Manchester School最新文献

This paper analyzes the impact of “spirit of capitalism” on stationary welfare and stability properties of a one-sector Ramsey economy, where the demand of money is motivated by a cash-in-advance constraint on consumption expenditures. Preferences are defined over consumption and capital stock. There is a monetary authority that follows either a money growth pegging rule or an interest rate pegging rule. When a money growth pegging rule is introduced, a unique steady state emerges. A slight desire for status is a sufficient condition for an increase in the money growth rate to exert a local stabilizing effect and to improve stationary welfare. When an interest rate pegging rule is introduced, two steady states may emerge: a “liquidity trap” and an “interior” steady state. Both steady states are locally determinate. Moreover, we show that a slight desire for status is also a sufficient condition to ensure that the stationary welfare at “interior” steady state is higher than the one of the “liquidity trap”. It follows that an increase in the policy rate is, then, an efficient way to exit the “liquidity trap” steady state. Under similar conditions, a higher policy rate increases the stationary welfare at the “interior” steady state.

This study finds that in an international mixed oligopoly at free entry equilibrium, social welfare under import tariff cum privatization is higher than output subsidy cum privatization, and the dual subsidy-tariff policy cum privatization degenerates into a single tariff policy cum privatization. The reason is that an output subsidy or the dual subsidy-tariff policy will incentivize domestic private firms to enter the free-entry equilibrium. Thus, the number of domestic firms with free entry is excessive, and social welfare deteriorates. A privatization policy is pivotal in the long run and is still more effective than a single subsidy policy.

This paper develops a Schumpeterian growth model with considering consumption and leisure externalities. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the effect of patent protection policy on growth and inequality, as well as the interaction between policy effect and externalities. According to the log form utility function specification, this means that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is unity. The following are the key findings of this paper. Patent protection policy encourages innovation and increases employment in the R&D industry, which enhances economic growth while increasing income inequality. In regard to externalities, an increase in the degree of consumption (leisure) externalities results in a higher (lower) growth rate and more (smaller) income inequality. When consumption (leisure) externality is greater intensity, the growth effect of patent protection policy becomes stronger (weaker), while its influence on expanding income inequality lessens (enhances). Finally, both the Pareto optimal patent protection policy and the optimal patent policy under the maximization of social welfare positively correlate with consumption externalities, but negatively correlate with leisure externalities.

This paper studies to what extent the transfer of US managerial technologies to Europe after World War II contributed to closing the gap with US businesses. Between 1952 and 1958, the US government sponsored the Productivity Program, which promoted management training trips for European managers at US firms. Through the analysis of reports compiled by UK, France, Germany, and Italian participating firms, I first document that these companies claimed between 5% and 10% yearly productivity increase thanks to the program. The fact that European businesses were not forced to adopt the American management model, but could adapt it to their firm needs and existing business practices was a key aspect of the program's success. Second, using data on US and Italian participating firms' performance I show that Italian firms grew on average 7.8 percent faster than that of US companies in the 10 years after the start of the program. Moreover, the distribution of productivity of Italian and US firms became more similar over years, confirming a performance convergence between these companies.

In this paper, we investigate house price shocks on the macroeconomic variables (financial market, inflation, and real sector) of the G7 economies. We use the GVAR to capture the spillover effects from the U.S. housing market and oil prices on these economies from 1991M3–2022M10. We identify the U.S. house price shock using the Structural Generalized Impulse Response Function, house supply and demand variables, and regional divergence. We find that the domestic stock markets and industrial production are the most sensitive to house price shocks. We further compare the importance of house and oil prices on domestic fluctuations. The estimates reinforce the previous findings: U.S. house prices are responsible for a quarter of the domestic volatility of the stock markets and industrial production. In the other macroeconomic segments, the effects of house prices are present, but in lower values. Our results show that house prices provoke more domestic fluctuations than oil prices. Finally, we also found that short and long-term credit markets, as well as stock markets, transmit the house price shock to industrial production. Consequently, we provide potential channels to comprehend the spillover effect of U.S. house prices on international markets.

This paper fills a gap in recent literature on productivity and regional development by examining the determinants of productivity in primary industries in English regions during the Middle Ages. It provides a comprehensive review of relevant literature on the tin, lead and silver mining industries in Medieval England. Modern studies of productivity typically focus on technology, labour skills, unionization and regional economic infrastructure as key determinants of productivity growth and focus on high-technology manufacturing industries This study of medieval mining, however, focuses on extractive industries in which advanced technologies played only a limited role. The paper shows that alternative factors contributed to the productivity of medieval mining including royal policy, the location of deposits and fluctuations in demand. Technology, investment in training and worker activism had, in contrast, little impact.

We provide a new reason for Bertrand-Cournot profit reversal. In a symmetric oligopoly, we show that firms get higher profits under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition under non-commitment process innovation if the products are sufficiently differentiated and there is positive knowledge spillover. As the number of firms increases, the degree of product differentiation over which the profits are higher under Bertrand competition can increase. Higher outputs under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition generate higher R&D investments under the former than the latter, which is responsible for our result.

This paper examines how cross-border ownership and restrictions affect commercial policies optimally chosen by the government of an importing country. Focusing on import competition in an oligopoly market served by two local producers and a foreign firm, we study and compare two partial ownership arrangements without corporate control: unilateral ownership by the foreign firm over a local producer and bilateral ownership between the two entities. The main findings are as follows: (i) When foreign ownership is unilateral, the optimal trade and industrial policies are an import tariff and a production subsidy, respectively. (ii) When foreign ownership is bilateral, the trade policy can be an import subsidy, and the industrial policy is a production subsidy. These results differ from the benchmark equilibrium without ownership, under which the optimal policy mix consists of an import tariff and a production subsidy. (iii) Unilateral foreign ownership always reduces domestic welfare. However, bilateral foreign ownership can increase domestic welfare when local producers' cost disadvantages are substantially high. (iv) Considering the usual lump-sum transfer for a balanced budget, bilateral ownership entails a lower public burden than two other scenarios for the government to finance its strategic use of trade and industrial policies.

This paper studies the impact of relative performance evaluation (RPE) on skilled-unskilled wage inequality. We find that in an economy with full employment, skilled-unskilled wage inequality will be expanded when the strength of RPE increases. However, when the urban sector is under the minimum wage restriction, the impact of RPE on skilled-unskilled wage inequality depends on the substitution elasticity between land and unskilled labor in the rural sector. If this substitution elasticity is sufficiently large (resp. small), skilled-unskilled wage inequality will be expanded (resp. narrowed down) when the strength of RPE rises.

This paper considers a mixed duopoly two-sided market of platforms in which a private firm competes with a public firm in a linear city model with fixed demand of full coverage. We examine whether prices of platforms are lower in the mixed duopoly market than in the standard pure duopoly market in which two private firms compete. We show that introducing a public competitor may or may not induce lower prices of the private platform than introducing a private firm, depending on the quality of the public platform service. In particular, if the quality of the public platform is superior, the prices of the platforms are lower than when it competes with the private rival, whereas they are higher if the quality is lower. We also show that the private firm invests more than the public firm. This has the policy implication that maintaining lower platform prices by introducing a competing public platform will not be sustainable in the long run.