This study examines the effect of unique strategies on corporate cash holdings. We find a U-shaped relationship between strategy uniqueness and cash holdings. When strategy uniqueness is low, the increase in uniqueness enhances a company's competitive advantage, leading to low demand for cash reserves. Conversely, when strategy uniqueness is high, the increase in uniqueness leads to higher information asymmetry, prompting firms to hold more cash to mitigate potential costs. The U-shaped relationship is stronger for financially constrained firms and those with optimistic managers. Overall, we present a manifestation of the uniqueness paradox in corporate cash-holding decisions, highlighting the pivotal role played by corporate unique strategies.
{"title":"Corporate strategy uniqueness and cash holdings","authors":"Zhenzhen Sun, Rongrong Zhang, Yifei Li","doi":"10.1111/fire.12442","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12442","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the effect of unique strategies on corporate cash holdings. We find a U-shaped relationship between strategy uniqueness and cash holdings. When strategy uniqueness is low, the increase in uniqueness enhances a company's competitive advantage, leading to low demand for cash reserves. Conversely, when strategy uniqueness is high, the increase in uniqueness leads to higher information asymmetry, prompting firms to hold more cash to mitigate potential costs. The U-shaped relationship is stronger for financially constrained firms and those with optimistic managers. Overall, we present a manifestation of the uniqueness paradox in corporate cash-holding decisions, highlighting the pivotal role played by corporate unique strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 4","pages":"1129-1160"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145146660","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
During the 2010s, the number of community banks in the United States declined by almost one-third. This paper provides evidence that the disappearance of community banks is related to the demand for economies of scale associated with technology investment. This paper documents that community banks with more technology investment are more likely to become acquisition targets. To address endogeneity concerns, this study employs an exact matching approach and an instrumental variable approach. Our study shows that the acquirer banks effectively attain economies of scale, demonstrated by enhanced operational efficiency. A rich battery of robustness checks confirms the results.
{"title":"Community bank consolidation and the role of technology investment","authors":"Cheng Jiang, Jonathan Scott, Zhaowei Zhang","doi":"10.1111/fire.12441","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12441","url":null,"abstract":"<p>During the 2010s, the number of community banks in the United States declined by almost one-third. This paper provides evidence that the disappearance of community banks is related to the demand for economies of scale associated with technology investment. This paper documents that community banks with more technology investment are more likely to become acquisition targets. To address endogeneity concerns, this study employs an exact matching approach and an instrumental variable approach. Our study shows that the acquirer banks effectively attain economies of scale, demonstrated by enhanced operational efficiency. A rich battery of robustness checks confirms the results.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 4","pages":"1161-1189"},"PeriodicalIF":1.9,"publicationDate":"2025-03-25","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"145146407","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Craig Doidge, George Andrew Karolyi, Kris Shen, René M. Stulz
Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) show that from 1999 to 2012, the US develops a listing gap relative to other countries, meaning that it has abnormally few publicly listed firms. In this paper, we update their evidence to 2023 and find that the listing gap increases, but at a low rate. By 2023, the US has about half as many listed firms per capita as other developed countries. We discuss some of the important questions raised by the existence and increase of the listing gap to which we hope researchers will find answers.
{"title":"Are there too few publicly listed firms in the US?","authors":"Craig Doidge, George Andrew Karolyi, Kris Shen, René M. Stulz","doi":"10.1111/fire.12439","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12439","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2017) show that from 1999 to 2012, the US develops a listing gap relative to other countries, meaning that it has abnormally few publicly listed firms. In this paper, we update their evidence to 2023 and find that the listing gap increases, but at a low rate. By 2023, the US has about half as many listed firms per capita as other developed countries. We discuss some of the important questions raised by the existence and increase of the listing gap to which we hope researchers will find answers.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 2","pages":"317-329"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fire.12439","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"143749898","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Adrian Fernandez-Perez, Ivan Indriawan, Marta Khomyn
We examine the relationship between investors’ emotions and GameStop (GME) stock returns during the price bubble of January–February 2021. Analyzing eight basic emotions (anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, and trust) from Plutchik's (1980) Wheel of Emotions, we use textual analysis of Reddit posts to find that fear strongly predicts intraday returns and volume order imbalance. The predictive relationship between emotion and returns shifts over time: joy is strongest before the bubble peaks, fear at the peak, and anger after the bubble bursts. These findings highlight the psychological factors influencing trading behavior during stock market bubbles.
