Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour最新文献

The aim of this essay is to develop an original interpretative hypothesis concerning problematic aspects of Georege Herbert Mead's social theory of the Self in the light of Carl Gustav Jung's analytical psychology. First of all, we will try to unveil a link between the Meadian component of the Self defined I and the dimension of the unconscious. Discussion of this connection will open to the hypothesis that the Meadian I can be understood as both an instinctive, unconscious and non-pre-social component of the Self. We will support this interpretative hypothesis by establishing a dialogue with two of the central concepts of Jung's analytical psychology, namely, the collective unconscious and the archetype. As we shall see, the main point of contact between the two theories lies in the identification of a common non-pre-social declination of the instinctive and unconscious assumptions of the conscious Self. More narrowly, we will try to explore this hypothesis by arguing for an interpretative affinity between the Jungian archetype and the Meadian social nature of instincts. Along these lines, we will propose a functionalist approach to the interpretation of the instinctive dimension of archetypes, according to which archetypes function instinctively. Our hypothesis of convergence between Mead and Jung with regard to the social nature of instincts and the archetype will lead us to sketch a peculiar and innovative social conception of the unconscious.

Social and human sciences have demonstrated again and again how commensality—the practice of eating together—has substantial implications, across time and place, for how social life is configured. Closely related phenomena have also been explored in biologically oriented sciences focused on human behavior. Yet, there is still little dialogue between these and the mainstream social science analysis of food and eating, despite their shared interests in the role played by food and eating in the organization of social life. The paper strengthens this dialogue and proposes that eating together be analyzed as a social tool: an innovation for the organization of complex behavior. More precisely, the proposition is that the habitual, routinized, and ritualized communal eating we see today developed into a social tool for exercising a diverse set of biologically evolved social traits. Through in-depth analyses of food sharing, meal sharing, and feasting, I propose three distinct propositions of commensality as a social tool: social coordination of needs (mainly nutritional); social order and complex interaction (primarily conversations); and the symbolic display of stratified social relations. Understanding communal eating as a social tool thus opens up for a unified theory to explain seemingly disparate social phenomena, such as the underlying sociality displayed through different meal arrangements. For a thorough understanding of this, intensified conversations across the borders of scientific paradigms are required. Commensality is a social tool that satisfies both the social and biological appetites.

Social scientists often treat the commodity form and commodity fetishism as concepts that reduce meaning to an economic base. The paper claims that this view is misguided and, furthermore, that these concepts enable us to formulate a dynamic approach to meaning in economic life. Building on recent discussions of commodity fetishism, I outline this dynamic approach to meaning and the commodity form. This approach demands attention to three issues: (1) the distinction between interpretations-in exchange and interpretations-of exchange; (2) how interpretations-of exchange relate to interpretations-in exchange; and (3) how status hierarchies can mediate this dynamic of meaning associated with the commodity form. In explaining these issues, I draw on a range of examples that illustrate their relevance to the organization of the capitalist world. The purpose is to illustrate that we can discuss meaning and the commodity form in a non-reductive manner, and in so doing draw distinct strands of social scientific investigation into conversation.

Pierre Bourdieu's theory of subjectivity is perhaps the most elaborate within the broad constructivist tradition, and Göran Therborn's is perhaps the most elaborate within the Marxist tradition. These traditions emphasize opposite components and tend to produce different explanations on micro-cognitive levels. But this article demonstrates a striking complementarity and ventures elements of synthesis. The two theorists are contrasted on four broad areas of social science: consciousness versus unconsciousness, identity formation, class, and discourse. Bourdieu emphasizes unconscious dispositions generally unamenable to individual control, whereas Therborn emphasizes formation of conscious beliefs. By bracketing the unconscious processes that Bourdieu captures, Therborn omits key mechanisms of social reproduction. Yet the mechanisms he does capture fit almost seamlessly into Bourdieuian theory on the mutual constitution of individual-level subjectivity and societal-level reproduction. Each theorist supplies what the other is missing for a theory of subjectivity with greater explanatory power than either offers alone.

