey, little research has examined housing outcomes of middle-income households, particularly relative to affluent households. The housing increase and 2007 Mortgage Law could have reduced housing differences between middle-income and affluent households, but the rise in gated communities could have increased these differences. Using data from Turkey's 2012 Household and Budget Survey, we find that middle-income households are significantly less likely than affluent households to own their homes and live in larger homes, and among owner-occupiers, in homes of higher value. Less pronounced differences are found in their residence in newer homes. Fewer differences in housing outcomes exist between middle- and lower-income households, particularly among owner-occupiers. These results suggest that the most affluent households, rather than the poorest households, are likely isolating themselves from other households, thereby affecting the future well-being of middle-income households.</p>","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12483","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"43793097","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Existing studies on urban redevelopment and gentrification in China have documented neoliberal urbanism and state intervention as the driving forces transforming Shanghai into a global city (see, e.g., Zhang 2002; Zhang and Ke 2004; Chen 2009; He 2005; He and Wu 2007; Ren 2008; Xu 2004). However, nearly 30 years into building a globalizing Shanghai, how much do we know about the lives of Shanghainese after their displacement? The urban landscape in the new global Shanghai alienates and disorients native Shanghainese. This new Shanghai is a three-dimensional printout designed by the state, both the central and municipal levels, and is modeled after global cities in the West. Approaches in urban redevelopment and renewal in the West in the 20th century diverged, some built up in their central districts such as New York City or London, the two quintessential global cities according to Sassen (2001), while others sprawled out such as Los Angeles. It is the former that policy makers in China aimed at, to (re)build an awe-inspiring metropolis of global significance to showcase China’s rise (Greenspan 2014:18). In the process, millions of native Shanghainese households were displaced, and millions of internal migrants came to call the city home. The limited number of studies done on the housing quality of the resettlement neighborhood and displacees’ new homes generate positive responses based on quantitative studies (Wu 2004; Li and Yu-Ling 2009; Day 2013). A more qualitative approach employed by recent researchers painted a different picture: they acknowledge that displacees experienced a strong sense of loss (Li 2014), and a lingering pain as severe and embodied as domicide (Shao 2013; Zhang 2017). Taking recent researchers’ investigations into displacees’ emotional responses to the resettlement process, and debates on the settlement housing and new neighborhoods as a departure point, my work intends to answer the questions about how displaced Shanghainese have responded to the new urban built environment and strategically adapted to it at different scales. Peter Marcuse (1967) adopts Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city (p. 45) as “a transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Peter Marcuse 2012:35) when exploring answers to the question “whose right(s)to what city?” His solution lies in politicizing among the disadvantageous and the disenfranchised, which unfortunately is
{"title":"“Pudong Is Not My Shanghai”: Displacement, Place-Identity, and Right to the “City” in Urban China","authors":"Fang Xu","doi":"10.1111/cico.12491","DOIUrl":"10.1111/cico.12491","url":null,"abstract":"Existing studies on urban redevelopment and gentrification in China have documented neoliberal urbanism and state intervention as the driving forces transforming Shanghai into a global city (see, e.g., Zhang 2002; Zhang and Ke 2004; Chen 2009; He 2005; He and Wu 2007; Ren 2008; Xu 2004). However, nearly 30 years into building a globalizing Shanghai, how much do we know about the lives of Shanghainese after their displacement? The urban landscape in the new global Shanghai alienates and disorients native Shanghainese. This new Shanghai is a three-dimensional printout designed by the state, both the central and municipal levels, and is modeled after global cities in the West. Approaches in urban redevelopment and renewal in the West in the 20th century diverged, some built up in their central districts such as New York City or London, the two quintessential global cities according to Sassen (2001), while others sprawled out such as Los Angeles. It is the former that policy makers in China aimed at, to (re)build an awe-inspiring metropolis of global significance to showcase China’s rise (Greenspan 2014:18). In the process, millions of native Shanghainese households were displaced, and millions of internal migrants came to call the city home. The limited number of studies done on the housing quality of the resettlement neighborhood and displacees’ new homes generate positive responses based on quantitative studies (Wu 2004; Li and Yu-Ling 2009; Day 2013). A more qualitative approach employed by recent researchers painted a different picture: they acknowledge that displacees experienced a strong sense of loss (Li 2014), and a lingering pain as severe and embodied as domicide (Shao 2013; Zhang 2017). Taking recent researchers’ investigations into displacees’ emotional responses to the resettlement process, and debates on the settlement housing and new neighborhoods as a departure point, my work intends to answer the questions about how displaced Shanghainese have responded to the new urban built environment and strategically adapted to it at different scales. Peter Marcuse (1967) adopts Lefebvre’s formulation of the right to the city (p. 45) as “a transformed and renewed right to urban life” (Peter Marcuse 2012:35) when exploring answers to the question “whose right(s)to what city?” His solution lies in politicizing among the disadvantageous and the disenfranchised, which unfortunately is","PeriodicalId":47486,"journal":{"name":"City & Community","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":2.5,"publicationDate":"2020-05-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/cico.12491","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"49482326","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
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