我们研究了2021年1月至2月价格泡沫期间投资者情绪与GameStop (GME)股票回报之间的关系。通过分析Plutchik(1980)的《情绪之轮》(Wheel of emotions)中的八种基本情绪(愤怒、期待、厌恶、恐惧、喜悦、悲伤、惊讶和信任),我们通过对Reddit帖子的文本分析发现,恐惧强烈地预测了日内收益和交易量的不平衡。情绪和回报之间的预测关系随着时间的推移而变化:在泡沫达到顶峰之前,快乐是最强的,在泡沫破裂之后,恐惧是最强的。这些发现突出了股市泡沫期间影响交易行为的心理因素。
{"title":"Emotions and stock returns during the GameStop bubble","authors":"Adrian Fernandez-Perez, Ivan Indriawan, Marta Khomyn","doi":"10.1111/fire.12438","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12438","url":null,"abstract":"<p>We examine the relationship between investors’ emotions and GameStop (GME) stock returns during the price bubble of January–February 2021. Analyzing eight basic emotions (anger, anticipation, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, surprise, and trust) from Plutchik's (1980) Wheel of Emotions, we use textual analysis of Reddit posts to find that fear strongly predicts intraday returns and volume order imbalance. The predictive relationship between emotion and returns shifts over time: joy is strongest before the bubble peaks, fear at the peak, and anger after the bubble bursts. These findings highlight the psychological factors influencing trading behavior during stock market bubbles.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 3","pages":"1063-1084"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fire.12438","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144635283","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Goutham Abotula, Maretno Agus Harjoto, Donna L. Paul
This study examines the relationship between board gender diversity and debt maturity dispersion, which measures debt rollover risk. In a sample of 3275 US firms, we find that firms with greater gender diversity on the board have relatively more dispersed debt structures, particularly when a critical mass of three women directors is achieved. We show that the increased debt maturity dispersion associated with the presence of women directors is positively related to subsequent firm performance. We also find that the relationship between gender diversity and debt maturity increases at a diminishing rate with more than three women on the board
{"title":"Board gender diversity and debt maturity dispersion","authors":"Goutham Abotula, Maretno Agus Harjoto, Donna L. Paul","doi":"10.1111/fire.12436","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12436","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study examines the relationship between board gender diversity and debt maturity dispersion, which measures debt rollover risk. In a sample of 3275 US firms, we find that firms with greater gender diversity on the board have relatively more dispersed debt structures, particularly when a critical mass of three women directors is achieved. We show that the increased debt maturity dispersion associated with the presence of women directors is positively related to subsequent firm performance. We also find that the relationship between gender diversity and debt maturity increases at a diminishing rate with more than three women on the board</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 3","pages":"1003-1031"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fire.12436","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144635282","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
Contracting theories predict that CEO power plays an essential role in the pay-setting process. I provide causal empirical evidence of how changes in the bargaining power of CEOs affect the level of CEO compensation. Using the staggered rejections of previously adopted inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by US state courts to capture an exogenous increase in CEOs’ bargaining power, I find that the IDD rejection results in higher levels of CEO compensation. The effect is strongest in firms whose CEO-board dynamics is significantly influenced by the IDD—firms whose CEOs face greatest job mobility shock and firms that can effectively use the IDD decision as a bargaining tool against their CEOs. The economic magnitudes are substantial in those subsamples of firms, ranging from 22% to 54% increase in compensation levels.