We explore the role of moral, cognitive, and pragmatic legitimacy in reproducing the organization of two on-demand labor platforms for couriers. Labor platforms are ideal cases to explore questions of legitimacy and institutional reproduction because they aspire towards automaticity. Since the 1970s, with the emergence of new production technologies and organizational forms, labor and work scholars have predicted a shift from the use of direct, coercive controls as a method to coordinate activity to more indirect, hegemonic, and normative methods of control. However, we find that in the case of the gig economy, platform firms are refuting the predictions of Post-Fordist labor scholars, relying upon new forms of direct technological control as well as coercive, indirect market control, as opposed to shared norms and obligations, as methods for coordinating activity. We explore the implications of ‘post-legitimate’ institutions, as well as the latent moral economy of gig workers as revealed through their critiques of the platform economy.

This special issue was based on a flagship panel of the 2022 International Association for Critical Realism (IACR) annual conference held at the Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in The Hague on realist complexity. The aim of this special issue is to capture and specify what Critical Realism (CR) can contribute to the literature on complexity. Against the background of previous attempts that have subsequently coalesced the two under the rubric of ‘Complex Realism’, the primary objective here takes stock of the various analytical shortcomings of ‘Complex Realism’ and aims instead to understand how CR scholars analytically treat complexity. Put differently, the contributors of this special issue problematize the amalgam between CR and complexity evident in ‘Complex Realism’ and ask instead how CR deals with complexity (Realist Complexity). In so doing, they present a variety of arguments and approaches which will be dealt with below. The next section will provide a short background on the origins of complexity sciences before it highlights both the tents and shortcoming of Complex Realism. The final section will provide a summary of all key contributors of this special issue.

Flow states are heightened moments of concentration, motivation and enjoyment, leading to total absorption in the present moment. A striking parallel exists between flow states and phenomenological accounts of autistic daily life. We analyse the components of flow theory alongside autistic autobiographical accounts to explore similarities and differences, in doing so moving toward an understanding of autistic flow theory. We highlight the considerations and opportunities this may hold for future autism research, in particular the advantage that this offers a non-pathologising approach to researching autism, one which helps to explain contextualised behaviour (i.e., alignment between the situation and what is happening in one's mind). Drawing on autistic autobiographical accounts, we outline four principles: (1) autistic people are uniquely placed to discover and manage flow; (2) autistic flow may qualitatively diverge from traditional models of flow; (3) difficulties maintaining and exiting flow for autistic people highlight a need to examine transitions into and out of flow; and, (4) internal and external constraints to flow highlight there is unrealised autistic potential yet to be discovered. The implications of an autistic flow theory are discussed in terms of how it can impact (a) our conceptual understanding of autism providing alternative explanations to previously researched phenomena, and (b) how we build enabling environments for autistic people that allow flow to flourish across educational practice, wellbeing and research contexts.

Cultural sociology undertheorizes the emotional dimension of culture. In this study, I use the case of invasive cosmetic surgery to develop conceptual tools for filling this gap. Cosmetic surgery (i) brings a prominent and complex change in meanings of the self and the social image that goes far beyond mere appearance; and (ii) it involves intensive emotions of suffering, anxiety, and excitement. These two features reveal key similarities that cosmetic surgery shares with Victor Turner's model of the ritual of passage. I apply it to the case at hand and show that these emotions, which are usually either neglected or seen as mere ‘side effects’ of surgery, strongly affect meaning-making related to cosmetic operations, meanings of the self, and broader aesthetic conventions. To zoom into these hidden processes, I introduce a sketch of a Durkheimian theory of cathexis that enables us to recognize cultural, cognitive, and emotional mechanisms of cosmetic surgery's ‘extraphysical effects.’ I illustrate my approach using open data from Internet forums of cosmetic surgery consumers and other evidence from existing literature.

Choices made under risk appear to differ depending on whether the decision problem is presented as an explicit description or experienced by subjects through a series of choices and outcomes. The difference, labeled the description-experience gap (DEG), has attracted a fair amount of attention and generated a substantial body of research. Alongside important insights gained, noticeably (and puzzlingly) absent from this literature are emotions – a feature more pertinent to actual experience than to mere description of events, thus potentially a source of difference in decisions observed in these two conditions. Even though emotions are considered a hallmark of experience, existing studies concerned with various aspects of DEG do not seem to address this facet of the question. This paper suggests the possibility that emotions comprise an important factor contributing to DEG. Theoretical considerations and relevant empirical evidence of decision-making guided by emotions are reviewed to support the proposed hypothesis. General perspective, directions for future research, and possible caveats are discussed.