Manchester School最新文献

The goal of this paper is to test the mean reversion process of the inflation rate in the Eurozone during the COVID-19 pandemic crisis. The study uses weekly data on consumer prices (measured through the Harmonized Consumer Price Index), spanning the period from 2020 to the mid of 2022. The findings document that euro area inflation follows a mean non-reverting process, with most of its components following a similar pattern. Moreover, sub-period analysis illustrates that the vaccination process against the pandemic gives a transitory character to euro area inflation, which, however, is dominated by the lockdown and the Omicron mutation periods. Finally, comparative analysis illustrated the differences of inflation persistence during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009.

We examine the impact of China's economic stimulus plan in 2008 on the total factor productivity (TFP) of China's listed firms. We hypothesize that firms operating in regions characterized by greater resource misallocation would experience a more pronounced decline in TFP following the implementation of the stimulus plan. To gauge the extent of resource misallocation, we employ the proportion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a measure. Our findings reveal a substantial decrease in TFP for firms located in provinces with higher SOE shares compared to those in provinces with lower SOE shares, amounting to approximately 9.2%. These results highlight the unintended policy consequence of the stimulus plan for firm-level productivity in China.

This paper presents a new framework for analyzing automation, robotics, and high-tech, which differs from the canonical model of technological progress by incorporating the higher education system. The main difference is that there is not just one type of skilled workers, but two types, and there is not one type of education but two - elite universities and standard ones. The gap between these two types of education is called ‘elitism gap’. The ‘elitism gap’ in the higher-education sector enables a separation of individuals by their abilities. Since the economy is divided between low-tech and high-tech sectors, the elitism gap leads to a separating equilibrium in which, high-ability workers graduating from top universities work in the high-tech sector, while low-ability workers, graduate from standard universities and work in the low-tech industries. In consequence, human capital in both industries is different, which leads to wage inequality. We then analyze the effects of an increased use of robotics on inequality. We show that robots affect the “matching effect” between abilities and education, and in consequence, inequality increases. We also show that wages and productivity gaps between high-tech and low-tech sectors are fueled by the elitism gap in higher education. This leads to heterogeneity in human capital, and therefore to an increase in wage inequality. We develop an index of the elitism gap, and show a positive correlation between the index of elitism gap and inequality in OECD countries.

In this paper we examine productivity trends, drivers of productivity growth and pro-productivity policies across the G-20 economies since 1970. While we find distinctly different productivity growth dynamics between G-20 economies and over time, one common observation is a widely shared slowdown in labour productivity growth since the 2010s underpinned by lower (or even negative) total factor productivity growth. Moreover, the growth in capital per worker hour has also begun to level off. We develop a typology of pro-productivity policies and argue that policies for investment and technological change need strengthening to support a revival of productivity growth. Such policies should include a balanced approach to stronger technological progress and more rapid diffusion; a strengthening of investment, especially in intangibles and public services; and greater attention for human capital. We also argue for stronger institutions and capabilities that allow for dynamic learning about pro-productivity policies across countries and over time.

The assumption of no correlation of the structural shocks as Blanchard and Quah's identification (BQ) assumes is not suitable when central banks, through discretionary policies or inflation targeting regimes, affect the output growth among other goals. In this study, we analyze the present value model of the current account (PVM) using a three-SVAR specification and a modified BQ to identify three structural shocks: country-specific permanent, country-specific temporary, and global, but allowing the correlation of the domestic ones. Using Australia, Canada, Norway, and the UK, we find that those shocks are correlated and are less volatile than BQ would assume they are. The PVM predictions that hold are: (i) a positive (no) response in the current account to a country-specific temporary (global) shock; and (ii) with the exception of Australia, there is no response in the current account to a country-specific permanent shock. In addition, for all countries, the country-specific temporary shock dominates current account changes but does not dominate net output growth fluctuations, which was a puzzle identified by a prior study. The role of the shock is enhanced by the modified BQ, but even with this enhancement, it still does not hold the most significant role in output variations, as indicated by PVM.

This paper studies the implications of business cycle frictions for the diffusion of permanent changes in automation. Incorporating task-based production in different versions of the New Keynesian model reveals considerable short-run implications. Price-distorting nominal rigidities amplify the labor displacement and attenuate the productivity and welfare gains of automation during the transition to the new equilibrium. They exacerbate the falls in the labor income share, the job finding probability, the value of long-term contracts, and labor market tightness. The inflation response follows a J-curve. Frictions in capital supply and wage rigidities amplify the labor displacement and attenuate the productivity gains too.

This paper computes a new measure of capacity utilization-adjusted Total Factor Productivity (TFP) using sector-level data from a sample of 18 Advanced Economies and 24 industries between 1970 and 2014. We then empirically examine the impact of structural reforms (labor and product market) on TFP by means of the local projection method. Structural reforms follow a narrative-base construction which have several advantages in our context. Results show that structural reforms positively impact TFP, particularly the liberalization of employment protection legislation for regular workers. The effect of reforms affects both changes in resource misallocation across sectors (the between effect) and within sectors (the within effect). The TFP-effect of both types of reforms varies depending on the phase of the business cycle prevailing at the time the reform is implemented. Finally, our findings are robust to a wide range sensitivity checks.

Using the lens of a life cycle model, we argue that an administrative failure of a wage payment delay in a workfare programme could adversely affect the welfare of the poor through two channels. First, it imposes an implicit consumption tax on the household. Second, it changes the status of labour from a “cash” to a credit” good and encourages workers with negative net worth to work harder to clear off the debt. The loss of welfare persists even when the worker has outside employment options. The model's prediction accords well with India's flagship National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), where payment delay to workers participating in the programme has been endemic. Our empirical evidence suggests that, contrary to conventional wisdom, worker participation in the MGNREGA programme is positively associated with a wage payment delay. However, such increased worker participation instead of signalling success of the programme points to a deeper problem of this workfare programme because of the welfare loss suffered by asset-poor households.

In Li & Yanagawa (2021), the name and number of the funding project was omitted. This should be as follows:

Funding: This work was supported by Guangdong Office of Philosophy and Social Science Grant Number GD19CYJ08.

International trade is currently under fire from many sides. Protectionist trade policies are on the rise, putting an end to the decade-long March of free trade. Making sense of the daily headlines and having an informed opinion on your own has rarely been more important than it is now. Our work aims to explain the driving forces behind international trade, its history, how it shaped the world, its economic models, issues ranging from job losses to the environment and why buying local often makes no sense. We summarize the most important academic literature on these topics in a non-technical, educational manner. If the reader feels enabled to form their own views on the pros and cons of international trade and that they can ‘talk the talk’, our effort has been fruitful.