{"title":"CEO bargaining power and compensation","authors":"Edward Kim","doi":"10.1111/fire.12437","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12437","url":null,"abstract":"<p>Contracting theories predict that CEO power plays an essential role in the pay-setting process. I provide causal empirical evidence of how changes in the bargaining power of CEOs affect the level of CEO compensation. Using the staggered rejections of previously adopted inevitable disclosure doctrine (IDD) by US state courts to capture an exogenous increase in CEOs’ bargaining power, I find that the IDD rejection results in higher levels of CEO compensation. The effect is strongest in firms whose CEO-board dynamics is significantly influenced by the IDD—firms whose CEOs face greatest job mobility shock and firms that can effectively use the IDD decision as a bargaining tool against their CEOs. The economic magnitudes are substantial in those subsamples of firms, ranging from 22% to 54% increase in compensation levels.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 3","pages":"1033-1061"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-03-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fire.12437","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144635458","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This study investigates the impact of “busy” independent directors on corporate financial leverage. Using a sample of 3321 Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2019, we find that firms with busier boards tend to have higher leverage, with corporate tax avoidance acting as a mediating mechanism. Supporting the reputational incentive hypothesis, busy boards discourage aggressive tax avoidance strategies that would otherwise allow managers to accumulate excess cash reserves. Consequently, these firms become more reliant on external debt financing to meet potential investment needs. Our findings highlight the role of “busy” independent directors in mitigating agency conflicts and shaping financial strategies.
{"title":"Board busyness and financial leverage: The impact of corporate tax avoidance","authors":"Vu Quang Trinh, Teng Li, Oanh Ha, Jia Liu","doi":"10.1111/fire.12434","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12434","url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study investigates the impact of “busy” independent directors on corporate financial leverage. Using a sample of 3321 Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2019, we find that firms with busier boards tend to have higher leverage, with corporate tax avoidance acting as a mediating mechanism. Supporting the reputational incentive hypothesis, busy boards discourage aggressive tax avoidance strategies that would otherwise allow managers to accumulate excess cash reserves. Consequently, these firms become more reliant on external debt financing to meet potential investment needs. Our findings highlight the role of “busy” independent directors in mitigating agency conflicts and shaping financial strategies.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 3","pages":"951-1002"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/fire.12434","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144635562","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"OA","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
In this study, we rank each executive based on their job title and examine gender disparity among them. We find that female executives face a disadvantage in promotions within firms located in highly religious counties. This phenomenon is especially evident among lower-ranked executives, whose promotions are more significantly influenced by cultural factors. Furthermore, our results remain intact when we adopt alternative specifications (e.g., propensity score matching, instrumental variable). This study unveils a hidden pullback of religiosity in restraining firms from advancing female leaders and has a broad implication that cultural dynamics surrounding a community can be very influential on corporate strategies and decisions.
{"title":"Religiosity and gender equality in the managerial labor market: Evidence from executive promotions","authors":"Xiaohu Guo, Xiaochuan Song, Lukai Yang","doi":"10.1111/fire.12435","DOIUrl":"https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.12435","url":null,"abstract":"<p>In this study, we rank each executive based on their job title and examine gender disparity among them. We find that female executives face a disadvantage in promotions within firms located in highly religious counties. This phenomenon is especially evident among lower-ranked executives, whose promotions are more significantly influenced by cultural factors. Furthermore, our results remain intact when we adopt alternative specifications (e.g., propensity score matching, instrumental variable). This study unveils a hidden pullback of religiosity in restraining firms from advancing female leaders and has a broad implication that cultural dynamics surrounding a community can be very influential on corporate strategies and decisions.</p>","PeriodicalId":47617,"journal":{"name":"FINANCIAL REVIEW","volume":"60 3","pages":"917-949"},"PeriodicalIF":2.6,"publicationDate":"2025-02-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":null,"resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":"144635356","PeriodicalName":null,"FirstCategoryId":null,"ListUrlMain":null,"RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":"","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":"","EPubDate":null,"PubModel":null,"JCR":null,"JCRName":null,"Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper applies a Skill Ratio under a False Discovery Rate (FDR) framework to bond mutual funds showing many bonds mutual fund managers are skilled primarily to the benefit of fund sponsors. Our Skill Ratio is the t-statistic of realized gross value added